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
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958.1
sto
Hutapur, ——— Who leads his power?
Under whose government come they along?
Mess. His letters, bear his mind:
Not I, my lord — SUANSERAN.

Who so shall tell a tale after a man,
He must rehearse, as might as ever he can,
Everich word, if it be in his charge,
All spoke he never so rudely and so large;
Or else he muste tellen his tale untruewe,
Or feinin thinges, a faden wordes newe. — CHAUCER.

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P R E F A C E.

The professional duties of the editor of this work imposed upon him, some four years ago, the agreeable necessity of perusing the twelve volumes of the "Wellington Dispatches," published by Colonel Gurwood. He found so much practical wisdom scattered through their pages that he assigned to himself the task of collecting the fragments, and presenting them to the Indian Army in the form of a Manual. He also found, that, though arranged in the order of their dates, the Dispatches did not so completely tell the date of the various campaigns in which the Duke of Wellington was engaged, as they would have done if they had been strung together by a narrative of the events which led

to the movements and actions described. He therefore resolved that should the occasion ever offer, he would present a volume of Dispatches in the form which he considered necessary to the completeness of its value as a work of reference. The occasion has presented itself in the campaigns in Affghanistan. The editor will be happy to find that his attempt to connect the Proclamations, Official Dispatches, Orders and Notifications, written and published during the eventful period which these campaigns embrace—eventful, by reason of the campaigns—has not been altogether abortive; but that, on the contrary, he has been able to facilitate the references, and render light the investigations, of the Soldier, the Politician, and the Student.

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER.

Although the stirring events recorded in the following pages will have induced almost all who have been interested in them to study the maps of Affghanistan and Scinde, and look a little into the history of those countries, it may not be amiss to briefly recapitulate in this place such circumstances as may aid the general reader in rightly understanding the causes, the course, and the locale of the occurrences described.

Affghanistan, in Central Asia, is bounded on the north by the Hindoo Koosh; on the south by sandy plains which separate it from Beloochistan; on the east by the Indus river; and on the west by the deserts skirting the kingdom of Persia. It contains five great towns: Cabul, Candahar, Ghuzni, Istaliff, and Jellalabad, whose united population was computed before the war at about 220,000 men, women and children, of whom about 90,000 were residents of Cabul, and the same number of Candahar. But there is a large population, independently of the inhabitants of towns; namely, the Nomade tribes, or *Ooloos*, who, under the various denominations of Ghilzies, Dooranees, Khyberries, and Eu-zoofzyes, live in tents or small houses of unburnt bricks in the deserts to the west, and in the Paropamisian and Soliman ranges of mountain, subsisting by their flocks and herds, or by rendering military service, and plundering caravans. In person, the male Affghans are tall and robust, though rather bony and muscular than otherwise. Their faces are long but handsome; their hair and beards black or brown. In manners they are simple and unostentatious, frank, open and manly; hardy, brave,

of Runjeet Sing, but upon terms to which, after the conquest, he (Mahmood) felt no inclination to adhere. This caused a breach between the Seikhs and the Affghans; the former seized Attock, then held by the brother of the ex-Governor of Cashmere, and were immediately assailed by the Affghans under Dost Mahomed Khan. The Affghans were routed with great loss, and driven across the Indus; they losing all the territory which they had previously held to the east of that river. Mahmood continued to reign by his vizier; he held Cashmere; he exacted homage from the Ameers of Scinde, and drove the Persians from Herat, where they had assembled to demand a tribute from Affghanistan. Futteh Khan, the vizier, rewarded himself for his instrumentality in bringing about all these matters, by distributing all the important offices of state among his brothers. This still further irritated the Crown Prince Kamran, who took an opportunity of putting out Futteh Khan's eyes, and of afterwards arraigning him in open Durbar between Cabul and Candahar, where he was set upon and assassinated. Mahmood, who passed his life in debauchery, feeling himself incapable of governing without the aid of Futteh Khan, betook himself to Herat, while his army was in the field against some rebels. This flight "involved a virtual resignation of his power, for though he retained Herat and the title of King, he became literally a mere vassal of Persia." He died in a few years, and his son Kamran succeeded him at Herat.

On the death of Futteh Khan, the vizier, Azeem Khan, his brother, then Governor of Cashmere, took arms against Mahmood and advanced upon Cabul. The flight of the King had left the throne vacant, which the Barukzye chieftain seized, and was therein supported by his brothers. He first resolved on recalling Shah Soojah, and placing him on the throne, and that unfortunate refugee, had actually proceeded a considerable distance on his way from Loodianah, when some display of weak


vanity on his part, some idle attempt to enforce a severe etiquette, offended Azeem Khan, who thereupon put Eyoob, a brother of Soojahool-Moolk's upon the throne, leaving the ex-Shah to retrace his steps. Shah Soojah now went to Scinde, and accepted for a time the hospitality of the Ameers. He afterwards returned to Loodianah. Meanwhile, the Seiks recovered Cashmere, and some other provinces, from the Affghans, and by a successful action on the Indus, rendered Peshawur tributary. This last battle, in which the Affghans were led by Azeem Khan, so affected the latter chieftain, that he soon sickened and died. His death was the signal of feuds among his brothers, Dost Mahomed, Shere Dil, Poordil, Rahim Dil and others, who had been placed in offices of state by Futteh Khan; they all, however, united to rob Azeem Khan's son of his wealth, and to deprive the puppet Eyoob of his throne, after which Shere Dil went with half a million sterling, and erected an independent chiefship at Candahur, while Dost Mahomed Khan took possession of Cabul. This happened in 1826.




Dost Mahomed ruled Cabul with mildness and sagacity, and but that he seemed more anxious to preserve peace at home than to extend his power abroad, would no doubt have acquired, without much difficulty the entire sovereignty of Affghanistan. He was held in much respect, and some degree of fear by surrounding tribes, and as he never shewed any disposition to restrain their lawless proceedings beyond the vicinage of his own Khanate, so did they rarely trouble themselves to invade his possessions, or aid in any intrigues to dislodge him. But there was a chief beyond the Indus, with whom he had a feud of the most deadly nature; a chief who not only held a faith offensive to true Mussulmans, but had stained the Affghans' flag by routing them in war, and wresting from them provinces to the west of the Indus. Runjeet Sing was the implacable foe of Dost Mahomed. He held Peshawur and Attock, in

defiance of the repeated efforts of the Affghans to regain them; and Runjeet Sing was the ally of the British, and his quarrel, of course, became theirs. But natives and governments seldom want pretexts for withholding assistance from each other, as Dost Mahomed had in his time experienced, when he sought the aid of the King of Bokhara and the Wullee of Kooloom. It is possible, therefore, that the British authorities would have pleaded their favorite doctrine of non-interference, but for an accident which induced them not only to espouse his cause, but at the same time to revive the claims to the Dooranee throne, of the exiled Shah Soojah. Russia had sent emissaries to Cabul, with the view of cultivating a good understanding with Dost Mahomed Khan. The Governor General of India, Lord Auckland, naturally solicitous for the tranquillity of British India—a tranquillity that ran the risk of being disturbed in proportion as the influence of Russia over the gate of that empire increased—endeavoured to establish a counter-influence, and to require the dissolution of the Russian connexion. Failing in this, it became expedient and necessary to replace Dost Mahomed by a ruler who should be favorable to the creation of a barrier against foreign approaches to India by the North-west, and whose friendship should be secured by the presence of a British Army. Hence the events recorded in the following pages.

MAP OF Part of Upper Scinde

Shewing the Routes from Sukkur on the Indus thro' the principal Passes into
AFFGHANISTAN,
and the elevations above the level of the Sea of some places
in the plain of Scinde & in the Bolan Pass.





MEMORIALS

OF

AFFGHANISTAN.

THE jealousy with which the two most powerful states in the Continent of Europe have regarded the dominion of Great Britain in India, has, at various times, during the past half century, developed itself in the form of intrigues, encroachments upon our nearest neighbours, or open attempts at invasion and the subversion of our power. The French, under Napoleon, menaced us from Egypt, and endeavoured to gain a footing in India, by forming alliances with powerful native chieftains, and assisting them in their quarrel with the British Indian Government. Russia, more crafty in her policy, slowly and silently moved her forces, and extended her territory and influence in a southerly direction. The progress of her arms was not stayed until she had become mistress of Georgia, and the Northern provinces of Persia to the right bank of the Araxes. The sagacity and foresight of the Marquis of Wellesley, seconded by the disciplined armies and fleets under his control, baffled the schemes of the French, who never revived the insane project of establishing themselves in India after their reverses in Egypt, the loss of the Isle of France, and the destruction of Tippoo Saib's power in Mysore; while the remonstrances of the Home Ministry, and the protests of the public press, checked the aggressive spirit of successive Autocrats. For the twenty years, therefore, preceding 1837, little was heard of any intention, in even the most formidable quarter, to disturb the supreme authority maintained by the English over the vast expanse of territory lying between Cape Comorin and the Himalaya range. It is true, that speculations upon the feasibility of an invasion of India by

Russia were rife; but these rather originated in the desire of sundry writers to establish theories of defence, than in any well-grounded apprehension that encroachments were meditated. Some professed to shew, that the movement was impracticable;—others demonstrated its feasibility, as far as the overthrow of natural obstacles was concerned, and suggested the political arrangements and military dispositions calculated to frustrate the ambitious attempt.

About the middle of the year 1837, however, the late Sir Alexander (then Lieutenant) Burnes, being upon a *commercial* mission to the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, then *de facto* ruler of Cabul, and omnipotent in Northern Afghanistan, discovered certain agents actively engaged in an endeavour to extend the influence of Russia, but *avowedly* only that of her instrument, Persia, to the banks of the Indus; to which end, at the same time, a Persian army, likewise assisted by Russian officers and agents, was laying siege to Herat. Sir Alexander Burnes used his best efforts to counteract these intrigues and operations, but, failing to do so, he returned to India, and apprised Lord Auckland, the then Governor General, of the result of his observations, suggesting at the same time, the course of policy which appeared to him adapted to counteract the schemes agitating in Afghanistan. The Government was not long in determining upon the measures now rendered advisable, particularly as the correspondence which the British Ministry had thought proper to open with the Russian government upon the subject of the suspicious agencies at Cabul and Herat, and the aggressive operations against the latter state, had brought matters to a pass, when a grand movement in India had become necessary to avert a serious rupture in Europe.

Accordingly, about the middle of the year 1838, preparations began to be made for the assembly of a large force upon the left bank of the Sutledge, whose destination was understood to be Afghanistan and Herat, and a preparatory mission under the late Sir W. Macnaghten, was deputed to Maharajah Runjeet Singh, with the view of obtaining his co-operation in the purposes of the expedition. A considerable body of Bombay troops under the command of Sir John Keane, was at the same time ordered to proceed from Bombay up the Indus, with the triple purpose of arranging with the Ameers for the free navigation of the river, keeping up the communication with Bombay during the campaign that might ensue, and forming a junction with the Bengal force; and simultaneously with these measures a detachment of troops, supported by a ship of war, was sent to occupy the island of Karrack in the Persian Gulf, to keep the Persians in check and interrupt their commerce.

The close of the rainy monsoon was the moment chosen for throwing off all reserve, and disclosing to the world the plans which the Government had been organizing, and the manner in which it was intended to carry them into operation. Policy perhaps suggested in the following proclamation the suppression of all direct allusion to Russian intrigue; but it required very little sagacity to discover, that the references to Persian proceedings pointed to the party behind the scenes, who directed the movements of the Iranee puppet.

Proclamation.

1. The Right Hon'ble the Govr. Genl. of India having, with the concurrence of the Supreme Council, directed the assemblage of a British force for service across the Indus, His Lordship deems it proper to publish the following exposition of the reasons which have led to this important measure.

2. It is a matter of notoriety that the treaties entered into by the British Govt. in the year 1832, with the Ameers of Sind, the Nawab of Bahawulpore, and Maharajah Runjeet Singh, had for their object, by opening the navigation of the Indus, to facilitate the extension of commerce, and to gain for the British Nation, in Central Asia, that legitimate influence which an interchange of benefits would naturally produce.

3. With a view to invite the aid of the *de facto* rulers of Afghanistan to the measures necessary for giving full effect to those Treaties, Capt. Burnes was deputed, towards the close of the year 1836, on a mission to Dost Mahomed Khan, the Chief of Cabul. The original objects of that officer's mission were purely of a commercial nature.

4. Whilst Capt. Burnes, however, was on his journey to Cabul, information was received by the Govr. Genl. that the troops of Dost Mahomed Khan had made a sudden and unprovoked attack on those of our ancient Ally, Maharajah Runjeet Singh. It was naturally to be apprehended that His Highness the Maharajah would not be slow to avenge this aggression; and it was to be feared that the flames of war being once kindled in the very regions into which we were endeavouring to extend our commerce, the peaceful and beneficial purposes of the British Govt. would be altogether frustrated. In order to avert a result so calamitous, the Govr. Genl. resolved on authorizing Capt. Burnes to intimate to Dost Mahomed Khan that, if he should evince a disposition to come to just and reasonable terms with the Maharajah, His Lordship would exert his good offices with His High-

ness for the restoration of an amicable understanding between the two powers. The Maharajah, with the characteristic confidence which he has uniformly placed in the faith and friendship of the British Nation, at once assented to the proposition of the Govr. Genl., to the effect that, in the meantime, hostilities on his part should be suspended.

5. It subsequently came to the knowledge of the Govr. Genl., that a Persian Army was besieging Herat; that intrigues were actively prosecuted throughout Afghanistan, for the purpose of extending Persian influence and authority to the banks of, and even beyond, the Indus; and that the Court of Persia had not only commenced a course of injury and insult to the officers of Her Majesty's mission in the Persian territory, but had afforded evidence of being engaged in designs wholly at variance with the principles and objects of its alliance with Great Britain.

6. After much time spent by Capt. Burnes in fruitless negotiation at Cabul, it appeared, that Dost Mahomed Khan, chiefly in consequence of his reliance upon Persian encouragement and assistance, persisted, as respected his misunderstanding with the Sikhs, in using the most unreasonable pretensions, such as the Govr. Genl. could not, consistently with justice and his regard for the friendship of Maharajah Runjeet Singh, be the channel of submitting to the consideration of His Highness; that he avowed schemes of aggrandizement and ambition, injurious to the security and peace of the frontiers of India; and that he openly threatened, in furtherance of those schemes, to call in every foreign aid which he could command. Ultimately he gave his undisguised support to the Persian designs in Afghanistan, of the unfriendly and injurious character of which, as concerned the British power in India, he was well apprized, and by his utter disregard of the views and interests of the British Govt., compelled Capt. Burnes to leave Cabul without having effected any of the objects of his mission.

7. It was now evident that no further interference could be exercised by the British Govt. to bring about a good understanding between the Sikh Ruler and Dost Mahomed Khan, and the hostile policy of the latter Chief showed too plainly that, so long as Cabul remained under his Govt., we could never hope that the tranquillity of our neighbourhood would be secured, or that the interests of our Indian Empire would be preserved inviolate.

8. The Govr. Genl. deems it in this place necessary to revert to the siege of Herat, and the conduct of the Persian nation. The siege of the city has now been carried on by the Persian Army for many months. The attack upon it was a most unjustifiable and cruel aggression.

perpetrated and continued notwithstanding the solemn and repeated remonstrances of the British Envoy at the Court of Persia, and after every just and becoming offer of accommodation had been made and rejected. The besieged have behaved with gallantry and fortitude worthy of the justice of their cause, and the Govr. Genl. would yet indulge the hope, that their heroism may enable them to maintain a successful defence, until succours shall reach them from British India. In the meantime, the ulterior designs of Persia, affecting the interests of the British Govt. have been, by a succession of events, more and more openly manifested. The Govr. Genl. has recently ascertained by an official despatch from Mr. McNeill, Her Majesty's Envoy, that His Excellency has been compelled, by the refusal of his just demands, and by a systematic course of disrespect adopted towards him by the Persian Govt., to quit the Court of the Shah, and to make a public declaration of the cessation of all intercourse between the two Govts. The necessity under which Great Britain is placed, of regarding the present advance of the Persian Arms into Afghanistan as an act of hostility towards herself, has also been officially communicated to the Shah, under the express order of Her Majesty's Govt.

9. The Chiefs of Candahar (brothers of Dost Mahomed Khan of Cabul) have avowed their adherence to the Persian Policy, with the same full knowledge of its opposition to the rights and interests of the British Nation in India, and have been openly assisting in the operations against Herat.

10. In the crisis of affairs consequent upon the retirement of our Envoy from Cabul, the Govr. Genl. felt the importance of taking immediate measures, for arresting the rapid progress of foreign intrigue and aggression towards our own territories.

11. His attention was naturally drawn at this conjuncture to the position and claims of Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk, a monarch who, when in power, had cordially acceded to the measures of united resistance to external enmity, which were at that time judged necessary by the British Govt., and who, on his empire being usurped by its present Rulers, had found an honorable asylum in the British Dominions.

12. It had been clearly ascertained, from the information furnished by the various officers who have visited Afghanistan, that the Barukzye Chiefs, from disunion and unpopularity, were ill fitted, under any circumstances, to be useful Allies to the British Govt., and to aid us in our just and necessary measures of national defence. Yet so long as they refrained from proceedings injurious to our interest and security, the

British Govt. acknowledged and respected their authority. But a different policy appeared to be now more than justified by the conduct of those chiefs, and to be indispensable to our own safety. The welfare of our possessions in the East requires that we should have on our Western Frontier, an ally who is interested in resisting aggression, and establishing tranquillity, in the place of chiefs ranging themselves in subservience to a hostile power, and seeking to promote schemes of conquest and aggrandizement.

13. After a serious and mature deliberation, the Govr. Genl. was satisfied that a pressing necessity, as well as every consideration of policy and justice, warranted us in espousing the cause of Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk, whose popularity throughout Affghanistan had been proved to His Lordship by the strong and unanimous testimony of the best authorities. Having arrived at this determination, the Govr. Genl. was further of opinion, that it was just and proper, no less from the position of Maharajah Runjeet Singh, than from his undeviating friendship towards the British Government, that His Highness should have the offer of becoming a party to the contemplated operations. Mr. Macnaghten was accordingly deputed in June last to the Court of His Highness, and the result of his mission has been the conclusion of a Tripartite Treaty by the British Government, the Maharajah, and Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk, whereby His Highness is guaranteed in his present possessions, and has bound himself to co-operate for the restoration of the Shah to the throne of his ancestors. The friends and enemies of any one of the contracting parties, have been declared to be the friends and enemies of all. Various points have been adjusted, which had been the subjects of discussion between the British Govt. and His Highness the Maharajah, the identity of whose interests with those of the Hon'ble Company, has now been made apparent to all the surrounding states. A guaranteed independence will, upon favourable conditions, be tendered to the Ameers of Sind; and the integrity of Herat, in the possession of its present ruler, will be fully respected; while by the measures completed, or in progress, it may reasonably be hoped that the general freedom and security of commerce will be promoted; that the name and just influence of the British Govt. will gain their proper footing among the natives of Central Asia, that tranquillity will be established upon the most important frontier of India; and that a lasting barrier will be raised against intrigue and encroachment.

14. His Majesty Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk, will enter Affghanistan

surrounded by his own troops, and will be supported against foreign interference, and factious opposition, by a British Army. The Govr. Genl. confidently hopes, that the Shah will be speedily replaced on his throne by his own subjects and adherents, and when once he shall be secured in power, and the independence and integrity of Afghanistan established, the British Army will be withdrawn. The Govr. Genl. has been led to these measures, by the duty which is imposed upon him of providing for the security of the possessions of the British crown; but he rejoices that, in the discharge of this duty, he will be enabled to assist in restoring the union and prosperity of the Affghan people. Throughout the approaching operations, British influence will be sedulously employed to further every measure of general benefit; to reconcile differences; to secure oblivion of injuries; and to put an end to the distractions by which, for so many years, the welfare and happiness of the Affghans have been impaired. Even to the Chiefs, whose hostile proceedings have given just cause of offence to the British Govt., it will seek to secure liberal and honorable treatment, on their tendering early submission; and ceasing from opposition to that course of measures, which may be judged the most suitable for the general advantage of their country.

By Order of the Right Hon'ble the Govr. Genl. of India,

(Signed) W. H. MACNAGHTEN,

Secy. to the Govt. of India, with the Govr. Genl.

Notification.

With reference to the preceding declaration, the following appointments are made:—

Mr. W. H. Macnaghten, Secretary to Govt., will assume the functions of Envoy and Minister on the part of the Government of India at the court of Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk. Mr. Macnaghten will be assisted by the following officers:—

Capt. Alexander Burnes, of the Bombay Establishment, who will be employed under Mr. Macnaghten's directions as Envoy to the Chief of Kelat, or other states.

Lieut. E. D'Arcy Todd, of the Bengal Artillery, to be Political Assistant and Military Secretary to the Envoy and Minister.

Lieut. Eldred Pottinger, of the Bombay Artillery; Lieut. R. Leech, of the Bombay Engineers; Mr. P. B. Lord, of the Bombay Medical Establishment, to be Political Assistants to the Envoy and Minister.

Lieut. E. B. Conolly, of the 6th Regt. Bengal Cavalry, to command the Escort of the Envoy and Minister, and to be Military Assistant to the Envoy and Minister.

Mr. G. J. Berwick, of the Bengal Medical Establishment, to be Surgeon to the Envoy and Minister.

(Signed) W. H. MACNAGHTEN,

Oct. 1st, 1838. Secy. to the Govt. of India, with the Govr. Genl.

On the 29th of November, 1838, the Bengal Division of the Army alluded to in the first passage of the above PROCLAMATION, assembled at Ferozepore, on the left bank of the Sutledge, and consisted of the following troops:—

FIRST DIVISION.

MAJOR GENERAL SIR WILLOUGHBY COTTON, K.C.B.

| | | |
|-------------------------|---|--|
| H. M.'s. 13th Lancers, | } | 1st Cavalry Brigade, Colonel R. Arnold, C. B., H. M.'s 16th Lancers. |
| 2nd Light Cavalry, | | |
| 3rd Light Cavalry, | | |
| 1st Local Horse, | } | 2nd Cavalry Brigade, Colonel J. Skinner, C. B. |
| 4th Local Horse, | | |
| H. M.'s. 13th Lt. Infy. | } | 1st Infantry Brigade, Colonel R. Sale, C. B. H. M.'s 13th Light Infantry. |
| 48th Native Infantry, | | |
| 16th Native Infantry, | | |
| 31st Native Infantry, | } | 2nd Infantry Brigade, Major General Nott. |
| 43rd Native Infantry, | | |
| 42nd Native Infantry, | | |
| H. M.'s 3rd Buffs, | } | 3rd Infantry Brigade, Colonel Dennis, H. M.'s 3rd Buffs. |
| 27th Native Infantry, | | |
| 2nd Native Infantry, | | |

MAJOR GENERAL DUNCAN'S DIVISION.

| | | |
|-----------------------|---|---|
| 35th Native Infantry, | } | 4th Infantry Brigade, Colonel A. Roberts, Eu- ropean Regiment. |
| Bengal European Regt. | | |
| 37th Native Infantry, | | |
| 5th Native Infantry, | } | 5th Infantry Brigade, Colonel Paul, 20th N. I. |
| 20th Native Infantry, | | |
| 53rd Native Infantry, | | |

Several Batteries of Horse and Foot and Camel Artillery, commanded by Colonel Graham, C. B., and a large detachment of Sappers under Captain Thomson of the Engineers.

In addition to these, though not forming a part of the force, there were a Regiment of Cavalry and two Regiments of Infantry, with the Body Guard, and a Battery of Horse Artillery, all composing the Escort of the Right Honorable the Governor General. A levy of six thousand men, armed, equipped, officered, and drilled after the manner of European troops, and called the regiments of Shah Soojah, was a few miles ahead, with His Majesty, in pursuance of the arrangement of his entering "Afghanistan surrounded by his own troops."

On the arrival of the army at its encamping ground, it was greeted by the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Henry Fane, G. C. B., with the following Order:—

ORDERS BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

TO THE ARMY OF THE INDUS.

Head-Quarters, Camp, Ferozepore, 27th Nov., 1838.

1. Circumstances in the countries west of the Indus have so greatly changed since the assembly of this army for service, that the Right Honorable the Governor General has deemed that it is not requisite to send forward the whole force; but that a part only will be equal to effecting the future objects in view.

2. His Lordship has therefore been pleased to instruct His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief as follows:—

The whole of the cavalry, one troop of horse artillery, one battery of 9 prs., and the artillery of the park, the sappers and miners, and three brigades of infantry, shall go forward; and the remainder of the troops will await farther orders at Ferozepore.

3. The lot to go forward has fallen on the troops enumerated as follows:—

The 2d troop, 2d brigade of horse artillery.

The camel battery of 9 prs.

The 1st, 2d, and 4th brigades of infantry.

The division of infantry to be commanded by Major-General Sir W. Cotton, being the senior Major-General.

4. The troops to go forward, and those to remain in Hindoostan, may make their arrangements accordingly. The head of the column

will move on as soon as possible after the army shall have been reviewed by the Right Honorable the Governor General, and the Maharaja Runjeet Sing.

5. Whatever alterations may be requisite in the details of the Staff, will be communicated in a future order.

6. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief deems this a fitting opportunity for expressing the great gratification which he has received from witnessing the alacrity evinced by all ranks of the army to serve their country on the present occasion, and from their excellent conduct on their march from the Jumna to the Sutlej. He assures them that had their services been still required in advance, and had he had the pleasure of leading them forward, he would have met any troops which might have been opposed to them with a full confidence of success, founded on their courage and excellent discipline, and on the zeal of the officers he has had the honor to command.

By Order of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief,

P. CRAIGIE, Major,

Depy. Adj. Genl. of the Army.

The 'circumstances' which caused the change in the intentions of Government, are explained in the following Notification, which was issued on the 8th November, soon after the army had quitted Kurnaul, on its march to Ferozepore:—

Notification.

ORDERS BY THE RIGHT HONORABLE THE GOVERNOR GENERAL
OF INDIA.

SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Camp at Buddee, the 8th November, 1838.

The Right Honorable the Governor General of India is pleased to publish, for general information, the subjoined Extract of a Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart, dated Herat, the 10th of September, 1838, and addressed to the Secretary to the Government of India:—

"I have the honor, by direction, of Her Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, and the Honorable East India Company's Envoy at the Court of Persia, to acquaint you, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor General of

India in Council, that His Majesty, the Shah of Persia yesterday raised the siege of this city, and with the whole of the Royal camp marched to Sangbust, about twelve miles, on his return to his own dominions. His Majesty proceeds without delay by Toorbut, Shekhi Jaum, and Meshid, to Teheran.

"This is in fulfilment of His Majesty's compliance with the demands of the British Government, which I had the honor of delivering on the 12th instant, and of the whole of which His Majesty announced his acceptance on the 14th August.

"His Majesty Shah Kamran, and his Vuzeer Yar Mahomed Khan, and the whole city, feel sensible of the sincerity of the friendship of the British Government, and Mr. Pottinger and myself fully participate in their gratitude to Providence, for the happy event I have now the honor to report."

In giving publicity to this important intelligence, the Governor General deems it proper, at the same time, to notify that, while he regards the relinquishment by the Shah of Persia of his hostile designs upon Herat, as a just cause of congratulation to the Government of British India, and its allies, he will continue to prosecute with vigour, the measures which have been announced with a view to the substitution of a friendly, for a hostile power, in the Eastern Provinces of Afghanistan, and to the establishment of a permanent barrier against schemes of aggression upon our North-West Frontier.

The Right Hon'ble the Governor General is pleased to appoint Lieutenant Eldred Pottinger, of the Bombay Artillery, to be Political Agent of Herat, subject to the orders of the Envoy and Minister at the Court of Shah Sooja Ool Moolk. This appointment is to have effect from the 9th of September last, the date on which the siege of Herat was raised by the Shah of Persia.

In conferring the above appointment upon Lieutenant Pottinger, the Governor General is glad of the opportunity afforded him of bestowing the high applause which is due to the signal merits of that officer, who was present in Herat during the whole period of its protracted siege, and who, under circumstances of peculiar danger and difficulty, has by his fortitude, ability, and judgment, honorably sustained the reputation and interests of his country.

By Order of the Right Honorable the Governor General of India,

W. H. MACNAGHTEN,

Secy. to the Govt. of India, with the Govr. Genl.

It may naturally be supposed that the alteration in the posture of affairs occasioned by the retreat from Herat, caused a great deal of annoyance to the Army. Every man was so fully possessed with the belief that he was destined to cross swords with the Persians, that the intelligence of their 'discretion' gave *le plomb* to his zeal. The lustre which the very idea of encountering a large force, said to be led and instigated by Russian emissaries and officers, had spread around the armament, was now entirely dissipated, and no fairer prospect presented itself than that of a long march through an uninteresting country, and the final occupation of a comparative desert.

Very little time, however, was given to the Army, to ruminate on these, and other more rational, causes of discontent. The arrival of Maharajah Runjeet Sing, the Ruler of the Punjaub, simultaneously with that of the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General, who had arranged to meet him on the banks of the Sutledge, was the signal for a series of pomps and displays, which gave ample occupation to every man in camp.

As part of the history of the armament—at least as connected with its political objects—a description may here be given of the meeting between the Right Hon'ble Lord Auckland, Governor General of India, and his Highness Maharajah Runjeet Sing, the Lord of the Five Rivers; it is derived from the *Calcutta Englishman*, the Editor of which paper personally attended the ceremonials, and reported them.

FIRST DAY.

Ferozepore, November 29.—The interview between Lord Auckland and the Maharajah, those 'two suns of glory,' came off this morning, realizing in its pomp and glittering variety, all the anticipations of the uninitiated. At daybreak, the guard of honor, consisting of a squadron of Her Majesty's 16th lancers, a squadron of the 4th light cavalry, the camel battery, a troop of horse artillery, Her Majesty's 3d buffs, the 43d, 31st, 2d, and 42d regiments native infantry, the body guard, and the flank companies of the European regiment, got under arms, and proceeded to form a street, leading to the durbar tents of the Governor General, which were enclosed in an extensive area formed of *Kunauts*. Soon afterwards, Major Wade, Mr. W. H. McNaghten, Mr. J. R. Colvin, Mr. H. Torrens, Sir Willoughby Cotton, and Brigadier Arnold, proceeded (accompanied by a detachment of the 4th cavalry, and a number of officers) to the encampment

of Runjeet Sing, across the river,* to escort His Highness to the Governor General's camp. And now were seen numerous cavaliers and gentlemen, hurrying, some on elephants, some on horseback, some on camels, to rendezvous at the durbar tent, and witness the imposing ceremony of the visit; and it is no exaggeration to say that this congregation of the gay and gallant was, in itself, a sight worth travelling a great distance to behold. There were some two or three hundred officers of different regiments off duty, and these, with a great number of staff and general officers, many of whom bore the orders of the Bath, of Hanover, of the Lion and the Sun, and of the *Bright Star of the East*, presented a picture of military splendor rarely exhibited in India. At about half-past eight o'clock, Lord Auckland came into the area, and was received by the flank companies of the European regiment, who did duty at the tents, with presented arms. About half-past nine, the distant clangor of a band of indescribable musicians announced the approach of the Maharajah. Now was 'mounting in hot haste;' down went the assembled elephants to receive the Governor General, Sir H. Fane, and their *cortège*; off went horsemen and chobdars, a goodly troop, to precede the procession, and in three minutes the whole body, forming two lines of elephants, marched up the street of regiments to meet the Maharajah. And now the guns of the camel battery spat forth their salutation, and horses reared, and troops presented arms, and bands struck up our 'National anthem;' Seiks galloped in and out in wild disorder, and dust arose even to the point of enveloping the proud procession. At the end of the street, (so happily was the whole thing timed and arranged,) the Maharajah appeared in the centre of a line of elephants, and met the Governor General and *his* gorgeous suite, just as his Lordship had reached its termination. The Maharajah, simply clothed in a red tunic and trowsers, and a turban of the same description—without one single trinket to adorn a person which, 'not to speak it profanely,' would be very little the better, or the worse, of such adorning; the Maharajah, be it known, was now received into Lord Auckland's howdah, and the whole pageant wheeled about to proceed to the durbar. To describe the rush that was made to reach the audience tent, and secure a good position while the formal interview took place, is utterly beyond the compass of a feeble historian. As the time advanced, Seik chieftains 'all clinquant, all in gold,' or clothed in every diversity of color, and every imaginable variety of picturesque

* The Maharajah was there encamped with some 20,000 followers, regular and irregular.

costume, armed to the teeth with spear, sabre, shield, and lighted matchlock—scrambled onwards, competing with the British red coats for a 'peep at the *tamasha*.' Arrived at the tents, which were already nearly crammed to suffocation, the Maharajah (giving precedence to Lord Auckland) alighted, and leaning upon the arm of His Lordship and Sir Henry Fane, made his way into the tent. But such was the density of the mob of *militaires*, and uncouth Punjaubees composing Runjeet's guard of honor; and so utterly dark was the whole apartment, from the crowd that blocked up the entrance, that it was with the greatest difficulty His Highness reached one of the couches to the right of the tent, where the Miss Edens, with Mrs. Churchill, Mrs. Sale, Mrs. W. H. McNaghten, and several other ladies, sat to receive him. Indeed, if he had not had the luck to be helped through by the good stout arm of 'stalwart Fane,' who is accustomed to *force passages*, it is doubtful if the Maharajah could have reached the couch at all. Here Major Wade came up, and did dragoman for Lord Auckland and the ladies for a few minutes. After this, the Governor General, aided as before by Sir Henry, took the Maharajah into an inner tent, where chairs of state were arranged, and the *οἱ πολλοί* excluded. About thirty gentlemen, and the ladies alone, with Runjeet's prime minister, his son, and some of the principal sirdars, were permitted to assist at this part of the business; and the more effectually to preserve this exclusiveness, the companies of the European regiment were called in, and with a few troopers of the body guard formed a lane for the passage of the party to and fro. Within this tent, the portable presents were produced, and exhibited a goodly selection from the choicest articles to be found in the *boutiques* of the gunsmiths and jewellers of Calcutta. But the gift of gifts, that, before which the Maharajah bent with the devotion of a *preux chevalier*, and the affection of a faithful and 'ancient' ally, was a full length portrait of our gracious little Queen, painted by Miss Eden for the occasion, and encompassed by a fitting frame of solid gold and jewelled cornices. On receiving this present, which was brought in by Major-General Sir Willoughby Cotton, (while the camel battery fired a royal salute,) the Maharajah, through Major Wade's interpretation, signified his intention to hang it up in his tent, and fire a salute in its honor! A good deal of edifying conversation now passed between the Governor General and his royal visitor.

When all had been said that it was thought requisite to say on the occasion, the Maharajah escorted as before, proceeded to another tent, to see the howitzers, the caparisoned elephants, and the magni-

ficient horses which had been prepared for his acceptance. The howitzers were extolled, the elephants praised, and the horses admired, though His Highness's taste, in the latter article, differs from that of the English, inasmuch as he was most taken with that which our countrymen deemed the least entitled to approbation.

The interview and its attendant ceremonies having now ceased, the Maharajah was attended to his elephant, which he duly mounted, and amidst compliments, hurrahs, the discharge of cannon, and the discourse of hautboys, returned to the place from whence he came, preceded and followed, as before, by a horde of retainers, and accompanied by Sir W. Cotton and some political officers. The troops were then marched off the ground, and the crowds of spectators returned at mid-day to their homes and their breakfast.

SECOND DAY.

November 30.—This day was devoted to a return of the visit attempted to be described above; and most truly may it be said, that to-day was the master of yesterday. The Sikhs fairly 'shone down the English.'

At break of day, the 16th lancers and the 2d cavalry sprung into their saddles, and went ahead, under the command of Colonel Arnold, to occupy the opposite or right bank of the Sutledge, at the foot of the bridge of boats, and await the coming of the Governor General. His Lordship was not long in his preparations for a start. Before sunrise, the body guard were paraded outside the enclosure, and very soon afterwards Lord Auckland, with his Secretariat, Sir W. Casement, Sir W. Cotton, Colonel Skinner, Major Wade, and several Staff Officers and Brigadiers, to the number of about thirty, left the tents as before, on elephants, in two close columns, the movement being announced by a salute from the guns of the horse artillery attached to the escort. Scarcely any regimental officer was permitted to accompany the procession, as the apprehension of a crush had induced the Maharajah to limit his invitation to some fifty or sixty gentlemen of the highest rank, or immediately about the person of the Governor General and Commander-in-Chief.

When the procession had gone a few hundred yards, a deputation, consisting of Shere Sing, the Maharajah's second son, and Dhihan Sing, his Prime Minister, with several other Rajahs and Sirdars similarly mounted, and escorted by some two or three hundred irregu-

lar cavalry, and a company of regular infantry, met His Lordship, and turned about to accompany him to the camp of the Maharajah. The march, over a space of about three miles, now became extremely picturesque and interesting. The pace of the elephants kept the horde of Seiks at a hard gallop, thereby affording them an excellent opportunity of displaying to advantage their equitation and martial bearing. The costume of the cavaliers was of course of a very motley complexion, and their arms, appointments, horses, and equipments, were not, perhaps, of an order to challenge close inspection; but the *tout ensemble* of the pageant was so extremely unlike anything that one sees anywhere else;—there was such a pleasant dash of poetry and romance in the congregation of daring horsemen bearing lance, targe, and matchlock, and flaunting in all varieties of colors, and diversities of uniform, that criticism was entirely disarmed.

On reaching the bridge of boats the party proceeded across the Sutledge singly, as there was no room for two elephants abreast. At the opposite side, the Governor General was met by Sir Henry Fane, Generals Torrens and Churchill, and the rest of the Staff and visitors from His Excellency's camp. These joined the first body of elephants, and the whole then moved forwards up a spacious street, formed by Her Majesty's 16th lancers and the 2nd light cavalry. The appearance of the lancers, under arms, was beyond all praise. They presented a spectacle which no Englishman could contemplate without some degree of pride. At the extremity of the street in question, the Governor General and his *cortège* came up on a small winding stream, over which a sort of road had been constructed of rushes, earth, and planks; and beyond this, His Lordship entered upon an avenue formed by some thousands of the picked troops of the Maharajah. Proceeding up the avenue, two lines of camel artillery, (Zumboors,) stretching to the right and left of a rising ground, fired an irregular salute, while the *allée* of regular cavalry flourished trumpets and kettle-drums, and presented arms. On went the pageant, while every step unfolded to the view some fresh spectacle on which the eye might rest with pleasure. After passing two regiments, a discharge of distant artillery announced that the Maharajah had left his tents, and in a few minutes afterwards, His Highness might be seen coming down to meet his noble visitors in all the pomp and circumstance peculiar to an oriental procession.

The scene which now presented itself, is utterly beyond description. All that the imagination can conceive of human grandeur—

all that the most exuberant fancy can devise in its endeavour to pourtray the *acmé* of royal splendour, was here bodied forth. Adown the avenue, formed by the serried ranks of hundreds of steady horsemen, whose steel casques and gay appointments glittered in the sun, moved two *masses* of elephants, bearing on their lofty backs the mightiest potentates of the Orient, seated in their gorgeous howdahs, and attended by the chief officers of their respective courts, sumptuously attired. Beyond were seen columns upon columns of scarlet-clad and helmetted troops, 'all furnished, all in arms,' arrayed with a precision, and preserving a steadiness, worthy of the best European discipline, while behind and about their ranks, stretching to the east and to the west, was an extensive encampment, in the centre of which were numerous tents of crimson and gold, indicating the chosen abode of a powerful military chieftain. Crowded together, at *viewing* distance from the legions, thousands of spectators of the humblest classes stood in ranks, preserving a silence, a decorum, and an *immobility*, which proved the existence of a severe military discipline even in the walks of civil life. No shouts rent the air,—save the licensed clamors of some rude faqueer : no vociferous cheers manifested the exuberant joyousness of a happy population. The admiration of the people—if admiration it were—was only depicted in their silent awe and breathless astonishment ; or kept in check by the apprehension of high displeasure. Not many minutes elapsed before the transient view, here attempted to be described, was interrupted by the *rencontre* of the two stately processions. It was not difficult to distinguish the Maharajah from his proud and gallant Sirdars : seated on a ponderous elephant in the centre of the line, and habited, as on the day before, in his dark crimson shawl cloth tunic, trowsers, and turban, without any tinsel or trinkets—in short, without any other relief to the uniformity of his exterior than that presented by a flowing white beard—the sagacious old man came out in strong contrast with his richly-clad attendants and chieftains. On closing with the Governor General, the Maharajah saluted His Lordship, and received him into his howdah, upon which the cannon again 'spoke to the trumpet', and the columns of elephants, now united, proceeded to the Durbar tents. The arrival at their destination, was the signal for another salute from the batteries of Runjeet's horse artillery, while bands of music, uncommonly well trained, played our National anthem, and loud clarions proclaimed the glory of the Maharajah. The tents were enclosed within a vast area of crimson cloth walls, about nine feet high, and decorated

with yellow lace. Within the enclosure, in well arranged ranks, forming numerous *allées* and guards of honor, stood some two or three thousand of the household troops of the Maharajah, clad, for the most part, in crimson silk or elegant *kincaub*, and armed with highly polished matchlocks and shields. The most perfect order,—the most profound silence prevailed,—broken only by the royal band, (formerly in the service of the Begum Sumroo,) and the murmurs of approbation proceeding from European lips. Alighting within this splendid enclosure the Maharajah conducted Lord Auckland, the Commander-in-Chief, and their suite to the Durbar tent, which consisted of a splendidly carpetted floor, provided with numerous gold and silver chairs, and covered in by a spacious *sumeeana*, lined with shawl cloth, placed in front of the Maharajah's principal pavilion. Here the whole assembly took their seats, and the ceremony of the introductions took place: Major Wade and Mr. W. H. McNaghten, who sat on Lord Auckland's right, acting as interpreter on behalf of the English visitors. As the British officers were severally introduced to Runjeet Singh, he addressed a few words to them, and rallied Colonel Skinner upon their old acquaintanceship. The principal Sirdars then presented themselves, and severally did homage to their Chief, receiving a few complimentary *salams*, and now and then an expression of good will. When the presentations were over, a band of nautch girls, bedizened with jewellery, and beautified after their fashion with *missee*, silver dust, etc., were called in, and formed a little circle, while the most celebrated *bayaderes* treated the company to a few of those singular movements which here pass for dancing. The shawls, trinkets, cloths, etc., which constituted the presents on these occasions, were now brought in, exhibited, and then appropriated by the officers of the Governor General's suite after the ordinary system. The horses, etc., were then inspected, and here terminated the ceremonials of the meeting on the modern 'Field of the Cloth of Gold.' Some little time was passed in visiting the different tents, inspecting the furniture, and other paraphernalia, and conversing with the chief Sirdars; and the Governor General then offered his adieu to the Maharajah, resumed his seat in the howdah, and departed in the order of his coming; the horse artillery, as before, honoring the event by a royal salute."

The ceremonies having terminated, the force destined for operations beyond the Indus, commenced its march, while the Governor General proceeded to pay a complimentary visit to the ruler of the Punjaub. The altered posture of affairs at Herat, as we have already shewn, caused a material reduction in the portion of the army contributed by the Bengal presidency, which now consisted of the following troops only:—

Her Majesty's 16th Regiment of Lancers and 13th Light Infantry, Bengal European Regiment, 2nd and 3rd Regiments of Light Cavalry, the Camel Battery, a proportion of Horse and Foot Artillery, Engineers, Skinner's Horse, the 16th, 31st, 35th, 37th, 42nd, 43rd, and 48th Regiments. N. I. Shah Soojah's force continued still in advance, mustering 6000 strong; and it was arranged, that after Lord Auckland had quitted Lahore, another body of 4800 men should move with Timour Shah, (Shah Soojah's son,) to Peshawur, under the command of Lieut. Col. *Wade, for the purpose of marching upon Cabool by the Khyber Pass, simultaneously with the movement upward from Sinde.

On the 10th December 1838, the Bengal force,—we borrow from Major Hough's minute and accurate description,—“marched in five columns preceded by the Engineers, Sappers and Miners in advance. The Head Quarters, (Major General Sir W. Cotton, commanding,) Horse Artillery and Cavalry Brigade moved on the 10th. The 1st, 2nd and 4th Infantry Brigades; and the park of Artillery and 4th Local Horse and the Commissariat supplies and stores in separate columns in succession, keeping a march between each column; and this was the order of march till the Army reached Rohree (Bakkur) in Sinde. The Commissariat supplies which accompanied the army, (amounting to about 9500 and about 38,000, including the camp followers,) were as follow: 30 days' supplies of all kinds, slaughter cattle for 2½ months; additional quantities of grain were sent down by water to Rohree, and depôts were formed at Bawulpoor, Shikarpore, etc. A reserve depôt was established at Ferozepore, containing 50,000 maunds, and two months' supplies of other grain. 14,235 camels were employed (for supplies only) with the Army on leaving Ferozepore. Each column carried a certain quantity of supplies with it. The sick and principal hospital stores were sent down by water. It was intended, had it been practicable, to have sent the ordnance stores, etc. by water, but boats

could not be procured in sufficient numbers. Indeed boats were required to be sent down to Bukkur on the Indus, to form the bridge of boats, for which purpose timbers were floated down. It would have been desirable to transport all heavy stores by water, and thus have saved the cattle. The march of the Army from Ferozepore to Rohree, on the Indus, never being above twenty, and often within a few miles of the river, (which assumes the names of the Sutluj, Gharra, and Punjnad, till it falls into the Indus), enabled the troops to have communications with the fleet of boats."

Simultaneously with this movement, the Bombay Army, under Sir John Keane, having landed in Sindh, marched towards Hyderabad, where Colonel (now Sir Henry) Pottinger was endeavouring to effect a treaty with the Ameers, to insure for us an uninterrupted march through their territories, the temporary occupation of Fort Bukkur on the Indus, assistance in the prosecution of our plans (to the extent of obtaining provisions for the troops,) the payment of twenty-eight lacs of rupees, and occupation of a part of the country by a reserve force.

The march down the left bank of the Sutledge was not distinguished by any particular events. It was evident, that there was a deficiency of public carriage, and the needlessly vast number of followers caused much expense and inconvenience, for their consumption was great, and the country was, with the exception of a few patches, extremely poor and barren; but nothing else occurred which was considered worthy of record. Sir Henry Fane, who accompanied the force in his boats on the Sutledge, retained the command until its arrival at Rohree, where a halt took place, owing to some difficulty about the cession of Bukkur, and the refusal of the Ameers to conclude the treaty with Colonel Pottinger. After a brief delay, a proportion of the Bengal force under Sir Willoughby Cotton was detached to Hyderabad to co-operate with Sir John Keane; but it had not proceeded many marches from Rohree, when it was ascertained that the Ameers had signed the treaty. A counter-march was immediately ordered. Meanwhile, the Shah's force under Major General Simpson, had marched down the right bank of the Indus, and took Larkhana, a place belonging to the Ameers; a measure which doubtless had its due effect in procuring the conclusion of the treaty. On the return of the troops to Rohree, Sir Henry Fane took his farewell of them in the following General Order, and the command of the Bengal column thence devolved on Major General Sir Willoughby Cotton.

"His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief being about to leave the

Bengal Column of the Army of the Indus in his progress where his duty calls him, feels it due to the troops, previous to his departure, to record what he has witnessed of their conduct during their march from Ferozepore into Sind, to hold it up as an example for their brother-soldiers on all occasions.

"The excellent discipline and good behaviour of the Troops, have conciliated the inhabitants of the country wherever they have passed, and he is glad to be able to point out the consequences. These have been not only the exaltation of their fame and character as soldiers, but these circumstances have greatly conduced to their personal advantage; because the confidence of the inhabitants which such good conduct has produced, has led to their freely resorting to our camp with the produce of their villages, by which means we have been free from all wants and privations. His Excellency desires, that the Officers of all ranks and departments will accept the expression of his approbation of their zeal, and of the good example they have set."

To facilitate the crossing of the Indus by the large Army now assembled on its banks, a bridge of boats, most ingeniously constructed by Captain Thomson of the Engineers, was thrown from Rohree, on the left bank, to the island on which Fort Bukkur stands, and from Sukkur on the right bank to the other side of the island, leaving a space of ground 300 yards in length between the two bridges. The passage across these bridges, was the first interesting event in a campaign destined to be more fraught with varied interest than any in which British troops in India had been engaged. A correspondent of the *Englishman* writing at the time, says, (and it is here quoted as bearing reference to the annexed plate,) "It was truly a beautiful sight to see the different corps with their bands playing, followed by long strings of camels and camp followers, wending their way over the bridge. The glittering of their arms in the sun, the Fort of Bukkur with its picturesque battlements frowning over the bridge, the ancient towns of Rohree and Sukkur overhanging the mighty stream, formed altogether a delightful picture."

On the arrival of the force at Shikarpoor, it was deemed prudent to alter the order of march, as it was apprehended, that, if the Shah's troops received a check on entering the Bolan Pass, the effect might be extremely mischievous. The disciplined forces were therefore placed in the van, and the celebrated Bolan Pass was entered on the 16th March 1839, without any obstruction. The Beloochees and Kakurs had carried on a system of plundering during the march, and several of

the camp followers were killed in defending property, and endeavouring to prevent the abstraction of camels by the freebooters, who hung upon the skirts and rear of the advancing column; but no symptoms of an organized opposition manifested themselves. The march through the Pass was similarly free from the molestation of any other enemy than these banditti; but many hardships and privations, arising out of the impossibility of obtaining a single article of supply, and the intense cold which killed many camels and crippled the camp followers, were endured by the troops. One officer, Captain Barstow, of the 37th N. I., was wounded by a shot from a Beloochee's matchlock.

On the 26th March 1839, the troops reached Quetta in the valley of Shawl. Here a halt of some days took place to allow Sir John Keane with Shah Soojah, the Envoy and Minister, Mr. (afterwards Sir William) Macnaghten, and the Bombay troops to come up. In the interval of their arrival, Sir Willoughby Cotton placed the column under his command on half rations; parties were sent out in every direction to procure grain, and means were adopted to induce the people in the neighbouring country to bring in sheep, flour, and forage for sale to the Commissariat. During the encampment, the troops were exposed to continual annoyance from the Beloochees, and a great number of camels were stolen from time to time.

On the 6th of April, Lieutenant General Sir John Keane reached Quetta, and assumed command of the whole of the Army of the Indus, issuing the following Order upon the occasion:—

“His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief having arrived in Camp and assumed command, in person, of the Army, and having directed Major General Sir W. Cotton to resume command of the Bengal Infantry of the 1st Division, he (Sir W. C.) cannot give up charge of the Bengal column without expressing in the strongest and warmest terms his thanks to Major Generals Thackwell and Nott, Brigadiers Sale, Arnold and Roberts, to Officers commanding Corps, and to the Officers and Men generally, and to Major Craigie, D. A. G., Major Garden, D. Q. M. G. and Major Parsons, D. C. G. and to the Officers of the several departments, for the admirable manner in which their duties have been conducted, and for the good conduct and soldier-like behaviour of the Troops during a march of more than 1100 miles.”

This Order was followed up by another, in which Sir John Keane expressed his thanks to Sir Willoughby Cotton, for “the able and judicious manner in which he had conducted the march of the Bengal column.”

While the troops were in Sinde, they had been joined by Captain (afterwards Sir Alexander) Burnes, Assistant to the Envoy, who was thence dispatched to Khelat to persuade Mehrab Khan, the chief of that place, to assist our troops with supplies of grain, to stay the marauding practices of the Beloochees, and to tender submission to Shah Soojah, the future ruler of Affghanistan. Sir John Keane had scarcely assumed the command of the Army at Quetta, when Captain Burnes returned from Khelat, announcing, that he had failed in the objects of his mission. The reader will note this occurrence, because it formed the grounds for a movement upon Khelat, which will be found described in a later part of this work.

Arrangements were now made for the march of the assembled forces to Candahar; and to keep open the communication with India, and to assist the transport of stores, and the movements of regiments, depôts were established at Shikarpore, Dadur, and Quetta. At the latter place, Major General Nott was left, with the Head Quarters of the second Infantry Brigade;* and a general superintendence and military controul within the province of Shawl was vested in him.

On the morning of the 7th April, 1839, the troops broke ground. Some idea of the state to which they had been reduced may be formed from the fact of sixty horses having been shot as too weak to proceed, while numbers of camp-followers were subsisting upon the fried skins of sheep, the congealed blood of animals, and such roots as they could pick up in the neighbourhood of the encampment! The route chosen by Sir John Keane, lay in a North-westerly direction, and promised, from the fertile character of the country through which it lay, to provide the means of recruiting the strength of the force. The only great difficulty which the army had to contend with, was the fearful Kojuck Pass; but even this was surmounted by perseverance, good management, and discipline. Though, in some places, the road was so narrow, that only one camel could pass at a time; though the rocks were here and there so steep, that it was dangerous to ride up, or down, the only practicable thoroughfares; though all the guns, tumbrils and waggons of the force were necessarily dismounted and *handed* across, still, the patience and resolution of the troops overcame every obstacle. The passage was accomplished after a great loss in ammunition, baggage, camels, tents, etc. etc. It had been reported, and was

* The 43rd Native Infantry was ordered, with a Ressalah of Horse and a Regiment of Infantry from Shah Soojah's force, to stand fast at Quetta.

confidently believed, that the chiefs of Candahar had resolved to oppose the further progress of Shah Soojah, and, in effect, the Kakur tribe, who were in their interest, did to a certain extent make a shew of guerilla warfare, much after the manner of the Beloochees. But whatever scheme of resistance may have been organized was entirely frustrated by the defection, from the cause of the chiefs, of one Hadjee Khan, the chief of the Kakur tribe. The Candaharees had advanced, some thousands strong, as far as the village of Deh Hadjee, north of the Kojuck Pass, with the purpose of confronting our troops. Here, according to Captain Outram, dissensions broke out among them. Hadjee Khan then pretended, that he would proceed forward to reconnoitre the British force and position; but experience of his treacherous character had taught them to understand the object of his movement, and they accordingly, on the 23rd April, retired upon Candahar, and thence fled to the fortress of Ghrisk, while Hadjee Khan, who had been in secret communication with Shah Soojah before the expedition started from India, came with 200 followers into the Shah's camp, and tendered his aid and submission.

From the Pass to Candahar, the Army moved on without obstruction of any kind, suffering, however, most acutely from the want of water, the half rations which it had been upon for six weeks, the intense heat, (the thermometer in the day ranging from 96° to 102°,) and the absence of forage of a nourishing kind.

On the 25th of April, His Majesty Shah Soojah reached Candahar, the ancient capital of the Dooranee empire, and the troops encamped in the neighbourhood. The following extract from the despatches of the Envoy, Mr. Macnaghten, then forwarded to the Supreme Government of British India, describes the feeling with which the King was received by his subjects.

"Yesterday the Shah with his disciplined troops made a march of twenty-two miles to Deh Hadjee, where we had the satisfaction of learning, that the Sirdars were about to decamp. We have since ascertained, that they actually set out about 3 o'clock yesterday evening, attended by about 200 followers. Their conduct to the last, was marked by meanness and rapacity. Whilst with one hand they were selling their stores of grain to the merchants of the city, they were practising every species of extortion and violence towards the peaceable inhabitants, and they departed amidst the execrations of all classes. This morning we reached upon Candahar, a distance of about eighteen miles, and we are now encamped within two miles of the city. The spectacle which presented itself

to us on the road, was the most interesting one it ever fell to my lot to witness. His Excellency Lieutenant General Sir J. Keane with the army of the Indus, was one march in our rear, our advance having been made on an erroneous calculation of the distance, which, owing to the heat of the weather, was too great to be performed by the European troops. The Shah's disciplined troops were behind us, and His Majesty advanced, attended only by the officers of the mission and his own immediate retainers. At every 100 yards of our progress, we were met by bands of well-mounted and well-armed men, all tendering their allegiance to His Majesty, whilst the peaceable inhabitants of the country assembled in crowds, and manifested their joy at the Shah's restoration in the most unqualified terms.

"Tranquillity is restored, the people flock to our camp with the greatest confidence. There is no longer any apprehension of scarcity, and even the confidential servants of the Sirdars, several of whom have visited me, declare their satisfaction at the change of Government, and state, that they would sooner have joined the Shah, but for the dread that some evil would have been inflicted on their families whom they must have left in the city.

"His Majesty proposed to send out a party in the hope of overtaking the fugitive Sirdars, and they certainly appear deserving of little consideration, after the wickedness and folly which they have displayed, in spite of repeated and solemn warnings. It would doubtless be useless and dangerous to allow them to remain at large, and excite disturbances in the country; but I was apprehensive that in the present excited state of men's minds, they might be seized by the Shah's party, and be subjected to unnecessary cruelty! I therefore prevailed upon His Majesty to permit me to make the Sirdars one more offer, which, if accepted, will enable them to retire to our territories in safety. Any provision which his Lordship the Governor General may please to assign to them, will of course fall far short of what they would have received, had they at once come into our terms, and I am of opinion that 500 Rs. per mensem for each of them would be an ample provision.

"It is my intention, therefore, to write to the Sirdars through Moolla Missee, their confidential adviser, and I am not without hope, that they will come into my terms, deserted as they are by nearly all the followers who left the city with them, and surrounded as they must be, by dangers and difficulties of all descriptions.

"I now proceed to detail the progress of events, from the date of my last communication.

"Since the despatch of my letter to your address, dated the 12th instant, giving the substance of my communication with the Sirdars, nothing of sufficient importance has occurred to require a separate report.

"In the Kojuck Pass, we found a natural obstacle of a much more formidable nature than we anticipated; it was speedily surmounted by the energy of the British troops. Brigadier Arnold, who went to reconnoitre

the Pass, suddenly came upon a small party detached by the Sirdars, and was fired upon; the party, however, made a precipitate retreat, and it was evident that the Sirdars had been surprised by the rapidity of our advance. In the same Pass, letters were intercepted from the Sirdars addressed to the authorities in Sevee and the Eastern provinces, stating, that they intended to advance and oppose us in Pesheen, and calling upon all true Mahomedans to join in a religious warfare against the invading infidels. We further learnt, that the Sirdars were still unremitting in their endeavours to excite the same feelings of animosity against us at Candahar.

"It subsequently came to our knowledge, that Rahim Dil Khan, with a number of other chiefs, and a body of between 2 and 3,000 cavalry had quitted Candahar, with a view of annoying us in every possible way, leaving Rahim Dil Khan to guard their interests in the city. The main body advanced as far as Killa Fattoollah, whence they detached parties to the vicinity of Dunda Goolaree. These parties succeeded in killing several of our followers, who had incautiously strayed, and in carrying off two of my elephants which had been, against orders, taken for the purpose of procuring fodder to a great distance from the camp. They also put us to considerable inconvenience for a short time, by diverting the stream which supplied our camp with water. On the morning of the 20th instant, Hajee Khan Kakur, who had accompanied the Sirdars from Candahar, and who is decidedly the most powerful chief in these parts, reported his arrival with about 200 horsemen to pay his respects to the Shah. He was escorted into camp, and received with all honour both by His Majesty and myself. This defection, it was obvious, would at once prove fatal to the hopes of the Sirdars.

"On the same day, two other persons of considerable influence came in; namely, Abdool Majeed Khan, the son of Shah Pussund Khan, Governor of Laah, and Gholam Akhoondzada, a Moollah, who I have good grounds for believing, was one of those who were most violent in stirring up the population to oppose us.

"The secession of these individuals, and the near approach of our troops filled the Sirdars with consternation, and they fell back rapidly on Candahar.

"The ancient nobles of the land have been nearly exterminated by the rapacious tyranny of the Barukzye usurpers; but it was gratifying to find, that the advent of the Shah was cordially welcomed in every stage of his progress by every man of respectability who has been left in the country; and His Majesty's reception at Candahar, as above detailed, has fully justified the opinions that have been announced as to his popularity with all classes of his subjects."

The Commander-in-Chief, when the whole of the force had reached Candahar, issued the following Order on the 4th of May.

"The combined forces of Bengal and Bombay being now assembled at Candahar, the Commander-in-Chief congratulates all ranks on the triumphant though arduous march which they have accomplished from distant and distinct parts of India, with a regularity and discipline which is much appreciated by him, and reflects upon themselves the highest credit. The difficulties which have been surmounted have been of no ordinary nature, and the recollection of what has been overcome, must hereafter be a pleasing reflection to those concerned, who have so zealously, and in so soldier-like a manner, contributed to effect them, so as to arrive at the desired end. The Engineers had to make roads, and occasionally in some extraordinary steep mountain Passes, over which no wheeled carriage had ever passed. This was a work requiring science and much severe labour; but so well has it been done, that the progress of the army was in no manner impeded. The heavy and light ordnance were alike taken over in safety by the exertions and good spirit of the Artillery, in which they were most cheerfully and ably assisted by the troops, both European and Native, and in a manner which gave the whole proceeding the appearance, that each man was working for a favorite object of his own.

"His Excellency shares in the satisfaction which those troops must feel, (after the difficult task they had accomplished, and the trying circumstances under which they have been placed, the nature of which is well known to themselves, and therefore unnecessary for him to detail,) at knowing the enthusiasm with which the population of Candahar have received and welcomed the return of their lawful Sovereign, Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk, to the throne of his ancestors in Afghanistan. Sir J. Keane will not fail to report to the Right Honorable Lord Auckland, Governor General of India, his admiration of the conduct and discipline of the troops, by which means it has been easy to effect, and to fulfil, the plans of His Lordship in the operations of the campaign hitherto. The Commander-in-Chief has already in a General Order, dated the 6th ultimo, expressed his acknowledgment to Major General Sir W. Cotton, for the creditable and judicious manner in which he conducted the Bengal Column to the valley of Shawl. His Excellency has now a pleasing duty to perform in requesting Major General Wiltshire, commanding the Bombay column, to accept his best thanks for his successful exertions in bringing the troops of that Presidency to this ground in the most efficient and soldier-like state. The Commander-in-Chief entertains a confident expectation, that the same orderly conduct which has gained for the troops the good will of the inhabitants of the states and countries through which they have passed, will continue to be observed by them during their advance upon Cabool, when the proper time for the adoption of that step shall have been decided upon by His Excellency, in concert with H. M. Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk, and the Envoy and Minister, W. H. MacNaghten, Esq., representing British interests at the Court of the King of Afghanistan."

On the 8th of May, Shah Soojah received the homage of his subjects on a musnud erected in the middle of an extensive plain, close to the city of Candahar. The whole of the Army of the Indus marched past the throne; a hundred pieces of Artillery discharged salvoes, in honor of the Shah's restoration, and the people illuminated the town.

From this period until the end of June 1839, the Army halted at Candahar. The interval was occupied in an endeavour to bring the Sirdars, who had fled on the approach of the Army, to some reasonable terms of concession, failing which, a detachment of troops was sent against them to Girisk; but they had fled, before its arrival, to the frontiers of Persia. The sufferings of the Army were still great, owing to the backward state of the grain crops, the non-arrival of a large convoy expected from Shikarpore, the impossibility of raising money on loan, and the hostility of the Ghilzies, who hovered about the skirts of the camp, stealing camels, horses, and baggage, and murdering camp followers.

On the 27th of June, the advance column of the Head Quarters of the Army marched from Candahar to Ghuzni. Large parties of Ghilzies hung upon the flanks of the Army; but excepting two or three slight skirmishes, in which the enemy were invariably driven off, nothing occurred to interrupt the advance. On the 21st July, the force reached Ghuzni, and immediately made preparations for assailing that fortress, which was held by a large body of Affghans and Ghilzies under Hyder Khan, one of the sons of Dost Mahomed Khan. The manner in which the fortress was attacked, and the result of the storm, is told in the following dispatch from Sir John Keane, the Commander-in-Chief, to the Governor General of India.

Head Quarters, Camp Ghuznee, 24th July, 1839.

"My Lord,—I have the satisfaction to acquaint your Lordship, that the Army under my command have succeeded in performing one of the most brilliant acts it has ever been my lot to witness, during my service of 45 years in the four quarters of the globe, in the capture by storm of the strong and important Fortress and Citadel of Ghuznee yesterday.

"It is not only, that the Affghan nation, and I understand Asia generally, have looked upon it as impregnable, but it is in reality a place of great strength, both by nature and art; far more so than I had reason to suppose, from any descriptions that I had received of it, although some are from officers in our own service, who had seen it in their travels.

"I was surprised to find a high rampart in good repair, built on a scarped mound, about 35 feet high, flanked by numerous towers, and surrounded

by a *fausse braye* and a wet ditch, whilst the height of the Citadel covered the interior from the commanding fire of the Hills from the North, rendering it nugatory. In addition to this screen, walls had been built before the gates, the ditch was filled with water and unfordable, and an outwork built on the right bank of the river, so as to command the bed of it.

"It is, therefore, the more honorable to the troops, and must appear to the enemy out of all calculation extraordinary, that a Fortress and a Citadel to the strength of which, for the last 30 years, they had been adding something each year, and which had a Garrison of 3500 Affghan soldiers, commanded by Prince Mahomed Hyder, the son of Dost Mahomed Khan, the ruler of the country, with a commanding number of Guns and abundance of Ammunition, and other Stores, Provisions, &c. for a regular siege, should have been taken by British science and British valor, in less than two hours from the time the attack was made, and the whole, including the Governor and Garrison, should fall into our hands.

"My despatch of the 20th instant from Nanee, will have made known to your Lordship, that the camps of His Majesty Shah Sooja-ool-Moolk and of Major General Wiltshire, with the Bombay Troops, had there joined me in accordance with my desire, and the following morning we made our march of 12 miles to Ghuznee, the line of march being over a fine plain. The Troops were disposed in a manner that would have enabled me at any moment, had we been attacked, as was probable from the large bodies of Troops moving on each side of us, to have placed them in position to receive the enemy. They did not, however, appear, but on our coming within range of the guns of the Citadel and Fortress of Ghuznee, a sharp cannonade was opened on our leading Column, together with a heavy fire of musquetry from behind garden walls, and temporary field-works thrown up, as well as the strong out-work I have already alluded to, which commanded the bed of the river. From all but the out-work, the enemy were driven in under the walls of the Fort, in a spirited manner, by parties, thrown forward by Major General Sir W. Cotton, of the 16th and 48th Bengal Native Infantry, and Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, under Brigadier Sale. I ordered forward three Troops of Horse Artillery, the Camel Battery, and one Foot Battery to open upon the Citadel and Fortress by throwing shrapnell shells, which was done in a masterly style under the direction of Brigadier Stevenson. My object in this was to make the enemy shew their strength in guns, and in other respects which completely succeeded, and our shells must have done great execution, and occasioned great consternation. Being perfectly satisfied on the point of their strength, in the course of half an hour I ordered the fire to cease, and placed the Troops in bivouac. A close reconnoissance of the place all round was then undertaken by Captain Thomson, the Chief

Engineer, and Captain Peat, of the Bombay Engineers, accompanied by Major Garden, the Deputy Quarter Master General of the Bengal Army, supported by a strong party of Her Majesty's 16th Lancers, and one from Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry. On this party a steady fire was kept up, and some casualties occurred. Captain Thomson's report was very clear, (he found the fortification equally strong all round,) and as my own opinion coincided with his, I did not hesitate a moment as to the manner in which our approach and attack upon the place should be made. Notwithstanding the march the Troops had performed in the morning, and their having been a considerable time engaged with the enemy, I ordered the whole to move across the river which runs close under the Fort walls, in columns to the right and left of the town, and they were placed in position on the North side, on more commanding ground, and securing the Cabool road. I had information that a night attack upon the Camp was intended from without. Mahomed Ufzul Khan, the eldest son of Dost Mahomed Khan, had been sent by his father with a strong body of troops from Cabool to the brother's assistance at Ghuznee, and was encamped outside the walls, but abandoned his position on our approach, keeping however at the distance of a few miles from us. The two rebel chiefs of the Ghilzie tribe, men of great influence; viz. Abdool Rahman and Gool Mahomed Khan had joined him with 1500 Horse, and also a body of about 3000 Ghazees from Zeinat, under a mixture of chiefs and moollahs carrying banners, and who had been assembled on the cry of a religious war. In short, we were in all directions surrounded by enemies. These last actually came down the hills on the 22d, and attacked the part of the Camp occupied by His Majesty Shah Shooja and his own troops, but were driven back with considerable loss, and banners taken.

"At day-light on the 22d, I reconnoitred Ghuznee in company with the Chief Engineer and the Brigadier Commanding the Artillery, with the Adjutant and Quarter Master General of the Bengal Army, for the purpose of making all arrangements for carrying the place by Storm, and these were completed in the course of the day.—Instead of the tedious process of breaching, for which we were ill prepared, Captain Thomson undertook, with the assistance of Captain Peat of the Bombay Engineers, Lieutenants Durand and McLeod of the Bengal Engineers, and other officers under him, (Captain Thomson,) to blow in the Cabool Gate, (the weakest point) with gunpowder, and so much faith did I place in the success of this operation, that my plans for the Assault were immediately laid down, and the orders given.

"The different troops of Horse Artillery, the Camel and Foot Batteries moved off their ground at 12 o'clock that night, without the slightest noise, as had been directed, and in the most correct manner took up the position assigned them, about 250 yards from the walls. In like manner, and with the same silence, the Infantry soon after moved from their

ground, and all were at their post at the proper time. A few minutes before 3 o'clock in the morning the explosion took place, and proved completely successful. Captain Peat of the Bombay Engineers was thrown down and stunned by it, but shortly after recovered his senses and feeling. On hearing the advance sounded by the bugle, (being the signal for the Gate having been blown in,) the Artillery, under the able directions of Brigadier Stevenson, consisting of Captain Grant's Troop of Bengal Horse Artillery, the Camel Battery under Captain Abbot, both superintended by Major Pew, Captains Martin and Cotgrave's Troops of Bombay Horse Artillery, and Captain Lloyd's Battery of Bombay Foot Artillery, all opened a terrific fire upon the citadel and ramparts of the Fort, and in a certain degree paralyzed the enemy.

"Under the guidance of Captain Thomson of the Bengal Engineers, the Chief of the Department, Colonel Dennie, of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, commanding the advance, consisting of the Light Companies of Her Majesty's 2d and 17th Foot, and of the Bengal European Regiment, with one company of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, proceeded to the gate, and, with great difficulty from the rubbish thrown down, and the determined opposition offered by the enemy, effected an entrance and established themselves [within] the gateway, closely followed by the Main Column, led in a spirit of great gallantry by Brigadier Sale, to whom I had entrusted the important post of commanding the Storming Party, consisting (with the advance above mentioned) of Her Majesty's 2d Foot under Major Carruthers, the Bengal European Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel Orchard, followed by Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry under Major Tronson, and Her Majesty's 17th Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel Croker. The struggle within the Fort was desperate for a considerable time. In addition to the heavy fire kept up, our troops were assailed by the enemy sword in hand, and with dagger, pistols, etc., but British courage, perseverance and fortitude, overcame all opposition, and the fire of the enemy in the lower area of the Fort being nearly silenced, Brigadier Sale turned towards the Citadel, from which could now be seen men abandoning the guns, running in all directions, throwing themselves down from immense heights, endeavoring to make their escape, and on reaching the gate with Her Majesty's 17th under Lieutenant Colonel Croker, followed by the 13th, forced it open; at 5 o'clock in the morning the Colours of Her Majesty's 13th and 17th were planted on the Citadel of Ghuznee amidst the cheers of all ranks. Instant protection was granted to the women found in the Citadel, (among whom were those of Mahomed Hyder, the Governor,) and sentries placed over the Magazine for its security. Brigadier Sale reports having received much assistance from Captain Kershaw of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry throughout the whole of the service of the storming.

"Major General Sir Willoughby Cotton executed, in a manner much to

my satisfaction, the orders he had received. The Major General followed closely the Assaulting Party into the Fort with the Reserve, namely, Brigadier Roberts with the only available Regiment of his Brigade, the 35th Native Infantry under Lieutenant Colonel Monteath, part of Brigadier Sale's Brigade, the 16th Native Infantry under Major MacLaren, and 48th Native Infantry under Lieutenant Colonel Wheeler, and they immediately occupied the ramparts, putting down opposition whenever they met any, and making prisoners until the place was completely in our possession. A desultory fire was kept up in the town long after the Citadel was in our hands, from those who had taken shelter in houses, and in desperation kept firing on all that approached them. In this way several of our men were wounded and some killed, but the aggressors paid dearly for their bad conduct in not surrendering when the place was completely ours. I must not omit to mention, that three companies of the 35th Native Infantry under Captain Hay, ordered to the South side of the Fort to begin with a false attack, to attract attention to that side, performed that service at the proper time, and greatly to my satisfaction.

"As we were threatened with an attack, for the relief of the garrison I ordered the 19th Bombay Native Infantry, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Stalker, to guard the Cabool road, and to be in support of the Cavalry Division. This might have proved an important position to occupy, but as it was, no enemy appeared.

"The Cavalry Division under Major General Thackwell, in addition to watching the approach of an enemy, had directions to surround Ghuznee, and to sweep the plain, preventing the escape of runaways from the garrison. Brigadier Arnold's Brigade, (the Brigadier himself, I deeply regret to say, was laboring under very severe illness, having shortly before burst a blood vessel internally, which rendered it wholly impossible for him to mount a horse that day,) consisting of Her Majesty's 16th Lancers under Lieutenant Colonel Perse, (momentarily commanding the Brigade, and Major MacDowell, the Junior Major of the Regiment, the Senior Major of the 16th Lancers, Major Cureton, an officer of great merit, being actively engaged in the execution of his duties as Assistant Adjutant General to the Cavalry Division,) the 2d Cavalry under Major Salter, and the 3d under Lieutenant Colonel Smyth, were ordered to watch the south and west sides. Brigadier Scott's Brigade was placed on the Cabool road, consisting of H. M.'s 4th Light Dragoons under Major Daly, and of the 1st Bombay Cavalry under Lieutenant Colonel Sandwith, to watch the north and east sides. This duty was performed in a manner greatly to my satisfaction. After the storming and that quiet was in some degree restored within, I conducted His Majesty Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk, and the British Envoy and Minister Mr. Macnaghten round the Citadel, and a great part of the Fortress. The King was perfectly astonished at our having made ourselves master of a

place conceived to be impregnable when defended, in the short space of two hours, and in less than forty-eight hours after we came before it. His Majesty was of course greatly delighted at the result. When I afterwards, in the course of the day, took Mahomed Hyder Khan, the Governor, first to the British Minister and then to the King to make his submission, I informed His Majesty, that I had made a promise that his life should not be touched, and the King in very handsome terms assented, and informed Mahomed Hyder in my presence, that although he and his family had been rebels, yet he was willing to forget and forgive all.

Prince Mahomed Hyder, the Governor of Ghuznee, is a prisoner of war in my camp, and under the surveillance of Sir Alexander Burnes, an arrangement very agreeable to the former.

From Major General Sir Willoughby Cotton, commanding the 1st Infantry Division (of the Bengal Army,) I have invariably received the strongest support, and on this occasion his exertions were manifest in support of the honor of the profession and of our country.

I have likewise at all times received able assistance from Major General Willshire, commanding the 2d Infantry Division (of the Bombay Army,) which it was found expedient on that day to break up, some for the storming party and some for other duties; the Major General, as directed, was in attendance upon myself.

To Brigadier Sale, I feel deeply indebted for the gallant and soldierlike manner in which he conducted the responsible and arduous duty entrusted to him in command of the storming party, and for the arrangements he made in the Citadel, immediately after taking possession of it; the sabre wound which he received in the face, did not prevent his continuing to direct his column, until every thing was secure; and I am happy in the opportunity of bringing to your Lordship's notice, the excellent conduct of Brigadier Sale on this occasion.

Brigadier Stevenson, in the command of the Artillery, was all I could wish, and he reports that Brigade Majors Backhouse and Coghlan ably assisted him; his arrangements were good, and the execution done by the arm he commands, was such as cannot be forgotten by those of the enemy, who have witnessed and survived it.

To Brigadier Roberts, to Colonel Dennie (who commanded the Advance,) and to the different Officers Commanding Regiments already mentioned, as well to the other officers and gallant soldiers under them, who so nobly maintained the honor and reputation of our country, my best acknowledgments are due.

To Captain Thomson of the Bengal Engineers, the chief of the Department with me, much of the credit of the success of this brilliant coup-de-main is due—a place of the same strength, and by such simple means as this highly talented and scientific Officer recommended to be tried, has perhaps never before been taken; and I feel I cannot do sufficient justice

to Captain Thomson's merits for his conduct throughout. In the execution, he was ably supported by the Officers already mentioned, and so eager were the other Officers of the Engineers of both Presidencies for the honor of carrying the Powder Bags, that the point could only be decided by seniority, which shows the fine feeling by which they are animated.

I must now inform your Lordship, that since I joined the Bengal Column in the Valley of Shawl, I have continued my march with it in the Advance, and it has been my good fortune to have had the assistance of two most efficient Staff Officers, in Major Craigie, Deputy Adjutant General, and Major Garden, Deputy Quarter Master General. It is but justice to those Officers, that I should state to your Lordship, the high satisfaction I have derived from the manner in which all their duties have been performed up to this day, and that I look upon them as promising Officers, to fill the higher ranks. To the other Officers of both Departments I am also much indebted for the correct performance of all duties appertaining to their situations.

To Major Keith, the Deputy Adjutant General, and Major Campbell, the Deputy Quarter Master General of the Bombay Army, and to all the other Officers of both Departments under them, my acknowledgments are also due, for the manner in which their duties have been performed during this campaign.

Captain Alexander, commanding the 4th Bengal Local Horse, and Major Cunningham, commanding the Poona Auxiliary Horse, with the men under their orders, have been of essential service to the Army in this campaign.

The arrangement made by Superintending Surgeons Kennedy and Atkinson previous to the Storming, for affording assistance and comfort to the wounded, met with my approval.

Major Parsons, the Deputy Commissary General, in charge of the Department in the Field, has been unremitting in his attention to keep the Troops supplied, although much difficulty is experienced, and he is occasionally thwarted by the nature of the country and its inhabitants.

I have throughout this Service, received the utmost assistance I could desire, from Lieutenant Colonel Macdonald, my Officiating Military Secretary, and Deputy Adjutant General of Her Majesty's Forces, Bombay; from Captain Powell, my Persian Interpreter, and the other Officers of my Personal Staff. The nature of the country in which we are serving prevents the possibility of my sending a single Staff Officer to deliver this to your Lordship, otherwise, I should have asked my Aid-de-camp Lieutenant Keane, to proceed to Simla to deliver this Dispatch into your hands, and to have afforded any further information that your Lordship could have desired.

The brilliant triumph we have obtained, the cool courage displayed, and the gallant bearing of the Troops I have the honor to command, will

have taught such a lesson to our enemies in the Afghan nation, as will make them hereafter respect the name of a British Soldier.

Our loss is wonderfully small, considering the occasion; the casualties in killed and wounded, amount to about 200.

The loss of the enemy is immense—we have already buried of their dead nearly 500, together with an immense number of horses.

I enclose a list of the killed, wounded and missing. I am happy to say, that, although the wounds of some of the Officers are severe, they are all doing well.

It is my intention, after selecting a Garrison for this place, and establishing a General Hospital, to continue my march to Cabool forthwith.

I have, &c.

JOHN KEANE, *Lieut. General.*

— No. I.

List of Killed, Wounded and Missing in the Army, under the Command of Lieutenant General Sir John Keane, K. C. B., and G. C. H., in the assault and capture of the Fortress and Citadel of Ghuznee, on the 23d July, 1839.

- General Staff,—1 Colonel, 1 Major wounded.
- 3d Troop Bombay Horse Artillery,—1 Rank and File wounded.
- 4th ditto ditto,—1 Rank and File and 1 Horse wounded.
- Bengal Engineers—3 Rank and File killed, 2 Rank and File wounded, 1 Rank and File missing.
- Bombay Engineers,—1 Lieutenant, 1 Rank and File wounded.
- 2d Bengal Light Infantry,—1 Rank and File wounded.
- 1st Bombay Light Cavalry,—1 Havildar killed, 5 Rank and File and 7 Horses wounded.
- Her Majesty's 2d Foot (or Queen's Royals),—4 Rank and File killed, 2 Captains, 4 Lieutenants, 1 Serjeant and 26 Rank and File wounded.
- Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry,—1 Rank and File killed, 3 Serjeants, and 27 Rank and File wounded.
- Her Majesty's 17th Foot,—6 Rank and File wounded.
- Bengal European Regiment,—1 Rank and File killed, 1 Lieutenant Colonel, 1 Major, 2 Captains, 4 Lieutenants, 1 Ensign, 1 Serjeant, 51 Rank and File wounded.
- 16th Bengal Native Infantry,—1 Havildar, 6 Rank and File wounded.
- 35th ditto ditto,—5 Rank and File killed, 1 Havildar, 8 Rank and File wounded.
- 48th ditto ditto,—2 Havildars killed, 5 Rank and File wounded.
- Total Killed.—3 Serjeants or Havildars, 14 Rank and File.
- Total Wounded.—1 Colonel, 1 Lieutenant-Colonel, 2 Majors, 4 Captains, 8 Lieutenants, 2 Ensigns, 7 Serjeants or Havildars, 140 Rank and File, 8 Horses.

Total Missing,—1 Rank and File.

Grand Total—on the 21st and 23d of July killed, wounded and missing—191 Officers and Men, and 16 Horses.

R. MACDONALD, *Lieut. Col. Military Secretary,
and Deputy Adjutant General Her Majesty's Forces, Bombay.*

WOUNDED.

Names of Officers Killed, Wounded and Missing.

General Staff,—Brigadier Sale, H. M.'s 13th Light Infantry, slightly;
Major Parsons, Deputy Commissary General, ditto.

Bombay Engineers,—2d Lieut. Marriott, slightly.

Her Majesty's 2d (or Queen's Royals),—Captain Raitt, slightly; Captain Robinson, severely; Lieutenant Yonge, ditto; Lieutenant Stisted, slightly; Adjutant Simmons, ditto; Quarter Master Hadley, ditto.

Bengal European Regiment,—Lieutenant Colonel Orchard, slightly; Major Warren, severely; Captain Hay, slightly; Captain Taylor, ditto; Lieutenant Broadfoot, ditto; Lieutenant Haslewood, severely; Lieutenant Fagan, slightly, Lieutenant Magnay, ditto; Ensign Jacob, ditto.

R. MACDONALD, *Lieut. Col. Military Secretary,
and Deputy Adjutant General, H. M. Forces, Bombay.*

No 2.

List of Killed, Wounded, and Missing in the Army under the command of Lieutenant General Sir John Keane before Ghuznee, on the 21st July 1839.

2d Troop Bengal Horse Artillery,—3 Horses wounded.

3d ditto Bombay ditto ditto,—2 Rank and File, 2 Horses wounded.

4th ditto ditto ditto ditto,—1 Horse killed.

2d Regiment Bengal Cavalry,—1 Horse killed, 1 Rank and File wounded.

4th Bengal Local Horse,—1 Rank and File, and 1 Horse missing.

Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry,—1 Rank and File killed.

16th Bengal Native Infantry,—1 Captain wounded.

48th ditto ditto ditto,—1 Lieutenant, and 2 Rank and File wounded.

Total killed, 1 Rank and File and 2 Horses.

Total wounded, 1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, 5 Rank and File, and 6 Horses.

Total missing, 1 Rank and File and 1 Horse.

Names of Officers Wounded.

Captain Graves, 16th Bengal Native Infantry, severely.

Lieutenant Vanbomrigh, 48th Bengal Native Infantry, slightly.

R. MACDONALD, *Lieut. Col. Military Secretary,
and Deputy Adjutant General H. M. Forces, Bombay.*

The foregoing description of the storming of Ghuzni would not be perfect unaccompanied by the Reports of the Engineer officers employed on the primary operations. They are therefore subjoined, and will be found, by the professional reader, serviceable and instructive.

MEMORANDA of the Engineers' operations before Ghuznee, in July 1839, by Captains Thomson and Peat.

"The accounts of the Fortress of Ghuznee, received from those who had seen it, were such as to induce His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to leave in Kandahar the very small battering train then with the Army, there being a scarcity of transport cattle. The place was described as very weak, and completely commanded from a range of hills to the north.

"When we came before it on the morning of the 21st July, we were very much surprised to find a high rampart in good repair, built on a scarped mound about 35 feet high, flanked by numerous towers, and surrounded by a *fausse-braye* and wet ditch. The irregular figure of the "*enceinte*" gave a good flanking fire, whilst the height of the citadel covered the interior from the commanding fire of the hills to the north, rendering it nugatory. In addition to this, the towers, at the angles, had been enlarged, screen walls had been built before the gates, the ditch cleared out and filled with water, stated to be unfordable, and an outwork built on the right bank of the river, so as to command the bed of it.

"The Garrison was variously stated from 3 to 4000 strong, including 500 Cavalry, and from subsequent information, we found that it had not been overrated.

"On the approach of the Army, a fire of Artillery was opened from the body of the place, and of musketry from the neighbouring gardens. A detachment of Infantry cleared the latter, and the former was silenced for a short time by shrapnells from the Horse Artillery, but the fire from the new outwork on the bank of the river was in no way checked. A nearer view of the works was, however, obtained from the gardens which had been cleared. This was not at all satisfactory. The works were evidently much stronger than we had been led to expect, and such as our Army could not venture to attack in a regular manner. We had no battering train, and to besiege Ghuznee in form, a much larger one would be required than the Army ever possessed. The great command of the parapets, from sixty to seventy feet, with the wet ditch, were unsurmountable obstacles to an attack, either by mining or escalading.

"It therefore became necessary to examine closely the whole "*contour*" of the place, to discover if any other mode of attack could be adopted. The Engineers with an escort went round the works, approaching as near as they could find cover. The Garrison were on the alert, and kept up a hot and well regulated fire upon the officers, whenever they were obliged

to shew themselves. However, by keeping the Infantry beyond musket range, and the Cavalry at a still greater distance, only one man was killed, and another wounded; the former being hit by men sent out of the place to drive off the reconnoitring party.

"The fortifications were found equally strong all round, the only tangible point observed being the Cabool gateway, which offered the following advantages for a '*coup-de-main*.' The road to the gate was clear, the bridge over the ditch unbroken, there were good positions for the Artillery within 300 yards of the walls on both sides of the road, and we had information that the gateway was not built up, a reinforcement from Cabool being expected.

"The result of this reconnoissance, was a report to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that if he decided upon the immediate attack of Ghuznee, the only feasible mode of proceeding, and the only one which held out a prospect of success, was a dash at the Cabool gateway, blowing the gate open by bags of powder.

"His Excellency decided upon the attempt; the camp was moved that evening to the Cabool road, and the next morning, the 22d, Sir John Keane, in person reconnoitred the proposed point of attack, approved of the plan, and gave orders for its execution. Preparations were made accordingly, positions for the Artillery were carefully examined, which excited the jealousy of the Garrison, who opened a smart fire upon the party.

"It was arranged that an explosion party, consisting of three officers of Engineers, Captain Peat, Lieutenants Durand and McLeod, 3 Serjeants, and 18 men of the Sappers in working dresses, carrying 300 lbs. of powder in 12 sand bags, with a hose 72 feet long, should be ready to move down to the gateway at day-break.

"At midnight the first Battery left Camp, followed by the other four, at intervals of half an hour. Those to the right of the road were conducted to their positions by Lieutenant Sturt, those to the left by Lieutenant Anderson. The ground for the guns was prepared by the Sappers and Pioneers, taking advantage of the irregularities of the ground to the right, and of some old garden walls to the left.

"The Artillery was all in position, and ready by 3 A. M. of the 23d, and shortly after, at the first dawn, the Party under Captain Peat moved down to the gateway, accompanied by six men of H. M. 13th Light Infantry, without their belts, and supported by a detachment of the same Regiment, which extended to the right and left of the road, when they arrived at the ditch, taking advantage of what cover they could find, and endeavouring to keep down the fire from the ramparts, which became heavy on the approach of the party, though it had been remarkably slack during the previous operations. Blue lights were shewn, which rendered surrounding objects distinctly visible, but luckily they were burned on the top of the parapet instead of being thrown into the passage below.

"The explosion party marched steadily on, headed by Lieutenant Durand; the powder was placed, the hose laid, the train fired, and the carrying party had retired to tolerable cover in less than two minutes. The Artillery opened when the blue lights appeared, and the musketry from the covering party at the same time. So quickly was the operation performed, and so little was the enemy aware of the nature of it, that not a man of the party was hurt.

"As soon as the explosion took place, Captain Peat, although hurt by the concussion, his anxiety preventing him from keeping sufficiently under cover, ran up to the gate accompanied by a small party of H. M. 13th L. I., and ascertained that it was completely destroyed. There was some delay in getting a bugler to sound the advance, the signal agreed on for the assaulting column to push on, and this was the only mistake in the operation.

"The assaulting column, consisting of 4 European Regiments (H. M. 2nd Regiment, Bengal European Regiment, H. M. 13th L. I. and H. M. 17th Regiment,) commanded by Brigadier Sale, the advance under Lieut. Col. Dennie, accompanied by Lieut. Sturt, Engineers, moved steadily through the gateway, through a passage inside the gateway, in a domed building, which opening on one side, rendered every thing very obscure, and rendered it difficult to find the outlet into the town. They met with little opposition; but a party of the enemy seeing a break in the column, owing to the difficulty in scrambling over the rubbish in the gateway, made a rush, sword in hand, and cut down a good many men, wounding the Brigadier and several other officers. These swordsmen were repulsed, and there was no more regular opposition; the surprise and alarm of the Governor and Sirdars being so great when they saw the column occupying the open space inside the gate and firing upon them, that they fled, accompanied by their men, even the Garrison of the citadel following their example. Parties of the Affghans took refuge in the houses, firing on the column as it made its way through the streets, and a good deal of desultory fighting took place in consequence, by which some loss was sustained. The citadel was occupied as soon as day-light shewed that it had been abandoned by the enemy, and the whole of the works were in our possession before 5 A. M.

"We lost 17 men, 6 Europeans and 11 Natives, killed;—18 Officers and 117 Europeans and 30 Natives wounded, total 152. Of the Affghans more than 514 were killed in the town, that number of bodies having been buried, and about 100 outside by the Cavalry; 1600 prisoners were taken, but I have no means of estimating the number of wounded.

"There were nine guns of different calibres found in the place, a large quantity of good powder, considerable stores of shot, lead, &c. &c. and a large supply of atta and other provisions."

Geo. Thomson, Capt. Engrs.
Chief Engr. Army of the Indus.

"During the reconnoissance the wall pieces were particularly troublesome. This weapon is almost unknown in our service, but it is a very efficient one, especially in the defence of works, and its use should not be neglected. Every fortified post should be supplied with a proportion of them, and a certain number of men in every Regiment practised in firing them.

"The charge recommended by Col. Paaley for blowing open gates, is from 60 to 120 lbs. and this is doubtless sufficient in ordinary cases; but in this instance we were apprehensive that the enemy might have taken alarm at our being so much on that side of the place, and in consequence partially or wholly built up the gateway. It was afterwards found that some attempts of the kind had been made by propping up the gate with beams.

"The charge was so heavy, that it not only destroyed the gate, but brought down a considerable portion of the roof of the square building in which it was placed, which proved a very considerable obstacle to the assaulting column, and the concussion acted as far as the tower under which an officer's party of H. M. 13th Regiment were standing at the time, but without occasioning any casualties. In cases of this nature, it is of course the first object to guard against any chance of failure, and it is impossible even now to say, how much the charge might have been reduced with safety.

"The enemy appeared so much on the alert, and the *fausse-braye* was so much in advance of the gate, that we never contemplated being able to effect our object by surprise. The only question was, whether it ought to be done by day or night. It was argued in favor of the former, that the Artillery would be able to make so much more correct practice, that the defences would be in a considerable degree destroyed, and the fire so completely kept under, as to enable the explosion party to advance with but little loss, and with the advantage of being able to see exactly what they were about. Captain Thomson, however, adhered to the latter, and we were afterwards convinced it was the most judicious plan; for although the fire of the Artillery was necessarily more general than it would have been in daylight, still it was so well directed as to take up a good deal of the attention of the besieged, and draw upon their batteries a portion of the fire which in daylight would have been thrown upon the explosion party and assaulting columns. It would also even in daylight have been difficult with our light Artillery to have kept down the fire so completely, but that a few matchlock men might have kept their position near the gateway, and in that narrow space a smart fire from a few pieces might have obliged the party to retire. The obscurity of the night, to say nothing of the confusion which it must occasion among undisciplined troops, is certainly the best protection to a body of men engaged in an enterprise of this nature. Blue lights certainly render objects distinctly visible, but their light is glaring and uncertain, especially to men firing through loopholes.

"The party of H. M. 13th consisted of 18 Officers; 28 Serjeants; 7 Buglers; and 276 Rank and File.

"It was made of this strength not only to keep up a heavy fire upon the parapets, and thereby divert attention from the party at the gateway, but also because we were not aware whether the *fausse-braye* was occupied or not, and as it extends so much in advance as to take the gate completely in reverse, it would have been necessary, had a fire opened from it, to have carried it by assault before the party with the bags could have advanced. The party with Lieutenant Durand was accompanied by 6 men of the 13th without their belts, the better to secure them from observation and to protect them from any sortie that might be made from the postern of the *fausse-braye* on the right, or even from the gate itself, while another party under an officer, Lieutenant Jennings, accompanied me as far as the tower so as to check any attempts that might have been made from the *fausse-braye* on the left, and at the same time keeping up a fire on such of the enemy as shewed their heads above the parapet; of this party one man was killed and a few wounded.

"Nothing could have been more gallant than the conduct of Lieutenants Durand and McLeod, and the men under their command, or more efficient than the manner in which they executed their duty.

"The powder being in sand bags, of a very coarse open texture, a long hose and port fire was thought to be the safest method of firing it. The end of the hose fortunately just reached the small postern. The casualties during this operation were much fewer than was expected, being in all 1 private killed, 2 Serjeants, and 23 Rank and File wounded.

"The heaviest fire was certainly outside the bridge, for the enemy near the gateway being marked whenever they attempted to shew their heads above the parapet, were obliged to confine themselves to the loop-holes, the range from which is very uncertain and limited against men moving about. A high loop-holed wall, although imposing in appearance, is a profile but ill adapted to resist attacks of this nature.

"The enemy were perfectly aware that we were in the gateway, but appeared to have no idea of the nature of our operations. Had they been so, they might easily have rendered it impossible to place the powder bags by throwing over blue lights, of which they had a large quantity in store. The powder pots and other fire-works so much used by the natives of Hindoostan, would certainly have rendered the confined space leading to the gate much too hot for such an operation, but the ignorance of the besieged was known and calculated upon,—the result shews how justly.

"Their attempts at resistance were confined to the fire from the loop-holes, and throwing over large pieces of earth, some of which appeared to be intended to knock off the port fire.

"I on this occasion received an excellent lesson on the necessity of not allowing preconceived opinions to lead to any carelessness, in accurately as-

certaining the result of any operation of this nature. The gateway appeared, from what I had seen from the hills to the north, to lead straight into the town, and on running in to examine it after the explosion, I was so much impressed with this idea, and so much convinced of the probability of the gateway having been blocked up during the day, that I was led to believe that it had actually been done from seeing in front of the gate that had been destroyed the outline of an arch filled up with brick masonry. The true entrance turned to the right and would have been discovered by advancing a few paces, and that in perfect safety, for the interior was secure from all fire. Lieutenant Durand, on first going up, saw through the chinks of the gate, that there was a light and a guard immediately behind it, and from that circumstance was convinced, that no interior obstacles of importance existed.

"My mistake therefore was luckily immediately corrected without any bad consequence resulting.

"A party of Sappers with felling axes, and commanded by Lieutenant Wemyss, and two scaling ladders in charge of Lieutenant Pigou accompanied the assaulting column.

"Of 10 Engineer Officers engaged in this attack, only one, Lieutenant Marriot, was slightly wounded. Captain Thomson, however, had a very narrow escape, having been thrown down by a rush of some swordsmen into the gateway, and nearly sabred while upon the ground."

(Signed) A. G. PEAR, *Captain,*
Bombay Engineers.

It is not the purpose of this work to discuss the merits of the many personal and political questions which arose out of the suppressions in despatches, or the course of minor proceedings following important operations, or much might here be said in reprobation of the manner in which the names of Colonel Dennie and Brigadier Roberts were slurred over by Sir John Keane. The former officer led the storming party, and most gallantly maintained his ground in the midst of darkness and surrounded by numberless desperate foes, until the column under Brigadier Sale could force an entrance. To Brigadier Roberts is due the credit of having captured Hyder Khan, the Governor of the fortress and son of the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, an event of great importance, but which has never yet, as far as the writer of this has seen, been described with the minuteness it deserves. It appears that after Brigadier Sale, who had been wounded at the gate of Ghuzni, had retired to his tent, the command of the fortress devolved on Brigadier Roberts. When the Brigadier had placed guards on the numerous prisoners taken in the conflict, (some fifteen or sixteen hundred,) and arranged for the protection of

the women and children, he directed his attention to the means of securing the chief. The prisoners had declared that Hyder Khan had escaped, and that his capture was now impossible. Brigadier Roberts, however, soon after assuming the command of the fort, had seen a very fine looking horse, richly caparisoned, with a handsome brace of pistols in the holsters, which he was requested to allow to be sent out of the fort, the request being accompanied by the assurance that all should be brought before the Prize Committee. The request was refused, although preferred by an officer who wished to purchase the lot, and the Brigadier suspecting that the horse was the property of the Governor of the fort, directed Captain A. Tayler of the European Regt., his Major of Brigade, to take a company of Infantry to the house where the horse had been found, and to search it. Captain Tayler, accompanied by Captain George Macgregor, assistant to the Envoy, did so, and the result was that Hyder Khan surrendered, after the officers had sworn in the name of the Saviour that the lives of the prisoners would be spared. It should be added, that the oath was exacted by Hyder Khan, who would otherwise, with his party, have died sword in hand. The Commander-in-Chief was delighted with the success of Brigadier Roberts's scheme; but, as shewn above, he had not the grace to make any especial acknowledgment of his services in the matter.

Leaving the 16th Regt. N. I., a small proportion of Artillery, and some Irregular Cavalry to garrison Ghuzni, the Army moved on towards Cabul; the Nuwab Jubbul Khan, brother of Dost Mahomed, having previously visited the fortress with overtures from Dost Mahomed, which however ended in nothing.

The Army had not proceeded more than three marches from Ghuzni, when authentic accounts reached the Camp, that Dost Mahomed, finding it impossible to rely upon his troops, had hastily abandoned his guns, which were in position at Arghundee, and fled towards Bamecan. His capture being a matter of great importance, it was resolved to immediately despatch a small body in pursuit of him. To Captain Outram, was entrusted the execution of this difficult task, and the better to ensure success, Hadjee Khan Kakur, the chieftain who had joined Shah Soojah's camp near Candahar, was appointed to accompany him with 2000 of the Shah's Affghans. The history of the pursuit is related with great spirit and fidelity in Captain Outram's narrative, which will be found in the Appendix to this volume, (No. I.) Its failure evidently arose from the treasonous part played by the Hadjee, who either feared

to encounter Dost Mahomed, or was still secretly in the interest of the Ameer.

Following the chronological order of events, we must now turn to the operations of Colonel Wade, who with Shah Soojah's son, had, as before mentioned, proceeded to Peshawur to march towards Cabul, when intelligence should reach him of the advance of the British force from Candahar. Colonel Wade had advanced as far as Jumrood upon the 20th of July, when he received advices of the movement of the force. He accordingly commenced preparations for making his way through the Khyber Pass, a formidable series of defiles overhung by lofty, rocky hills, from which an opposing enemy can offer the most formidable obstructions to an advance. But we will let Major Hough describe it:—

"The Khyber Pass is about twenty-eight miles in extent. From the entrance on the Peshawur side it is seven miles to Ali Musjid, from which it is two miles to Lalabeg Ghurree, a valley which is about six miles long and one and a quarter broad; hence is the Pass of Lundeekhana; in fact, excepting the valley, the rest of the Pass, or for twenty-two miles, can be commanded by jingals (wall pieces) or even by the mountain rifle (juzzail) fired with a rest, and in many places by the common musket. The road being stony, the movements of troops with guns is necessarily slow. The first four miles, after the entrance to the Pass, the road is contracted, and the hills on each side, are nearly perpendicular; to the left, two miles up the Pass, there is a road which leads up to the top of the hills. It widens after the third mile, but still the road is exposed to a fire from either side. At about five and a half miles is the town of Jaghir on the right, which could fire on any enemy moving by either road. From the town, Ali Musjid is one and a half mile; on the left is the range of hills by which you move up to the fort; on the right is the hill which runs parallel to, and which is commanded by, the fort.

"The range of hills to the left leads to the cantonment of the Khyberrees; that of Choorah is about eight miles from the fort; that of Teerah seven or eight marches off. The town of Jaghir was filled with the enemy. The fort contained a considerable garrison. There were breast-works thrown up on the hills, so that it was necessary to move on slowly, and at each halt to stockade the troops, as well as to protect the position; and the left was the point which required the utmost vigilance."

Colonel Wade had taken the precaution to buy over the Khyberrees between Peshawur and the entrance to the main roads leading through the Pass, while Shah Soojah's emissaries had secured the neutrality, if not the aid, of the tribes beyond Alee Musjeed. But for the seven

miles between his position and that fortress, Colonel Wade knew that he would have to encounter the opposition of the Khyberees, supported by Mahomed Ukhbar Khan, Dost Mahomed's son, who with 2500 men and 14 guns, occupied a post near the head of the Khyber Pass, contiguous to Jellallabad. On the 22d July, the Colonel moved forward, stockading as he went. Every inch of his route was disputed by the enemy, but the gallantry and steadiness of the troops enabled him to make good his way to Alee Musjeed, of which, on the 27th July, he was enabled to take possession, the enemy having evacuated it and fled. Beyond this point, no opposition was encountered. Colonel Wade made a halt, to give time for the troops under Sir John Keane to push upward from Ghuzni, and for himself to arrange with the Khyber chiefs for the permanent opening of the Pass to travellers, convoys, caravans, and the dawk (letter post) to and from India. He then resumed his march, and on the 3d September 1839, reached Cabul with the Shahzada.

On the 6th of August the Army reached Cabul, and on the 7th, the Shah made his triumphal entry into the capital. The event is described in the annexed extract of a letter from Sir John Keane to Lord Auckland:—

Extract of a Letter from His Excellency Lieutenant General Sir John Keane, K. C. B. and G. C. H., dated Head Quarters, Camp Cabool, 8th August, 1839.

"It gives me infinite pleasure to be able to address my despatch to your Lordship from the capital, the vicinity of which, His Majesty Shah Shoojaool-Moolk and the Army under my command, reached the day before yesterday. The King entered his capital yesterday afternoon, accompanied by the British Envoy and Minister and the gentlemen of the mission, and by myself, the Generals and Staff Officers of this Army, and escorted by a squadron of Her Majesty's 4th Light Dragoons, and one of Her Majesty's 16th Lancers, with Captain Martin's Troop of Horse Artillery. His Majesty had expressed a wish that British troops should be present on the occasion, and a very small party only of his own Hindostanee and Affghan troops. After the animating scene of traversing the streets and reaching the palace in the Balla Hissar, a royal salute was fired, and an additional salvo in the Affghan style, from small guns resembling wall pieces, named jingalls, and carried on camels. We heartily congratulated His Majesty on being in possession of the throne and kingdom of his ancestors, and upon the overthrow of his enemies, and after taking leave of His Majesty, we returned to our camp.

"I trust we have thus accomplished all the objects which your Lordship had in contemplation, when you planned and formed the Army of the Indus, and the expedition into Afghanistan.

"The conduct of the Army, both European and Native, which your Lordship did me the honor to place under my orders, has been admirable throughout, and notwithstanding the severe marching and privations they have gone through, their appearance and discipline have suffered nothing, and the opportunity afforded them at Ghuznee, of meeting and conquering their enemy, has added greatly to their good spirits.

"The joint despatch addressed by Mr. Macnaghten and myself to your Lordship on the 3d instant from Shikarbad, will have informed you, that at the moment we had made every preparation to attack (on the following day) Dost Mahommed Khan, in his position at Urghundee, where, after his son Mahommed Akhbar had joined him from Jellalabad, he had an army amounting to 13,000 men, well armed and appointed, and 30 pieces of artillery, we suddenly learnt that he abandoned them all, and fled with a party of horsemen on the road to Bameean, leaving his guns in position as he had placed them to receive our attack.

"It appears, that a great part of his army, which was hourly becoming disorganized, refused to stand by him in the position, to receive our attack, and that it soon became in a state of dissolution. The great bulk immediately came over to Shah Shooja, tendering their allegiance, and I believe His Majesty will take most of them into his pay.

"It seems that the news of the quick and determined manner in which we took their stronghold, Ghuznee, had such an effect upon the population of Cabool, and perhaps also upon the enemy's army, that Dost Mahommed, from that moment began to lose hope of retaining his rule for even a short time longer, and sent off his family and valuable property towards Bameean, but marched out of Cabool with his army and artillery, keeping a bold front towards us until the evening of the 2d, when all his hopes were at an end by a division in his own camp, and one part of his army abandoning him. So precipitate was his flight, that he left in position his guns, with their ammunition and waggons, and the greater part of their cattle by which they were drawn. Major Cureton, of Her Majesty's 16th Lancers, with his party of 200 men, pushed forward on the 3d, and took possession of those guns, etc. There were twenty-three brass guns in position and loaded, two more at a little distance which they attempted to take away, and since then, three more abandoned still further off on the Bameean road—thus, leaving in our possession twenty-eight pieces of cannon, with all the material belonging to them, which are now handed over to Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk."

The King took up his residence in the Balla Hissar, or Citadel of the capital; the troops were disposed in the neighbourhood, and prepara-

tions were immediately made for consolidating the authority which had thus been re-acquired. One of the first measures was to despatch Captain Outram, after his return from the unsuccessful pursuit of Dost Mahomed Khan* to the Ghilzie country, lying between Ghuzni and Candahar, in order to tranquillize the disaffected, and induce their submission to the King. This duty Captain Outram performed successfully and satisfactorily. He captured many of the refractory,† destroyed their fortresses, displaced chieftains, substituting persons in the interest of Shah Soojah, and recovered a quantity of the property in camels, etc., abstracted from the British troops during their march from Candahar. The next measure of the King's was, to hold a Durbar, and to confer the Dooranee order of Knighthood on all those officers who had distinguished themselves on the march from India. The third was, to depute Major General (now Sir Thomas) Willshire, with the returning Bombay Column, to punish the chief of Khelat, who while professing friendship for the British Government, and negotiating a treaty with its representatives, had instigated the tribes in the neighbourhood of the Bolan Pass, to plunder the Army of the Indus during its march. The manner in which this service was performed, is set forth in the following dispatch from General Willshire, written on the 14th December 1839:—

TO THE RIGHT HON. LORD AUCKLAND, G. C. B.

Governor General of India, &c. &c. &c.

"MY LORD,—In obedience to the joint instructions furnished me by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Indus, and the Envoy and Minister to His Majesty Shah Shooja, under date Cabool, the 17th September 1839, deputing to me the duty of deposing Mehrab Khan of Khelat, in consequence of the avowed hostility of that Chief to the British nation, during the present campaign, I have the honor to report that on my arrival at Quetta on the 31st ultimo, I communicated with Captain Bean, the Political Agent in Shawl, and arranged with him the best means of giving effect to the orders I had received.

* Hadjee Khan Kakur was rewarded for his double treason, by being placed in close confinement with a strong guard over him.

† Amongst these, were a party who had murdered Colonel Herring of the 57th Bengal Native Infantry, on his way from Candahar with a treasure party.

"In consequence of the want of public carriage, and the limited quantity of Commissariat supplies at Quetta, as well as the reported want of forage on the route to Khelat, I was obliged to despatch to Cutch Gundava the whole of the Cavalry and the greater portion of the Artillery, taking with me only the Troops noted in the margin, leaving Quetta on the 3rd instant.

"During the march the communications received from Mehrab Khan were so far from acceding to the terms offered, that he threatened resistance if the Troops approached his capital. I therefore proceeded and arrived at the village of Giranee, within 8 miles of Khelat, on the 12th instant.

"Marching from hence the following morning, a body of horse were perceived on the right of the road, which commenced firing on the advanced guard, commanded by Major Pennycuik H. M.'s 17th Regiment,* as the column advanced; and skirmishing between them continued until we came in sight of Khelat, rather less than a mile distant.

"I now discovered that three heights on the N. W. face of the fort, and parallel to the North were covered with Infantry, with five guns in position, protected by small parapet walls.

"Captain Peat, Chief Engineer, immediately reconnoitred, and having reported that nothing could be done until those heights were in our possession, I decided at once on storming them simultaneously, and if practicable, entering the fort with the fugitives, as the gate in the Northern face was occasionally opened to keep up the communication between the fort and the heights.

"To effect this object, I detached a Company from each of the European Regiments from the advanced guard, with Major Pennycuik, H. M. 17th Regiment, for the purpose of occupying the gardens and enclosures to the North-East of the town, and two more Companies in the plain, midway between them and the column; at the same time I ordered three columns of attack to be formed, composed of four Companies from each Corps, under their respective Commanding Officers, Major Carruthers of the Queen's, Lieut. Colonel Croker H. M. 17th Regiment, and Major Western 31st Bengal N. I., the whole under the command of Brigadier Baumgardt; the remainder of the Regiments forming three columns of reserve under my own direction to move in support.

"A hill being allotted to each column, Brigadier Stevenson commanding the Artillery, moved quickly forward in front, towards the base of the heights, and when, within the required range, opened a fire upon the Infantry and guns, under cover of which the columns moved steadily on, and commenced the ascent for the purpose of carrying the heights exposed to the fire of the enemy's guns, which had commenced while the columns of attack were forming.

"Before the columns reached their respective summits of the hills, the

enemy overpowered by the superior and well-directed fire of our Artillery, had abandoned them, attempting to carry off their guns, but which they were unable to do; at this moment it appearing to me the opportunity offered for the troops to get in with the fugitives, and if possible, gain possession of the gate of the fortress, I despatched orders to the Queen's Royals and H. M. 17th Regiment to make a rush from the heights for that purpose, following myself to the summit of the nearest to observe the result; at this moment, the four Companies on my left, which had been detached to the gardens and plains, seeing the chance that offered of entering the fort, moved rapidly forward from their respective points towards the gateway, under a heavy and well-directed fire from the walls of the fort and citadel, which were thronged by the enemy.

"The gate having been closed before the troops moving towards it could effect the desired object, and the Garrison strengthened by the enemy driven from the heights, they were compelled to cover themselves as far as practicable behind some walls and ruined buildings to the right and left of it, while Brigadier Stevenson, having ascended the heights with the Artillery, opened two guns under the command of Lieut. Foster, Bombay Horse Artillery, upon the defences above its gates and vicinity, while the fire of two others commanded by Lieutenant Cooper, Shah's Artillery, was directed against the gate itself, the remaining two with Lieutenant Creed being sent round to the road on the left, leading direct up to the gate, and when within two hundred yards, commenced a fire, for the purpose of blowing it open, and after a few rounds they succeeded in knocking in one-half of it; on observing this I rode down the hill towards the gate, pointing to it, thereby announcing to the troops it was open; they instantly rose from their cover, and rushed in; those under the command of Major Pennycuik being the nearest were the first to gain the gate, headed by that Officer; the whole of the storming column from the three Regiments rapidly following and gaining an entrance as quickly as it was possible to do so, under a heavy fire from the works and from the interior, the enemy making a most gallant and determined resistance, disputing every inch of ground up to the walls of the inner citadel.

"At this time, I directed the reserve columns to be brought near the gate, and detached one company of the 17th Regiment under Captain Darby, to the Western side of the fort, followed by a portion of the 31st Bengal Native Infantry, commanded by Major Weston, conducted by Captain Outram, acting as my extra Aide-de-Camp, for the purpose of securing the heights under which the Southern angle is situated, and intercepting any of the Garrison escaping from that side. Having driven off the enemy from the heights above, the united detachments then descended to the gate of the fort below, and forced it open before the Garrison (who closed it as they saw the troops approach) had time to secure it.

"When the party was detached by the Western face, I also sent two com-

panies from the reserve of the 17th under Major Deshon, and two guns of the Shah's Artillery, under the command of Lieutenant Creed, Bombay Artillery, by the Eastern to the Southern face, for the purpose of blowing open the gate above alluded to, had it been necessary, as well as the gate of the inner citadel, the Infantry joining the other detachments making their way through the town in the direction of the citadel.

"After some delay, the troops that held possession of the town, at length succeeded in forcing an entrance into the citadel, where a desperate resistance was made by Mehrab Khan at the head of his people, he himself with many of his Chiefs being killed sword in hand; several others, however, kept up a fire upon our troops from detached buildings difficult of access, and it was not until late in the afternoon, that those who survived were induced to give themselves up on a promise of their lives being spared.

"From every account, I have reason to believe, the Garrison consisted of upwards of 2000 fighting men, and that the son of Mehrab Khan had been expected to join him from Nowsky with a further reinforcement. The enclosed return will shew the strength of the force under my command present at the capture.

"The defences of the fort, as in the case of Ghurnee, far exceeded in strength, what I had been led to suppose from previous report; and the towering height of the inner citadel was most formidable, both in appearance and reality.

"I lament to say, that the loss of killed and wounded on our side has been severe, as will be seen by the accompanying return; that on the part of the enemy must have been great, but the exact number I have not been able to ascertain. Several hundreds of prisoners were taken, from whom the Political Agent has selected those he considers it necessary for the present to retain in confinement; the remainder have been liberated.

"It is quite impossible for me sufficiently to express my admiration of the gallant and steady conduct of the Officers and men upon this occasion, but the fact of less than an hour having elapsed from the formation of the columns for the attack, to the period of the troops being within the fort, and that performed in the open day and in the face of an enemy, so very superior in number and so perfectly prepared for resistance, will, I trust, convince your Lordship, how deserving the Officers and troops are of my warmest thanks, and of the highest praise that can be bestowed.

"To Brigadier Baumgardt, commanding the storming column, my best thanks are due, and he reports that Captain Wylie, Acting Asst. Adjt. General and Captain Gilland, his Aides-de-Camp, ably assisted him, and zealously performed their duties; also to Brigadier Stevenson, commanding the Artillery, and Lieutenants Forster and Cowper respectively in charge of the Bombay and Shah's Artillery, I feel greatly indebted for the steady and scientific manner in which the service of dislodging the enemy from the heights, and afterwards effecting an entrance into the fort was performed.

ed. The Brigadier has brought to my notice the assistance he received from Captain Coghlan, his Brigade Major, Lieutenant Woosnam, his Aide-de-Camp, and Lieutenant Creed when in battery yesterday.

"To Lieutenant-Colonel Croker, commanding H. M. 17th Regiment, Major Carruthers, commanding the Queen's Royals, Major Weston, commanding the Bengal 31st N. I., I feel highly indebted for the manner in which they conducted their respective columns to the attack of the heights, and afterwards to the assault of the fort, as well as to Major Pennycuik of the 17th, who led the advanced guard companies to the same point.

"To Captain Peat, Chief Engineer, and to the Officers and men of the Engineer Corps, my acknowledgments are due—to Major Neil Campbell, Acting Quarter Master General of the Bombay Army, to Captain Hagart, Acting Deputy Adjutant General, and to Lieutenant Ramsay, Acting Assistant Quarter Master General, my best thanks are due for the able assistance afforded me by their services.

"It is with much pleasure I take this opportunity of acknowledging my obligations to Major Campbell, for relieving me from the necessity of returning by the route by which the Army advanced to Cabool, which being entirely exhausted, must have subjected the troops to great privations and the horses to absolute starvation; the Quarter Master General took upon himself the responsibility of leading my column through the heart of the Ghiljee and Koohul countries, never hitherto traversed by Europeans, by which our route was considerably shortened, a sufficiency obtained, and great additions made to our geographical knowledge of the country, besides great political advantages obtained in peaceably settling those districts.

"From my Aides-de-Camp, Captain Robinson and Lieutenant Halkett, as well as to Captain Outram, who volunteered his services on my personal Staff, I received the utmost assistance, and to the latter officer I feel greatly indebted for the zeal and ability with which he has performed various duties that I have required of him, upon other occasions as well as the present.

"It is with much satisfaction I am able to state, that the utmost cordiality has existed between the Political Authorities and myself, and to acknowledge the great assistance I have derived from Captain Bean in obtaining supplies.

"After allowing time to make the necessary arrangements for continuing my march, I shall descend into Cutch Gundava by the Moona Pass, having received a favourable report of the practicability of taking guns that way.

"I have deputed Captain Outram to take a duplicate of the despatch to the Honourable the Governor of Bombay by the direct route from hence to Sonmeanee Bunder, the practicability or otherwise of which for the passage of troops, I consider it an object of importance to ascertain."

I have, &c.

T. WILLSHIRE, Major General,
Commanding Bombay Column, Army of the Indus.

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Return of Casualties in the Army under the Command of Major General Willshire, C. B. employed at the storming of Kelat, on the 13th November, 1832.

| Corps. | KILLED. | | WOUNDED. | | | | | | | | | | | Total killed and wounded | | Horses Killed Wounded | |
|---|-------------|----------|---------------|-------|----------|-------------|---------|-----------|----------|-----------|----------|---------------|---------------|--------------------------|-----|-----------------------------|---|
| | Lieutenants | Subadars | Rank and File | Total | Captains | Lieutenants | Ensigns | Adjutants | Jemadars | Sergeants | Drummers | Rank and File | Regt. Boonies | Total | | | |
| Detachment 3d Troop Horse Artillery, ... | | | | | | | | | | | | | | None | | | |
| 1st Troop Cabool Artillery, | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Gun Lascars attached to ditto, | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| H. M.'s 2nd or Queen's Royal Regiment,... | 1 | 0 | 21 | 22 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 40 | 0 | 47 | 49 | 0 | 1 |
| H. M.'s 17th Regiment, | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 29 | 0 | 32 | 29 | 0 | 0 |
| 31st Regiment Bengal N. L. | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 14 | 1 | 22 | 25 | 0 | 0 |
| Sappers, Miners and Pioneers, | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| 2 Ressallahs of the 4th Bengal Local Horse, | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Total, | 1 | 1 | 29 | 31 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 1 | 67 | 1 | 107 | 128 | 0 | 1 |

Missing, None.

Names of Officers Killed and Wounded.

| KILLED. | REMARKS. |
|---|---|
| Corps. | Rank and Names. |
| H. M.'s 2nd or Queen's Royal Regiment, 1 Corporal, since dead, | Lieut. P. Gravatt. |
| WOUNDED. | |
| H. M.'s 2nd or Queen's Royal Regiment, | Capt. W. M. Lyster, severely. |
| ditto ditto ditto | Capt. T. Sealey, ditto. |
| ditto ditto ditto | Lt. T. W. E. Holdsworth, ditto. |
| ditto ditto ditto | Lt. D. J. Dickinson, slightly. |
| ditto ditto ditto | Adj. J. E. Simmons, severely. |
| H. M.'s 17th Regiment, | Capt. L. C. Bouchier, ditto. |
| 31st Regiment Bengal N. L. | Capt. Lawrin, slightly. |
| ditto ditto | Ensign Hopper, severely. |
| | C. HAGART, Captain, Acting Deputy Adjutant General B. C. |

To return to Cabul. Reports having reached the Envoy, that Dost Mahomed was at Bameean, a small force was detached thither, and another small body was sent to Ghuzni to bring up the prisoners, (including the Governor, Hyder Khan,) preparatory to their being conveyed to India. The Army gradually recovered the effect of its long march from India, both men and cattle deriving much benefit from the climate, the food procured in the abundant markets, and the repose of cantonments. The casualties, from the fatigue which the troops had undergone, were however by no means few, and amongst them the Government had to lament the loss of some valuable officers. Besides Colonel Thomson of the 31st Bengal Native Infantry who died of fever, from exposure in the Bolan Pass, and Colonel Herring who was murdered by the Ghilzies, the service lost Colonel (then Brigadier) Arnold of the 16th Lancers, Captain Fothergill of the 13th Light Infantry, Captain Timings of the Horse Artillery, and Captain John Hay of the 35th Regiment Native Infantry. Scarcely any disastrous consequences resulted from the antipathy of the Affghans to the Europeans and Hindoos, owing, in a great measure, to the precautions used by the commanding officers against the too frequent resort of the soldiery to the town of Cabul.

By the middle of October 1839, it had been ascertained by the British Envoy at the Court of Shah Soojah, that the country around was, to all appearance, sufficiently reconciled to the new order of things to justify the partial fulfilment of the engagement contained in Lord Auckland's proclamation, that the British troops should be withdrawn when the Shah was once "secured in power, and the independence and integrity of Affghanistan established."

Accordingly, orders were issued for the return to India, by the route of the Khyber Pass and the Punjaub, of the whole of the force, with the exception of the 1st (Bengal) Division of Infantry, the 2nd Regiment of Bengal Light Cavalry, a Light Field Battery, and a detachment of Sappers under an Engineer Officer. These were disposed in the following manner:—

Cabul.—Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, the 35th Native Infantry, and three guns. The Head Quarters of the Shah's 1st Cavalry and some of his Artillery.

Jellallabad.—The 48th Native Infantry, the 4th Brigade, the 2nd Bengal Cavalry, some Sappers and Miners, and a Ressallah of Skinner's Horse.

Ghuzni.—The 16th Native Infantry, a Ressallah of Skinner's Horse, a proportion of Shah Soojah's troops.

Candahar.—The 42nd and 43rd Native Infantry, a Company of Artillery, a Ressallah of Local Horse, and some details of the Shah's troops.

Major General Nott (now Sir William) was placed in command of the troops* at Candahar, while Sir Willoughby Cotton commanded the whole force in Affghanistan.

On the 15th October, the retiring troops commenced their march, Sir John (afterwards Lord) Keane accompanying the first column.† Mahomed Hyder Khan, late Governor of Ghuzni, and Hadjee Khan Kakur, the arch-traitor, proceeded in the custody of Major McSherry, of the 30th Native Infantry, with the second column.‡

After Colonel Wade had forced the Khyber Pass, on his way to Cabul with the Shahzadah Timor Shah, he stationed small detachments at different points,§ with the view of keeping open the communication with the Punjaub, and watching the operations of the Khyberies. These detachments, consisting of Sikh troops under British officers, were attacked by the Khyberies, generally with success, but on the approach of the returning columns, they partially suspended their hostility. After these columns, however, had reached Peshawur, and it was deemed advisable to send detachments to reinforce the garrison of Alee Musjid, and supply it with provisions, stores, and ammunition, the Khyberies assailed the returning parties, killing and wounding several men and officers. The columns therefore halted until Colonel Wheeler should reach Alee Musjid, from Jellallabad, with the 37th and 48th Regiments of Native Infantry, a force sufficient, it was believed, to relieve Alee Musjid effectually, and to support the negotiations set on foot with the Khyberies by Lieutenant Mackeson,§ the Political Agent at Peshawur. Colonel Wheeler succeeded after a sharp action with large bodies of the mountaineers in restoring tranquillity, and the columns continued their route. Sir John Keane, with the Head Quarters, reached India without any other accident befalling the force which accompanied him, beyond a disaster on the Jheelun river in the Punjaub, where a few men and an officer (Captain Hilton) of Her Majesty's

* Her Majesty's 16th Lancers, 2 Companies of the 21st Bengal Native Infantry, and a Ressallah of the 4th Local Horse.

† A troop of Horse Artillery, the 3d Light Cavalry, the 40th Local Horse; 2 Companies of the 27th Native Infantry; Invalids of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, and the 2d European Regiment.

‡ Jumsrood, Alee Bughan, Alee Musjid, and Jellallabad.

§ The hostility of the Khyberies to Shah Soojah and his supporters, originated in the reduction by the King of the allowance for which the Hill Chiefs had stipulated, as the condition on which the Pass should be kept open.

16th Lancers were drowned. Sir John visited Maharajah Kurruck Sing at Lahore, and reached Ferozepore early in January 1840. Here he embarked for Bombay, and proceeded to England, where the honours of the peerage, and a pension of 2,000*l.* per annum were conferred upon him and his successors for two generations, as a reward for his services.

Although it had not been considered necessary to retain the whole of the troops at Cabul, it was still evident that there was much to be done before Shah Soojah could be considered in a perfectly secure position. Dost Mahomed had taken refuge in the territories of the Usbeks, and was endeavouring to move the chiefs of Khooloom and Koondooz to make a demonstration in his favour. Meanwhile, Russia, on the pretext of avenging herself upon the Khivans for the capture of some hundreds of her subjects, who had likewise been reduced to a state of slavery, threatened to march an army upon Khiva, and did, in effect, put her threat into execution to the extent of sending a large body of troops from Orenberg.* To check this movement, which was obviously intended to bring a corps of observation to the Affghan frontier, Lieutenant Abbott of the Artillery, was deputed to Khiva, and subsequently to Russia. He was followed by Lieutenant (now Sir Richmond) Shakspeare, who succeeded in rescuing a great number of Russian slaves, escorting them to their own territory. Russia could have no pretence for moving upon Khiva, if her professed objects were attained by the intervention and negotiations of the British Government.

To conciliate the chiefs in the more immediate neighbourhood of Shah Soojah's territories, several young officers, with the title of "Political Assistants," were deputed with offers which were, in most cases, accepted.† But some chiefs still held out, and amongst those was Sayud Hossein, the Padsha of Kooner, an extensive valley about forty-five miles from Jellallabad in an E. N. E. direction. A force under Colonel Orchard, of the Bengal European Regiment, was therefore dispatched to Pushoot, the principal stronghold of this petty sovereign, to dethrone him, and place on the musnud a chieftain more favorably disposed towards the interests of Shah Soojah. The military operation, as will be seen by the following dispatches, was not successful; but the disaffected chief nevertheless fled from

* The troops were unable to penetrate far into the desert. Climate, and the harassing attacks of Khivans and free-bouters compelled them to retreat, and the expedition was abandoned.

† It should have been mentioned, that Captain (now Major) D'Arcy Todd, had long previously been sent to Herat on a pacific mission.

the country, which was immediately occupied by the *protege* of the Shah.

TO THE RIGHT HONORABLE LORD AUCKLAND,

Governor General of India.

"I had the honor to acquaint your Lordship in my despatch of the 10th instant, that in consequence of a requisition from the Envoy and Minister,

2 9-Pounders.
1 Troop 2nd Cavalry.
1 Wing 5th N. I.
80 European Regiment.
20 Sappers.
A Regiment Shah's Infantry.
1 Regiment Shah's Cavalry.
700 strong under C. N. Christie.

I had detached Lieut. Col. Orchard, c. s., of the European Regiment, with the force named in the margin, to reduce the fortress of Pushoot, distant about 50 miles from hence N. N. East, and endeavour to capture or dislodge a refractory chief, who had, with a body of armed followers, established himself therein.

"I beg leave to forward for your Lordship's perusal a despatch I yesterday received from Lieut. Col. Orchard, by which I am sorry to observe, that notwithstanding a long and steady attack upon the gateway, which was represented to the Lieut. Col. as the only assailable point, yet owing to the inclemency of the weather, (though the outer gate was demolished by the fire of the nine pounders, and the bags of powder were twice laid against the inner one,) yet from the heavy rain they totally failed in the object required, and the troops were obliged to be recalled by the Lieut. Col., who, I regret to state, suffered a severe loss, having, as the accompanying return exhibits, had 65 killed and wounded; and amongst the latter Lieut. Collinson of the 37th, and Hicks, European Regt. The arrangements, as reported to me, that were made by the Lieut. Col. appear to have been judicious, and in my opinion would have been entirely successful, had it not been for the heavy rain which prevented the powder from having had its proper effect against the second gateway.

"The Lieut. Col. speaks, I am happy to say, in the highest terms of the conduct of the officers and men on this trying occasion, and their gallantry and steadiness appear to me to deserve the highest commendation.

"Although the attack was unfortunately not successful against the gate, yet the effect shewed itself, by the enemy evacuating the Fort of Pushoot, and also that of Kelake on the other side of the river, a short time after the troops had retired."

Camp Pushoot, 19th January, 1840.

TO CAPTAIN DOUGLAS, *Assist. Adj. Gen. Army of the Indus.*

SIR,—“I have the honor to report for the information of the Major General Commanding in Afghanistan, that on the afternoon of the 17th, the rain having ceased, and with every expectation of favourable weather for commencing operations, I issued the necessary orders to the detachment

for attacking, on the following morning, the Fort of Pushoot, and as it was advisable that Captain Abbott should have his guns into battery and the infantry be in the best position they could occupy before daybreak, we left camp at half-past 4 A. M. As soon as Captain Abbott could distinguish the gate, he opened the battery against it, and after firing for nearly two hours, succeeded in making a practicable breach on each side of the gate; when Lieut. Pigou, with a party of 15 men of the European detachment and 25 Sepoys of the 37th advanced, pushed down the gate, and proceeded to examine the inner one.

"The Bugler with the party observing them going forward sounded the advance, (without order,) which caused the storming party and column to immediately move down towards the breach, but Lieut. Pigou having ascertained that the inner gateway was closed, ran back, and directed them to get under cover from the enemy's fire, which was easily accomplished among the numerous ravines close to the Fort.

"Lieut. Pigou then returned and applied the powder to blow open the gate, but as it had rained without intermission from about half an hour after commencing the attack, from the damp state it was in, the very inferior quality of it, being powder of this country, it, unfortunately, failed.

"As from the situation of the gate, and from the nature of the ground surrounding the Fort, it was found impracticable to bring a gun to bear on it, Lieut. Pigou suggested that another trial should be made to blow it open, and a sufficient quantity of powder, nearly 100lbs., having been procured from Capt. Abbott, the attempt was made, but I regret to say it also failed.

"As it still continued to rain heavily, the troops had been exposed to a severe fire for several hours, Captain Abbott having expended nearly the whole of his ammunition, and every possible means adopted towards gaining an entrance into the Fort having failed of success, I determined at half-past 11 A. M. on withdrawing the troops from before the Fort until the weather cleared up, and certain measures could be taken to ensure success.

"Our failure, however, I am happy to say, has proved as good as having gained possession of the Fort; for a short time after we retired, the enemy evacuated the fort of Pushoot, as well as that of Khatake on the opposite bank of the river, both of which are now in our possession; but I am sorry to say, there is nothing in either fort but a small quantity of grain, and about 100lbs. of powder.

"I lament to say our loss has been rather severe, (a return of which is enclosed,) which was mainly caused by want of means to reduce a place of such strength.

"To Lieut. Pigou the highest praise is due for the gallant and meritorious manner in which he three times advanced to the inner gate under a heavy fire from the enemy, and laid the powder to blow it open, the failure of which can only be attributed to the causes already explained—to the party

who accompanied him, under the command of Ensign Pattule, the greatest credit is also due for the manner in which they kept in check the enemy's side.

"To Capt. Abbott the highest praise is also due for the manner in which he has conducted the arduous duties devolving upon him, as well as the great service rendered by him yesterday. I also beg to bring to the notice of the Major General, the conspicuous gallantry of Lieut. Tytler, who accompanied Lieut. Pigou on both occasions of bringing the powder, and throughout the day rendered me every assistance; I am also highly indebted to him for the manner in which he has conducted every duty required of him as Assist. Quarter Master General since leaving Jellalabad.

"I have much pleasure in bringing to the notice of the Major General, the great assistance I have on all occasions received from Lieut. Pond, whom I appointed as detachment staff.

"The highest praise is also due to every officer and man composing the detachment, who have cheerfully borne up against every privation and hardship; and the coolness, gallantry, and ambition of each individual displayed yesterday morning, elicits my warmest thanks and approbation.

"In noticing the names of officers to whom I am indebted for assistance during this expedition, I have omitted to mention that of Lieut. Dallas, of the Commissariat Department, who has on all occasions proved himself a most zealous officer in procuring supplies whenever there was any possibility of obtaining them, and also rendering me every assistance during the attack yesterday.

Return of Killed and Wounded of a Detachment under the Command of Lieutenant Colonel Orchard, C. B., before the Fort of Pushoot, on Saturday 18th January, 1840.

Camp Pushoot, 18th January, 1840.

| <i>Detail.</i> | <i>Killed.</i> | <i>Severely Wounded.</i> | <i>Slightly Wounded.</i> |
|---|---------------------------|--|---------------------------|
| Artillery, | 0 | - - 0 | Sepoys, - 2 |
| Sappers and Miners, ... | Sepoy, 1 | Naick, - 1 Sepoy, - 1 | Serjeant, - 1 |
| 1st European Regiment,... | Private, 1 | Ensign, - 1 Privates, - 3 | |
| 37th N. I. | Havildar, 1 Sepoys, 6 | Lieut. - 1 Havildar, - 1 Naick, - 1 Sepoys, - 9 | Drummer, 1 Sepoys, - 5 |
| H. M.'s Shah Shoojah's } 3d Regt. | { Jemadar, 1 Sepoys, 9 | { Havildars, 2 Naicks, - 3 Sepoys, - 10 | { Sepoys, - 7 |

J. ORCHARD, Lieut. Col. Comdy. Detachment.

J. R. POND, Lieut. Detachment Staff.

P. S. The Trooper of Captain Christie's horse wounded. Seven horses drowned in crossing the Forts.

Nominal Roll of Officers Killed and Wounded.

Lieutenant Collinson, 37th Regt., severely wounded.*

Ensign Hicks, 1st Eur. Regt., ditto ditto.

Jemadar Gunace Tewary, H. M. Shah Soojah 3d Regiment, killed."

J. ORCHARD, Lt.-Col., *Comm. Detachment.*

After the affair at Pushoot, the winter began to set in, and Shah Soojah with the Envoy, and a proportion of the troops, took up winter quarters at Jellalabad. Operations against Dost Mahomed, who was now ascertained to be under the protection of the Usbeks, were therefore in a measure suspended, and the political officers stationed throughout the country from Khelat to Cabul, employed themselves in testing the feeling of the country towards the restored dynasty, in assuring the adherence of those who voluntarily yielded submission, and in devising measures of hostility against those who still refused to recognise the new power. It was only at Bameean, on the Hindoo Koosh, that activity was rendered necessary, by the importance of securing the post, and of counteracting the intrigues of the Ex-Ameer, Dost Mahomed, with the tribes in the neighbourhood. The series of operations arising out of this policy extended over so long a period of time, and were in themselves of so interesting and important a nature, that the history of British proceedings in Affghanistan would be imperfect, if they were not described with the utmost minuteness, compatible with the dimensions of this volume. No apology therefore is necessary for the following copious reprint from an admirable paper, which appeared in successive numbers of the *Bengal Hurkaru*, descriptive of the proceedings of our political officers, and the small body of troops placed at their disposal. The details have never been contradicted, and may therefore be relied upon; and though it is foreign from the purpose of this work to give the opinions of the authorities from whom facts are quoted, it is but common justice to say of the author of "*The British on the Hindoo Koosh*," that his presages were generally justified by results—his opinions borne out by later events.

"The valley of Bameean, from Zohauk to Scorunkhdhurr,† its western termination, is about 14 miles in length, and varies in breadth from half a

* This officer afterwards died of his wounds.

† "The red gain," so called from the colour of the hills and rocks around.

mile to 80 paces. Between Topshee and the eastern extremity it is about 4 or 500 yards in width, and but little cultivated, there being a considerable quantity of bush jungul on the banks of the stream, particularly in the neighbourhood of Zohauk. Above Topshee the valley is exceedingly tortuous, and is scarcely wider than the stream, which, in fact, at some periods of the year, when swollen by the melting snow, does entirely fill the narrow opening between the hills; but at about four miles from Bameean the hills recede considerably, and the valley assumes a more pleasing appearance, being highly cultivated, and occasionally enlivened by a few trees, chiefly willows and poplars. Zohauk, however, is a pretty spot, as well as Topshee and Abinghur, a small fort about a mile higher up than the former place. Generally speaking, wherever there is a fort there are a few trees, and this gives a pleasing aspect to a place which otherwise would present but little attraction. The valley opens near the fort of Mooila Meer Mahomed, situated on a somewhat high bank, at the entrance of a narrow gorge leading to the north. Thence following the course of the stream up its left bank, the traveller passes two forts, one of which, called Lalla Khall, is of a considerable size, and perched upon a lofty cliff overhanging, and on the opposite side of, the river which separates the two forts. About half a mile beyond Lalla Khall, the valley again contracts, and the narrow pathway* usually followed, skirts the side of the rocky hills on the right, the base of which is washed by the river, which here, impeded in its course by rocks and stones, flows turbulently on. But after pursuing this straggling path for a distance of scarce a hundred yards, you again enter a more open space, in which, at about a mile and a half from the jutting rock, and close under the northern hills, our camp was pitched. The valley was here about half a mile in breadth: close in our front was a group of four forts, three of which were on the further or Southern bank of the stream: around them were a few trees of a goodly size, and beyond them, and close where the Fouladi valley forms a junction with that of Bameean, rose a dense clump of trees (somewhat resembling the poplar in their uniform straightness) situated in a spacious Zyarut or burial ground. On our right, and on a slope, in front of the big image, were the ruins of a village surrounded by a battlemented, but now dilapidated, wall. Beyond was to be seen the fort, also in ruins, where Yazdanbuksh, the Hazareh chief, had been some few years before treacherously slain by Hadji Khan Kakur. There are several other ruins in the neighbourhood, some of which are on a table land, which rises about 200 feet above the valley, to the South of it, and East of that of Fouladi; and which extends to the base of the lower hills of the Koh-i-

* The old road through the valley is a mere pathway, and uniformly keeps the Northern side of the valley, except at Zohauk, where it necessarily crosses the stream to reach that place. The guns were obliged to follow a different line, frequently crossing the river and passing through the fields.

baba range. These old forts appear to have been of a superior structure to those which are now met with in the valley: one of them, in particular, is admirably situated for defence, being placed immediately overhanging the junction of the two valleys; and separated from the table land to the East of it by a small dhurrah, while to the South the only communication with it, is by a narrow natural causeway. At the base of the eminence on which the ruins stand, flows the Fouladi stream, access to which is effectually secured by a small tower at the base of the rock.

"There are several streams, which, flowing from the neighbouring ranges, pour their waters into the river of Bameean. Of these the principal one is that of Fouladi, which, taking its rise among the rocky hills, which bound the southern view, flows from the south west, for about six miles, through a rich valley, nearly equal in breadth and productiveness to that in which we were located; the stream, after washing, as before mentioned, the foot of the eminence surmounted by the ruined fort, forms a junction 1,200 yards lower down, with the Bameean river. Still half a mile lower there is another stream, which waters a narrow, but well cultivated valley, lying at the foot of the eastern slope of the table land, and confined on the other side by more lofty hills. Near Ahinghur or Tifonchee, there are two other streams, also issuing from the southern hills, and at Topshees there is a considerable rivulet, along the banks of which is the principal road leading to the *Shaut* of Shuttur Gurdun* at Kaloo. Besides these there are several stony defiles leading into the mountains on either side, but these are for the most part dry, except at certain seasons after sudden melting of the snow.

"The view in the valley is at all times much circumscribed. From Bameean itself, barely two miles of the valley can be seen, and that principally to the eastward, for immediately at the foot of the big image the ground, on the northern bank, rises, and as the river bends to the southern side of the valley, the view in that direction is closed by the slope, above which, however, are to be seen the red hills enclosing the defile of Soorukdhurrah. To the south, looking from Bameean, rise a chain of rocky hills, rearing on high their dark, naked peaks; in recesses and clefts among these mountains where the rays of the sun can seldom penetrate, large patches of snow remain during the entire year. The hills, however, which enclose the valley on the north, are insignificant in height, and very different in appearance from those opposite to them; being invariably of a reddish hue, and of indurated clay, interspersed occasionally with huge rocks of red granite. Eastward the valley extends as far as the jutting rock before mentioned, while beyond, the spectator observes the rocks which bound the narrow valley below Jalla Khail, and towering above them the rounded summits of the hills, branching off from Kaloo and Irak.

* "Shuttur Gurdun"—camel's neck.

"As the detachment entered the valley of Bameean, everything denoted the rapid advent of winter. Snow fell upon our tents, on the 6th of October, when encamped at Zohauk, and again on the morning of the 7th, we observed it snowing fast in the northern hills, while a few flakes fell in the valley. The tall trees of the Zyarut had been stripped of their leaves by the cold wintry blast, and the corn, already cut, lay in heaps on the ground, where it was trod out by the "unmuzzled oxen." The approach of this rigorous season, is, amongst the Koosh mountains, at all times sudden, and occasionally it has been known to come on so rapidly as to cause the destruction of standing crops by premature falls of snow. It was intensely cold when we first arrived, and in a few days after, the thermometer fell in the morning to 14 or 16 above zero. The husbandmen hastened the gathering in of their corn, and we, on our part, began to consider the best means by which we might shelter men and cattle from the rigors of a mountain winter.

"Dr. Lord arrived a few days after the detachment, and in a short time, a bargain was struck with the owners, for the use of three of the neighbouring forts. These edifices are usually constructed of sun-baked mud; they are enclosed by a high wall about 30 yards square, and from 20 to 30 feet in height, flanked by round towers, placed at each angle, the summits of them being sometimes on a level with the top of the wall, but more generally about ten feet higher. In the interior are the rude huts which constitute the dwelling places of the inhabitants. The predatory habits of the natives of Central Asia have led to the construction of such forts throughout the whole country. Against bands of marauders they form excellent places of defence: the walls being of sufficient height to prevent their being easily surmounted, and being, as well as the towers, pierced for matchlock fire to bear on all the ground surrounding. Yet have they been often captured by both Affghans and Usbeks; often treachery, at other times the extraordinary negligence of the garrison is the cause. In the latter case, the capture is effected at night, and generally by one of these two plans. The first method is by introducing a single man into the Fort, who climbs over the wall, and, opening the gateway from the inside, admits his comrades. Another plan is, by quietly boring through the wall, to force an entrance into one of the huts inside, and thus carry the place by surprise. I have been credibly informed, that by such simple means as these, the Affghans have often captured forts, which might have resisted an open display of force for a considerable time; but great, indeed, must be the apathy and carelessness of the defenders to allow their forts to fall through such stratagems as these.

"The forts which were selected for the troops, were of that group which I have mentioned as being situated immediately in front of our camp, and were all on the further or Southern bank of the river. Together they formed an irregular triangle, the forts themselves marking the angles.

Two of them were allotted to the Infantry, and were of the construction above described; but the third, that of the Artillery, was of a large and superior build. It consisted of two compartments, each about 32 yards square—the fort lay North and South—the Northern compartment had lofty walls and towers surmounted with battlements, and provided with machicoulis. The other part of the fort was not so well constructed; in it, eventually, stables were erected for the horses. This was not, however, accomplished without much difficulty, on account of the great scarcity of wood adapted for building purposes.

"The Bameecanichs, or inhabitants of the valley of Bameecan, are Tajicks, while the dwellers among the hills around are principally Hazarehs. These two races, though perfectly distinct in origin and religion, bear to each other a striking resemblance. In either tribe is to be remarked the broad, flat face, with high cheek bones, and small eyes, which would best proclaim a Tartar descent: the Tajicks are, however, supposed to be the aborigines of the country, while the Hazarehs have a better claim to Tartar origin, as they, I believe, first made their appearance among the mountains of Afghanistan, with the army of Jenghis-Khan. Both the Bameecanichs and Hazarehs are extremely fair, with frequently light hair and eyes; their forms are robust and athletic; but their air is ungainly, and their countenances present more signs of stupidity than intelligence. They are simple, good-natured men, perfectly free from the blustering insolence and murder-loving propensities of the other tribes of the country. I do not mean, however, that the Hazarehs have not their blood feuds (which can only be ended by the murder of the hostile party) like the Affghans, but their behaviour towards us was peaceable and friendly. Officers could ride in the neighbourhood, unarmed and unattended, to a distance of upwards of thirty miles, while in other parts of Afghanistan, a man's life was scarcely safe beyond the precincts of the camp. The natives of Bameecan and its neighbourhood have long been a suffering race, being subject to the oppressive inroads of both Affghan and Usbeg, the former exacting heavy contributions, while the latter were wont to make sudden dashes into the valley and carry off a few unfortunate prisoners, who were thenceforth condemned to a life of slavery in Toorkistan. But there are some tribes of the Hazarehs, who, trusting in the great strength of their mountain fastnesses have long defied, both the Affghan and the Toork; among these are the Deh Zangee, Yehalung, and Sheik Ali Hazarehs. The two former tribes are located westward of Bameecan, while the latter, I have before mentioned, as dwelling near the passes eastward of Irak. These tribes are predatory, and are a source of terror to merchants with caravans, on which they levy duties as they pass through or near their districts. The Deh Zangees held, for years before our arrival, a post on a hill immediately above the hills of the Soonik Dharrabo defile, from whence they were wont to await the arrival of the numerous caravans,

which annually pass by that route. These tribes, occasionally make forages on less warlike districts, and the Sheik Ali Hazarehs have even visited and levied black mail in the valley of Bameean. The Hazarehs, in their own mountain land, are brave and resolute, and it is related, (though I cannot vouch for the truth of the story,) that thirteen men stopped the whole army of Morad Beg. That monarch, some years ago, invaded the countries south of his dominions, and after capturing Syghan and destroying some villages, he reached Bameean. But on attempting to penetrate by the Kaloo defile, it is said, that thirteen Hazarehs, posted in the rocks around, opposed his progress, and after slaying several of his men, so intimidated the Usbeg Army, that the Meer of Koondooz was forced to retrace his steps.

"Enough of these mountaineers—to return to my narrative. On the 15th, the snow fell heavily in the valley, and on the following day, those of the troops, for whom huts were ready, took possession of their posts; in a few days, the barracks were completed, and the remainder were put into winter quarters. But there was a part of the detachment, which, it was soon found it would be impossible to retain during the winter. This was the cavalry, consisting of about 100 of Christie's horse, and 800 Affghan horse, under Abdoolah Khan Atchekzye, Abdool Ruheem Khan, and Guddo Khan. There was neither stabling, nor a sufficiency of forage for so many horses, indeed we had some fear that we should scarcely find the supply of the latter article adequate for the keep of the gun horses.

"Under these circumstances, it became necessary to send this arm of our force back to Cabul. With regard to the Affghans, independent of the reasons above mentioned, we had others still more weighty for desiring the absence of those gentry; for Dr. Lord, soon after his arrival, discovered that the Sirdars were in active correspondence with Dost Mahomed Khan! So much for the fidelity of Affghan friends; yet, Guddo Khan, the elephant stealer, has since done service to the state in two engagements in the Zemindeawer and Ghilzie districts.

"But we did not long remain quiescent in our forts; for before the month had closed, intelligence reached us from northward, warning us that the time for action had commenced.

"The valley of Syghan runs parallel to that of Bameean, and is separated from it by a range of hills, 10,000 feet in height. In the palmey days of the Affghan empire, Syghan was subject to the Dooranee monarchs, whose rule extended to the banks of the Oxus; but during the civil dissensions which occurred in the commencement of the present century, the countries north of the Hindoo Khoosh were lost to the crown of Cabul. Within the last ten years, the chief of Syghan had been in the habit of paying tribute to both Moorad Beg of Koondooz, and to the Ameer of Cabul, or rather to whichever of the two states might have the immedi-

ate power to enforce such payment. But when the power of Koondooa fell, and Kooloom became independent, Dost Mahomed Khan asserted his supremacy north of the Koosh. At the time that Mr. Masson visited these mountains, Haji Khan Kakur, the Governor of Bamecan, exercised absolute power as far as the Dundan Shikun Pass; and only a year before our invasion, Meer Akrum Khan, (one of the Ameer's sons,) marched even as far as Kooloom, capturing Syghan, Kamurd, and other places on his route. It would appear from this that these transmontane chiefs never acknowledged the supremacy of their more powerful neighbours, until compelled by the presence of a force. At the period to which my narrative has arrived, the valley of Syghan was torn by internal dissensions. There were two chiefs in the valley, either of whom claimed superiority and the possession of the principal fort. Of the two, Mahomed Ali Beg was the actual holder of the fort of Sar-i-Sung, but his adversary, (a young Usbeg, by name Khilich Beg,) asserted that his father and uncle had been foully dispossessed and murdered by his rival. The consequence was, that the valley of Syghan became nearly a desert; the fields lay waste, for the one would not sow, lest it might eventually be the lot of the other to reap the corn. Neither chief durst move through the valley, unless followed by a numerous retinue, with mounted scouts in advance, to see that no enemy lay in ambush. The paltry squabbles of these Usbeg Montagus and Capulets, at length brought the British and Toorkistan forces into collision. Khilich Beg applied to the Wallee of Kooloom for assistance against his more powerful and successful rival; and that monarch immediately seized the opportunity thus offered, for extending his powers so far beyond his actual possessions. But there was other influence at work. Dost Mahomed Khan was residing, and in high favour, at the court of the Meer Wallee, and the expedition was probably entered upon more with a view to benefit him, by giving him possession of a stronghold on the very borders of the empire, from which he had just been expelled.

"About six or seven hundred Usbeg horse were accordingly despatched from Kooloom, under the command of Gholaum Beg, the eldest son of the chief of that place, and having joined the party of Khilich Beg, together they encamped beneath the walls of Sar-i-Sung, and laid siege to that fort, I should rather say, blockaded it, for they took no active measures for its reduction. A confidential follower of the ex-Ameer was in the camp of the besiegers, and, it was generally supposed, that in the event of the capture of the place, this man was to have been nominated Governor in the name of Dost Mahomed Khan.

"Khilich Beg having called in the Kooloom power, it was natural that Mahomed Ali Beg should turn his attention towards us; for he felt, of course, that he could not resist, unsupported, the power of Kooloom. He had before been subject to Cabul, and he determined on returning to his allegiance: he accordingly sent a messenger to the Political Agent,

acknowledging the supremacy of Shah Soojah, and in return requesting our aid against his enemies. He did not ask in vain.

"Had there been no other reason for our interference, this surely was sufficient; that a chieftain, who had long paid tribute to Cabul, (for Mahomed Ali Beg is a very old man,) and who had given his allegiance to the monarch of our choice, claimed our help against the ruler, who had received, with open arms, the known enemy of Shah Soojah. But there were other and far more urgent incentives to action. Our own safety was involved in that of Sar-i-Sung. It was essential to our well-being that that fort should remain in the hands of a friend. It would have been madness to have sat tamely, while our enemy was securing to himself the possession of a stronghold beneath our very eyes. The petty Usbeg chief could not have successfully resisted, for any length of time; the fort must have fallen into the hands of Dost Mahomed and his Usbeg friends; it would become a sort of rallying point to our enemies, from whence they could have harassed and annoyed our small detachment during the winter. It was of the utmost importance, moreover, to impress our neighbours with a due idea of our power, vigour, and daring. Had we, on the other hand, remained quiet spectators of the doings at Syghan, so manifestly hostile to our interests, such forbearance would have been attributed to fear and a knowledge of our own weakness. Fortunately, Dr. Lord was a man of a vigorous mind, quick and accurate in judgment, and decisive in action. Our small detachment was entirely thrown upon its own resources, and it became absolutely necessary to conceal our real weakness and insufficiency to cope with the dangers with which we were surrounded: at this period, a shew of irresolution or timidity would have greatly embarrassed our situation; but one bold stroke insured to us tranquillity and safety during the ensuing winter.

"Lord's plans were soon formed: he communicated with the military superior, and a detachment was immediately prepared for secret service, while the Political Agent despatched a messenger to Gholaum Beg, desiring him to quit Syghan immediately, and warning him, that should he remain there after sunset on the 30th, he might expect a visit from the Feringees. Lord's design was to make a foray or chupao on the camp of the besiegers; and the country between Syghan and Bamecan being of a very difficult nature, and the great object of the expedition being celerity of movement, so as to effect a surprise on the enemy,—no ordnance accompanied the detachment, which was ordered to be composed as follows: sixty-five non-commissioned officers and troopers from the Native Horse Artillery, under Lieut. Mackenzie; one hundred and twenty bayonets from the Shah's Goorkah corps, under Lieut. Broadfoot, and a detachment of Christie's horse,* under a native officer; the whole party being com-

* A small detail of this corps had been left at Bamecan, for the purpose of escorting camels to Cabul.

manded by Captain Hay. In addition to these troops, about thirty or forty Affghan horse, belonging to the Agency, accompanied the detachment, under the command of Lieut. Rattray; and the Hakim* of Bameean supplied his quota of one hundred Affghan horse.

"The destination of the detachment was not known until the 30th, and at sunset of that day, before which time it was calculated that Gholaum Beg must have received Dr. Lord's message, the party set out from Bameean.

"It was a long and weary march, and the nights were then intensely cold. At first they wound by a straggling path through dark and narrow glens, rendered still more dreary and dismal by the dim and uncertain light of the stars; then mounting the almost perpendicular face of the mountain, by a steep winding road, they traversed, for many miles, the undulating summits of the hills, until they reached the small fort of Akrobat, situated about midway between Bameean and Syghan. Here the detachment was obliged to halt awhile, as many were still behind, the cavalry portion having far outstripped the infantry, who were, however, mounted on tattoos; but there were many of them of but inferior description, while others had to carry double weight, so they did not progress very rapidly. As soon as the stragglers had been collected, the party again set forward, and, after crossing the Kotul of Akrobat, plunged into a series of the most tremendous and gloomy defiles. Here, through the darkness and the roughness of the pathway which they followed, they were necessarily obliged to travel with caution, so that the sun had already gilded the summits of the hills, when they reached the small valley and solitary fort at Iliatoo. Here the little party was formed, in order to be in readiness for the coming attack; and they marched on, expecting every moment, as they rounded some projecting rock, to come in sight of the Tartar camp; but it was not until they had journeyed some six miles beyond Iliatoo, that the fort of Sar-i-Sung, perched on the summit of a lofty rock, burst upon their view. As the leading files entered the valley, the defenders hailed the approach of the Feringees with loud and exulting cheers. These cries seem to have given the enemy the first notice of the approach of our troops, for when the cavalry debouched from some orchards which surround the rock on which the fort stands, the Usbeks were seen rapidly flocking to the centre of their camp, and mounting their horses, which were there picketed in rows.

"At first it was supposed that the Usbeks were forming line to receive our attack; and, the word being given, the native troopers and Affghan horse, led by their respective officers, dashed forward to the charge, while the infantry followed in support. But the idea of resistance never entered the minds of those composing the valorous host opposed to us; each man

* "Hakim"—Governor.

mounted his horse, and they fled separately, each seeking his own individual safety; some pursuing their rapid course down the valley, while others mounted the steep hills, inclosing it on the north. The troopers and Rattray's horse galloped past the enemy's camp, which remained standing, and continued the pursuit some distance down the valley; but I am sorry to say, that the greater number of the men composing the Hakim's quota, considered the Usbeg tents as the proper termination to the chase; for they pulled up, and immediately commenced serious work in what is in their eyes the main object of every expedition—plunder. This appears to be the invariable custom of the Affghan soldier; he never dreams of pursuing, but as soon as the enemy is driven off, he turns to reap what harvest may have been left on the field. It is thus that they have frequently met with complete overthrows, after having first gained the day; the enemy returning and pouncing on them when in confusion, and unprepared for a fresh attack.

"The fields around Syghan are, many of them, marshy, and the valley is much intersected by ditches, so that our men, not being accustomed to steeple chases, met with many awkward, but, fortunately, harmless, accidents. Fear lent wings to the Usbegs, and but few of them were overtaken. The chase was, however, continued some miles down the valley, before the troops were recalled from the fruitless pursuit. As for Gholaum Beg, though the greatest efforts were made to capture him, he got clear off, and did not draw bridle till he reached Kamurd. Khilich Beg, being hard pressed, shut himself up, with a few followers, in a small fort belonging to Murad Beg, about a mile and a half below Syghan. The pursuit was continued beyond this, and when returning, our people were fired on by the men inside; but, luckily, no further damage was done than wounding two horses. The detachment had not left Bameean totally unprepared for such an emergency, but two bags of powder had been provided for the purpose of blowing open a gate, should such a step be necessary. However, on being summoned by Doctor Lord, Khilich Beg agreed to come in and submit, a promise which he fulfilled a few days afterwards.

"Meantime, the Infantry had climbed the hills in pursuit of those who had fled in that direction; but they met with as little success as the Cavalry. The Goorkahs are famed for their activity, and the facility with which they climb the mountain side; but the Usbegs had the start, and kept it. They are not in general well mounted, but it is surprising to see the ease and safety with which their small horses gallop along the narrow, dizzy pathways among hills, which appear nearly inaccessible. So our men only got a few long shots at them, which did not, I imagine, cause much slaughter. However, it was not our object to destroy them, but more to instil a little fear; in order to insure our own safety. Their loss must have been slight, not above 7 or 8 killed or wounded: I

should consider that the utmost. Of our party, one Affghan was mortally wounded.

"This little affair, although so bloodless, no doubt created a favorable impression among both friends and enemies. About one hundred horsemen and the same number of infantry, put to flight a far superior body of Usbeks. Native accounts, if I remember aright, numbered the latter at six or seven hundred; but I fancy their strength would be more correctly stated at three hundred and fifty, or four hundred fighting men, with grooms and other followers. Of our own party, I have before mentioned, that the Hakim's men, mostly, stopt to plunder; the detachment of Irregular horse did not come up until the affair had been concluded.

"The Usbeks were completely surprised, and left their camp and baggage on the ground. It is said that when Gholaum Beg received Lord's message, he laughed, and said, "the Feringhees are elephants, and cannot move quick; it will be time to go, when we hear of their starting." He afterwards complained that we were down upon him too soon; for that he had intended to start at ten o'clock that morning. Poor man! he not only lost all his camp equipage, but his breakfast to boot; his pillau was found smoking on the fire.

"The detachment returned to Bameean immediately after having raised the siege of Sar-i-Sang; and the beneficial effects of the measure soon shewed themselves. Dost Mahomed's star, which had for a time shone forth, was again dimmed by a cloud; his fortunes waned, and the natural consequence was, that of those who had followed the unfortunate monarch into exile, many now deserted him in his utmost need; his funds failed fast, and the ex-Ameer was forced to grant a discharge to those of his followers, who demanded it. During the month of November, many of these, with their wives and families, passed through Bameean on their way to Cabul. It truly seemed an act of baseness to forsake the fallen man, whose favours they had enjoyed during the hour of prosperity; yet some excuse may be offered. They were reduced to the most lamentable plight, if the accounts which we received may be relied on. The Ameer had no money, and could not support so many dependents; they were therefore, obliged to resort to the sale of horses and other property, to procure the means of subsistence for themselves and families. They remained with him for some time, hoping that fortune would wear a more favorable aspect; but Gholaum Beg's unsuccessful expedition to Syghan, dissipated any bright visions which might have been conjured up, and Dost Mahomed himself, now lachar and dispirited, gave to many a written discharge, under his own seal, and bade them seek their livelihood elsewhere.

"During November and the early part of the following month, but little occurred to interrupt the monotony of our existence. The winter gradually increased in severity, but we were now able to bid defiance to the

frosts and snows of this dreary region. The troops were all established in winter quarters as comfortably as we could expect.

"The expulsion of the Wallee's troops from the valley of Syghan, had the effect of opening our communications with Toorkistan; and various diplomatic efforts were now made, which had for their object the capture or surrender of the Ameer; but unfortunately, these negotiations were unattended by success. It is certain, that the natives of Central Asia, have on some points very strict notions of honour; for though Dost Mahomed has been at different periods in the power of the Affghan, the Usbeg, and the Hazareh, and though large sums have been always offered for possession of his person, yet no one has been found base enough to betray the fugitive monarch, though he has trusted himself among those who were at one time his open enemies.

"Our immediate neighbours, the inhabitants of Bameean and its vicinity, appeared to be a quiet and orderly race of people. The lower orders especially were friendly and inoffensive towards us, professedly preferring the presence of our orderly troops, to that of the rude Affghan soldiers, who had formerly been quartered in the valley, and who were wont to oppress and lord it over the less warlike cultivators of the soil. They shewed a decided partiality towards British arbitration, for they almost invariably appealed to the justice of the Agent, instead of to that of the Affghan Governor. Such I believe also, to be the case in various other parts of the country, for these native superintendents are not much famed for even-handed justice; the longest purse carries more weighty arguments than the clearest evidence; and the principal object with these gentry appears to be the *screwing* as much money as possible, out of the unfortunate *ryots*. The Hakim, whom we found established at Bameean, on our arrival, was recalled, on the representation of Dr. Lord, before the close of the year. But there was one class of people to whom our coming was by no means agreeable; they considered us as interlopers, and industriously endeavoured to create a party against us; these were the chiefs, influential men of the valley, who, albeit they had no particular fault to find with us, felt their power was weakened, and independence threatened by our presence: no doubt, too, they yet retained some attachment towards the old *régime*, under which they had often enjoyed an immunity from taxes through the inability of the Governors to coerce them. These men, a short time after our arrival, united and formed a conspiracy against us: but, fortunately, their plans were timely discovered, and frustrated by the Political Agent, Dr. Lord.

* * * * *

"But little snow fell in the valley in the month of December, but the lofty hills encircling us were clothed in one sheet of white, save where rose some dark sharp ridges, which presented no resting place for the flakes. Before the 15th, the Passes over the Hindoo Koosh were closed against

all but footmen, and consequently our communication with Cabul became less frequent, and more difficult. But the roads leading to the northward were still open, and it was about this time, or rather earlier in the month, that we received reports from Toorkistan, which again interrupted the quiet tenor of our lives. In the course of the preceding month, we heard that the Dost had been meditating a flight towards Persia, notwithstanding several urgent solicitations or commands from the King of Bokhara to repair to his Court. On the 9th December, intelligence reached us, that the Ameer had quitted Kooloom, *en route* to Persia; but that he had been compelled to relinquish his projected journey, and to betake himself to Bokhara; and soon afterwards we heard that the Wallis was bent upon attacking Kamurd; and that the Ameer-ool-Moomuneen, (His Majesty of Bokhara,) had offered his daughter in marriage to the ex-chief of Cabul, with the Province of Balk as a dowry; and that, at the same time, he promised to aid the fugitive monarch towards the recovery of his dominions, by despatching forthwith an army of 12,000 men to overwhelm the garrison of Bameean. Now, although much credence was not due to such a report, yet it was not altogether unworthy of consideration. Prudence is by no means a bad quality, when it is not allied to fear; all of our little society at Bameean agreed that, though the march of an army from Bokhara to our valley was by no means a probable event, it would be advisable to take such precautions as lay in our power, and to strengthen our position as much as possible.

"The time had now come, when our little detachment of scarce 700 bayonets, was entirely thrown upon its own resources; we knew that no aid could come to us; grim winter with his frosts and snows had barred all access to our valley from the Cabul side, we were alone, and exposed to the attacks of all the hordes of Tartary. It was on a consideration of these peculiar circumstances of our situation, that it was determined to construct intrenchments, capable of resisting any attacks of an enemy unprovided with artillery. Our position was not a particularly good one, in a military point of view, being overlooked and commanded by hills on either side, at distances respectively of about 600 and 350 yards; yet no more favorable spot could be found in the valley, the distance between the hills being there at its utmost extent, and our three forts being so placed as to afford mutual defence, (forming as it were, the three angles of a triangle,) and to command access to either river. The table land above would have afforded a much stronger position; but the idea of forming intrenchments there could not, for a moment, be entertained at that period of the year, as there was no shelter for our troops. Dr. Lord, although he fully concurred in the advisability of erecting the proposed breastworks, was dissatisfied with the position, on account of the defects noted above; and it was partly with a view to reconnoitre the neighbouring valley of Syghan, in hopes of finding there a more favorable spot, and partly

on account of the moral influence which he expected a forward movement would create, that he determined on proceeding in person to Sar-i-Sung, accompanied by a detachment, eventually destined to garrison that fortress.*

"The party (consisting of two Companies of Infantry and 25 troopers as Cavalry, with two mortars and a 3-pounder gun) left Bameean on the 17th of December; and about the same time the intrenchments were commenced under the direction of Lieutenants Broadfoot and Mackenzie.

"Immediately on debouching from the defile, the traveller, turning his eyes to the right, beholds the grey battlements of Sar-i-Sung, while, immediately in front, and but a few paces distant, is the Mehman-Khaneh, by which name is dignified a row of dome-roofed huts, enclosed by a square wall; the accommodation which these afford, would not exactly accord with our notions of hospitality; yet, nevertheless, their dirty walls have, I doubt not, often yielded most welcome shelter from the wintry winds to the way-worn and benumbed traveller.

"The fort is perched on the summit of an isolated rock, about 120 feet high, and but a short distance from the hills bounding the valley on the southern side; its shape is oblong, the greatest length being east and west,—and the walls are of brick, and, though far from substantial except on one side, are stronger than those of the generality of forts to be met with. The rock on two sides (the western and southern) is completely perpendicular, and on the other sides, only sufficiently sloping to admit of the narrow winding pathways, which lead to the gateway in the eastern face; this latter side is the strongest portion of the fort, and is flanked by two well built towers. The interior space is much contracted, and subdivided by a second gateway, over which, as well as above the outer gate, is one of the *balakhanehs* or principal rooms of the fort. At the foot of the rock on the northern side are the ruins of a village, which was destroyed, I believe, by Morad Beg, and beyond these, and also on the eastern and western sides, there are some orchards of apricot trees. The valley here is about the same breadth as that of Bameean, and it is watered by a small stream, which, immediately after washing the base of the southern hills, flows close under the water of the Mehman-khaneh, and then, bending outwards, skirts the orchards, and continues its course towards the east. Eventually it forms a junction with the rivulets of Bameean and Kamurd, and passing Goree and Koondooz, empties itself into the Oxus.

* The agent sent an application to Cabul for a reinforcement of four Companies of Infantry; but, as expected, the supply was refused.

† "Sar-i-Sung" means literally the "top of the rock." I have said "is perched," but more correctly I should have written in the past tense, as the building is now no longer.

" From causes already mentioned, this valley of Syghan is far less productive than that of Bameean. Immediately in front of the fort, and between it and the northern hills, there are several cultivated fields; but towards the west, stony, undulating ground succeeds, and east of the fort, stretch for a considerable distance, some waste lands, green and marshy, entirely neglected by the inhabitants. The hills around are insignificant when compared with those visible from Bameean, as they do not form a portion of the great snowy range; their hue is generally of a reddish brown, their outline rugged, and though low, they are exceedingly difficult to surmount. The most striking feature of the valley is, as may be supposed, the rock and fortress of Sar-i-Sung. The former, viewed from the north or west, rises majestically from the centre of the orchards, which belt its base; and the old grey walls, diversified with tower and keep, frowning over the valley stretched below, remind the traveller of those relics of the feudal ages, which are still frequently to be seen in our own land. But this lordly fortress, in its towering grandeur, presents to the eye an idea of strength, far greater than that which it actually possesses, for immediately to the south, and within easy musket range, is a hill which entirely commands it, and which looks into the interior space, taking the northern battlements in reverse.

" The inhabitants of Syghan, Kamurd, and the neighbouring parts, are of several different tribes; even in the same fort, Tajicks, Hazarehs, and Usbegs may be found. Mahomed Ali Beg calls himself a Toork, while Khilich Beg, whose fort is about five miles down the valley, is an Usbeg; Kudum Shah Beg, again, who lives higher up and nearer the Dundan-i-Shisun, is an Hazareh. Ixit-oollah Khan, of Kamurd, is a Tajick; Sirdar Syud Mahomed, of the Dusht-i-Sufaid, near the Nal-i-Ferish pass, boasts himself a Tartar; Pursund Shah, of Dooab, is of the Hazareh race, and Baba Beg, of Banuck, near Kamurd, is chief of a tribe called Ajuree. Among people of such various races, it is not to be wondered at, that there should be as many interests as clans. Dissensions are, of course, frequent, and it is only when all are equally assailed, threatened by some external foe equally the object of fear or hatred to all, that the Usbeg and Hazareh, the Tartar and the Ajuree, will unite. Most of these were for a time our professed friends. Khilich Beg, however, was at all times an object of suspicion, and Baba Beg Ajuree never joined us; but he was one of the few.

" One of Lord's objects in visiting Syghan was, as I before mentioned, to see whether a better military position might not be there found than that which we occupied at Bameean. But it did not require great examination to shew us, that the fort itself was unfitted for that purpose, both from its size, (it not being capable of holding more than two companies,) and from its situation, being commanded at musket shot distance. The ground, however, occupied by the orchards and between the rock and the river, could have been formed into an exceedingly defensible post by the addition of some field works, as it had the advantage

of being screened from fire from the hill by the fort, which might have been held as a citadel, by a few men. The advanced state of the season, and the want of cover for the troops, however, prevented our entertaining any idea of a present change of quarters. There was no event of any consequence occurred during our stay in the valley. Lord's time was principally occupied in receiving the native chiefs, of whom several paid him visits of ceremony, Khilich Beg being among the number. It was curious to observe with what care this last named chief avoided collision with his rival; no doubt, too, he felt considerable satisfaction at seeing his old enemy obliged to yield possession of his stronghold into other hands, and to betake himself to one of his other forts, of a far less ostentatious description; for Mahomed Ali Beg held several either in his own name, or in that of his son or brother. Most of the neighbouring chiefs, either in person visited the Political Agent, or sent messengers to him; but the man of Banuck seemed to be of a stubborn disposition, and did neither, appearing to be not so fully impressed, as were the others, with our powers and greatness; on the contrary, while we were at Sar-i-Sung, a report came to us, that he actually meditated a *chupao* on our detachment.

*[The party return to Bamecan, and the author describes the march.
He then proceeds.]*

"Meanwhile Dost Mahomed Khan was an inmate of a prison at Bokhara.

"I have said, that the hopes of a brighter fortune, which this unhappy Prince at one time nourished, were rudely frustrated by the intelligence of Gholaum Beg's disaster; and the beneficial working of Lord's vigorous policy was fully developed. It is true, that the evil was merely averted; but as he could not possibly have foreseen the events, which afterwards rendered all the advantage, previously gained, nugatory, the praise due to him for having succeeded in driving the Ameer from the Southern banks of the Oxus, should not be withheld. Despair was largely infused among the followers of the fugitive monarch, and he himself, too, on whom care had laid its heavy hand, no doubt shared in this feeling, and suffered some anxiety to steal upon him, when he heard of the sudden blow struck by the Feringees, and knew not what more might follow. He no longer felt himself secure, and almost immediately prepared for flight towards Persia, where he felt sure of a favourable reception, his mother being a native of that country; but day by day he delayed his departure, perhaps with a lingering hope, that something advantageous might yet occur to prevent the necessity of so long a journey,—perhaps, through financial difficulties; but at length he set out, accompanied by his sons and his brother, the Nuwaub Jubbur Khan: his journey, poor man, did not end in the way which he had anticipated. I never heard the exact route by which he was proceeding, but he must have passed within a short distance of Balkh; for the Governor of that place, which is subject to the rule of Bokhara, sent him

a message, requesting him to give him a meeting, as he had some proposals to make to him on the part of the Ameer-ool-Moomuneen. Dost Mahomed sent his brother the Nuwaub to him, to hear what these proposals might be; but the Governor of Balkh laid hold upon the envoy, and declared that he would not free him until the Ameer in person came. Accordingly the ex-chief went to procure the liberation of his brother, and when arrived at that once famous, but now insignificant city, he found himself little less than a prisoner. Jubbur Khan was released, but the dethroned monarch was informed, that the king of Bokhara desired his presence. Perfectly helpless, he could not but accede, and, perhaps, at the time he entertained hopes of a friendly reception. The Nuwaub returned to Kooloom with his own and the Dost's family, while the other, accompanied by the young Khans, Akbar and Afzul, repaired to Bokhara. There, instead of meeting with the reception, which first reports led us to believe awaited him, the whole party were thrown into dungeons, and thus did Dost Mahomed, in fleeing from the British, who would have proved then, as now, kind hosts rather than enemies, become dependent on the caprices of a tyrant.

"The full force of winter set in at Bameean, about the middle of January. Before that time the party had returned from Syghan, with the exception of the Infantry, who had been left there under the command of Lieut. Golding. I must pass briefly over the next few months, for there was nothing worthy of mention occurred during them. We had frequent falls of snow early in the new year, and the frost increased much in intensity, the thermometer, during January, frequently falling to 10° and 12° below Zero; the rivers, both of Fox-ladi and Bameean were frozen over to a considerable thickness, and springs issuing from the hill side froze, as they trickled down, before they could reach the stream. Our houses admitted the cold air in a very unpleasant manner, and it was seldom that we could keep our rooms sufficiently warm, to raise the quicksilver above the freezing point. Fuel, too, was unfortunately both scarce and expensive, and long before the necessity for fires passed away, we were compelled to burn bushes and shrubs, even assafetida plant, and dried cow dung. This severe weather was found rather favorable to our European constitutions, but our men suffered severely from the cold. We reduced our number of night sentries as much as possible, on this account, and, fortunately, they had all been well provided with warm clothing, Government having issued *poshteens* (sheep-skin coats and cloaks) and warm gloves and stockings; still, the Shah's regiment lost several men from affection of the chest and lungs.

"The construction of the defensive works, commenced in December, was prosecuted with but little intermission, except at times, when the snow compelled us to desist during the winter months. The soldiers of the garrison, divided into several working parties, as well as about 200 Hazarehs, who were most happy to be hired, were employed in this use-

ful labour. But the work did not progress very rapidly; the days were very short, and the mornings and evenings too cold for such employment; the frozen ground too was almost impervious to our pickaxes, and in some places it was so hard, and so thickly interspersed with stone or fragments of rock, that we were obliged to have recourse to blasting. But our supply of powder was too small to allow of our expending it thus, except when absolutely obliged, otherwise we should have completed the lines much quicker. All idea of their necessity had soon passed away, yet we still thought our time well employed in their formation. After events fully proved their utility, for although not actually reduced to defend them against an enemy; still there is but little doubt that the knowledge of their existence alone prevented the more rapid advance of the Ameer and the allied forces; and thus, time was given us to augment our strength and resume the offensive.

"From time to time we received accounts of the progress of the Russian army towards Khiva, but this gave us no cause of anxiety, as the failure of the expedition was generally expected; our attention was more particularly directed towards the prisoner of Bokhara and the Nuwaub of Kooloom. The former had been deprived by his arbitrary master of nearly all his dependents, only five or six men besides his sons being allowed to remain with him; the remainder were sent back to Tush Koorghan. Jubber Khan, now left alone, seemed much inclined to accept the offer of the British, but he wavered yet for a long time. The Wallee had, very generously, yielded to him for his maintenance, the transit duties on merchandize passing through his dominion: so he was now better able to support his still somewhat numerous party. The principal cause of the Nuwaub's indecision seems to have been a threat, which, it is reported, the king of Bokhara held out, that the news of Jubbar Khan's surrender to us, would be the signal for the decapitation of his brother. Whether this was the case or not, I cannot say: but there is no doubt that the family long time feared that such a result would attend their departure from Kooloom. On the 20th of February, the eldest son of the Nuwaub, a lad of about eighteen years of age, named Abdool Ghunnie Khan, attended by a small sowarrie, arrived in our lines, having been sent by his father, with friendly messages to Lord. The Khan, a sharp, intelligent youth, was of course received and treated with the utmost kindness, and he in a short time, declared himself so pleased with his changed circumstances, that he would not willingly return to Kooloom, except for the express purpose of bringing the Nuwaub with him to Bamecan. He looked upon the Dost's situation in a very philosophical manner, considering him already a dead man, and therefore the fate which might await him, in case the Nuwaub came in, a matter of but small consequence. Some months after, the Ameer made use of similar expressions; for, when he was engaged with the Wallee, in his campaign against the Kaffers, being reminded that his wife and family were in our power, he merely answered, "I have no family, I have buried my wife and children."

" In the month of March, though the winter had not actually passed away, a considerable change in the weather took place. The snow had entirely disappeared from the valley, and the ice had been broken up and washed away by the swelling waters of the rivers; the days became warmer, though it still froze hard at night, (but no longer with such intensity,) and snow occasionally fell. It was in this month that there occurred in the neighbourhood of Bameean, one of those events, which so often happen in a country conquered, but not subdued; and which, however much they are to be deplored, yet cannot be avoided without injury to the interests of the state, or disgrace to its arms.

" The circumstance to which I allude was an affair which took place on the 14th of the month, between us and some Hazarehs of the neighbourhood. It was a very unfortunate event, and at the time led to much censure being heaped on Lord's head, through a total ignorance of the circumstances of the case on the part of those who blamed him. The contumacy of a few obstinate men obliged us to proceed to vigorous measures, which, however, I am glad to say, were unattended with gross tyranny and wanton barbarity.

" The valley of Pouladi from its *embouchure* leads towards the South-west, penetrating the Kohi Baba range. For a distance of some six miles, it is of considerable breadth, but at that point, it branches into several narrow dharrahs, each watered by a small stream, all of which unite at nearly the same point, forming the larger rivulet which flows into the Bameean river. These dharrahs run into the very heart of the mountains, the streams rising at the foot of the dark rocky clefts which contain the perpetual snows. Above the point of separation, there are but few forts, and these are perched above the valley's ter-
re-
plein, usually on some level ledge in the hill side, or in a sheltered nook of the mountains: but the spaces between the forks formed by three of these dells, are occupied by table-lands, raised above the bottom below about 150 feet, and of triangular shapes; upon these there are upwards of twenty forts, grouped in different places, but never at any great distance apart. Over these, there were two chieftains, Mir Moheb and Shah Nusser, who were indeed the heads of all the Hazareh tribes, dwelling between Bameean and the Kohi Baba: it was with the inhabitants of some of these forts, the subjects of the last named potentate, that our quarrel commenced.

" I have before casually adverted to the difficulty we experienced in providing forage for the horses belonging to our detachment. Before the winter set in, we were in the habit of sending men to a considerable distance, to a spot amid the hills near Akrobat, where there was a quantity of the long dry *chummun* grass. This was of a bad quality, very far from nutritious, but as a *pis aller* we collected as much as possible, until the snows and frosts drove our people to seek shelter in the valley, and thenceforward, we were obliged to depend on the supplies of dried lucerne and straw, which the neighbouring forts and caves contained. The natives sold willingly, though at heavy prices, as long as their stock lasted; but day by day, as time wore on, we were obliged to

extend our forage circle, although on the representation of the commissary, the officer in charge of the artillery had considerably reduced the daily feeds of the gun-horses. The commissariat agent travelled sometimes to a considerable distance in search of forage, even to Shibr and Kaloo. In March he succeeded in purchasing a large supply of boosah (at exorbitant charge*) at one of Shah Nusser's forts on the table-land. From this he was in the habit of taking away and bringing into the lines, a certain quantity daily, not having carriage sufficient to remove all at one time. But on the 13th, while he was thus engaged, a quarrel arose at the fort; it apparently originated between the Hazarehs and some Affghan sowars, who had gone thither to purchase grain for the use of Abdool Ghunnie Khan. The cause of the disturbance was never satisfactorily ascertained, but it ended in, not only the Affghans, but our own people also, being driven off and pelted. On this, one of our people, naturally provoked by such unmerited (for such it appeared to be, as far as we could learn,) treatment, uttered some threats which the Hazarehs received contemptuously.

"This incident we learned about midday on the 13th, and messengers were immediately despatched by the Political Agent, to learn from Shah Nusser the cause of the outbreak; but no answer was returned, further than, that he declined our interference *in toto*. Mir Moheb denied any participation in the other man's doings, and, as he was a superior chief to Shah Nusser, he was deputed by Lord to use his endeavours towards an amicable adjustment. He, however, met with no more success than our own messenger; all the answer was, that the chief was 'yagi,' or insurgent. Several other men of considerable influence in the valley, among them Moollah Meer Mahomed and Alladah Khan (ool Syudabad) were sent as envoys to the implacable Hazarehs; but the negotiations were all fruitless. The wishes which Lord conveyed to him, were certainly not such as he could have found any difficulty or hardship in complying with. The Political Agent asked him to explain the cause of the quarrel, in order that the offenders, on which ever side they should prove to be, might be punished. He further said, "If you wish to be our friend, you will submit to this arbitration; if I find our people to blame, you may rest assured that I will punish them; if you will not agree to make some explanation, I cannot but consider you as an enemy." Such, or to such effect, were Lord's messages; but Shah Nusser persisted in a dogged silence with regard to the quarrel; merely declining our interference, refusing to acknowledge Lord's authority; furthermore, he abused us as Kaffirs, and swore we might bring our guns as soon as we chose. Every means were used in vain to conciliate him. The urbabs,† whom we employed as our ambassadors, were the most respectable men of the neighbourhood, and if any one could have persuaded him, they could. There is no doubt that the promptness of the proceedings, which

* About this time, straw sold for a rupee a maund; and dried lucerne about 25 or 30 seers the rupee.

† The principal man in a fort is usually thus designated.

followed the Hazareh's contemptuous defiance, alone prevented the insurrection from becoming more general. In such matters, the greatest difficulty is in commencing, and the Hazarehs having thus thrown down the gauntlet, I think it highly probable that the others were glad to perceive the first steps taken; but that, with their usual caution, they waited to see what the result might be.

"All negotiation having failed; the Hazarehs prepared for our coming. The revolt of one solitary chieftain was certainly a matter of but little importance, although he possessed some ten forts, strongly placed. But Lord did not view the affair in that light; it was to be considered not what Shah Nusser himself could effect, but what results might follow the contumacy of one man, if allowed to pass unnoticed. Lord was by no means a careless observer, and he saw at once that such a spirit, if left unchecked, might rapidly increase to an alarming extent; that the spark if not extinguished might become a flame. He acted wisely and promptly: when he found his advances towards conciliation rudely repulsed, he marched troops against him; and this took place at noon the next day. Let it not be said that this was too hasty; it shewed decision, but not precipitation. As Shah Nusser dwelt only half an hour's ride from Bameean, 24 hours gave plenty of time for negotiation; it was clear enough, that if he conceded not within that period he would not yield at all. As soon as it was found that we must have recourse to force, expedition was advisable, both for example sake and to prevent the Hazarehs from having time to prepare, or to gain fresh adherents to their cause, by calling on the neighbouring tribes for their assistance; every day we delayed would have given them fresh courage. And so, next day at noon, four companies of infantry, two guns and about sixty horse marched against him; not because he refused to give us grass for our horses, but because he refused to acknowledge the authority of the then Governor of Bameean.

"*Quem Deus vult perdere, prius dementat.*" Verily they were madmen, the inhabitants of that small fort, who shut their gates against us, and appeared on the towers, with their matchlocks, evidently prepared to assail us. We had just come within sight of the table-lands before mentioned; they were immediately in our front, about 400 yards, distant. On the nearest point of one on our right front, we observed a considerable crowd of armed men, but on the left hand one, no enemy was visible: the forts on it were said to belong to Mir Moheb, while those on the one occupied, were the property of Shah Nusser. Up this hill we were to have ascended, as above was our object; but the foolish conduct of the fort below saved us the trouble. It belonged to the refractory Hazareh chieftain, and was situated in the valley close to the road, and about 450 yards from the position which the enemy had taken up. We were much surprised, when we reached it, to see the warlike attitude assumed by those within, for we did not expect to meet with any opposition below. The column was accordingly halted; and Rattray, the Political Assistant, rode to the gate of the fort, and commenced a

parley with them. They refused to open their gate; neither would they send a man down to confer with our party. After some time wasted thus, Rattray returned and reported his failure in inducing them to yield; but Lord requested him to try again. Accordingly, taking Ali Usker, a Persian attendant with him, he again presented himself below the turret, although by this time, the garrison of the fort were making signals to those occupying the hill, apparently to induce them to come down to the attack. Lord and all our party looked anxiously on, for we were not without some fear lest the Hazarehs should fire on the parleyers, while Rattray and the Persian used all their eloquence in vain. The people were assured by them that they should suffer no harm in person or property: that we did not wish to take their fort from them, but merely desired that one man should come down, and open the gate, giving us some assurance that they would not molest us: in that case they were told that we should leave them and pass on; but, whether from fear, obstinacy, or orders from their chieftain, I know not, they would not comply with such reasonable demands.* When Rattray announced the failure of his attempts, which had altogether occupied about half an hour, Lord turned to the Commanding Officer, who stood by, and said, "I can do no more, Captain Garbett; the affair is now in your hands."

"The party was then moved up, and the guns were placed in position; one against the gate of the fort, and about 30 paces from it, the other directed against the body occupying the hill at about 400 yards distance. The gate fronted the table-land, so that the guns fired in contrary directions. Attached to the one opposed to the fort was a covering party, consisting of about 80 Infantry of the Shah's 4th Regiment.

"As soon as this position had been taken up, and before we had commenced hostilities, a single shot was fired from the hill, and immediately followed by a sharp fire from both parties of the enemy. This at once frustrated the hopes still entertained, that the deluded people in the fort would surrender, when they perceived our intention to enforce submission. On account of the inequality of the ground, we could not run a gun up to the gate to blow it in; so round shot were used, which at first went crashing through, without doing much injury to the gate, as from being so close, the shot made a clean hole through the planks; but on changing the aim to the side-posts or stanchions, the whole frame yielded, after a few rounds. For a short time, the fire was rather severe, the matchlocks of the men on the hill reached us easily; and soon after the work had commenced, a skirmishing fire was opened, from the brow of the hill on the left, but we could distinguish no one, except when for an instant, the

* It is not true, as has been asserted, that we demanded the delivery of some disputed forage—our request was simply as stated above. It was really too much to expect that, without any assurance of their non-interference, we should pass on, and leave a hostile fort in our rear, the men in which might have annoyed us greatly, when ascending the table-land.

upper part of a man's body might be seen just appearing above the brow, now here, now there; and instantly followed by the flash of a matchlock. Just then our men were dropping fast, but the fire did not continue so general, but for 15 or 20 minutes; for after a shot or two had tried and found the distance, a few rounds of shrapnel from the other gun, drove the enemy from the hill in front; and about the same time, Rattray, with his Affghan horse, followed by a party of Infantry, galloped up the other eminence, and drove the skirmishers from their position, killing and wounding a few of them; but the majority took refuge in the fort, Mir Moheb's. Rattray rode after them to the gates, and, on exhorting with that chief, the latter declared, that his people had gone out in defiance of his orders, and that he would prevent all further interference. This was a rather gratuitous promise on his part, as the affair had now nearly terminated. The frame-work of the gate being thrown down, the company, which had hitherto been employed as a covering party, entered the fort, the garrison of which, with the exception of one man, taken prisoner, and some shot in the entrance, still held out in the tower. Several ineffectual attempts were made to reach them, but they had ascended through a trap door to the upper story, and then pulled the ladder up. Their resolute courage, poor men, was worthy of a better fate; but, what could be done? soldiers don't like standing still to be shot at, especially when their adversaries being behind a stout wall, they cannot effectually answer the fire;—so, not being able to get the Hazarehs out by any other means, some straw on the ground floor was fired, with a view to smoke them out; and a few rounds from the guns were fired into the upper part of the turret. But even this had no effect; they would not come forth, though the fire did not burn so fiercely at first as to prevent them from doing so. The straw smouldered, emitting volumes of smoke, but very little flame. It was a sad business; every man perished. When the firing ceased, we sent a Hazareh to speak to them, and then we learnt that none but women and children remained, who at the same time made their appearance on the summit of the tower. These, after some time, and with considerable difficulty, we succeeded in getting down from their perilous situation; this we were obliged to effect from the outside, as all the floors except the upper roof had fallen in. We cut down a young tree, and rearing it against the wall, a man was thus enabled to convey a rope to the summit, by which the unfortunates were lowered. The fate of the men was melancholy in the extreme; but I do not think they could have been destroyed by the fire, as they might have escaped to the roof, by the same means as the women did. Most probably some of the last shots from the guns killed or wounded all who remained.

“ We did not continue hostilities any further, considering that having driven the Hazarehs from their positions, together with the capture of the fort, would, most probably, have produced a sufficient example. Had we, at that time, advanced against the more distant forts, it is probable that the Hazarehs, as if driven into a corner, would have fought desperately. It was not our object to shed blood, but to reduce them

to submission, by persuasion rather than by the sword; and it was hoped, that by giving them time to cool, and to reflect on the results which might attend any further insubordination, that desirable end might be attained. We all commiserated the dreadful fate of the poor men, who had just perished, and regretted the necessity which had compelled us to inflict such a dreadful punishment. The fort contained only about twelve or fifteen men, of whom only one escaped with his life, but no one can justly be blamed for this,—the men courted death, they brought it down on their own heads.

“It having been determined to cease hostilities for the present, the detachment returned to the lines at Bamian, to await the result of fresh negotiations. Our loss amounted to one killed and 17 wounded, of whom four or five died. We had upwards of 300 men present, but scarcely 200 were actually engaged; and all our loss was sustained in something less than half an hour. Of the enemy's number, no accurate information could be obtained, but there could not have been more than 200 men on the hills. Some accounts stated, that they had lost 46 men, including 10 killed in the fort; another version gave the total amount at 53; but, knowing how much these matters are generally exaggerated, I am inclined to doubt that they suffered so severely. Mir Moheb's brother, a moollah, was killed by the cavalry on the hill, and some others, also fell, or were wounded by the sabre. Several, too, were afterwards known to be lying in the forts, suffering from shrapnel or round-shot wounds.

“Lord's overtures, after this severe lesson had been read to them, were happily attended with more success than before. Mir Moheb, who, notwithstanding his own tribe had suffered in the conflict, declared himself our friend, and that his brother merited his fate, reported that Shah Nasser was now more fearful than haughty, and that the Hazarehs were prepared rather to run than fight. It was deemed advisable under these circumstances to allow them time to get over their fear, which we anticipated, would be succeeded by submission. And so it happened; shortly the refractory chief, now humble enough, surrendered to the Political Agent, and was, of course, pardoned. One condition was, however, insisted on, that he should provide the heir of the fort, (who, fortunately for himself happened to be absent at the time,) with means to recommence his business as husbandman. In a few days, our relations with the Hazarehs, were on as amicable a footing as before.

“April shewed some signs of spring; a very heavy fall of snow had occurred near the end of the preceding month, which lasted two days, and was immediately succeeded by a quick thaw. After this there was a gradual, but perceptible change in the weather, and soon the earth became sufficiently soft to admit the ploughshare.

“But the snow still remained deep on the higher parts of the range, so that the Passes were scarcely practicable between us and Cabul, and our communication continued uncertain and difficult. Not so with

regard to the road leading northwards; Kafilas came in frequently from Toorkistan, bringing us the products of Bokhara, China, and Russia; the travelling merchants owning these were mostly compelled to remain with us for a time on account of the state of the roads in advance not permitting camels or laden ponies to pass; but some proceeded on their journey, hiring Hazarehs to carry their merchandize over the snowy Passes; and thus their yaboos, freed from their burdens, were enabled to accomplish the toilsome march. Dealers, too, with long strings of horses, some of superior breed, constantly arrived. Many of these were eagerly purchased for the use of the artillery, to fill their thinned stable, or to replace those, which, worn down by toil or the severity of the winter, were no longer fit for service. And camels also were about this time procurable in considerable numbers, but the greater proportion were sent on to Cabul instead of being retained for the use of the Shah's infantry. This, caused much inconvenience, and loss, both of public and private property.

Other and more important arrivals took place during the month of May, envoys from different powers of Toorkistan. Among these were a messenger from the Khan of Mazar, and another from Moorad Beg; the latter of these was Atmaran, an influential Hindoo, who had long held the post of Dewan Beggee at the court of Koondooz. After remaining some time with Lord, he passed on to Cabul.

The proceedings of the Nuwaub of Kooloom were exceedingly perplexing: about the middle of the month, a letter came from Baba Beg, informing us that he had positively started; but a few days after, he changed his intention, if indeed he had at that time really determined on coming in; several times pitched his camp outside the town, and as often struck it again; once he even sent his advance tents as far as Guzneeguk, the first stage from Tash Koorghans; and it was on this occasion that our friend of Heibuck wrote to us. However, our hopes were again frustrated. Other members of the family, however, possessing less indecision or less zeal in the cause of the Ameer, made their appearance during the month. One detachment consisted of some of his women-kind, a few sisters and an old lady mother, I believe, of the chief, and some nephews. These last were some of the youngest of the family shoots, young lads of 16 or 17, whose swords had not yet left the scabbard in the field, or black-eyed, rosy cheeked boys. Soon after these came Mahomed Uzim Khan, one of the ex-chief's sons, a fine, well-built young man, and a splendid specimen of the Afghan gentleman and soldier. At the same time too there arrived in our lines our old adversary, now our friend, Gholam Beg, the son of the Wallee, he who had fled so quickly from before Syghan, in November of the past year. This man presented certainly a striking contrast to the young Afghan: fat and unwieldy in appearance, uncouth in manners, with apparently as few mental as personal endowments, he looked neither the prince nor the warrior. All three in due course of time proceeded on their way to Cabul. There was another individual, too,

who passed through Bamian, the precise time of whose arrival, I now forget, and this was the crafty Vuzeer of Kooloom, the Moola Wallee Shah, who afterwards played a somewhat conspicuous part in the game of diplomacy.

"It was about the end of May or beginning of June that a small party, consisting principally of cavalry, left Bamian and proceeded on a tour of reconnoissance towards the northward. The principal object of this movement was to examine the Pass beyond Kamurd, the Kara Kotul, the last intervening ghaut between our post and the defile which leads down upon Kooloom. The natives of the country immediately supposed, that the expedition was planned for the purpose of *chupa'ing* some unknown delinquent, and some surmised that the party was about to effect a forcible seizure of the Nuwaub. However, Captains Garbett and Rattray (who were of the party) went with no such warlike intentions, though, I believe, some hopes were entertained, that the movement might have a quickening effect upon Jubbar Khan's proceedings. His arrival now was the only one required to render the political negotiations completely successful; and so every possible means was put in force, in order to bring about the desirable event, and even the old report of our projected advance was renewed.

"The party proceeded by way of Syghan and Kamurd. After passing the latter place they turned down the narrow valley, in which it is situate, and after a short stage reached Bajgah, a solitary fort, placed immediately opposite the embouchure of the narrow defile, which leads off the base of the Kara Kotul. Considerably to their surprise they found the fort vacated, and still more were they astonished when Sirdar Syud Mahomed, to whom it belonged, said, that he had purposely cleared it in order to present it to them as a post for troops, or for any other purpose that might be desired. At first sight the position seemed an exceedingly favorable one, strong in defence, and having a full command over the road leading to the Pass. Under these circumstances, it was thought advisable to take advantage of the Sirdar's obliging offer; a small party of infantry, who were with the detachment, was left in the fort, and a favorable report of the place as a military post was sent into Bamian. As soon as Lord heard of the fort having been given up to us, he wrote in to Cabul, both to Sir W. McNaghten and to Major-General Sir W. Cotton, who then commanded in Affganistan, strongly recommending the permanent occupation of the place.

"His arguments prevailed, and permission was granted to despatch the Shah's 4th regiment to occupy the fort, retaining at Bamian such portion as might be considered necessary to protect that place.

"Meanwhile the reconnoitering party had crossed the Kara Kotul, and descended to the village of Doob. This last Pass is, if possible, more difficult than that of the Dundun-i-Shikun; it is of considerable extent, and the path generally leads over huge masses of rock, placed in layers one above the other, like regular steps; beyond the Kotul the road in the defile is still worse. At Doob, as elsewhere, the travellers met with

the utmost hospitality; and having accomplished the object of their trip, they retraced their steps to Bamian, towards which place, the Nuwaub was now (the latter part of June) at length journeying by easy marches.

"By this time the garrison of Bamian had been increased by the arrival of a party from Cabul, consisting of 300 rank and file, detached from Captain Hopkins' (Affghan) regiment of infantry, and on the 29th of June, Captain Hay's regiment, leaving one company at Bamian, marched in progress to their new station; but this movement was not effected without some difficulty; for, as I before mentioned, no carriage had been provided for the corps; the march was entirely unexpected, until a very short time before the day of departure, and the hiring of baggage-cattle in the valley, was by no means easy of accomplishment. Fortunately, the artillery was better off in this department; so by borrowing a few camels, and hiring donkeys, sufficient carriage was obtained to enable the regiment to move to Syghan. The corps met, on the 1st July, the Nuwaub Jubbar Khan, with his numerous cortège, and thence, in two marches, reached their destination, without meeting with any obstacle, or any opposition from the inhabitants. But their troubles soon commenced. There were only five companies and one officer with the head quarters, and these totally unprovided with cattle, for those which had carried their equipage to Bajgah immediately returned: two companies were at Syghan under Lieut. Golding, and the 8th remained at Bamian, in the neighbourhood of which place Lieut. Broadfoot was encamped, being at that time detached from the regiment and employed in raising a corps of pioneers recruiting from among the Hazarehs and other tribes of the neighbourhood. Shortly after Captain Hay had reached Bajgah, there came thither one, who having been some short time in the neighbourhood, should have been consulted ere the place had been fixed on as a military post—I allude to Lieut. Sturt, of the Engineers, who had been sent from Cabul for the express purpose of surveying and reporting on the mountain Passes, and who arrived at Bamian about the 18th or 20th of June. It would have been well had the measure been resolved upon with less precipitation, and had this officer's opinion on the fitness of the place been first asked; but, as it was, he saw it after Hay was located there, and condemned it in toto.

"The Nuwaub reached Bamian on the 3d of July; bringing with him all the family and followers of the Ameer, except those few who were still in captivity at Bokhara. Among the former were two of his son's sons, Akrum Khan and Shere Jan, besides several others, mere boys. Of his other adult sons, one had previously passed through, and two others, Mahomed Azul and Akbar, were with their father. Jubbar Khan's retinue was still a very considerable one, notwithstanding the great diminution in its numbers, which had taken place at the close of 1839; there could not have been less than 300 male followers, nearly all of whom were armed and mounted.

"Hay arrived at Bajgah at the beginning of July; but before entering upon a narrative of the events that took place in that quarter, I will

endeavour to give some faint description of the valley of Kamurd and the neighbouring localities.

"It was scarcely worthy of the name of valley, but rather should be called a deep, dreary glen, so narrow was it and so vast the rocks which bounded it; through it there flowed, as in the more southern vallies, a narrow rivulet, but this, like the dell which it watered, was deep, far deeper than the streams of Bamian and Syghan, with steep banks, and seldom fordable. The valley (for I still shall use the term commonly applied, though it gives, but little idea of what the place really resembled) was approachable by two principal roads from the northward, the one by the Dundan-i-Shikun, and the other by the Nal-i-Ferish; besides these there was a small difficult pathway leading by a less devious route across the hills immediately in front of the Syghan fort. The nearest fort to the northern base of the first named Pass, was that of Izit-ool-lah Khan, a friendly Tajick; near this, the river (commonly called *Soorukh*, from the red colour of its waters) was fordable, though with difficulty, from the rapidities of the current; a short distance lower down the stream, there were two other forts, belonging to one Sula Beg; these were admirably situated for the purposes of mutual defence; they were on opposite banks of the river, connected by a small wooden bridge completely screened by the forts on either side. Of one fort the gateway opened upon the river, while that of the other was placed in the eastern face, or that looking towards Bajgah. In front of this entrance there was a small mud-wall, forming a species of rude redoubt; moreover, this front was flanked by a fire from the other fort, which projected about one-third of its length further to the east, so as completely to guard the approaches to its neighbour; both of these forts were of better construction than the generality of such edifices. At this point, too, the valley was so narrow that if the neighbouring hills were occupied, a party attacking the forts would be exposed to a close, plunging fire from either side. On the Bajgah side, reaching nearly to the very walls and extending for some few miles down, lay a dense tract of orchards, the trees being generally the apricot and walnut. These lands were enclosed and intersected by numerous mud-walls, adding considerably to the strength of the locality, if held by an enemy. Through these orchards led the narrow road to Bajgah. Further down the valley, was a fourth fort, also the property of Sula Beg. This was called Pyeen Bagh, and was situate, as the name implies, at the extremity of as "below the gardens" or orchards; it was a very inferior structure to the other two, and at the time of my narrative, in a somewhat dilapidated condition.

The whole extent of the glen from Kamurd to Hay's post (a distance of 10 or 12 miles) presented much the same appearance, with the exception of the change from orchard to field; but every where it was narrow, generally under 150 paces in width, and always enclosed by stupendous rocks rising above 1,000 feet above the bottom; tortuous too in the extreme, and at every bend you appeared to enter a dungeon,

no outlet being visible till you approached it closely, and the gloomy precipices rising on all sides like walls. The fort of Bajgah was on the northern bank of the river, and at this point the hills were even higher than at Kamurd itself, at a rough calculation upwards of 1,500 feet, or at any rate, I think not under that elevation. They rose for the greater part of their height nearly perpendicular, but above sloped off. In front of the northern face of the fort was the entrance to the narrow defile, leading to the foot of the Kara Kotul Pass. The other road to Syghan led eastward from Bajgah, down the valley; and, crossing the deep and rapid river by a narrow bridge passed through a small village, and entered the Dusht-i-Sufaid, where was situated the fort of Sirdar Syud Mahomed. Thence the road passed across the mountain belt by the long and arduous Pass, so aptly termed by the natives, "the carpet of horse shoes;" descending into the valley of Syghan, some five or six miles below Sir-i-Sung, and but a short distance from the strong-hold of Khilich Beg.

"But a short time elapsed after the occupation of the post, before it became manifest that the inhabitants around looked upon the new comers with a jealous eye. The friendly feeling which had, in such a marked degree, existed at Bamian between the peasants and the soldiers, did not shew itself at Bajgah; but, on the contrary, from the very first, distrust seemed engendered in the hearts of the countrymen. Captain Hay endeavoured to place the intercourse between them on a more friendly footing, and to encourage the natives to establish some market or bazar in the vicinity of his fort; but his effects failed, and he found the utmost difficulty in purchasing even small quantities of forage or grain. But though this sullen determination on the part of the inhabitants to keep aloof from the intruding Feringhees, was soon perceptible, yet it was not until near the close of the month that more decided signs of hostilities exhibited themselves. About that time, the first rumours came of the gathering of armed men in the vicinity, and of the frequent passing and repassing of small bodies of sowars in the direction of the neighbouring Kotul. Nor was it long before Hay had ocular proof that such was the case, for, on the extreme summits of the northern hills overlooking Bajgah, were frequently seen groups of horsemen, apparently watching the movements of our people in the deep glen below them. These horsemen did not, however, remain long at any one time, but rather appeared to come and go repeatedly, or, as if there were different parties all passing from the Kotul towards Kamurd by the mountain, instead of by the valley route. Whether such was the case, I have no direct means of ascertaining; but think it highly probable, from the fact of a body of Usbeg horse being shortly afterwards known to be in the neighbourhood of Kamurd.

"The plot soon thickened, and in a few days, there were several different bodies of armed men, principally of the Ajur tribe, posted between Kamurd and the Goorkah corps. Unfortunately Hay himself was at this time suffering from sickness, so much so as frequently to be

confined to his bed. He had, as I mentioned before, no officer with him; under these circumstances, he wrote to Golding and Rattray, (who had on hearing of these matters, proceeded to Syghan) to request that the former should be despatched with one company from the Sar-i-Sung garrison, to reinforce the Bajgah fort, which he did not consider sufficiently strong to clear the valley: at the same time, he recommended that the company should take the eastern road, as he understood that Baba Beg Ajuree had occupied the Dundan-i-Shikun Pass. But the garrison of Syghan being under the command of Captain Garbett, this requisition could not be complied with, until reference had first been made to the last named officer: this was done, and Rattray received discretionary powers to detach the company, if necessary; Garbett himself too followed closely on the heels of his messenger, and joined the party at Sar-i-Sung. Ere this, however, the Ajurees had withdrawn from the lower part of the valley, and immediately after Rattray had written to Hay, informing him that he had received authority to send Golding to join him, if he should think fit to do so, information was received that the Pass was again open. Under this altered state of affairs, the immediate necessity for the movement had ceased, and a letter to that effect was accordingly despatched to Hay; but it would appear, that this unfortunately did not reach him until after he had sent off a party to meet Lieutenant Golding, whom he supposed to be on his way to join by the Kamurd route; though such, in fact, was not the case, Rattray, having at the time, no immediate intention of detaching the company. But, unfortunately, Hay was misled by some expression contained in one of the letters received by him, though they were not intended to convey such a meaning.

"On the 1st of August then, Hay, being himself still suffering from indisposition, detached a serjeant (the only one with the corps) in command of two companies of the regiment, with instructions to repair to Kamurd, for the purpose of meeting and escorting to Bajgah, Lieutenant Golding, who, he expected, would reach the former place on the 2nd. Accordingly, the little party proceeded up the valley, and their march was accomplished without interruption. With the permission of Sula Beg, who appeared amicably disposed towards them, they formed their bivouac for the night close under the walls of one of his forts; but little did the poor soldiers, many of whom there took their last rest on earth, dream, when at night they lay down to repose, that the faithless chief was then plotting a foul conspiracy against them. But so it was; Sula Beg met them with smiles upon his lip, but with treachery in his heart: he wanted either the power or the courage to carry his own machination into effect; and so, upon the arrival of the detachment, he wrote, or, perhaps more probably, sent a verbal message to the chief of Ajur, saying, "See, I have the Feringhees in a *dhag*;"* they are

* "*Dhag*": literally a pot or cauldron: meaning that the party were in a situation, whence they could not escape. The term is rather an expressive one, applied to any part of the glen; but probably Sula Beg did not refer to the localities, but meant that he had them "in a fix."

ready to your hand : come, lose not the opportunity ; but if you are not here by noontide to-morrow, I will yield up my fort to them." He was not reduced to that alternative ; Baba Beg did come.

"The morning came, but with it came not the party they had been sent to meet, and the serjeant supposed that the march of the other company had been deferred, and accordingly, after the lapse of a few hours, prepared to return to Bajgah. The detachment, however, was not destined to quit the place in peace : suddenly, without the slightest suspicion of danger, having been up to that moment entertained, a matchlock fire was opened upon them from several directions, both from the walls of the fort and from the neighbouring orchards. They quickly prepared to resist their aggressors, and it was well they did so, for a body of Usbeg horse now made its appearance, and charged down upon the little band, which, however, stood firm and quickly repulsed them. But not so with the Ajuree footmen ; these were posted in such positions, as to be screened either by walls or trees, nearly entirely, both from shot and sight ; and from behind their cover, their long jezails played with deadly execution. At length, but unwillingly, Douglas, (worthy of his name and of a better fate*) was compelled to withdraw his men from the forts.

"Step by step, inch by inch, firmly, with a bold front, the little band retreated through the dense orchards and the wilderness of gardens, exposed to the galling fire of their scarce-seen enemies ; but ever and anon, wherever he could catch a glimpse of his foemen, the serjeant fronted his party and returned their fire. The contest was a very unequal one ; the Ajurees had both the advantage of the situation, much aided by their knowledge of the ground, and of a superiority of numbers. Moreover, they were accompanied by a body of horse, which, although they did not again attempt close quarters, was of material service ; for the sowars frequently took up some footmen behind them, and then galloping off, would place them in some convenient position whence they could better annoy the retreating party. Thus the fight continued for some miles ; our men were dropping fast under the fire of the Ajurees ; the wounded were assisted on by their comrades, but the dead lay on the ground where they fell, the serjeant, however, taking the precaution of stripping them of their arms and ammunition ; the disabled were also relieved of their burdens ; and to avoid encumbering too much the remnant of the party, and at the same time to prevent such implements of war from falling into the hands of the enemy, many of the muskets were thrown into the deep river which ran by the road side.

"The party had still some considerable length of road before them, and nearly utter destruction seemed inevitable, for their numbers were already much diminished, and their ammunition nearly expended ; but

* He afterwards rejoined the European regiment at his own request, and was accidentally drowned at Nonsheh in the river of Cabul.

fortunately, succour was at hand. Tidings of this lamentable affair had early reached Bajgah, and, fortunately, about the same time Sturt had arrived on his return from Kooloom. This officer volunteered his services to Captain Hay, and was immediately despatched with two companies to the assistance of the serjeant, and the joy of the little party may be imagined, when, at the very time at which their situation appeared hopeless in the extreme, they beheld advancing towards them the serried ranks and glancing arms of those whose well-known uniform proclaimed them to be friends. At the sight, the Ajurecs, till then triumphant, turned and fled quickly towards Kamurd, and the two parties united, returned now unmolested to the British fort.

"And such was the inauspicious commencement of the campaign which at length terminated in signal victory."—

Here the narrative breaks off, but we gather the sequel from other sources.

Encouraged by the success of the stratagem in the Kamurd valley, and by the small number and divided positions of the force at Dr. Lord's disposal, the Usbegs acting in Dost Mahomed's interest took courage, and gathering their forces together, attacked the little fort of Bajgah on the 30th. Previous to this act of hostility, there had been some shew of negotiation with Dr. Lord and Lieut. Rattray, the Political Agents, but, as the pacific protestations of the Usbegs were not sincere, they ended just where they began. On the morning of the 30th August, the hills around Bajgah were crowded by some 300 footmen, and about 500 Usbeg horse went down into the valley, among whom were Mahomed Afzal Khan, (the son of Dost Mahomed), Goolam Beg, and Moolah Wallce Shah. The Goorkahs mounted the hills, and drove back the footmen, while Lieut. Rattray charged the Usbegs with 200 Affghan horse. The Usbegs fled, with the loss of 16 prisoners, three men killed and 12 wounded. Thus far well, but an attack having been made by the Usbegs, about the same time upon the fortress of Heibuck, held by a friendly chief, and that post having fallen, the chief fled to Sarbagh. The position of the British was thus greatly weakened, for neither Sarbagh nor Bajgah held garrisons strong enough to resist the advance of Dost Mahomed, who was now understood to be approaching with the Mir Wullee's forces. It was therefore resolved by Lieut. Rattray to evacuate Bajgah, and fall back upon Syghan, while such a movement could be effected with safety. The march was accomplished with little molesta-

tion from the enemy, as far as the vicinity of Sar-i-Sung, where the Goorkahs bivouacked. On the 31st August, Captain Hopkins arrived at Sar-i-Sung with his Regiment of Dooraneees, a corps of Jaunbar under Capt. Hart, two-six pounders, and some Bameean horse. With this force and the Goorkah Regiment, it was resolved to cross the Durdan-i-Shukan (mountain,) and attack Kamurd before the arrival of the two chieftains from the north. On reaching the foot of the mountain, however, on the 2nd September, intelligence was received, that Moorad Beg had joined Dost Mahomed. This rendered all prospect of success in the Kamurd valley quite hopeless, and a return to Syghan consequently became a measure of prudence. In retiring, the Affghan Regiment under Captain Hopkins abandoned their colors and deserted, taking advantage of the deficiency of carriage with the force to plunder even the property of their own commandant wherever they found it unguarded. A part of the regiment was induced to return to its allegiance; the remainder joined Dost Mahomed. The fortress of Sar-i-Sung having been made over to a chief in our interest, and Syghan being considered untenable against a large force, the troops fell back upon Bameean. Here they were soon joined by the 35th N. I., and 200 horse under Colonel Dennie of the 13th Regiment, who had been dispatched to their relief. In the meanwhile, the Ex-Ameer, Dost Mahomed, was rapidly advancing at the head of a large body of Uzbegs. Colonel (Brigadier) Dennie immediately advanced to meet him, and on the morning of the 18th September, had the good fortune to encounter and completely defeat him. The Brigadier's despatch relates the manner of the action.

To Major General Sir WILLOUGHBY COTTON, G.C.B. and K.C.H. Commanding the Troops in Affghanistan, Camp Bameean, 18th September, 1840.

SIR,—“ My last communication will have apprised you of our having crossed the Irak Mountain.

“ At the urgent representations of Dr. Lord, Political Agent, of the proximity of the enemy to Bameean, I continued to press on to its relief by forced marches, and arrived here on the 14th instant. That same evening having drawn out the Goorkah Regiment, I disarmed Captain Hopkins' Corps of Affghans, who although loaded, offered no re-

assistance, and this essential duty, I am happy to say, was performed without difficulty. Finding no enemy in the neighbourhood, I proceeded to make arrangements for an advance on Syghan, where it appeared the enemy really was in force.

"These measures were, however, rendered unnecessary by his actual, but unexpected presence.

"Allow me to congratulate you on our having obtained a complete and decisive victory over the conjoint Army of Dost Mahomed Khan and his Usbeg Allies, under the Wallee of Koolloom. Last evening I received information from my advanced posts, that bodies of Cavalry were entering the valley from the great defile in our front, six miles from hence. Wishing to draw them well on, I did not discourage their approach, but learning this morning that they had attacked a fortified village that was friendly to us, and as these people had claims on our protection, it became necessary to drive off their assailants.

"From the reports brought in I was led to conclude, that only a few hundred had entered the valley, and therefore took with me only one-third of our force, with a 6-pounder gun and howitzer.

"I confess I was taken by surprize, after driving in what proved to be only their advanced party, to find an Army in my front. To have sent back for reinforcements would have caused delay, and given confidence to the enemy. It would have checked the forward feeling that animated the party with me, and gave assurance of success.

"The enemy had got possession of the chain of forts before us, reaching to the mouth of the defile. They drew up, and attempted to make a stand at each, with the main body, while their wings crowned the heights on either side. In dislodging them from the latter, I am sorry to say the Goorkahs suffered. After four or five volleys, seeing our steady and rapid advance, the whole force appeared to us to lose heart, and fled in a confused mass to the gorge of the Pass. I now ordered the whole of the Cavalry in pursuit, who drove them four miles up the defile, cutting down great numbers, and scattering them in all directions, many throwing away their arms, and escaping up the hills.

"Of the deserters from Captain Hopkins' Corps, not a few have paid the penalty of their treachery, and their muskets and accoutrements were found in all directions.

"The Dost, and his son Mahomed Uzyl Khan, and the Wallee, owed their escape to the fleetness of their horses, and were last seen with not more than 200 followers around them.

"The prisoners report, that the ex-Chief was wounded early in the day. His only gun, his kettle drums, with his camp, ammunition and provisions, have fallen into our hands.

"The number of the enemy was at least 6,000, and those chiefly Usbegs.

"I can form no accurate estimate of their killed and wounded, but their loss must have been considerable.

"I enclose a list of our Casualties and my Order of the day, in which I have endeavoured to express my sense of the conduct of the Officers and men in this brilliant affair."

I have the honor to be, Sir, your most obdt. servant,

W. H. DENNIE,

Brigr. Comg. N. Frontier.

Return of the Force employed against the Enemy, under the orders of Brigadier W. H. DENNIE, C. B., at Bameean, 18th Sept. 1840.

"2 Pieces of Horse Artillery, with detail—1 Lieutenant; 1 Staff Serjeant; 2 Havildars; 1 Bugler and Drummer; 23 Rank and File, and 7 Gun Lascars. 4 Companies 35th Regiment—1 Captain; 1 Lieutenant; 2 Ensigns; 2 Subadars; 3 Jemadars; 16 Havildars; 6 Buglers and Drummers, and 219 Rank and File. 4 Companies Goorkah Battalion—2 Lieutenants; 1 Staff Serjeant; 5 Subadars; 4 Jemadars; 17 Havildars; 4 Buglers and Drummers, and 252 Rank and File. Detachment Anderson's Horse—1 Lieutenant, and 100 Rank and File, including Native Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officers. Detachment Hart's Janbauz—1 Captain, and 200 Rank and File. Total—2 Captains; 5 Lieutenants; 2 Ensigns; 2 Staff Serjeants; 7 Subadars; 7 Jemadars; 35 Havildars; 11 Buglers and Drummers; 804 Rank and File, and 7 Gun Lascars."

W. H. DENNIE, *Brigadier.*

Return of the Casualties sustained by the Force employed against the Enemy under the orders of Brigadier DENNIE, C. B., at Bameean, 18th September, 1840.

"Artillery—Killed and Wounded none. Detachment 35th Regiment—Killed none. Wounded 2 Sepoys, one man dangerously. Detachment Goorkah Battalion—Killed 3 Sepoys, and 1 Horse; Wounded 1 Subadar; 2 Havildars; 1 Naick and 9 Sepoys. Lieutenant Golding's Horse shot under him—all the men severely wounded. Detachment Anderson's Horse—Killed 6 Horses; Wounded 1 Lieutenant; 3 Sepoys and 5 Horses; Lieutenant Le Geyt severely wounded—1 man dangerously. Detachment Jaunbauz—Killed 1 Sepoy; Wounded 2 Sepoys; one dangerously wounded. Detachment Jaunbauz—Killed 1 Sepoy; Wounded 2 Sepoys; one dangerously wounded."

W. H. DENNIE, *Brigdr.*

ORDERS BY BRIGADIER DENNIE, C. B.—*Camp Bameean, 19th September, 1840.*

"Brigadier Dennie has pride and pleasure in recording his sense of the conduct of the Troops employed against the Enemy yesterday, and congratulating them on the success which rewarded their efforts.

"The Brigadier begs to offer his particular thanks to Lieutenant McKenzie, commanding the two pieces of Horse Artillery, to whose admirable practice the result of the day was mainly attributable. He requests that Captains Younghusband and Codrington will receive for themselves, and convey to the Officers and men under their orders, his sense of their merits. Lieutenant Golding, with the Flankers on the heights, deserve by their coolness and steadiness, every commendation. Anderson's Horse, led by Lieutenant LeGeyt, severely wounded in the pursuit, distinguished themselves.

"The Janbauzes, headed by Captain Hart, proved themselves faithful and forward. To Captain Shortreed the Brigadier offers his best acknowledgments for the valuable assistance he afforded, as also to Lieut. Broadfoot of the Engineers, who gave him his personal attendance.

"Captain Arthur Connolly and Lieutenant Rattray, volunteers on this occasion, will be pleased to accept this mark of their zealous exertions being fully appreciated."

W. SHORTEED, Capt.

Major of Brigade.

Immediately after this affair, the Political Agent sent to the Ameer, Dost Mahomed, offering terms, should he be inclined to surrender. The Dost replied, that it was his determination to conquer or fall in the attempt. Brigadier Dennie therefore advanced towards Syghan with four guns, six companies of the 35th N. I., and six companies of the Goorkahs; but he had not gone further than Akrobat, when the Ameer and his Usbeg allies retreated from Syghan, after leaving garrisons in Ilistoo and Sar-i-Sung. On the 24th September, Brigadier Dennie entered the valley of Syghan, and immediately destroyed the last named fortress, in order to put it beyond the power of any future enemy to annoy the detachment it might be deemed advisable to retain at Bameean. On the 25th of September, a messenger arrived from the Mir Wullee of Kholoom, intimating his readiness to treat with us. Lieut. Rattray was therefore dispatched to him, and a treaty was concluded, by the terms of which the armies retrograded; Syghan was ceded to

the British; Heibuck to the Wullee and Baba Beg, the late chief, and the Wullee engaged, that he would not harbour Dost Mahomed or any of his family. After this treaty had been effected, Dost Mahomed fled to Nidjrow, and at the beginning of October, Colonel Dennis returned with his force to Cabul.

Having pursued the course of events in the Hindoo Koosh to their termination, it is now proper to glance at the occurrences which took place south of Cabul from Ghuzni to Upper Scinde in the year 1840.

The country remained tolerably tranquil during the winter months of 1839-40; convoys, detachments, Government messengers, and even solitary travellers passed to and fro by the Khyber, or the Bolan Passes, without much molestation from the tribes; and attempts were successfully made to organise corps of hill men, whose business it should be to ensure *permanent* protection to parties proceeding from Scinde, the Punjaub, and India. At Quetta, a corps of *Bolan Rangers* was raised, while bodies of Juzzailchies and Jaun Baz horse were equipped in the Khyber, and placed under the command of officers distinguished for their gallantry and intelligence.

About the middle of April 1840, however, the Ghilzies, who, it was supposed, had been subdued by Capt. Outram, again raised the standard of rebellion, and it became necessary to send out strong parties of troops against them. The first detachment, under Captain Anderson of the Horse Artillery, marched to Tazee, between Ghuzni and Candahar, where the enemy were understood to be in great force. Captain Anderson was joined by Captain Taylor of the Bengal Europeans at Naoruck. They had with them four guns, 800 infantry and 360 cavalry. The infantry and guns marched direct upon Tazee, under Captain Anderson, while the cavalry, divided into two parties, took circuitous routes for the purpose of surprising the enemy; but scarcely had Captain Anderson proceeded five miles, when he found the hills over which he had to pass crowded with Ghilzies to the number of 2,500 men. A smart action immediately took place, which is thus briefly described by an eye-witness:—

“ Captain Anderson formed on a neighbouring eminence, with Lieut. Spence supporting him on the left, but before Capt. Woodburn, who had orders to form on the right, could get into position, the ravines in that

Sketch of the Battle of
TAZEEL.





direction were filled with men, from whom he suffered much, and who were only to be dislodged by a shower of grape and a smart attack from the rear. The guns opened in fine style upon the horsemen, who twice crossed to attack Spence's flank, and suffered severely from the guns in passing. The enemy then charged, and were met gallantly at the point of the bayonet by Spence's men, which sadly discomfited them, and they presently fled. In the mean time, Captain Taylor, hearing the report of the guns, changed the direction of his march, and took the enemy in flank. Lieut. Walker, who had made a greater *detour*, did not come up until the afternoon. He had, however, fallen in with some of the fugitives, very little to their advantage, and reported that there was not a man of them left in the neighbourhood of Ghondee. The loss of the enemy was about 200 killed, and several prisoners were taken. Our loss is not stated positively; but it is said that Captain Woodburn's men on the left suffered severely."

Immediately after Captain Anderson's departure from Cabul, a small force was sent out under Colonel Wallace, with instructions to proceed to Khelat-i-Ghilzie, destroying *en route* all the enemy's forts or fortified places capable of defence. Meanwhile, Major General Nott moved up from Candahar to Khelat-i-Ghilzie, to join and take command of the various detachments destined to act against the refractory. These prompt measures speedily put an end to the insurrection. The forts were suffered to be destroyed without resistance, and the Ghilzies retired to their hills and homes, within six weeks from the date of their taking the field.

Attention was now directed to the state of affairs in Upper Scinde. The attack on Khelat, and the death of Mehrab Khan, were events not readily to be obliterated from the recollections of a people in whom revenge was a powerful principle, and independence almost a condition of existence. Receiving but a paltry compensation, in their estimation at least, for a forced abstinence from predatory habits, and impatient under the control of foreigners, with whom they had not one single attribute in common, and for whose habits, religion, and political objects they entertained neither sympathy nor respect, it is not to be wondered at that they should avail themselves of the earliest opportunity, after the troops in the occupation of the country had been reduced by gradual retirements to small garrisons and isolated posts, to re-establish themselves in their ancient independence. The Brahoe chieftain, Shah Nawaz Khan, who had been placed on the musnud at Khelat, as the

most favorable to the views of the British Government, (with Lieut. Loveday as Political Agent,) exercised but small influence over the tribes to the west and south of the Bolan Pass; they had espoused the cause of the youthful son of the former Khan, and only awaited a fitting time for the demonstration of their views and feelings. In the hills to the east of Dadur, and north of Shikarpore, the Murrees and other countless tribes of Beloochees panted for the unrestrained licence to which they had ever been accustomed, watching the occupied forts with extreme jealousy, and pouncing upon convoys and travellers whenever their unprotected state afforded the temptation to plunder.

It is difficult, if not impossible, at this date, and with the imperfect information at our command, to trace any connection between events occurring in different parts of Upper Scinde, within a short period of each other. Without therefore insisting upon the existence of concert, the circumstances which took place in that hostile territory will be described in the order of their dates; and, though politically considered, it will be seen that they all proved unfortunate, we have the consolation of knowing that the opportunities which were afforded in their progress for the display of the prowess and fidelity of the British Sepoy, were never in a single instance lost.

The first serious instance of the continued hostility of the Beloochees occurred on the 7th May. Lieut. Clarke of the 2nd Bombay Grenadier Regt. N. I., commanding a detachment of Scinde Irregular Horse, had proceeded to fort Kahun, in the Boogtie hills, in company with Captain Lewis Brown of the 5th Regt. N. I., who had been ordered to occupy and hold the fort with 300 bayonets and 2 howitzers. The duty of Lieut. Clarke was merely to take charge of the 600 camels which accompanied the little garrison, and to return with them after they had discharged their loads. He had reached Kahun, and was returning to Poolajee, a post situated in the level country south of Kahun, when at the Surtoff Pass, distant about 20 miles from Kahun, he and his party consisting of 50 horse and 150 infantry, were encountered by 2,000 Murrees. The hostility of their purpose being apparent, Lieutenant Clarke proceeded to arrange his men for an attack. His first care was, to provide, as he believed, for the safety of the camels by placing them under charge of the sowars; he then stationed small parties of about 12 sepoy each on neighbouring hillocks, and marched the rest of his men towards

the Beloochees, now collected to the number of about 2,000 on a height, a mile probably from the party.

After the firing had lasted about two hours, a bugler returned for the ammunition camel, from which it may be inferred, that the stock in the men's pouches was by that time totally expended, and before he could return, the sepoys were seen flying before the Beloochees.

The small parties on the hills witnessing the disorder of their companions left their posts, and endeavoured to join the camels and sowars, in some cases throwing away their accoutrements, to accelerate their speed. All were overtaken either on the spot, or before the unhappy fugitives could reach a village at a short distance on the road, and cut to pieces by the enemy. The sowars, witnessing the complete route of the sepoys, immediately fled, and made the best of their way to the post of Poolajee, and related the particulars of this cruel catastrophe. The camels were taken, and many of the camel-men killed.

The Beloochees, who fought like maddened devils, had about 300 killed and wounded.

The guide, Gunnah Khan, who witnessed the attack on the sepoys, gave the following account of the death of Lieut. Clarke. The sepoys, appears, under his command, advanced some distance up the hill on which the Beloochees had made their stand, and opened fire, but the Murrees who had ensconced themselves behind the rocks, were comparatively safe from its effects. Lieut. Clarke, after killing three of the enemy with his own hand, and two having fallen by the sword of his orderly (a young sowar) was seen to stagger from a wound; at this moment a Beloochee seized him by the waist, and bore him to the ground, when his throat was immediately cut.* The Murrees then proceeded to invest fort Kahun, with the view of either drawing out Capt. Brown's detachment and cutting it to pieces, or reducing the garrison to starvation.

Soon after this disastrous occurrence, the Brahoes having organized their measures for the restoration of Mehrab Khan's son, revolted at Moostung, and mustering forces from all quarters commenced a series of hostilities, which terminated in the loss of Khelat to the party placed

* In the narrative of Captain L. Brown, No. 2 of the Appendix, further reference is made to this young officer.

in authority there by the British Government. Their earliest step was to invest, in June 1840, the little fort of Mirree at Quetta, where Captain Bean, the Political Agent, was shut up with a small detachment consisting of 230 men of the Shah's infantry and a few Beloochee artillery-men. But formidable as the Brahoes (chiefly of the Kakur tribe) were in numbers, they could not daunt this little band, which, as will be seen in the annexed letters from an officer of the garrison, successfully repelled the first assault, and attacked the enemy so vigorously beyond the wall in the following month, as to prevent a renewal of hostile operations in that quarter.

"*Juttee Mirree at Quetta, 27th June, 1840.*—Since the 21st we have been on the *qui vive*. The first cause of all this was the assemblage of a considerable body of Kakurs, chiefly Panizyes, Laranzyes, and Bozyes, under a Yagee Panizye chief, named Guffoor. These had taken up their quarters in a deep and narrow gorge, 9 or 10 miles to the north-east of our camp, but their numbers had not increased sufficiently, to warrant, in their opinion, an attack on even our small force, which consisted of about 230 of the Shah's 1st Infantry and our Beloochee gunners, in all 250 untried men. The night of the 21st was passed in watching by all, the ladies not even excepted, for they, poor creatures, were too much frightened to take rest. At 2 A. M. all being quiet, Hammersley* started with four sowars to examine the gorge, and to ascertain the strength of the party in it, of which we were rather uncertain. He reached the Kakur camp at dawn of day, and having satisfied himself of the presence of about 400 men, he turned towards home to acquaint Bean with what he had seen. Some of the fellows who observed us, rode up the side of the hill, and took a few long and harmless shots at us. The 22d brought intelligence of a division amongst the Kakur sirdars, and of the Panizye chief having withdrawn his *Ooloos*, and returned to his home. It was also positively stated, that those sirdars who had disagreed with Guffoor, would come in to us, were we to send for them. This all sounded very well, but our suspicions were not so easily lulled—it looked too much like a plot, and we were doing our best to fathom it. In the evening, whilst we were all down at the lines, another spy came in and corroborated the statement of Guffoor's departure somewhere or other, but where he knew not. Our sowars too who had been scouring all around, saw no signs of an enemy, but still all were on the alert, as on the preceding evening. The following morning some of the headmen who were supposed to have quarrelled with Guffoor, offered to come in, if sent for, and about 2 P. M. they arrived at Bean's house, having left their followers (80 men) at our Bolan Ranger camp. Shah Buzoory, a

* *Lieut. Hammersley of the 41st Bengal N. I.*, a gallant young soldier, who had raised the corps of Bolan Rangers.

Doomur Kakur, who bears the rank of a Soobadar in the Rangers, on hearing of the arrival of these men in his camp, advised us to send for the headmen and to keep them safe till all was over, as it would prevent their men from acting against us in the attack, which was sure to take place that night, and that he would watch the motions of the others, and let us know if any thing suspicious should occur during the night. As our adviser had always behaved well, we determined upon following his instructions by confining the sirdars. When these men came to Bean's house for the ostensible purpose of making their salaam and entering our service, we requested the pleasure of their society till all should be arranged; but at the same time they were informed that they should be well treated and well rewarded in the event of their establishing proofs of their honesty. Well, night came on, and with it positive information from divers quarters of the advance of the Kakurs, to the number of 1000: sowars were posted at the different points, at which we expected the lushkur to enter the plain. Piquets were planted all round, with instructions to fire on the approach of any large body, and then to retire on the magazine and quarter guard, which adjoin one another, and which we made our standing point in the event of our piquets being obliged to retire. Sand bags were arranged to the height of two feet in front, the treasure was placed within these, and the two ladies and children within the magazine. The 9-pounder was placed at the right front angle and 6-pounder at the left front angle, supported by all the available Infantry. Unfortunately there was a bazar about 100 yards in front, and several other buildings all around, which would serve to shelter an enemy; still our position was the best we could find, as all the magazine was there, and we could not possibly remove the stores under three days, neither could we divide our small force between it and any more eligible situations. From dusk till midnight nothing more occurred to lead us to suppose the enemy were near, and we were beginning to think that they had repented of their designs, when a sowar galloped in and informed us of the move of the lushkur. This man was followed by another and another, till at last each had only to ride a little in front of the piquet to satisfy himself of the approach of a large body of men. On they came, as quietly as possible, till they reached or nearly reached the right of the lines, where the Horse Artillery stables stand; there they set up a most fiendish shout, which they kept up till they arrived within grape range from the 6-pounder; the first round missed the main body, but the second did great execution, and I am sure it must have told well, for it completely stopped the yelling, and sent the vocalists flying into and behind the bazar for shelter; some passed through the bazar, but were soon driven back by the 9-pounder and the musketry.

"It now became necessary to detach a few men to the top of the bazar, for the purpose of driving them out; a few rounds accomplished this, and gave Bean, who stood to the 9-pounder, a few capital shots, which once more drove the cowardly rascals back to shelter; but they were not allowed to remain there long, for Griffin with a party of

sepoys, walked up to the opposite end of the bazar from that to which the first party proceeded; a volley did the business, and drove the Kakurs right in front of my gun (the 6-pounder.) We gave them a few rounds as they made off, and if we did not kill many, we did our best, depend upon it. This was the *finale*: a few straggling shots were fired on us as the enemy retreated, but with no effect. The first gun was fired about $\frac{1}{2}$ past 2 or $\frac{1}{4}$ before 3 A. M., and all the Kakurs had fled by dawn. A few were cut up during the retreat, by half a dozen sowars, and had we had but a few good cavalry or sowars, many more would have been disposed of ere they could have reached the hills. The accounts of the number of Kakurs who actually came down vary much; some say that the main body consisted of 1000 men, and others that they were only 800 in the larger body, but that there were other parties to the amount of 600 men ready to fall on our rear and flanks, had they an opportunity of doing so. I forgot to mention to you that the 10 men we confined in the afternoon, all declared that no attack was intended, but on their being brought out and lodged in front of the magazine, and assured that they should be liberated in the event of their words coming true, but that on the contrary, all should die, the moment a shot was fired at us, the hearts of some failed, and they confessed that an attack was to take place just before day-light, and at the very point where we were best prepared. One of these prisoners declared, that he would prevent the attack being made if allowed to go away, but this was not what we wished, and we told him so. I must tell you of a circumstance which will give you some idea of the barbarous tribes we have to deal with. They have an idea that certain men have the power of rendering the sword and bullets of their adversaries harmless—the Murrees are supposed to possess this spell, and are said to have executed it on that unfortunate occasion, when Lieut. Clarke's party was cut up in Cutchee, and, I myself, have heard many of the Kakurs declare most solemnly, that they had seen the bullets strike the Murrees with a force that would have killed any other men, but that they always fell harmless, as if they had struck a statue. Well, it seems that they have an idea here that we too can deal in charms of this kind, for on the morning of the attack, just as the Kakurs reached a spot where the shooting commenced, it halted for a moment to work a counter-spell which would completely defeat our witchcraft. This counter-spell consisted in sacrificing a dog by cutting off its head, tail and legs, but I don't think they will trust to this on another occasion. The 9-pounders fired 16 rounds of grape, the 6-pounders fired 6 of grape and 3 of round shot. Our loss was trifling, only two Beloochee gunners and one of the 1st Regiment of sepoys wounded. Of the enemy 16 were found shot dead by grape and small shot, six were cut up by the few sowars who followed in pursuit, and three were taken prisoners; but the number carried off wounded is reported to have been an enormous proportion; 100 wounded, 60 of them mortally and 40 slightly. There are also 80 missing, and supposed to have died of their wounds whilst endeavouring to escape through the hills. This may be, in some measure, an exaggeration; but judging from the traces of blood

visible in all directions, and knowing that it is usual for these savages to carry off their wounded and dead too, if possible, I should say that the number of wounded cannot fall far short of what has been reported.

"The ladies, on whose account we are most anxious, have hitherto behaved most nobly, and when shut up in a close and dirty magazine, their coolness and passive courage could not have been surpassed."

"QUETTA.—" *Quetta, 10th July, 1840.*—My last letter to you despatched from this, was dated the 8th, and since that I have scarcely been in bed. Every succeeding hour was bringing us fresh rumours of an advancing foe, and we have been incessantly under arms day and night. Yesterday morning the enemy hove in sight with swarms of cavalry and infantry round the slope of a hill to the westward. Their number was estimated at 5000, and they took up a long line of encampment, partially investing the town. The previous evening I went through the ceremony of erecting on the citadel the Union jack, Shah Soojah's flag, and the regimental colour, which were placed upon the highest bastions amidst a general salute and three hearty cheers. The enemy in the morning sent a party of cavalry to cut lucerne in a field, some distance from their camp, and within range of our guns. Lieut. Bosanquet went out with 30 of his suwars to drive them off, but a body of their Infantry advanced and commenced a fire, while a slight skirmish took place with the enemy's suwars, and several casualties occurred, among which Bosanquet received a slight sabre cut on his bridle hand; one of his suwars was cut down, and two horses wounded. Our guns then opened with round shot and *skivered* a few men and horses. At 4 p. m. they again advanced in detached parties, but were soon scared with the 9-pounder round shot. It was determined among them to scale our walls, or dig them down by night, and they had brought for the latter purpose all the spades and shovels of Mustoong. At 1 a. m. as the moon went down, we heard their 'nukarus' beating, and the walls and bastions of the fort were immediately manned, but after 3 hours' impatient suspense, day-break discovered to us their camp in 'statu quo.' They very soon, however, appeared moving in masses, for the purpose of plundering the villages in the distance, and from the firing we heard, there must have been a great deal of resistance made. A little after sunrise they advanced in bodies of cavalry towards the town, but our guns opened upon them with grape and round shot with fearful effect, falling slap into their masses and rolling over men and horses in splendid style. It remains now to be seen whether they will dare a reconnoitre with our small arms from the walls. We have 600 men on the walls. Bosanquet's troopers are all supplied with muskets from my spare arms, and take the Northern wall, acting as foot soldiers.

"The 42d, 4 guns and 300 cavalry had received orders to hold themselves in readiness to march at a moment's notice to our assistance, and may be expected here in a few days.

" *Quetta, 19th and 20th July.*—The enemy raised the siege of Quetta on the morning of the 17th, suddenly breaking up their Camp and retreating on Mustoong after having kept us in expectation of a storm for seven days and nights, during which time, scarcely a man had off his accoutrements. We had some pretty Cavalry skirmishes outside the walls, without very many severe casualties.

" The enemy left behind all their scaling ladders, by which they had intended mounting the walls by six abreast.

" You have no idea what a period of anxiety it has been to us, surrounded as we were by such a faithless race.

" Two of Captain Bean's own chuprasees had actually volunteered to lead and place the ladders at the weakest points; another personal attendant, decked with presents and riding one of Bean's own horses, (as a conceived valuable servant,) went over to the enemy. They appear to have made certain of taking the town, and certainly their numbers were in their favor, (6000 at least) and the walls of the town are low, broken and extensive.

" The Chiefs quarrelled among themselves on the night of the 16th, and the several parties in a couple of hours more (had they remained) would have themselves been engaged in a bloody feud. All my men (500) were on the walls, and would gallantly have defended them to the last, but all things considered, it is as well that the attempt was never made. The Kakur tribe joined the enemy and swelled their ranks much. The people of the town itself, I always feared, and between two fires, what could our utmost exertions have effected? In such a case, not one amongst us could have survived. On the morning of the 16th, an advance was made by the enemy, amidst clouds of dust, firing and smoke. The walls were manned and all ready to receive the attack, when their plans were disconcerted by the sudden arrival of 150 Affghan horse under Lieutenant Jackson, by an unsuspected route on their flank. He had several casualties, and the enemy amidst the dust and confusion, fancying it a larger body, retreated to their camp. On such trifling events depend the fate of thousands, for thousands must have fallen that day, under the galling fire of guns and musketry. The enemy were all mad to take Bean's life. Mahomed Hoossein Khan, the Chief, a son of the late Khan of Kheilat calls him the murderer of his father. From the 23d of last month until this time, I have slept in my clothes every night—my mind has been constantly on the rack for the safety of Quetta. I knew that while the British flag floated on the Citadel, no British arm would fail to defend its honor, and I knew that should it fall, not one European would live to witness it, but then the very idea that it should fall to such a set of villains was enough to harrow up the very soul! All now, I hope, is right, and the people of the country have seen the folly of their ways, and may they renounce them."

Immediately after these affairs, considerable reinforcements reached Quetta from Candahar, and the enemy gradually drew off and did not

renew their attack. Operations, however, against Khelat next occupied the attention of these Beloochees, and accordingly we find them before the fort about the middle of August 1840. For the particulars of the manner in which they assailed this stronghold, and ultimately became its possessors, we are indebted to the journal kept by Mr. Masson, a traveller, who happened, during the siege, to be with Lieut. Loveday, the political officer in charge. Stripping it of its purely personal details, we are presented with the following:—

"Associated with Lieut. Loveday and his fortunes, I naturally enquired as to what measures had been taken for the defence of the town. It was too plain, that Shah Nawaz Khan had been too much occupied in the management of his unruly Brahoes, or too oppressed by natural carelessness, to take any, and no attention had been given to the repairs of the walls, or to any thing else. Neither had Lieut. Loveday at all interested himself, although he had been recommended by some, and wisely too, I think, to take charge of the defence. I had heard much of the works with which he had strengthened his own residence; they however were trifling, and the house was not tenable under attack for a quarter of an hour even to Brahoes assailants. I endeavoured to put a little spirit into the affair, and caused some of the most glaring defects in the town walls to be obviated, and had some of the dead walls which might afford shelter to a foe, without the walls, pulled down; but there was not time to do much. I saw also that the people of the Khan were set about the casting of the bullets, as if it was meant to fight, there must be something to fight with. Shah Nawaz Khan was pleased to see me at Lieut. Loveday's house. On the day following my location at Lieut. Loveday's house, Shah Nawaz Khan withdrew his men into the town, and told them off to the walls. To Kamal Khan, Ettars Zai of Baghwan, and Khan Mahomed Khan, son of Isa Khan of Wadd, he confided the southern gate called Gil Khan, with an outwork at that point called the Sangar. The eastern gate, or Dil Dar, he entrusted to the son of Rashed Khan's party,—between whom and Kamal Khan's men, Mir Boher was stationed with his boy; the Mir on account of Rashed Khan's son being a child, was actually the head of the Zehri contingent, which being numerous, had nearly the whole eastern front of the town to defend. The northern or Mustang gate being adjoining to Lieut. Loveday's residence was considered under his charge, but Omar Khan Kakshani was fixed, subject in it to Lieut. Loveday's order. From the Derwaza Mustang the line along the western front to the Miri, was made over to the men of Shalkoh, Mehara, Sandaran, etc. villages near Kelat, and the party of Khair Mahomed Shahghasei. From the Miri to the Sangar, the walls were defended by Lutanis, Kamfararis, etc. The Miri was in charge of Mir Fatti Khan, brother to Shah Nawaz Khan, and the duty taken by the latter, whose

couch was placed by night under the Derwaza Dil Dar, was to be on the alert, to patrol the ramparts, and to be ready to give assistance to any point attacked. On the succeeding morn the enemy appeared, and halting awhile on the low hills near Kelat, filed round by the dry bed of a water-course, and entered the gardens east of the city. Immediately, or as soon as they had alighted from their cattle, they rushed to the Babi suburb south of the town, and attacked Kamal Khan's position. The attack in time spread to the Derwaza Dil Dar, comprising the intermediate post of Mir Boher. It was clear our assailants intended to have got over their business speedily, or it may be they had supposed the gates would have been opened to them. It is not unlikely that most of Shah Nawaz Khan's chiefs had written very dutiful letters to the rebel camp, neither it is impossible that had they been less uncere- moniously attacked, they might, saving appearances, have yielded the town; but the brusque *besit*, or summons of the Sahawanis put them on their mettle, and they fired ball in return. Much firing took place until the afternoon, when the assailants retired. Blood was shed on this occasion, a great point in Brahoe warfare, as it authorized the hope that accommodation was out of the question, and that the hostile parties must fight in earnest. We considered the chances of holding the town as now ten to one in our favor, as we naturally looked to the result of the first onset with some interest, not only as it would shew the kind of opponents we had to deal with, but what was of more moment, as it would test the fidelity of our friends. Our Brahoe levies subsisted on an allowance of flour; I succeeded in procuring from Lieutenant Loveday a supply of dates for the combatants. The enemy, I should have noted, were not above 1000 to 1200 men of all descriptions, and many of these were unarmed, and many more armed only with sword and shield: the chance is, that in the number of firelocks we were equal to them, sup- posing we had within the walls 500 to 600 men. Throughout the night, a firing was maintained from Kamal Khan's post, and also during the next day and night, but no regular attack was made, the rebels having deter- mined to attempt an escalade, and being occupied in the preparation of ladders. The third night came, and we were aware of the design, although not so of the point of intended attack. Shah Nawaz Khan had taken the native precaution of distributing torches along the ram- parts, which, as long as they were unconsumed and replenished with oil illumined the space for some distance around them. He was also, as customary with him, active in patrolling the place, retiring occasionally to his couch in the Derwaza Dil Dar. About two or three o'clock in the morning, the torches extinct or burning very dimly, an increased firing announced the attack, and the point seriously menaced we found was not far from us, being the quarter between the Mustang gate and Miri occupied by the Skalkohis, Nicharis, Sandaranis, Jettaks, etc. Nasrulah, a Kelat servant of Lieutenant Loveday, brought the news that ladders were fixed, and implored that a party of Sipahis should be sent. Lieutenant Loveday permitted his havildar, Allabuksh, to select eight men. These were accompanied by two or three others

as amateurs and by Nasrulah. They opportunely reached as a number of the enemy had entered the town, and their companions were being assisted over the walls by those who ought to have defended them. The attack, of course, had been made on understanding with part of the garrison, who it seemed fired wadding only, while they lowered their lughis to help the enemy up the ladders. The sipahis performed their duty admirably, and compelled the assailants to flight, cutting off from retreat those who had entered the town, about thirty in number, under Jelal Khan: these men fell in with Shah Nawaz Khan on his rounds. They fired at him, and killed two or three of his men, while the rest, with a few exceptions, fled. Shah Nawaz Khan cut a man down, but being nearly alone, was compelled to fly. Jelal Khan and his party finding themselves unsupported, made the best of their way to Kamal Khan, and besought his protection. The men were disarmed, and with their leader, who was allowed to retain his arms, were kept prisoners. While the party of sipahis was engaged on the walls, a kalassi sent with ammunition was intercepted by the men of the garrison, who took his supply of cartridges as well as his sword. Nusrulah coming on the same errand, conveyed a second supply. The same man also brought the welcome news of the repulse of the escalade. The victorious sipahis now wished that a guard should remain over the slain on the walls, till morning should enable them to see and to despoil them. The restitution of their arms was the first demand made by the rebels after they entered the town. In the grey of the morning, Lieut. Loveday went from his house to the spot of the night's achievement. We had scarcely reached it, and cast our eyes on the corpses strewn around, and the broken ladders under the walls, when a brisk fire re-opened on the side of Kamal Khan. We returned to our house, and learned that the enemy had renewed the attack, as it proved, under the idea that Jelal Khan and his party, (who they were not aware had surrendered,) would open the gates to them. This attack was sharp and continued for about two hours, when the enemy again withdrew.

"We might now have congratulated ourselves upon the events of the past night, but were not allowed long to do so, for symptoms of a general panic soon manifested themselves. They communicated even to our own people. It was true that the party of sipahis who had so gallantly behaved, had, in the heat of battle, slain and wounded also some of the traitors of the garrison, and there was reason to apprehend, unless measures of precaution were adopted, that in another attack they would side openly with the enemy. Throughout the day our sipahis were constantly exclaiming that there was treachery, inferring so from the guns at the Miri, occasionally fired, being loaded with blank cartridges, as they supposed. In the evening we were visited by Shah Nawaz Khan, who was low spirited. I proposed to eject the traitors with or without their arms. This step the Khan did not think advisable. I next proposed to give every man of the garrison a small sum of money, and to promise as much more, every time they repulsed the foe. This mode was not approved of. From this day the casting of bullets

was suspended, and all idea of continuing the defence seemed to be abandoned.

"Kamal Khan, upon whom Shah Nawaz Khan almost entirely depended, declared the place untenable, that arrangements were indispensable, and all had affirmed he would fight no more. It seems the enemy, enraged at Kamal Khan's opposition, had threatened to send to Bagh-wana for his wives and children, with the view of placing them in their front as they marched to the walls, and thereby to compel him to open the gates to them. Whether affected by this menace, or that he had previously inclined to play a double part, he now wavered, and Shah Nawaz Khan found he could no longer reckon on him. About sunset, a Saiyad, as vakeel, came to the town on the part of the enemy, either in pursuance of a concerted plan, or that finding force was ineffectual, it was deemed necessary to have recourse to fraud. The Khan next sent an Elchi, I forget who, to the camp of the enemy, observing, it behoved him to do so, as an Elchi had been sent to him. It was easy to divine what would be the end of the negotiation. On the next day Kamal Khan met the Sirdars of Saharawan in a garden without the town. What passed is not known, but the result of the conference was an Ekrar Nameh, or engagement between the Sirdars of Jehalawan and Saharawan, giving the takht or musnud of Khelat to the son of the late Mehrab Khan, and Baghana Zodi and Khozdar to Shah Nawaz Khan, the latter vacating Khelat on the third day. Lieut. Loveday with his sipahis, people, and property was to be escorted to the Shah. A copy of the document sealed by Kamal Khan on behalf of the Sirdars of Jehalawan, and by the Saharawan Sirdars, was given to Lieut. Loveday.

"As soon as the Ekrar Nama had been concluded, intercourse was free between the town and rebel camp, and Nasrulah, Lieut. Loveday's Khelat servant, began the work of deception by producing a letter, which he said the Darogah, his ancient master, had sent to him when he and the young Khan started from Kharan, desiring him to tell Lieutenant Loveday how much the Darogah esteemed him. Nasrulah was now, in consequence, sent to the Darogah, and returned bringing back the kindest assurances, either never made by that crafty old man, or made only to deceive.

"Lieut. Loveday had on the first mention of negotiation been taken by Shah Nawaz Khan to the Miri, and had seen the Khan's mother, who with her son thought at the time there was no alternative but treaty. Now, however, better acquainted with the state of the rebel camp, Shah Nawaz Khan and Mir Boher of Zehri wished to break off the treaty. Mir Boher had been suspected, and perhaps with justice; but events had changed him, and he was now willing to continue the defence; indeed, since the investment he had fought with sincerity. He came twice or thrice to Lieut. Loveday, with and without Shah Nawaz Khan, but the fatal influence of Haji Osman, Nasrulah, and the rest paralyzed every thing. These men made the grossest misrepresentations as to the number of the rebels, their abundance of

provisions and of other necessities, which were believed; whereas they were without food and ammunition, and if kept at bay for two or three days more, must have dispersed. Mir Boher proposed to have provided against treachery within by removing the parties who had manifested it, to other points, and placing in their stead Khan Mahomed Khan, an approved good man, and his party. He was also averse to ejection from the town. Mir Boher spoke with real anguish to Shah Nawaz Khan of the disgrace about to fall on them, saying it was binbureda, or cutting off their horses, and that Kamal Khan had spoiled all.

"To counteract the efforts of Shah Nawaz Khan to get up resistance, or to persuade Lieut. Loveday to accompany him, Haji Osman and Nasrulah set on foot a variety of missions to the rebel camp. Had not the consequence been so fatal, the zeal for negotiation at this period would have been amusing. It is obvious how important it was to the enemy that Lieut. Loveday should remain at Khelat in their power, whether they intended to gratify their revenge and cupidity at his expence, or whether they hoped by the possession of his person to secure terms. Nasrulah was sent to the camp a second time with Morad Khan, a Naik, and Imam Buksh, a drummer. The two latter made their salam to the young Khan, who spoke very courteously to them, and sent them to the Shah Ghassi to report in secret the object of their mission. Nasrulah was privately closeted with the Darogah. Haji Osman introduced on the scene his uncle Atta Mahomed Khan, brother of the notorious Akhund Mahomed Sitlik, and this man with Rais Pir Mahomed of Khelat were sent privately by night. On the next day, Atta Mahomed Khan went publicly with a retinue of forty or fifty persons he had collected. Yet this was not all; the Hindus came to ask Lieut. Loveday if they might go to make their salam: they were told, yes; and moved from the town in a body to the rebel camp. While such things were in progress, Lieut. Loveday, on Shah Nawaz Khan coming to call on him, with his accustomed familiarity of friendship would place his arm around him, affecting to coincide with his views and plans, while at the time his agents were negotiating (if such a term may be used) with the Khan's enemies, and frustrating his intentions. Shah Nawaz Khan, however, reproached Lieut. Loveday with the fact of his man Nasrulah being in secret conference with the Darogah, and at another time rebuked Haji Osman, and used high language. Kamul Khan moreover complained to Lieut. Loveday, that Shah Nawaz Khan had even presumed to accuse him of playing falsely. Yet Lieut. Loveday's envoys always brought back the same unqualified assurances of kind treatment and protection—the young Khan, the Darogah, and Bibi Gunjani were all inspired by the best and kindest feelings, and the Sirdars of Saharawan were determined to adhere with fidelity to their engagements; Lieut. Loveday might do entirely as he pleased, return to Shall or remain at Kelat; if he went to Shall, the Bibi Gunjani was to accompany him; if he remained, his every wish was to be gratified; another and handsome house was to be built for him in place of the one pulled down by the Brahmins, and whose timbers had been converted into escalading

ladders. Nasrulah particularly certified to the good intentions of his old master, the Darogah, and Atta Mahomed Khan, who professed to have great influence with Bibi Gunjani, assured Lieut. Loveday of that lady's good will, and that she looked upon him as her son. A letter was brought by Atta Mahomed Khan, said to be from the Bibi; but in the place of her seal, her name was scrawled within a circle. Lieut. Loveday seemed satisfied with all that was done, and to place belief in all he heard. I think he was very angry with me for cautioning him, or presuming to suggest that he was deceived. Yet I knew it was so, and with bitter disgust I heard Rais Pir Mahomed, on return from his nocturnal mission, and after he had reported to Lieut. Loveday what had passed, repeat, sitting with Nasrulah, a Persian couplet ending with the words "sag down," and intimating that his victim had fallen into the snare laid for him. Besides the people here named, Gholam and Fatti, brothers, and Babi, merchants, Wal-Mahomed, a tailor, Buta Sing, a Sipahi, and others whom I cannot remember, were sent on missions of one kind or other. Elchis were raked up from all quarters, and the aid of no one was refused.

"Shah Nawaz Khan finding his wishes to continue the defence baffled, urged Lieut. Loveday to accompany him, taking all his effects with him. He assured him that he should be conducted in safety to Zehri or Baghwana, where, as he pleased, the struggle might be renewed, or he could retire. The Khan preferred Zehri, being supported by Mir Boher, and that the Malloh route would be kept open, while Shikarpur was near. He honestly and truly confessed, that he could not undertake the responsibility of the Shall route. Lieut. Loveday seemed to acquiesce, but only seemed: his advisers were ready with their insinuations against the motives of the Khan and of Mir Boher, and were not willing that their victim should escape. Lieut. Loveday urged he had not a sufficient number of camels, and the Khan offered to supply any number he wanted. Some faint attempts were made to pack up, but were soon abandoned.

"The third day had now arrived, when the young Khan and rebel host were to enter the town. Shah Nawaz Khan was early in the morning with Lieut. Loveday, entreating him even then to accompany him with his party, taking only his valuables, for it was too late to think of moving the bulk of the property. Lieut. Loveday was fixed, as if by enchantment to Khelat, and lent a deaf ear to all that was said. Shah Nawaz Khan had before asked him if all the Feringhees were as laghor, or unmanly, as he was, and now prophesied to him all the indignities and perils to which he exposed himself by remaining.

"It was not until this period that Shah Nawaz Khan thought of abdication. The time was very critical. He had not deserted Lieut. Loveday, but had been deserted by him, when he decided to take the decisive step of repairing to the camp of Mehrab Khan's son, and of investing him with a khelat. He had scarcely left the town when Nasrulah and Haji Osman, who had been sent betimes to the camp, returned, and with singular impudence implored Lieut. Loveday, when he had it no

longer in his power, to accompany Shah Nawaz Khan, saying there was evil in his stay at Kelat.

"When Shah Nawaz Khan left Lieut. Loveday, his brother Mir Fatti Khan came. He requested a paper, which Lieut. Loveday gave him, noting that he had been solicited to depart, but had determined to remain and negotiate for the safety of himself and his party. Fatti Khan went and returned, when Lieut. Loveday took the paper from him, and wrote another in which the reason for remaining was stated to be his determination to die at his post. Shah Nawaz Khan had behaved throughout the siege most creditably. Whatever other motives may have dictated the step of his abdication, he made it still a means of contributing, as far as in his power, to the good treatment, by the opposite party, of Lieut. Loveday, and of facilitating arrangements with it, which that officer had commenced. Nothing was more evident than the anxiety manifested by Shah Nawaz Khan, to shew his sense of obligation to the Government that had placed him in authority, by protecting the officer appointed to act with him, and certainly it was not his fault that the officer refused to be protected by him. Shah Nawaz Khan on arraying the son of Mehrab Khan with a khelat, explained to him and the assembled chiefs, that the khelat had not been given to him by Lieut. Loveday, but by the Sirkar Company; that he had a friend at Kelat, whose kind treatment he should expect in return for the resignation of his station. That friend was Lieut. Loveday. He said in the figurative style of the Brahoes, that Lieut. Loveday was his beard: when the son of Mehrab Khan replied, that the gentleman had now become his beard, and that he should be treated as a brother, etc. The two Khans next moved in procession to the town, and as the cavalcade advanced, we had the mortification to witness to what a contemptible rabble we had surrendered the town.

"After having attended the son of Mehrab Khan to the Miri, Shah Nawaz Khan, in the act of leaving the town, called on Lieut. Loveday. The Khan called me to witness he had not failed in his duty to the Sirkar Company, or to Lieut. Loveday.

"A little time afterwards, Haji Osman had the audacity to tell Lieut. Loveday, when repeating what he had heard had passed when the Khan arrayed Mehrab Khan's son with a khelat, that the Khan offered to be the first to lay hands on Lieut. Loveday, and that Kamal Khan and Mir Boher had spoken to the same purpose. To so infamous a scoundrel did Lieut. Loveday trust for information, and by such informations were his opinions formed, and his conduct determined.

"The son of Mehrab Khan seated in the place of his father, received during the day the congratulations and offerings of the people. Lieut. Loveday sent also his Mabarak, or salutation of welcome, with offerings of fifty rupees each to be presented respectively to the young Khan and to Bibi Gunjani, and they sent in return four men to attend at Lieut. Loveday's gates, avowedly to keep the turbulent Brahoes from intrusion, but in like manner to watch over intercourse with the house, and to take care that no one left it. Bibi Gunjani also sent in a message to

Lieut. Loveday to beware, a hundred times to beware, that he gave no money to any one; or at least such a message was brought in the Bibi's name."

These various occurrences—at Quetta, Khelat, and in the Surtoff Pass—naturally aroused the attention of the political authority, (Mr. Ross Bell,) in Scinde, and reinforcements, with the view of strengthening the different posts already occupied, recapturing ground that had been lost, and putting down the insurrection in the Moostung, were immediately called for. The situation of Captain Brown at Kahun, surrounded and closely watched as he was by hordes of Beloochees,—to keep whom in check was the original purpose of the occupation of Kahun—was the first object of solicitude. Reports from that officer announced that his provisions were fast failing him, but that he was determined on holding his post until reduced to the last extremity. It was therefore resolved to throw supplies into the fort without delay, and with this view a convoy of 1,200 camels and 600 bullocks was placed under the charge of Major Clibborn of the 1st Bombay Grenadiers, who with a force of 464 bayonets, 34 rank and file of Bombay artillery, and three 12-pound howitzers marched for Kahun. The misadventures of this force—constituting as they did the most serious calamity that had befallen our arms—are thus narrated by one of the officers engaged, and is borne out in all essential particulars by Major Clibborn's own despatch.

"In spite of the intense heat of the weather, the convoy started on the 12th August, and by marching at night, accomplished the distance to Poolagee, of one hundred and ten miles, across the burning and desert plains of Scinde, with less distress to the men than could have been anticipated. At Poolagee, Major Clibborn's force was increased by 200 Poona and Scinde irregular horse, under Lieutenants Lock and Malcolm; and entered the hills by the southern Pass on the 24th. In five marches they reached the Surtoff mountain. It took thirteen or fourteen hours, namely from 2 A. M. to 3 or 4 P. M., to get the convoy and guns up the mountain; the latter had to be dragged up by manual labour, the road running up the steep face of the mountain, in many places nearly perpendicular, and which is said by those who have seen both to exceed in difficulty the famed Khojuk Pass. The suffering of the sepoy's employed in this service, and indeed of all, exposed as they were to the burning heat of an August sun, was distressing in the extreme, but it was borne cheerfully and without a complaint. The night was passed on the table-land on the sum-

mit, with no water nearer than the foot of the Ghaut. The men had little rest; they were under arms the greater part of the night, the Beloochees keeping up a fire on the piquets and camp from the other side of an impassable ravine. At 2 A. M. on the morning of the 31st August, the march was continued to the foot of the second range of mountains, distant six or seven miles. The road lying along the foot of the mountain was so cut up by ravines and nullahs, that one of the guns upset, occasioning considerable delay in righting and repairing it, the men being all the while exposed to a galling fire from the Beloochees, which wounded several. Moving on again, we soon came in sight of the Pass of Nuffook, and here all our difficulties became apparent. The road which had been reported practicable for guns and camels, rose before our wearied and exhausted troops in a zigzag course up the side of a precipitous mountain; the crest crowded with the enemy, screened under shelter of the rocks, who, on our appearance, set fire to a beacon light. It was now 10 A. M., and the heat fearfully oppressive. A letter from Captain Brown, in Kahun, of the 27th, reported that abundance of rain had fallen, and that no doubt we should find a sufficiency of water at our ground. The reports of the guides on arrival were that there was no water! and the little remaining in the wretched Paukals from the last halting ground, on the top of the Surtoff Pass, (where neither water nor forage exists), was dried up. Under these circumstances, it was evident that the whole force and cattle must perish from thirst, unless the Pass of Nuffook were carried, beyond which, water was said to be procurable, and the fort of Kahun distant about six miles. We waited anxiously till half-past one for the arrival of the rear-guard, consisting of the 1st and 2nd companies of the 1st Grenadiers, one howitzer, and the Poonah Horse under Lieut. Lock. At two, the dispositions for attacking the Pass were made, and the left flank companies of the 1st and 2nd Grenadiers and fifty volunteers, Poonah Auxiliary Horse, under Lieut. Lock, were led on with admirable coolness and order by Capt. Raitt, followed by a strong support of the Grenadiers. An effective flanking party was posted at the foot of the Ghaut, on the right, who kept up a heavy fire on the crest of the hill. The guns were placed so as to throw shrapnel shells to clear the head of the Pass, while the storming party advanced up the steep face of the mountain. The remainder of the escort with the colours were drawn up on the plain, facing the Pass and protecting the guns. With the greatest anxiety we watched the progress of the storming party, as they steadily wound up, under a heavy fire from the enemy; in some parts they were only able to advance in single file. The road at all times barely practicable for guns, had been altogether destroyed; and they found breast-works, topped with thorny bushes, built across the road, in three places most exposed to the fire from the ridge. These they surmounted; the ledge of the head of the Pass was gained, and the party ready to rush on; one sepoy was seen to reach the gap and fire through, when from every side they were assailed by a tremendous fire from the enemy, and rocks and stones were hurled from the summit. The Beloochees, with a wild shout, rushed

down sword in hand. Hundreds and hundreds poured over the ridges of the mountains, and leaping into the midst of the men, bore all before them. Sepoys and Beloochees were mingled on the hill. Seeing the attack completely repulsed, and that to make any stand on the steep face of the hill was impossible, the supporting and flanking parties retreated to the colours. The enemy rushed down the mountain, and although the guns were sweeping the plain with grape, advanced with such determined gallantry and impetuosity, that there was barely time to form the men, a task rendered but the more difficult by the number of recruits necessarily placed in the ranks for the present service. The Beloochees pouring round in all directions, attacked sword in hand, and throwing in showers of the heavy stones with which the plain abounded, advanced to the very muzzles of the guns. The men, however, behaved admirably, and kept up so brisk a fire, that with well applied rounds of grape from Capt. Stamford's howitzers, the enemy was repulsed with great slaughter, dispersing in all directions, numbers falling in the flight. Our loss on the mountain was now found to be very severe. Nearly half the storming party had fallen, and we had lost four officers. Raitt was shot through the thigh about half way up the mountain, when he turned round and asked Franklin to lead the advance, but seeing him supporting poor Williams, who had just been shot through the heart, he bound his handkerchief round the wound, and again took his place at the head of his company, where he fell nobly when the rush took place, at which time also Franklin was killed. Little Moore received two shot wounds, and was afterwards cut down by a Beloochee in passing. Lock, who led the dismounted Sowars, was severely wounded, receiving a sword cut, and several severe bruises from stones on the head; but was forced down the hill by his orderly, and reached one of the guns in a fainting state. Out of the hundred dismounted Sowars alone, fifty-three were killed."

"The enemy had been repulsed with great slaughter, and most of their influential men were lying dead around us; but the Pass remained in their possession, and their numbers were still very great, the combined tribes of the Beloochees, amounting in fact to several thousands. To follow up our success was impossible; the heat was dreadfully intense, and the sufferings of the men and cattle, from exhaustion and thirst, became painfully apparent. The men grew clamorous for drink, and the cries of the wounded and dying, for water! water! were increasing. The few bottles of beer among the officers' baggage, given to allay the wants of the greatest sufferers, gave rise to scenes of frenzy and despair. Men of all castes rushed and struggled for it, and many a miserable wretch, on getting hold of a bottle and finding it empty, dropped lifeless on the ground. The scene was agonizing to behold. Parties were sent to search for water; and Meer Hussain, one of the guides, having reported that they had discovered some in a nullah, about half a coss off, the whole of the Puckaul Bheesties, and camel Puckauls, under the escort of the irregular horse, were despatched to procure a supply. The gun-horses were sent with the party, being quite unfit, in their

exhausted state, to take the guns back, and many of the officers' horses also accompanied them. The evening was spent in collecting and bringing off the wounded, and occasionally firing shells into the hills, from which the enemy still kept up a fire on the skirmishers in the plain. Party after party returned, reporting that no water was to be found; and, about sunset, some stragglers from Meer Hussain's party came in, reporting that the whole had been surrounded in a nullah, the greater part cut to pieces, and the horses carried off. "Under these circumstances (Major Clibborn states in his official despatch), it became necessary to determine what should be done. I had already lost about 150 men of my small force (small, when the nature of the country and the size of the convoy are considered,) the remainder being enfeebled with thirst, and the exertions of the two previous days; and, to add to our different difficulties, most of the camel men, dooly bearers, etc. had absconded during the action, after plundering the commissariat. The gun-horses were gone; and the men of the Golundauze, so prostrated from fatigue and thirst, that latterly they could scarcely rise to fire a gun. In this state, I found it impossible, allowing that I made a successful attack on the Pass, to convey either the stores or guns over it, particularly as the road had been destroyed; and, after mature deliberation, I found that it would be impracticable to carry out the object of the convoy to throw provisions into Kahun; and further, that unless the water-party, horses, etc. returned soon, my whole force, cattle and followers, must perish of thirst. The sad alternative devolved on me of deciding on the abandonment of the unfortunate garrison of Kahun, the stores and materials of the detachment; and the chance presented itself by a rapid retreat to the water at Surtoff, of saving the remainder of my men and the numerous followers, with such carriage and stores as their enfeebled state would permit me to carry off. I therefore resolved, unless the gun-horses and water arrived by 10 P. M. to move off quietly with my troops. Such continuing to be the case at that hour, I directed Capt. Stamford to spike his guns, and at eleven o'clock we moved with as much quietness as the frantic state of the men would permit. I am grieved to add, that we were obliged to abandon nearly every thing—guns, stores, camp equipage, etc.; the desertion of the camel-drivers having put it out of my power to remove them." The wounded were carried on the few camels we could manage to take with us. We reached the top of the Surtoff fortunately without obstruction from the enemy, for the men were completely knocked up. Here all discipline was at an end; the men, rushing down the hill, leaped into the pools of water like madmen. The rear-guard was attacked by a large body of Beloochees, and the slaughter among the followers was very great. As soon as the men could be got from the water they were formed into square, as the Beloochees were reported to have shewn themselves on all sides, and we waited for day-break, when it was found that the whole of the convoy and baggage we had been able to remove, had been carried off in the confusion and darkness of the night. The sepoys at Nuffosk, had been ordered in the evening to put three or four day's supply of flour in their

haversacks, but most of the men had been too much exhausted to do so; and we now found ourselves absolutely without food. Not a single tent was saved, either for officers or men; and nothing remained but to make a forced march on Poolagee, distant more than fifty miles. Fortunately we had still a few empty camels, and were joined by others on the road, on which we brought on the wounded. Lock had a narrow escape; he was carried to Surtoff, bound to the back of a Sowar, and afterwards brought on lashed to the back of a camel. The sufferings of all on the march to Poolagee, from the intense heat of the weather, rendered more insupportable by the reflection of the sand and sandstone rocks, is not to be described. Poor Capt. Heighington, of the 1st Grenadiers, died the day after we reached Poolagee, from the effects of the sun and fatigue, and many of the men died on the march. Major Clibborn, whose exertions were untiring, and whose courage and self-possession through these trying scenes were most conspicuous and the admiration of all, would have probably shared the same fate had not one of the sepoys, observing a change in his countenance on the march, begged of him to wrap a muslin sash (which he gave him) round his head in place of his chakoe. This, no doubt, saved his life. In his official despatch he deservedly notices the gallant bravery of Lieutenant Lock of the Poonah Irregular Horse, and Lieutenant Malcolm of the Scinde Horse. The great number of their men who fell, shews how nobly they did their duty; indeed, the conduct of all the men, many of the 1st Grenadiers raw recruits, who never before had been under fire, was exemplary.

Officers killed in the disastrous attack on the Pass:

1st Grenadiers, Capt. Raitt and Lieut. Moore.

Jemadar Jewrakeen Sing.

2nd Grenadiers, Captain Franklin and Ensign Williams.

Subadar Gooroo Bux.

Statement of killed and wounded.

| KILLED. | | | | | | WOUNDED. | | | | | |
|-------------------------|----|----|----|----|----|-------------------------|----|----|----|----|--|
| Artillery, | .. | .. | .. | .. | 7 | | | | | | |
| Pioneers, | .. | .. | .. | .. | 4 | | | | | | |
| 1st Grenadiers, | .. | .. | .. | .. | 86 | 1st Grenadiers, | .. | .. | .. | 62 | |
| 2d Ditto, | .. | .. | .. | .. | 26 | 2d Ditto, | .. | .. | .. | 10 | |
| Poonah Auxiliary Horse, | .. | .. | .. | .. | 36 | Poonah Auxiliary Horse, | .. | .. | .. | 10 | |
| Scinde, 1st Horse, | .. | .. | .. | .. | 20 | Scinde, 1st Horse, | .. | .. | .. | 10 | |
| 179 | | | | | | 92 | | | | | |

out of a force of about six hundred and fifty men.

"This does not include the loss of life on the return march. When in the month of March, Captain Brown alluded to the excessive heat, and stated that the thermometer on the second day's march ranged as high as 116°; what must it have been in the month of August, that fatal season of heat?"*

* A Military Commission was appointed to investigate the conduct of Major Clibborn, and the causes of the disaster on the Nullock Pass. The Commission condemned Major Clibborn and all the superior Officers who had ordered and provided for his expedition. The Government subsequently removed the two senior Members of the Commission for giving an honest verdict.

The condition of Captain Brown during these disastrous occurrences, and for some time subsequently was, as may be conceived, most deplorable. The Journal which he kept, from the period of his first occupation of the Fort of Kahan, down to the hour when he evacuated it under highly honorable terms, will be found in the Appendix to this volume (No. II). It discloses a history of patience, cheerfulness, resolution, discipline, and bravery, under circumstances of the most trying nature, and redounding so much to Captain Brown's honour, that the Bombay Commander-in-Chief gave him a staff appointment, the Government transferred him to a lucrative Political office, and his Sovereign conferred upon him a Brevet Majority. Lord Ellenborough afterwards created him an Honorary A. D. C.

The Beloochees having now committed themselves irretrievably, of course anticipated a severe visitation as soon as the arrival of reinforcements should enable the British troops to take the field. They therefore proceeded to strengthen the works of Khelat, and to add large numbers to the garrison, while Nusseer Khan, the son of Mehrab Khan, was urged to place himself at the head of the revolted tribes, and to drive the British from the country they occupied between Quetta and Shikarpore. Several attacks were made by them upon Lehree, Dadur, and other small posts, and upon detachments of troops marching across the desert to Gundava, and the Bolan Pass; but the determined gallantry of the 5th and 25th Bombay N. I. assisted by Skinner's horse and the Scinde and Poona irregulars, and now reinforced by a portion of Her Majesty's 40th Regt. under Major Boscawen and the 38th Bengal N. I., rendered their defeats frequent, and their advantages slight and temporary.* It was not, however, until the beginning of November 1840, that troops had arrived from the opposite points of Candahar and Lower Scinde in sufficient force to strike a decisive blow at the resuscitated power of the Beloochees. On the 3rd of that month, Major General Nott had reached Khelat with the 42nd and 43rd Regiments of Bengal N. I. some guns under Captain Anderson, a part of Shah Soojah's Cavalry under Capt. Walker, and Infantry under Capt. Macan; but the

* In one of these affairs, our troops fell in with the body of Lieut. Lowndes, who had been carried about in fetters by the people with whom he had entrusted himself, and who murdered him to prevent his release. The body was yet warm and bleeding when found by the 40th Foot under Major Boscawen at Dadur.

garrison had fled upon his approach, and he found the fortress completely evacuated. He therefore returned to Quetta, leaving Colonel Stacy as Political Agent in charge of Khelat, supported by a regiment of infantry. Nusseer Khan, however, still remained in arms in the hills, occasionally descending by the Bolan Pass to give battle to the detached forces, and on one occasion actually besieging and plundering Dadur. To crush this chieftain, and to restore tranquillity to the whole of Upper Scinde, engaged the attention of the field force which had now assembled under Major General Brookes of the Bombay Army, and it was not long before an opportunity appeared for striking an effective blow at the rebel power.

General Brookes having received information to the effect that Nusseer Khan, with about 4000 men, had taken up his position in the neighbourhood of Kotrah, where he was expecting a large reinforcement, despatched one of his A. D. C.s to Colonel Marshall, directing him (Colonel M.) to attack the Khan's camp, with the greatest possible promptitude. Colonel Marshall's detachment consisted of about 500 of the 25th N. I., 150 of the 2nd Grenadier Regiment, 180 of the 21st N. I. and two guns, with details from the 5th company of the Golan-dauze Battalion, under Lieutenant Pruett—in all 842 fighting men. With this force, Colonel Marshall having received the General's Orders on the morning of the 30th Nov., immediately made his preparations to attack the Khan's position at day-break on the 1st Dec. This he did, with signal success. The surprize was most complete—Nusseer Khan himself fled in consternation, at the first appearance of our troops; but his chiefs held out most desperately against us, and not before nearly 500 were slain, was the enemy put to flight. Then Meer Bohur Zebree, who commanded the Khan's army, and seven other chief leaders, including the Bohur's son, with 132 of their bravest followers, surrendered themselves, and were made prisoners. On our side the loss was comparatively small—one officer, Lieut. Lodge of the 25th, killed—and in all, 11 killed and 30 wounded.

The defence was most desperate, and the position occupied by the enemy so strong, that the Bombay troops must have fought with the utmost steadiness, and the most persevering gallantry, to have achieved a victory against such advantages. Lieut. Wallace, the Assistant Political Agent, who went with the detachment, reports, that "the hill, to

which the enemy retreated, was a perfect natural fortress, and the daring, steady, and persevering manner, in which each position was attacked and carried, reflects the highest credit on the troops, whose behaviour throughout an arduous day's work was admirable;" and General Brookes, in a Field Order, which will be found below, congratulates in a warm, but not undue, strain of eulogium, the brilliant service performed by the detachment. Lieut. Smith of the Bengal Native Infantry, (an extra A. D. C. to General Brookes,) who much distinguished himself in this affair, escorted Meer Bohur and his son to Sukkur. Among the killed, on the enemy's side, were four chiefs—Tubzul Khan, Shere Khan, Hydur Khan, and Shuffee Mahomed. The escape of Nusseer Khan was inevitable; his position appears to have been more than a mile to rearward of his camp, and, as he moved off at once, and the Passes leading to his encampment were strongly guarded, it was impossible to overtake him. He fled with only two followers, having been from the first unwilling to oppose us.

After their defeat, the enemy gathered together, in great force, between Kundah and Colonel Marshall's camp (round which an entrenchment had been made) the whole number being mounted, but they appeared to exhibit every inclination to keep at a respectful distance.

An officer in Captain Teasdale's detachment of the 25th N. I., thus describes, in a letter, the forcing of the first Pass:—

"In consequence of the guide with us having lost his road, a considerable delay unavoidably occurred, and we did not get well into the mountains until day-break.

"At half past 6 o'clock in the morning of the first instant, our detachment arrived at the gorge of a deep defile in a very strong country, which was pointed out to us by the guide as the entrance into the camp of the insurgent chief Nusseer Khan. Seeing the heights on each flank crowned with Brahoes, Captain Teasdale detached two strong parties under Lieut. Lockley and Ensign Oliphant, of the 2nd Grenadier Regiment, to dislodge them.

"The enemy immediately opened their fire, and kept it up with great briskness, wounding several of our men. As soon as Capt. Teasdale perceived that his flanking parties had gained the summits of the hills, and commenced their fire, he advanced with the main body, and forced the Pass, killing and wounding a great number of the enemy, and driving them over the hills.

"We found the Khan's camp evacuated, but his person was pointed out to us at the distance of upwards of two miles in full retreat up a

precipitous mountain. We pushed forward detachments after them, who, as well as the main body found the whole country strowed with cattle and bags of grain. One of these parties succeeded in reaching a body of the Brahoes, three of whom they killed, and secured ten camels laden with household furniture and the chief's kettle drums.

" Finding that the chief had escaped, we pushed on with all despatch to co-operate with Colonel Marshall. Captain Teasdale had previously detached Ensign Bourdillon, 25th Regt. N. I. with a party to drive down a body of the enemy, whom he saw on a hill on the left of our position.

" The loss of the enemy in disputing the first Pass was between 30 and 40 killed. I do not think that more than 10 escaped wounded, as the action was very close during the whole period."

" Field Army Orders by Major General BROOKES, Sukkur, 6th December, 1840.

" Major General Brookes has much satisfaction in notifying to the troops composing the Field Army, the signal success which has attended that portion of it stationed at Kotrah, under Lieut. Colonel Marshall.

" The Major General having received authentic intelligence that Nusseer Khan, with the garrison of Khelat, about 4000 men, had been encamped in a strong position in the hills, within eight miles of Kotrah, and that reinforcements to the extent of many thousands were on the road from Thall to join him, directed Lieut. Smith, 15th Bengal Infantry and acting A. D. C. to the Major General, to proceed express to Lieut.-Col. Marshall's camp, with orders to the Lieut.-Col. to attack the Khan in his position. Lieut. Smith left this at 2 o'clock on the 28th, and although his progress was greatly impeded by falling in with a large body of the enemy's cavalry, who followed and fired on him several miles, he succeeded in reaching Lieut. Col. Marshall's camp on the morning of the 30th ultimo, completing a march of 150 miles in 38 hours. The attack was made the following morning at daylight, by Lieut. Col. Marshall, at the head of 900 infantry of the 2nd Grenadiers, 21st and 25th Regiments, commanded by Captains Boyd, Innes, and Teasdale, with 60 irregular horse under Lieut. Smith, and 2 guns under Lieut. Pruett. The enemy were completely surprised. Nusseer Khan, and two followers, escaped on foot at the first alarm, but his chiefs and followers made a long and desperate defence. At length when four chiefs and upwards of 500 men were left dead on the field, and nearly the whole of the rest put to flight, the enemy's chief commander Meer Bohur, with his son, six other chiefs and 132 of their bravest followers surrendered themselves prisoners. The whole of the enemy's baggage, and a large quantity of arms, fell into our hands.

"The loss on our side, considering the obstinate nature of the conflict, was wonderfully small. Lieut. Lodge, 25th Regiment, 1 Havildar and 9 Rank and File killed, and 2 Havildars and 28 Rank and File wounded.

"The Major General returns his best thanks, and sincerely congratulates Lieut. Col. Marshall, the European and Native Officers, Non-commissioned Officers and Privates on this brilliant achievement.

"The services of Captain Boyd, 2nd Grenadiers, Captain Innes, 21st Regiment, Captain Teasdale, 25th Regiment, and Lieutenant Pruett of the Artillery, deserve particular praise; and will be brought to the notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. The services also of Lieut. Smith deserve the Major General's warmest praise, not only for his gallantry in the field, which was conspicuous, but for the determined perseverance and courage which he displayed in pressing on, despite of fatigue and the dangers which he had to surmount in a country occupied by the enemy, so as to deliver his despatches to Lieutenant Colonel Marshall in time to ensure the instructions they contained being carried into effect, before the arrival of the reinforcements expected by the enemy, which would have rendered the attempt impracticable.

G. H. BROOKES, *Major-General,*
Commanding Field Army."

After this affair, the Brahoes and Murrees retreated to their hills, placing themselves under the Beebee Gunjan, the principal wife of Mehrab Khan, who had been residing at Dadur, a pensioner of the British Government, until the capitulation of Shah Newaz, and the occupation of Khelat by Nusseer Khan, induced her to fly and join the adherents of her husband's family.

Leaving affairs in Scinde, we now retrace our steps to Cabul, where the Envoy was deeply engaged in devising schemes for the settlement of the country. The stand made by Dost Mahomed in the Hindoo Koosh, had inspired many of the chieftains in Kohistan with hopes of his ultimate success, and of their own consequent restoration to power and influence. In the Ghilzie country also disaffection revived, and it became very evident that vigorous measures were indispensable to crush the Hydra which now assailed the security of Shah Soojah's dominions. On the 24th September, (1840,) a strong force was dispatched, under Brigadier Sale, to Charekar in the Kohistan, where a large party of rebels had assembled, and whither, it was supposed,

Dost Mahomed would betake himself, on his way to Cabul, after his repulse at Bameean, and the conclusion of the treaty with the Wullee of Kholoom. Colonel Wheeler, C. B., was sent to Kudjah to attack and punish the refractory Wuzzerees.* Another detachment was dispatched to assist Colonel Orchard's return from Kudjur (Korner) with the European Regiment, he being then surrounded by the enemy. At Ghuzni the garrison was put upon its mettle, the Artillery sleeping at their guns, for the disaffection had become strongly marked, and Dost Mahomed's two sons had escaped from confinement there.

Brigadier Sale, guided and assisted by Sir Alexander Burnes, moved in the first instance against the town and forts of Ali Khan and Rujub Khan, two chiefs who had been most active in their communications with Dost Mahomed. He invested them on the 29th September. The enemy occupied a strong position, but fled after a brief shew of resistance, across an unfordable river. The engagements which took place on these occasions were nearly bloodless, the only casualties being Captain Edward Conolly, an Assistant to the Political Envoy at Cabul, who acted as Aid-de-Camp to Brigadier Sale, two men of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, and two Grenadiers of the 37th N. I. The operations are described in the annexed despatch addressed to Sir Willoughby Cotton.

*To Major Genl. Sir WILLOUGHBY COTTON, G. C. B. and K. C. H.
&c. &c. Cabul.*

Camp Tootumdurra, 29th September, 1840.

"*SIR*,—At day light this morning I quitted my encampment at Rohat, and was joined at Charekar, 5 miles in advance, by the Detachment under the command of Captain Fraser of the 2d Light Cavalry.

"At Charekar I learned from Sir Alexander Burnes, that no alteration had taken place in his views, with reference to the expediency of an attack on the Forts at the entrance of the Ghorbund Pass, belonging to Aly Khan, and known by the name of Tootumdurra. I therefore determined to attempt their capture immediately, and moved forward from Charekar at 8 A. M., having the Cavalry in advance.

"On arriving in front of Tootumdurra, I found the enemy posted in a very strong position: a village surrounded by garden walls, defended by a small fort and several detached towers, commanded the undulating ground below the high and steep hills which bound the Ghorbund

* The dispatches of Colonel Wheeler, relative to these operations, not being at hand while this sheet is passing through the Press, will be found in the Appendix.

Pass to the south, and a chain of their detached forts within musket range respectively of the village and each other, extends to the Eastward of the village; one of these forts, a hexagonal structure, with towers at the angles is of considerable strength. The rear, or north of the position was defended by a deep canal carried along the high ground above the Ghorebund River, the vale below is entirely covered with gardens, beyond which again rise the rocky hills to the north of the Pass.

"A party of the enemy was drawn up in front of the village protected by a mound, a second occupied the face of the hill to the west of the village, and the towers and forts were garrisoned by matchlock-men, who opened a brisk fire on the party of Cavalry sent in advance to reconnoitre.

"The Grenadier Company of the 37th N. I., a party of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, Shah Shooja's 2d Cavalry, and two of Her Majesty's guns, 6-pounders, under Lieut. Warburton, was directed to clear the hill to our left, and then to take the position of the enemy in flank, and co-operate with the other parties engaged in clearing the village.

"Two Companies of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, under Lieut. Holkham, were detached to the right to take possession of two of the small detached forts, in which operation they were supported by three 9-pounder guns, under Captain Abbott. The fire from these guns was also, as opportunity offered, directed on the towers and other defences of the village, with the view of dislodging the enemy from their advantageous position, and facilitating the advance of the Infantry.

"These operations were crowned with complete success.

"The principal column of attack, consisting of the remainder of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, two Companies of the 27th N. I., and the Light Company of the 37th N. I. was then ordered to advance, and moved on the village at a rapid pace. The enemy continued their fire till the heads of the Companies were within 50 paces of the walls, when they fled with precipitation across the river, and over ground where they could not be followed by the Cavalry.

"The garrison of the large fort seeing the position both to their right and left thus in the possession of our troops, and Captain Abbott's guns in battery opposite the gate, abandoned the post, and escaped through a wicket, which, opening to the south, was covered from the fire of the detachment.

"Parties of Infantry were sent in pursuit across the valley, and another small fort on the low ground temporarily occupied, but finding the enemy completely broken and dispersed, these parties were recalled, and I encamped in the vicinity of the forts, the whole of which were in our possession by 11 A. M.

"The accompanying Casualty Return will shew that this advantage has been attended by little loss, a fact which I in a great measure attribute to the dread inspired by the excellent practice of Artillery under

the able direction of Captain Abbott, assisted by Lieutenants Maule and Warburton; but I have to lament the loss of Captain Edward Conolly of the 6th Light Cavalry, who joined me in the morning as a volunteer. He was shot through the heart on our advance against the village.

"It is my gratifying duty to express my entire satisfaction with the conduct of the Troops it has fallen to my lot on this occasion to command. The rapid flight of the enemy prevented their sustaining or inflicting much loss, but the steadiness and gallantry with which the Troops advanced was such as to warrant my entertaining the most sanguine hopes of success, even had the really formidable position we attacked been defended to the last.

"I am now, at the request of Sir Alexander Burnes, (who accompanied me throughout the operations I have detailed,) taking steps for the destruction of the forts that have fallen into our hands.

"To Captain Sanders of the Engineers, I was much indebted for his judicious and scientific observations, both during and previous to the commencement of the operations.

"Captain Wade of H. M. 13th Light Infantry, my Brigade Major, gave me every assistance in seeing my orders carried into effect.

"Though not in the Army, Mr. Wheeler accompanied me as a volunteer to carry orders, and I had several times occasion to employ him thus."

I have the honor to be, Sir, your most obdt. Servant,

R. SALE, *M. G. Comp. Detachment.*

On the 3d of October the Brigadier attacked a fort named Julga, said to be the principal stronghold of the rebels. The walls were found too thick to be effectively breached by the 9-pounder guns which he had with him, and too high to be reached by the scaling ladders. The assaulting column, which had advanced in the belief that the breach was practicable, and which behaved with conspicuous gallantry, was in consequence, compelled to retire, leaving 11 men of Her Majesty's 13th and 1 of the 37th N. I. killed, and having 12 men wounded. The vigour of the attack had, however, so intimidated the garrison, who must have also suffered severely from our fire, that they immediately afterwards fled, and possession was obtained of the place, which was destroyed. It was regretted that the rebel chiefs had by this means escaped, but there appeared not to be likelihood of any necessity for further protracted operations. The Dooranee Horse behaved well.

The Brigadier thus describes the occurrence in his despatch dated 5th October. The despatch, together with all others from the same quar-

ter, was forwarded in one from Sir W. Cotton, but as the communications of the latter officer were, from his position, mere matters of form, it is unnecessary to give them.

From Major General Sir ROBERT SALE, K. C. B., Commanding Field Force in Kohistan, to Major General Sir WILLOUGHBY COTTON, G. C. B. and K. C. H., Commanding the Troops in Affghanistan, dated Camp Julga, October 5th, 1840.

"SIR,—The Political Agent having informed me, that several of the Rebel Chieftains had fled to a fort within 16 miles of my camp at Charekar, I determined on attempting to secure them, and with this view directed Captain Anderson with two Squadrons of His Majesty Shah Soojah's Cavalry, the Jan Bazees under Lieutenant Dowson, and about 500 Dooranee Horse, who were placed at my disposal by the Shahzada Timoor, the whole under the direction of Captain Sanders of the Engineers, to proceed to Julga, and endeavour to surround the fort before any of the garrison could effect their escape, till such time as I could bring up the Infantry and Artillery to attack the place.

"This detachment marched before 1 A. M. on the morning of yesterday, the 3rd instant, and by sunrise succeeded in completely investing the fort, and placing parties in secure positions in every direction by which the garrison could effect their escape.

"I have to express my obligations to the Officers and Men of His Majesty Shah Soojah's service by whom this service was effected, and am particularly indebted to Captain Anderson for the promptness and rapidity with which his Corps took up their position, and I trust His Majesty will be pleased to make known to his Troops the satisfaction I have expressed at their spirit and good conduct on this occasion.

"By 10 A. M. I arrived before the fort with Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry and the two Squadrons of 2d Cavalry; before 11 o'clock 3 9-pounders and a 24-pounder Howitzer under Captain Abbott, came up; about 12, two of His Majesty's 6-pounders under Lieut. Warburton also arrived, but the badness of the road unfortunately delayed the Mortars till late in the afternoon, and it was not till 4 P. M. that one of them was brought into play. It was desirable to bring our operations in the attack of this Fort to a close as soon as possible, as from the numerous ravines in its vicinity it would have been extremely difficult to prevent the escape of the rebels after nightfall, and a fire from the 9-pounders was immediately opened on the South-East tower of the fort, which by 1 P. M. was greatly dilapidated, when a cessation of their fire was rendered necessary, all the ammunition in the field having been expended.

"At 2 P. M. the fire recommenced, and at 3, the tower and adjacent curtain to the East were breached, and the breach to all appearance being exceedingly easy, I resolved on assaulting it without delay.

"A storming party, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Tronson, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, consisting of 5 Companies of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry under Brevet Major Kershaw of that Corps, and of Detachments of the 27th and 37th Regiments of Native Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Rind of the latter Regiment, were formed for the purpose, in a ravine near the South-East angle, which afforded good cover for the troops within 150 yards of the fort, and on the signal being given, the column advanced to the breach with the greatest steadiness and gallantry. They were met however by the enemy on the crest of the breach with most determined resistance; a close fire from a numerous body of matchlockmen was opened on the head of the column from the houses within the fort. Powderbags were thrown in great numbers among the men ascending the breach: many of the leading men were shot dead on the breach; and after a desperate struggle to force an entrance into the fort, they were with great judgment withdrawn by the Officer commanding the party to the cover afforded by the adjacent ravine, where they remained till I issued orders for their recall, intending to renew the attack when it might be made by a combined movement against the breach, gateway, and wicket, with better success.

"The enemy, notwithstanding every precaution was taken to intercept them, succeeded in escaping from the fort before 7 p. m., and at that hour our troops took possession of it. I am now taking measures for its destruction.

"It is with feelings of the deepest regret that I record the loss sustained in our unsuccessful attack. The address and spirit displayed by the Officers and Men of the storming party demand my warmest thanks, and I cannot express the mortification I experienced in seeing their noble exertions baffled when on the point of being crowned with success.

"To Lieutenant Colonel Tronson, commanding the Storming Party, I am greatly indebted for his gallant execution of the important duty committed to him. He was nobly seconded by Brevet Major Kershaw of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, whose exertions to surmount the numerous obstacles which impeded the advance were conspicuous. The crest of the breach was at one time attained by four Officers of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry—Brevet Major Kershaw, Lieutenant and Adjutant Wood, Lieutenants Edward King and George Wade, and I beg to express my high admiration of their zeal and gallantry.

"Captain Abbott and Lieutenant Warburton distinguished themselves in the service of the Artillery, and their performance of the duty on which they were engaged merited my warmest approbation.

"I beg also to bring to your favorable notice, the assistance I derived from Captain Wade of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, my Brigade Major, for the efficiency and attention displayed by him in carrying my wishes into effect throughout the service.

"Captain Raban, 48th Native Infantry, Commissariat Officer, also gave me high satisfaction in officiating as my Aid-de-Camp during the day; and Mr. Wheeler, whose services I have already had occasion to

bring to your notice, on this occasion was conspicuous for the steadiness and promptness with which he conveyed my orders under a harassing fire.

"I have again to bring to your favorable consideration the able and valuable assistance rendered me by Captain Sanders, Chief Engineer, with the force."

I have, &c.

R. SALE, *Major General,*
Commanding Field Force in Kohistan.

From Lieutenant-Colonel TRONSON, Commanding Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, to Major General Sir ROBERT SALE, K. C. B. dated Camp October 3d, 1840, 8. P. M.

"SIR,—I have the honour to report, that having been placed in command of the storming party this day, consisting of five Companies of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry under Brevet Major Kershaw, and of Detachments of the 27th and 37th Native Infantry, commanded by Captain Rind, of the 37th, the party proceeded with great regularity and spirit towards the fort. On nearing the breach, we were assailed by a quick and destructive fire, through which, gallantly led by their Officers, the party rushed up the breach, which was crowded by Officers and Men in the face of a close and deadly fire; the crest of the breach was gallantly held under this destructive fire, for a considerable time by Brevet Major Kershaw, Lieutenant and Adjutant Wood, Lieutenant Edward King, and Lieutenant G. Wade, with Sergeant Major Airey; the gallantry of those Officers with their Men called forth at the moment the admiration and cheers of all their comrades. Finding the breach totally impracticable, I placed the party under immediate cover, and subsequently withdrew them to a ravine, awaiting the orders of the Major General.

"The best consolation and reward of all who were engaged will be the innate conviction of each individual having to the utmost gallantly done his duty, but as the Commander of this party, I feel bound to render my warmest eulogium and thanks to the Men and Officers engaged, more particularly to Major Kershaw, whose exertions and gallantry throughout were most conspicuous. I have great pleasure in acknowledging the exertions of Captain Rind and his Adjutant Ensign Mayne, 37th Native Infantry, with their detachments of the 27th and 37th.

"I enclose a list of killed and wounded, which I very deeply regret to find so serious; among them we have lost our most respected and gallant Sergeant Major, who nobly fell at the summit of the breach."

I have, &c.

E. J. TRONSON, *Lieut. Colonel,*
and Major 13th Light Infantry.

NUMERICAL RETURN

Of the Killed, Wounded and Missing of the Troops on Field Service under the Command of Major General Sir R. H. Sale, K. C. B., at the Storm of the Fort of Julga, on the morning of the 3d October, 1840; also of the Ammunition expended on that day. Camp Julga, 3d Oct. 1840.

"Engineers Wounded 1 Private; Artillery—Wounded 1 Private; Cattle, 1 Horse and 1 Yaboo; Rounds of Ammunition expended, 9 Shrapnel 9-Pounders; 1 shell 24-Pounder Howitzer; 33 8-inch Shell Mortars; 452 Shot round 9-Pounders, and 8 Shrapnel 24-Pounder Howitzers. H. M. 13th Light Infantry—Killed 1 Serjeant and 13 Privates; Wounded 1 Staff, 3 Serjeants, 2 Corporals and 12 Privates; Lieut. and Adj. Wood slightly; Missing none. Rounds of Ammunition expended, 1388 Musket Ammunition. 27th Regt. N. I.—Wounded 1 Bugler and Drummer and 1 Private. 37th Regt. N. I.—Killed 2 Privates; Wounded 1 Serjeant, 2 Corporals and 7 Privates; Missing none.—Rounds of Ammunition expended, 1635 Musket Ammunition. Shah's Artillery—Wounded 1 Soobadar; Rounds of Ammunition expended, 3 8-inch Shell Mortars and 114 Round Shot 6-pounders. Shah's Cavalry—Killed, Wounded, and Missing none."

The bastions of the fort having been destroyed by Brigadier Sale's orders, the force moved to the valley of the Ghorbund river, a short distance westward of the site of the ancient city of Bighram. Here the Brigadier remained until the 8th, receiving the submission of some influential Barakzye chiefs, who had until then refused to acknowledge the supremacy of Shah Soojah. On the 8th, the troops marched to Charekar, expecting to meet Dost Mahomed; but hearing that he had reached Nijrow, the camp was moved to Kara Bhag, where a better opportunity presented itself for watching the ex-Ameer's movements towards Cabul. On the morning of the 13th, intelligence was brought into camp, that Dost Mahomed had come through the Ghorbund Pass at Tootan Durrah early that morning, and that he had taken up his quarters in a fort some 15 miles distant. The spy reported that the Dost's cattle were very much exhausted and knocked up, and that if a strong party of Cavalry was immediately dispatched, the chances were in favor of his being intercepted, and that he had not more than a hundred followers with him. On this, Lieut. Dowson, with 200 Jan Bazes, and 200 of the Shazadah's *Populzies* set out. However, they were unsuccessful

When the party arrived at the fort, they found that Dost Mahomed had left it about 10 the same morning for Nijrow, some twenty miles almost due East of Charekar. Lieut. Dowson, with the prey almost in his power, had to right about and return to Charekar. Two of the Ex-ruler's horses, which were completely knocked up, were brought into camp. Desertion still continued; on the morning of the 14th October a whole company of Lieut. Maule's regiment of Khoistances went off to their Old Ruler, and it was feared that another company would take the first opportunity of following their example. The company, which deserted, could have been relied upon above the others.

On the morning of the 15th October, the camp was pitched near Kura Bhag, after a long march over a heavy country, and preparations were made for the attack of a fort in the neighbourhood, which it was supposed would give our people some trouble, as it was of a much stronger kind than any yet assaulted, or met with in the valley. It was represented as having a high rampart wall, very thick, strong bastions at the angles, and a double gate.

The Chief who was in possession of it, was written to, to come into our terms, but returned an answer to this effect:—"You were all day long battering the fort of Julgah, and did not get in after all; besides, you let Meer Musjidee escape. Now, my fort is a stronger one than his; I have sent my family and property away, and you may come when it best suits your convenience; but I must distinctly tell you, that I can never bow to a *Kafir King*, and I'll fight to the last."

The Field force however moved in battle array at 10 A. M. on the 17th October with every prospect of meeting most strenuous opposition. The fort of Baboo Khoosh Ghur was supposed, from report, to be a very strong place, and its approach lined with high garden walls for miles around.

Shortly before the column moved off, Captain Sanders of Engineers, accompanied by a strong reconnoitring party, consisting of a squadron of the 2d Light Cavalry, two companies of the 27th Regt. N. I., and two 6-pounder guns, the whole under Captain James Fraser, marched. The road lay over ravines, water-courses, wheat fields etc. On the reconnoitring party nearing the fort, the garrison took fright and fled, and the troops took peaceable possession.

Captain Sanders destroyed the fort of Baboo Koosh Ghur; after that, the force moved to Ak Sarai, and took up a position for the purpose of watching the Dost's movements.

On the afternoon of the 18th October, some officers looking towards the village of Kardurrah, about $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles west of camp, espied a large body of armed men collected, apparently for some enterprize. They were in number between 800 to 1000, and one party displayed a banner. The Cavalry was immediately formed in a line, facing towards Kardurrah, and messengers were sent to enquire the object of the assemblage. The reply was quite pacific, and suspicions were lulled, though proper precautions were taken to prevent any chance of surprise. At a little before 9. P. M., the night being dark, our troops were attacked in front and rear at the same moment by about 500 men, who were completely covered by the ravines and walls which approached close to our camp. The fire continued bravely until past 11 o'clock, but fortunately was directed so high, that very little damage was sustained by our party. One russuldar of the Shah's Regular Cavalry was killed, together with one sepoy of the 37th N. L., a few men and horses were wounded, and *nothing was missing*. The assailants having expended all their ammunition, retired in disgust, carrying off one man killed and one badly wounded by the few shots that were fired by our men. On the 19th, the force was joined by the six companies 37th and by the 2 nine-pounders from Cabul, and on the 20th it advanced four miles, and encamped near the garden ground of Kardurrah, and the adjacent village of Beyduck. It was determined to attack the place next morning, and the enemy seemed very confident in the strength of their position, and resolute to defend it.

The night passed quietly, and our men rose on the morning of the 21st October, fresh and ready for action. The Cavalry, with a wing of the 37th and 2 six-pounders were sent against the eastern front of the enemy's position, while the main body of Infantry with the nine-pounder and mortar batteries took the road to Beyduck, beyond which was said to be a position attainable by guns, and from which Kardurrah might be cannonaded. They had not moved a mile when villagers came to say, that the whole of the enemy had taken to flight, and that the village of Kardurrah was without an inhabitant. The advanced guard leaving its

guns, went forward to destroy the village, and the remainder of the troops returned to camp.

On examining the position which the enemy (800 or 1000 in number) had not ventured to defend, it became immediately apparent that their want of courage had spared us the loss of probably one-half of our men, to say nothing of the possibility of an unqualified defeat: the difficulties presented by the ground to an enemy assailing the village, cannot be adequately described; vineyards and gardens forming a succession of terraces, one above the other, on the steep hill side, garden walls without number, and trees of all sorts, closely planted, were obstacles to be surmounted ere the village itself could be attained; and the village was of considerable extent, containing about 800 flat roofed houses, the streets so narrow that only one horseman could pass through the best of them, and only two or three lanes giving entrance from beyond the walls of the place, which was built on a *steep* ascent, house rising above house like a series of irregular steps. Had the enemy defended this ground with resolution, it was the opinion of some officers that it would have been scarcely possible for us to have carried the village. The road proved to be impracticable for guns, and that one could have given but little assistance to the assailants from any position which it could have attained in the course of the morning.

The village having been partially destroyed, and the vineyards relieved of an immense quantity of beautiful grapes, the force marched on the 22d October, and encamped on an open plain between Ak Serai and Kambagh.

From this date, for an entire week, little of any importance occurred, but on the 29th of October, the campaign was brought to a crisis by an action which, though it must be remembered as displaying the gallantry of certain British officers in the most brilliant colours, and as constituting the last blow which Dost Mahomed struck in his feeble endeavour to regain his throne, will likewise disfigure the annals of British warfare, as recording the cowardice of a regiment of cavalry at a moment the most anxious and critical. Although the despatches detailing this affair are, in conformity with the plan of this volume, given below, the history of an action so remarkable as that which took place at Purwan Durrah, will scarcely be complete without the details furnish-

ed in the following newspaper account sent from Charekar, and published at the time.

"On the morning of the 29th ultimo, an express arrived from Lieutenant Maule, commanding the corps of "Kohistanees," requesting a party of regular Infantry, as all his Kohistanees were preparing to start for Dost Mahomed's camp. Lieut. Lang was instantly despatched with a company of the 27th Regt. to garrison the small fort, where Lieut. Maule was, and who is still there. At noon of the 29th, the whole force, under Major General Sir R. Sale, marched to a fort called 'Bhag-alum.' Here intelligence was received that the Dost had left Nijrow, and come down into the Kohistan Valley. On the 30th and 31st, the force halted, and a strong reconnoitring party, accompanied by Capt. Sanders and Lieut. Broadfoot of Engineers, moved out to survey the country. On the 1st instant, all marched to Meer Musjiddeh fort. Here intelligence reached them of the Dost having moved to Purwan Durrah, a small valley, through which runs a clear rapid stream, and several small forts scattered amongst the orchards. It was now determined to march on Purwan Durrah the following morning, and the troops were directed to move as follows:

"The advance guard, consisting of four companies of H. M. 13th Light Infantry, under Major Kershaw, two six-pounder guns under Lieut. Warburton, the two flank companies of the 37th Regt. N. I. and one company of the 27th Regt. N. I. under Lieut. Rind of the 37th Regt; the two Squadrons of the 2nd Light Cavalry and the Shah's 2nd Horse, the whole being under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Salter. The remainder of the force followed in rear.

"About day-break the advance guard moved off, and one of our correspondents says, such a country as we traversed, I shall not forget in a hurry; the morning was a heavenly one, and the whole country, adorned as it is with yellow foliage, with a bright autumn sun shining on its face, appeared as it were a shining mass of gold—but our road was difficult in the extreme; immense canals, ravines, deep water cuts and every possible obstacle that could present itself to our Army. We reached the Ghorbund river between 8 and 9 A. M.; here we had considerable difficulty in crossing the guns. This surmounted, we ascended the high land under the Hills, and finding a fort occupied, and which had commenced firing on us, we formed into line and moved in this position a short distance, when the river issuing through the Purwan Pass, obliged us to re-form column. By this time, the villagers were flocking towards us calling loudly for mercy, and intreating us to move on quickly, and save their property from the hands of Dost Mahomed's Army, which was plundering them, and preparing to decamp. Our Cavalry advanced, crossed the river, and ascended the bank on the opposite side; Doctor Lord and Lieut. Broadfoot accompanied them. After considerable difficulty we crossed the guns, which again stuck on the opposite bank, which was exceedingly steep. On

our Cavalry reaching the top of the opposite bank, Dost Mahomed Khan, and an Army of some 4000 Horse and Foot, were seen breaking cover from the town and forts, and making the best of their way to some heights on the right, which lay at the base of a high mountain. The scene now became most exciting. Dr. Lord proposed moving on the Cavalry, and taking up a position on the enemy's flank; his request was acceded to, and Captain Anderson's Horse were ordered round to the left, to prevent the enemy turning our flank. The guns were now got up, and had joined the front part of the advance. We then moved on, and orders were sent to recall the Cavalry; before however the order reached, the enemy had begun descending on them. Captain Fraser, who commanded the Regiment, gave front, and ordered the men to draw swords and advance to the charge. The 1st troop wavered, and the men began to fall back by eights and tens. The enemy were now close on them, and the Officers so completely occupied with the enemy, who were moving on them at a slow and determined pace, never anticipating being left to fight the Dost's army themselves, merely called out 'Come on! Charge! Come on!' Will it be believed, that the men, led as they were in this gallant, this noble manner, by such officers as the 2nd are blessed with, went *threes about*, and cut like a flock of sheep, from a force far inferior to them in numbers? The 2nd troop did stand better, but they never advanced, and the *left* squadron, *though not the first* to run, never attempted, nor made the slightest effort to support their gallant commanders, who they saw surrounded and engaged hand to hand with the enemy. The Affghan Cavalry were now fairly in our ranks cutting and slashing in all directions. Dost Mahomed led his men down the hill—was seen to take off his Loongee from his head, and stand calling out to his brave followers—"In the name of God and the Prophet, fight; drive those Feringee Kaffirs out of the country, or I am a gone man." The Cavalry were now seen coming towards the column in full retreat, as hard as the horses could lay legs to the ground, loose horses flying in all directions, and the Dost's Cavalry pursuing them. Captain Fraser arrived on his horse, covered with blood; he had received a deep cut down his back, and his right hand hanging to a bit of skin, detailed the disaster in a firm and collected manner, and was then taken to the rear. Captain Ponsonby was brought in, he had received a ball through his left arm, the top of his left thumb cut off, and a very severe sabre cut across the face—cutting his right cheek bone, dividing his nose and extending across the left cheek. His sword, (a *superb Prosser*, made to order for Captain Fraser,) nearly cut in two, and hacked considerably. The enemy had cut his reins, which rendered his horse quite unmanageable; and one blow which was aimed at his loins, cut his jacket and the cantle of his saddle. His charger was shot through the neck, and both ears taken off. Nearly all the killed and wounded, including the three Officers, were left on the field. Till within a few minutes of Captain Fraser's arrival, we were congratulating

ourselves on the pluck of the enemy coming down; and seeing all the charging and flashing of sabres, concluded that our Cavalry had it all their own way. But, alas, the enemy's high red banner seen flying in our ranks, soon opened our eyes to expect another tale. The advanced guard now formed into line, and our guns were drawn up in position to receive the enemy; but they passed in front of us at too great a distance, even for our guns to touch. After some delay, the General ordered two companies of the 37th and the Cavalry to move round to the right, and search for the missing officers; and directed two of Abbott's guns under Lieut. Dawes, and the three companies under Lieut. Rind, to move to the left and attack the enemy, who were accumulating on a rocky hill on the flank. Both detachments moved off, Lieutenant Dawes opened fire on the enemy with most admirable precision. The high red Standard of the enemy was now carried up and planted on the top of the hill; this the General thought rather too much of a good thing, and sent orders to Lieut. Rind to move up with his detachment and take the hill from the enemy. The companies moved off covered by the guns. The ascent was near to being impracticable, and they were exposed to a heavy fire; but fortunately most of the shot passed over their heads, and in a short time the companies were up and in possession of one of the ugliest looking places I ever saw in my life. A grenadier of the 37th was saved by his breast plate. A havildar and three men were wounded. After driving off the enemy and holding the hill for half an hour, the companies were withdrawn. Lieut.-Colonel Salter returned with the bodies of his late Adjutant and Dr. Lord—the former without its head; both bodies were naked, and much cut. Lieutenant Broadfoot's was not found till night, when it has brought in, also with a head.

"The troops were now withdrawn, camp pitched, and we retired to rest, all fully accoutred, with the full prospect of having a precious warm night's work.

"Day-break came without a shot being fired from our side. The enemy had decamped, and were said to have gone in the direction of Charekar.

"The Bugle sounded to arms—and orders were given to strike camp and march. We reached this by half past 1 p. m. well tired and fatigued.

"Dost Mahomed was only seen in the early part of the morning; he wore a large white turban and light coloured dress; and was always attended by a sky-blue Banner.

"The Affghans, though exceedingly fine men, were badly mounted; had our Cavalry charged, without any exertion on the men's part, they must have overthrown them. The two wounded Officers testify to having left their mark on several Sirdars. All the enemy who came down were well dressed, and appeared to carry with them the air of chieftains. The loss sustained by the enemy is not known; ours is pretty considerable."

Extract of Division Orders by Major General Sir ROBERT SALE, K. C. B. Commanding the "Kohistan" Field Force, Camp, Charekar, 3d November, 1840.

"1st—The Major General Commanding the Field Force congratulates the Troops under his command on the complete dispersion of the enemy yesterday, and which has been confirmed by reports received this day of the dispersion, and retreat of Dost Mahomed Khan into "Nijrow."

"2d—The Major General remarked with much pleasure the handsome manner and spirited style in which the two flank companies of the 37th Regiment, one company of the 27th Regiment N. I. some Jaun Bauzes supported by two Guns under Lieutenant Dawes, the whole under the command of Lieutenant Rind of the 37th Regiment N. I. carried and cleared the heights in front of the "Purwan Pass."

"3d—Major General Sir Robert Sale cannot help expressing his unqualified approbation of the gallant manner in which Captains Fraser, Ponsonby, and the Officers of the 2d Light Cavalry led their Squadrons against the enemy, and he deeply regrets that such gallantry on the part of their Officers was not appreciated by the troops under their command.

"4th—The Major General has to deplore on this melancholy occasion the loss of three (3) valuable Officers, Doctor Lord, Political Agent; Lieutenant Crispin 2d Light Cavalry, and Lieut. Broadfoot of Engineers, as also the services of Captains Fraser and Ponsonby of the 2d Light Cavalry, who, he regrets to say, have been severely wounded."

HAMILTON WADE, M. B.

Another letter from the late scene of action says:—

"When Captain Ponsonby's reins were cut, his horse became quite unmanageable, and galloped off after the flying troops; a ravine was in the way, and the horse being unable to clear it, tumbled into it and threw the Captain; Mr. Bolton, the riding master, who happened to be coming up in rear, he being one of the abandoned left to fight for himself, by some chance followed Captain Ponsonby's track, and observed his officer just in time to save his horse jumping on him. Mr. Bolton succeeded in laying hold of Captain P.'s charger, tied the cut reins together, helped his officer up, and brought him into camp.

"Mr. McDermot, the Veterinary Surgeon, had also a most providential escape; an Affghan cut at him, missed his aim, but knocked the little Vet., off his horse. The small man on finding himself in this mess, took to his scrapers, and fortunately overtook the Farrier-Major, on the back of whose saddle he mounted, and reached the column

in safety. Captain Ponsonby states, that he owes his life to his charger, a fine large powerful Ghuznee horse; the beast on being surrounded became very violent, and lashed out behind in such a manner as precluded the possibility of any horse coming near his heels. He kicked three of the Afghans over, horses and all.

"The excuse the Cavalry make for not fighting is, that they object to the English sabres; this is not the first instance of the kind."

The following is the official account of the action:—

*To Major General Sir WILLOUGHBY COTTON, G. C. B. and K. C. H.
&c. &c. &c., Cabul.*

"SIR,—Having received intelligence that Dost Mahomed Khan, with a number of armed followers, had taken possession of some forts in this direction, from which he proposed moving to-day towards the Ghorbund Pass, with the view of effecting a junction with his son Mahomed Afzul Khan, I determined on endeavouring to frustrate the attempt.

"Accordingly at 6 A. M. I broke up my Camp at Bamian, the fort of Meer Musjidce, and moved on this position.

"An advanced column, consisting of four companies of H. M. 13th light infantry, the two flank companies of the 37th N. I., one company of the 27th N. I., two 6-pounders of the Shah's, two squadrons of the 2d light cavalry, and 200 of Anderson's horse, the whole under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Salter, preceded the main body which was commanded by myself.

"On approaching Purwan, the forts and villages were rapidly evacuated by the enemy, who were seen flying to the hills in great numbers; I cannot compute them at lower than 500 horse and 3500 foot: the native reports received swell their numbers to a much higher amount.

"Dr. Lord, who accompanied Col. Salter to procure information, sent word that he believed if the cavalry proceeded in advance, they would be able to cut off some of the fugitives, and in compliance with his request, the 2d Cavalry were ordered to skirt the hill to the right, while the Shah's horse, under Captain Anderson, took post on the left of the Pass to prevent any of the enemy attempting to escape in the direction of Ghorbund. The infantry followed, but their movements were greatly retarded by the guns, the progress of which was much impeded by the numerous water-courses that intersected the road.

"The 2d cavalry had preceded the column about a mile, when a body of the enemy's horse, about 200 in number, supposed to be headed by Dost Mahomed in person, came down the hill to attack them. The cavalry was formed into a line, and led on to the charge by Captains Fraser and Ponsonby, commanding the two squadrons. It is my pain-

ful duty to record, that the gallant bearing of these officers was but ill seconded by their men; they both found themselves in the midst of the enemy unsupported by their troops, and after being most severely wounded, extricated themselves with difficulty, and found their men flying before the enemy. I deeply regret to state that Lieutenant Crispin, the Adjutant of the regiment, was cut down and killed, leading his men into action; Dr. Lord was also most unfortunately killed in this affair, and Lieut. Broadfoot, of the Engineers, who was also in advance, is missing.

"Of the gallantry of Captain Fraser and the other officers of the 2d Cavalry, who led the squadrons of the regiment on the occasion, I cannot speak too highly, and I regret that their noble example, and the opportunity offered to the 2d Cavalry of adding to its laurels, have been thus neglected by them.

"The flank companies of the 37th Regiment and one company of the 27th Regiment, supported by two guns from Captain Abbott's Battery, and followed by some of the Jaun Bazes, now ascended the hill overlooking the Pass and Valley of Purwan, which was crowded by the enemy's Infantry, and cleared it in brilliant style, the enemy deserting their positions one after the other, and flying in the direction of the Punjshere Valley, where they still cover the hill side in great numbers.

"The enemy, however, are at too great a distance to admit of my following up the advantages I have obtained this evening; the whole of the troops having been under arms for nine hours; I have therefore encamped on the ground, taking every precaution to guard against a night attack.

"I beg to enclose the accompanying casualty return, from which you will perceive, that excepting the serious disaster sustained in the affair of the 2d Cavalry, but little loss has resulted from the day's operations.

Camp Purwan, 2d Nov. 1840.

I have, &c.

R. SALE, Major Genl.

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of a Detachment on field service, under the command of Major General Sir ROBERT SALE, K. C. B., on the 2d November 1840, Camp Purwan, 2d November, 1840.

"Engineers.—Missing, 1 Lieutenant.* 2d Light Cavalry,—killed 1. Adjutant;† 1 Subadar, 1 Jemadar, and 2 Sepoys; Wounded, 2 Captains;‡ 1 Subadar, 1 Havildar, 22 Sepoys, 2 Syces, and 16 Horses. Missing, 3 Havildars, 1 Naik, 7 Sepoys, 1 Syce, and 12 Horses. 27th Native Infantry—Wounded, 1 Havildar. 37th Native Infantry—Wounded 3 Sepoys."

R. SALE, Major General,

Comdg. Fd. Force, Kohistan.

"I beg to recommend that Dr. Thompson of the 2d Cavalry, be sent out to take charge of the wounded of that Regiment."

* Lieutenant Broadfoot.

† Cornet and Adjutant Crispin killed.

‡ Captains Fraser and Ponsanby severely wounded.

On the day following this action, and a few hours after the Envoy had received official intimation of its results, the unfortunate Ex-Ameer rode to Cabul, and most unexpectedly delivered himself up a prisoner. The occurrence was described in a letter from Sir W. Macnaghten, to Lord Auckland, the Governor General.

"I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the Right Hon'ble the Governor General in Council, that Dost Mahomed Khan, the ex-chief, surrendered himself to me yesterday evening.

"I was returning from my evening ride, and within a few yards of my own residence in the citadel, when a single horseman galloped up to me, and having satisfied himself that I was the Envoy and Minister, told me that Dost Mahomed Khan was arrived, and sought my protection.

"Dost Mahomed Khan rode up to me, and alighted from his horse. After the usual salutations, I begged him to mount again, and we proceeded together to my residence, in the compound of which I have pitched a tent for the ex-chief, and have provided him with every thing necessary to his comfort. He assured me that he had not been off his horse for twenty-four hours, yet, he shewed but little symptom of fatigue, and his self-possession was very remarkable. He put his sword into my hand as a token of submission, but I at once returned it to him, and he seemed gratified for this mark of confidence. He asked me about his family, and, at his own suggestion, and in my presence, he wrote letters to his son Mahomed Afzul and to his two other sons, whose escape from Ghuznee was recently reported, desiring them to come in immediately, as he himself had confided in my protection, and been honorably received.

"Dost Mahomed Khan must have come into Cabul direct from the field of battle, without the knowledge of any of his adherents in the field.

"I have to lament the loss of my assistant Mr. P. B. Lord, who was unfortunately killed in this affair. His Lordship in Council is too well acquainted with the zeal and abilities of the deceased officer to require any eulogium from me."

Immediately after Dost Mahomed's surrender, it was resolved to send him to India with his sons, under the care of Captain P. Nicolson of the Shah's Cavalry, assigning to him a handsome pension, and leaving his place of residence to be arranged by the Governor General in Council. The troops were recalled from the Kohistan, with the exception of a detachment of Goorkhas left at Chareekar; and as a Brigade was on its way to Cabul, (escorting a convoy), through the Punjab, it was now judged advisable to send back the European Regiment with Dost Ma-

homed, and two Companies of the 27th Native Infantry, (which had previously come to Cabul with a convoy of stores,) as an escort to Sir Willoughby Cotton, whose command had expired. Major General Elphinstone succeeded Sir Willoughby Cotton in the Affghanistan command, and H. M. 44th Regiment, under Colonel Shelton, replaced the Bengal Europeans. The 2d Regt. of Light Cavalry was struck out of the Army List, as a punishment for the poltroonery of the troops in the hour of trial, and the dastards were dispersed with ignominy. A new corps, denominated the 11th, was raised to supply the place of the 2d, and to preserve to the gallant surviving officers of the latter corps, the advantages derivable from their position, in the service.

The surrender of Dost Mahomed would, it was supposed, have conduced to the final settlement of Affghanistan. The disaffected, it was imagined, had lost their rallying point, and nothing remained but to place a sufficient force in the neighbourhood of the Ghilzies,—who, under any circumstances maintained a sort of wild independence,—and to put the hill tribes upon ample allowances, to ensure a permanent and tranquil occupation of the country. There can be little doubt that this policy carried out, in the fullest and most liberal sense, would have given to Shah Soojah a much larger tenure of his authority, even if it did not ensure a life-possession of the throne with succession to his progeny. But a sufficiency of troops was *not* retained, nor was good faith kept with the mountaineers who forsook their wonted lawless pursuits for a stipulated consideration. The sequel exhibits the consequences of too much confidence in Shah Soojah's hold upon the affections of his subjects, while unawed by the presence of a large army, and vigilant political agents; and too strong an assurance of the impunity of dishonesty.

Two years had now elapsed since the British forces marched from Ferozepore, to carry out the purposes of the Proclamation of 1st October 1838. During that interval, Runjeet Sing, and his successor, Kurruck Sing, had died. The heir apparent, Nao Nehal Sing had been killed by the fall of the archway of a gate under which he was passing, while forming part of the funeral procession after the death of Kurruck Sing; and Shere Sing, another son of Runjeet's, was now contesting the possession of the throne with the widow of Nao Nehal Sing, who pretended

that she was *enceinte* at the time of her husband's demise. The commotion in the Punjab arising out of this contest, led the Government of India to assemble a considerable force upon the Sutledge, to act as circumstances might render necessary, either as a support to the party whose succession was of the most importance to British interests, to guard against frontier aggressions, or to keep open the communication with Afghanistan. A very few weeks, however, sufficed to settle the question in favour of Shere Sing, whose supremacy was assured by the adhesion of the disciplined portion of the army, and the support of Dhyau Sing, the Minister. The force which was assembled at Ferozepore, was therefore counter-ordered.

It has probably been remarked in the dispatches of the *latest* dates, in the foregoing pages, that the titles and rank of many of the Officers named, differ from those borne by them at the commencement of the campaign. It is due to them, and to the Government which they served, to take the occasion of this division of the four years' history to mention that honors and distinctions had been freely, if not lavishly, bestowed upon all who had distinguished themselves, either by political services, or military skill and gallantry. Lord Auckland was himself created an Earl, Mr. Macnaghten a Baronet, Sir John Keane, as already stated, was raised to the Peerage; Captain Burnes was Knighted, and permitted to hold the rank of Lieut.-Colonel in Afghanistan; Lieut.-Colonel Wade was likewise Knighted; Brigadier Sale was created a Major General, and honored with the decoration of a Knight Commander of the Bath; Lieut. Col. Thackwell was Knighted; a large Queen's Brevet advanced many Majors to the rank of Lieut.-Colonel, and numerous Captains to the rank of Major in the Army, while Companionships of the Bath, and the different classes of the Dooranee order were distributed to all who had been foremost in the race for distinction.

The political and commercial consequences of the two years' campaign were in the highest degree satisfactory. The Nepaulese drew in their horns; conspiracies in the Deccan and the Southern Mahratta country were discovered and crushed. The Burmese withdrew all manifestations of hostility. The Persians totally abandoned their design upon Herat and Afghanistan, and the Khivans yielded readily to our representations of the importance of conceding the demands of Russia. Large quantities of British Indian produce and manufactures, to the value of thirty-eight

lacs of rupees, found their way into Affghanistan by the Indus and the Punjab, and there appeared to be every reasonable prospect of a considerable extension of the trade under increased protection and security of transit.

The opening of the year 1841 found Affghanistan tranquil, with the exception of the province of Zemindwaur, where the Ghilzies, under a chieftain named Uctar Khan, were still in a state of insurrection. To disperse these rebels, a small detachment was sent under Captain Farrington of the Bengal Army, whose success in executing the task confided to him is described below :—

TO CAPTAIN POLWHEEL.

Major of Brigade, Candahar.

SIR,—“ I have the honor to report as follows for the information of Major General Nott, Commanding.

“ You are already aware that the detachment under my command reached Koosh-Kina-Kood on the 28th ultimo, where we halted on the following day, to enable Lieut. Elliot to complete his arrangements. On the morning of the 30th, we moved on Sungboor, 16 miles in the direction of Saerwan Killah, where the force under Mahomed Allum Khan had been completely worsted the evening before by the rebels, his guns taken from him, etc. etc. The unfortunate defeat had been the means of enabling the rebel chief to gain many adherents, and his force from all accounts was beginning to assume a formidable appearance. It was therefore deemed advisable to make our movements as rapidly and secretly as possible. For this purpose, the detachment moved on Girisk on the morning of the 31st, distant 25 miles, crossing the river at Hellmond. The rebels imagining we were moving on their position at Saerwan Killah, had arranged to make a *chupawah* on the Girisk fort, and had crossed the river for that purpose.

“ On the 1st January we continued our march to Kareegha, 22 miles, and by so doing, the rebels, uncertain of our actual position, were in a manner outwitted; for at one time they thought there was another force in their rear. On the 2d, a halt was indispensable, to refresh men and cattle, but the information received having led us to suppose that the enemy were in our vicinity, a reconnoitring party, consisting of Guddo Khan's horse, and some of the 1st Cavalry, with Lieutenants Patterson and Hawkins, H. A. proceeded in the direction of Lundie Nowah. This party proved to be of the most essential service, for it was ascertained by them, that the enemy had actually taken up a position near the village of that name.

“ Accordingly, on the morning of the 3rd, the force moved soon after sun-rise, and about 10 A. M. reached the heights, in front of the village

of Lundie Nowah, where the rebels had taken up a strong position amongst Sand Hills, with a canal along their rear: Guddo Khan's Resallah with Lieutenant Patterson, having succeeded in driving in their advance posts, gave time for the guns, under Lieut. Hawkins, supported by the 2nd Regt. N. I., to get into position. A well-directed fire of shrapnel and grape having been opened on the rebels, amounting to 12 or 1500 horse and foot, were prevented crossing the rest of the heights behind which they were ensconced. The Infantry followed up the advantage thus gained by the Artillery, and under a heavy fire of matchlocks, drove the enemy completely from their position. The rebels had been drawn up in four divisions, two of which attempted to turn our left, but unsuccessfully, the Cavalry having charged and defeated their object in that quarter. By this time the flight was pretty general, and the party of the 1st Cavalry with Guddo Khan's Resallah, pursued and completed the route. One Standard was taken. The killed and wounded on our side are as annexed. That of the enemy amounted to sixty left dead on the field, amongst which a Chief, Fuegbolah Alizza. The wounded were proportionally great, but as the enemy carried them all away, their numbers cannot be estimated correctly. Having refreshed my men at Lundie Nowah by half an hour's halt, the detachment continued its march on Shornek, the stronghold of the rebel chieftain, where the guns lost by Mahomed Allum Khan were recaptured.

"I also beg to mention, that since Lieut. Elliot, the Political Agent, first joined me at Koosh-Kina-Kood, I have found his information with regard to the country and the movements of the rebels to have been most accurate, and his arrangements for the supplies and forage of the troops most admirable.

"In conclusion, where all have done their duty, it would be invidious to name individuals: but from the circumstances of Guddo Khan's Resallah not being a component part of the regular force, I may be excused in bringing to the notice of the Major-General, the conspicuous gallantry of the leader and his men; his loss has been most severe, as you will see from the return.

"I have the honor to enclose an extract of detachment orders on the occasion for the Major-General's information." I have, &c.

H. W. FARRINGTON, Capt.

Comd. Detach. on Field Service.

Extract of Detachment Orders by Capt. FARRINGTON, Commanding, Camp Sharack, 3rd January, 1841.

"The Commanding Officer has to congratulate the troops under his command upon the short and decisive victory gained by them this morning, over the rebel troops under Auctar Khan, and returns his best thanks to all, both officers and men, for the cool and gallant conduct they evinced.

"To Lieut. Hawkins, commanding the Artillery, the Commanding Officer's best thanks are due for the quick and able manner in which he brought his guns into action.

"The Commanding Officer also begs that Lieut. Maclean, 2nd Regt. N. I., will accept his best thanks for the able and judicious manner in which he moved and disposed of the regiment, for the time under his command."

T. F. PATTERSON, *Lieut.*
Detachment Staff.

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Detachment, commanded by Captain FARRINGTON on the 3rd instant, at Loodenumow, Camp Shahrae, 4th Jan. 1841.

2d Regt. N. I.—One Lieut. and one Sepoy severely, and one Lieut. and two Sepoys slightly wounded.

H. Arty. S. F.—One Horse killed and one severely wounded.

Ressalah 1st Regt. Light. Cav.—One Havildar and one Horse killed; three Sepoys and three Horses severely, and five Sepoys and one Horse slightly wounded.

Ressala Affghan Horse.—Two Sepoys and four Horses killed; seven Horses severely, and one Sepoy and five Horses slightly wounded.

This, for a short time, checked the spirit of rebellion, but did not effectually crush it.

In Scinde, Mr. Ross Bell, the Political Agent, and Colonel Stacy, continued to exert themselves to bring the Brahoes to terms, while Capt. Lewis Brown employed his influence with the Murrees to reconcile them to the new order of things. Their efforts were tolerably successful. It was not found so easy, however, to induce the Kujjuk tribe to recognise their obligation to the Government. They refused to pay the previous year's tribute, and shutting themselves up in the fort of Sebee, about 40 miles N. E. of Dadur, bid defiance to the Political Agent. Upon this, Major General Brookes sent a detachment under Col. Wilson of the Bombay Cavalry to coerce them. The detachment consisted of a wing from the 2d Bombay Cavalry, one from the 2d Grenadiers, one from the 20th N. I., a troop of European Artillery, and the whole of Lieutenant Curtis' Irregular Horse. Colonel Wilson immediately attacked the fort, but, after three hours' and a half most desperate fighting was obliged to retreat. Lieutenant Creed of the Artillery, and Lieutenant Falconer of the 2nd Grenadier Guards, were

killed. Colonel Wilson, commanding, was shot through both thighs, and Lieut. Shaw, of the Commissariat, severely wounded. Nine non-commissioned officers and men killed, and forty wounded. General Brookes, immediately on receiving this very unfortunate intelligence, moved up from Bagh with the 40th Queen's and all the disposable force; but on arrival he found the place evacuated, though every thing was left behind in confusion. It appears that there was much mismanagement in the attack. The troops were most injudiciously marched into the body of a town without any precautions taken to gain possession of each successive house, to right and left, as it was neared, and consequently their loss was enormous; for the enemy abstained from all demonstrations of their presence, until our troops were (so to speak) well into the middle of the town; and then they poured into them a fire so steady, and so galling—a fire too, directed chiefly against the British officers, that numbers of our gallant fellows were mown down without the power of resistance—without even seeing the enemy. Colonel Wilson soon after died of his wounds. The loss of the enemy was ascertained to be 200 men, among whom were some influential chiefs.

Soon after this disaster, Major General Brookes moved towards the Bolan Pass with the troops under his orders, to join the force at Quetta. Before he had proceeded half the distance, the General with his second in command, Brigadier Valiant, (Her Majesty's 40th Foot,) were recalled,—the Government having thought proper to degrade them in this manner for their conscientious discharge of their duties as Members of the Commission for investigating the causes of Major Clibborn's disaster in the Nufoosk Pass. But though the General and the Brigadier were withdrawn, the troops of Her Majesty's 40th Regt., the 38th Bengal N. L., the 25th Bombay N. L., &c. continued their march, and it was during the progress of the Battering Train, escorted by a detachment of Skinner's horse, that a serious accident occurred by the sudden rising of a torrent, of which an account will be found in the Appendix No. 3.

Immediately after the Sebee affair, rumours became rife throughout the country, that the Persians were again gathering on the frontier in the neighbourhood of Ghorian, meditating a fresh attack on Herat, and these rumours gained color, from the circumstance of Major Todd, the

Envoy at Herat, having quitted that city on receiving an unsatisfactory reply to his enquiries from Yar Mahomed, the minister of Shah Kamran, the occupant of the Herat guddhee. Whether the Persians were, or were not, sincere in their hostile purposes, or whether the whole was the result of an intrigue, having for its object the expulsion of the British Envoy, is uncertain; but it is at all events matter of fact, that emissaries from Herat spread themselves from Cabul to Scinde, encouraging revolt, and promising aid. The effect of these insidious efforts was unfavorable to the peace of the empire, the more especially as it was supposed that disturbances were not altogether disagreeable to Shah Soojah, who, it was generally alleged, now began to feel the presence of his English supporters and allies rather irksome; still, there was no appearance of the existence of a combination amongst the tribes, who had in a manner been brought under our sway. The revolts were isolated—at one time the country contiguous to the Khyber being in arms,—at another the south of the Ghilzie country being in a state of hostility. To put down the former insurrection, Brigadier Shelton moved out of Jellalabad, the winter head quarters of the Shah and the Envoy, and his course of operations is narrated in the annexed dispatches.

To Major General ELPHINSTONE, Camp in Affghanistan, on his march towards Cabool via Peshawar, Camp Nazian Valley, 24th February, 1841.

SIR,—“I have the honor to report to you that at the requisition of the Envoy and Minister at the Court of Shah Soojah-ool-Moolkh, for a force to coerce a refractory tribe called the Sungbo Khell, inhabiting the Nazian Valley, I marched from Jellalabad on the morning of the 21st instant, with the Troops noted in the margin, in progress to Beshboolaq. I arrived there on the 23d, and was joined by Captain Ferris's Corps of Jazilchees, and the 3d Regiment of Jaun Bauz. I left Beshboolaq with the force under my command, at 4 o'clock this morning, and entered the Sarobi Pass, leading into the Nazian Valley, soon after day-break, according to the following disposition. Two hundred of the Jazilchees under Hyder Alli, Native Commandant on the left flank, to move along the high ground closing the Valley on the East side, the remainder of the Corps under the command of Captain Ferris on my extreme right, to take the enemy on the left flank, two Companies of H. M.'s 44th Regiment and two Companies of the 27th Regt. N. I., supported by two

Detachment of Sappers and Miners.

Ditto 1 Troop 1st Brigade of Horse Artillery with 4 Guns.

H. M.'s 44th Regiment and 27th Regiment N. I. Troops of H. M.'s Shah Soojah-ool-Moolkh.

Detachment of Mountain Train.

1 Squadron 2d Cavalry.

3d Infantry Regiment.

1st Corps of Jaun Bauz Cav.

Companies of the former Corps and one of the latter, with two six-pounders, the former under the command of Capt. Scott, and the latter of Capt. Swayne, of H. M.'s 44th Regt. to crown and move along the heights to the right on the west side of the Valley. I myself, with the main body, composed of the remaining Companies of H. M.'s 44th under Lieut. Col. Mackrell, and of the 27th Regt. N. I. under Lieutenant Colonel Palmer, with two guns under Captain Nicholl of the Horse Artillery, supported by the 1st Regiment of Jaun Bauz under Lieut. Golding, and a Squadron of Shah's 2d Cavalry under Lieut. Mayne, proceeded up the centre of the Valley. Captain Craigie, with the Shah's 3d Infantry Regiment, the Mountain Train under Captain Backhouse, 3d Jaun Bauz under Lieutenant Dowson, and a numerous body of Oolooos or Moolkeahs, made a considerable detour and entered the valley of the Eastern Pass.

"The more fortunate position of Capt. Ferris with his Corps on the extreme right brought him in immediate contact with the enemy as they were driving off their herds and flocks, and retiring with their women and children; and as these were inclining over to the left side of the valley to get out of his reach, the party of two hundred under Hyder Alli, Native Commandant, very opportunely met them from that side, when most of the cattle fell into our hands, and several men were killed and wounded on both sides; a party of Jaun Bauz under Lieut. Golding, made a successful charge amongst the fugitives and killed several.

"The conduct of Captain Ferris and the men of his Corps was conspicuous throughout the day; they attacked the enemy with great gallantry, and pursued them with determined bravery over almost inaccessible heights, driving the enemy before them under a galling fire, as did also the parties under Captains Scott and Swayne. I much regret that Captain Ferris's Corps have suffered some loss. Several Companies of H. M.'s 44th Regt. and 27th Regt. N. I. were out during the day on skirmishing parties, and on every occasion displayed a conspicuous bravery that ensured success.

"A few men held out in two forts, and obliged me to blow open the gates, which was effectually accomplished by Lieut. Pigou of the Engineers, supported by the Light Company of H. M.'s 44th Regt. under Capt. Robinson. It is to me a source of deep regret to have to report, that the second occasion proved fatal to Lieut. Pigou, who was blown up and killed on the spot, and the body thrown a distance of eighty yards by the sudden explosion of the powder bags—the cool intrepidity with which he performed this trying duty does credit to his memory; in him the service has lost a talented and promising young Officer.

"The Nazian Valley, which is about eight miles in length, is studded with forts from one extremity to the other, some of them are formidable positions. The advance of the Troops was one continued course of success, and by one o'clock nearly the whole of this formidable valley and all the forts, too numerous to enumerate, were in our possession.

"Lieut. Colonel Mackrell, commanding H. M.'s 44th Regiment, and Lieut. Colonel Palmer, commanding the 27th Regiment N. I., are en-

titled to my best thanks for the steady support they afforded while advancing.

"I am greatly indebted to my Major of Brigade, Captain Grant, and to Captain Bellew, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, for the zeal and attention they displayed, and the able assistance they rendered me throughout the day.

"I have to acknowledge the important services of Captain Paton, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, who accompanied me as Field Engineer, and who conducted the right column of attack under Captain Scott, with a skill and judgment highly creditable to that Officer.

"I am indebted to Captain Douglas, Assistant Adjutant General, who volunteered to accompany the column, for his able assistance.

"Captain Balderson, of the 16th Regiment N. I., who also volunteered his services, made himself generally useful.

"I should not do justice to Captain Hopkins, of the Shah's Service, did I not notice the zeal evinced by this Officer in volunteering to accompany his own Corps, the 27th Regiment N. I., and who did good service with the right column of attack. Lieut. Towgood, Officiating Sub-Assistant Commissary General, is entitled to my best thanks for the excellent arrangements adopted for the necessary supplies.

"The useful information and able assistance afforded by Captain Mackeson, Political Agent, greatly facilitated our success.

"I have not yet received the returns of casualties, but which to the best of my information, amount to about eight killed and twenty-five wounded; the loss on the part of the enemy has not been ascertained, but it is calculated they must have had from forty to fifty killed and wounded. *

"I propose advancing again to-morrow, with a view to get possession of the southern extremity of the valley."

I have the honor, &c.

J. SHELTON, *Brigadier,*

Comdg. Force in the Nazian Valley.

To Major General ELPHINSTONE, C. B., Commanding in Affghanistan, on his march towards Cabool via Peshawur, Camp Nazian Valley, 25th February, 1841.

SIR,—“I have the honor to report that I left my Camp this morning at 6 o'clock and proceeded with a part of the force up the Valley which contracts into a narrow defile lined with forts, in many parts confined to the bed of the Nullah, with precipitous rocky sides: the enemy appeared in small numbers on the tops of the hills to the right and left, but retired as we advanced. After proceeding about three miles from the place where I had left the 3d Shah's Infantry Regiment yesterday, we came to an open cultivated space studded with forts, apparently forming the Southern extremity of the Nazian Valley. From this point another valley winds round to the South-west, lined with forts: and to the left a narrow defile with perpendicular sides,

the width of the bed of the Nullah leads into an uninhabited valley running South-east, in which only one dilapidated tower is visible.

"The absence of all information with regard to the nature of the valley, its extent or difficulties, tended to render an advance through such formidable defiles somewhat appalling. The skill displayed by the flanking parties in surmounting and crowning almost inaccessible heights removed every obstacle by thus taking the forts in reverse, and deterring the enemy from retaining possession from the certainty of being surrounded without hope of escape by having their retreat cut off.

"The number of forts now in our possession amount to eighty-four. It is my painful duty to report the death of Captain Douglas, Assistant Adjutant General; a party of the enemy fired upon us while advancing, and unfortunately shot him dead by my side. Captain Douglas was a talented officer, of much experience, and is a real loss to the service. I the more deplore the death of this excellent officer, as it was the only casualty that occurred this day.

"My present advanced position is about twelve miles from the entrance of the valley.

"Herewith I beg to enclose a Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing on the 24th instant."

I have, &c.,

J. SHELTON, Brigadier.

Commg. the Force in the Nazian Valley.

Return of Killed and Wounded of the Force under the Command of Brigadier J. SHELTON, in the attack on the Nazian Valley on the 24th Feb. 1841, Camp Nazian Valley, 24th Feb. 1841.

| CORPS. | Killed. | | | | | Wounded. | | | | | Missing. |
|------------------------------|-------------|---------------|------------|------------------------------|---------|---------------|------------|---------|------------------------------|---------|------------|
| | Lieutenant. | Pinjabashies. | Havildars. | Privates, Sepoys and Sowars. | Horses. | Pinjabashies. | Dubashies. | Naicks. | Privates, Sepoys and Sowars. | Horses. | Sepahcees. |
| Engineers, | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| H. M.'s 44th Regiment, .. | 0 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| 3d Inf. Regt. H. M. S. S. F. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Jazeelchie Regiment, | 0 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 18 | 0 | 5 |
| 1st Regt. of Jan Baz, | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 7 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 19 | 0 |
| Total, | 1 | 9 | 1 | 7 | 7 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 23 | 19 | 5 |

Name of Officer Killed.—Lieut. Pigou, of Engineers.

J. SHELTON, Brigdr. Comdg. the Force in the Nazian Valley.

About six weeks subsequent to this, it was found necessary to send a party against a fort in the neighbourhood of Khelat-i-Ghilzie. There is no official communication extant descriptive of the attack, but in the newspapers of the day it is stated, that "a force, consisting of Captains Macan's and Griffin's corps, some of Captain Christie's cavalry, and a few guns, had moved towards Kelat-i-Ghilzie, and Macan on arrival, moved at once to capture one of the forts in their neighbourhood. Lieutenant Hoppe led on a storming party supported by Captain Macan with another company, and on the arrival of the party at the gate of the fort, about 11 o'clock p. m., Captain Sanders of the Engineers placed the bag of powder, and succeeded in blowing down the gate. Hoppe then rushed forward with his company, but was felled to the earth by a stone hurled at him by the defenders. Macan and Sanders were more fortunate, and getting into the fort, aided by Hoppe, who presently recovered, went to work in first rate style. The chief and fifteen men were killed, five were wounded, and a few prisoners were captured, the other part of the *garrison* having escaped over the walls. Captain Macan and Lieutenant Hoppe were both wounded, slightly, but Captain Sanders, we regret to say severely, having carried away three wounds. Macan is said to have brought down three, Sanders two men."

The continued risings of the Ghilzies requiring the permanent presence of troops, it was deemed expedient by the Government to cause a strong fortress at Khelat-i-Ghilzie to be placed in such a state of defence as would admit of its being occupied by a garrison, which could keep the surrounding country in check, and effectually resist a siege or other attack. This measure was of course extremely distasteful to the Ghilzies, who attempted to interrupt the works by surrounding the small body of troops. Upon intelligence of this demonstration on the part of the Ghilzies reaching Candahar, Colonel Wymer, with 400 of the 38th, and the remainder of Christie's horse, commanded by Captain Leeson, and four Horse Artillery guns, moved with stores towards the fort, but when within two or three marches of their destination, the Ghilzies hastened from Khelat-i-Ghilzie, and made for the approaching troops. Captain Macan, 'eager for the fray,' immediately gave chase with a portion of his force, but not coming up with them, nor being able to gain any intelligence of their movements, the Captain suspecting a feint, and that, perhaps, the Ghilzies had returned by another

route to surprize the garrison, halted for the night. The Ghilzies moved on, and coming upon Col. Wymer's force in the night and in camp, they, fully three thousand in number, immediately attacked our troops, who had formed, in front, rushing down to the bayonets. They were repulsed, but again and again made the attempt in very gallant style; this failing, they tried the flank and turned it, but got well drubbed for their pains. They exhibited a most determined spirit, only exceeded by the truly loyal and gallant behaviour of the sepoy, who, when solicited by the Ghilzies to give up their charge, under promises of reward and protection, replied by discharges of musketry. Their bravery repulsed every attack, and at length drove the Ghilzies off the field. Next morning seventy of the enemy were found to have fallen. It is impossible to say what the number of wounded may be, as the Ghilzies ran every risk in carrying them away; but it was, no doubt, considerable. Colonel Wymer's force was too small to pursue them. Our disasters were, 38th N. I., one Sepoy killed and 10 slightly wounded, Leeson's horse, 3 killed and 5 wounded. The Artillery a horse or two killed. Total 4 killed and 15 wounded. Colonel Wymer's coolness and arrangements, when surprized, are said to have been admirable, and both officers and men behaved as gallantly as the Bengal Infantry usually do.

Subjoined is Colonel Wymer's own account of the affair, addressed to the Assistant Adjutant General at Candahar.

Kelat-i-Ghilzie, May 31, 1841.

" Sir,—I have the honor to report for the information of Major General Nott, commanding at Candahar, that shortly after the arrival of the detachment under my command, as noted per margin, at Eelme on the 19th instant, information was brought me that a large body of Gilzie rebels were in motion, with the supposed intention of attacking my detachment, and capturing the convoy under my charge, and a few hours after the report, stated that they had dispersed. At 5 P. M. my scout again returned with intelligence, that the whole of the rebel force, headed by the Gooroo and Sultan Khan, Gilzie chiefs, were in full march for the purpose of attacking my detachment, which was also confirmed by the return of Captain Leeson, who had gone with a large reconnoitring party. Orders were immediately given for the troops to get under arms, and I proceeded to

Detail.
2 guns Horse Artillery.
A wing of Shah's 1st Cavalry.
4 companies 38th Regiment N. I.
21 men, Sappers and Miners.

select the most favorable spot for a position to receive the enemy, a short time prior to which some low hills in the distance were observed through telescopes to be covered with troops, both horse and foot, distant about three miles. I immediately placed the detachment in the chosen position, and then awaited the arrival of the enemy, it being quite out of my power, from the small party of troops and magnitude of the convoy, for me to act otherwise than on the defensive.

"About half-past five P. M. the enemy were observed to form and advance to the attack in one dense mass—when about nine hundred yards distant, the two six-pounders opened upon them with beautiful precision and effect, on which the enemy separated into three distinct columns, and advanced in the most cool and deliberate manner, with the evident intention of making a simultaneous attack upon both my flanks and centre, which was met with the greatest coolness and gallantry by the small detachment, in which they were assisted by a small party of horse under Guddoo Khan, who had taken up a position on a slight eminence for the protection of my left. The enemy were permitted to approach to within a very short distance, when a cool and destructive fire was poured into them from the infantry line, which, after some continuance, caused their troops, from the right and centre, to unite with those on their left, resting upon and limiting the steep banks of the Turnuck river. This caused a corresponding change in my position to be necessary, which, although under a galling fire, was effected with the greatest steadiness, in proof of which I may state, that during the execution of the movement, the left of the 38th was attacked in the most determined manner by a large body of infantry armed with drawn swords, who seeing our men in motion, must have thought they were retreating, and uttering a loud shout rushed in upon them, and the rapidity with which the men reformed and repulsed the attack, elicited my warmest approbation.

"From this time the combined efforts of the enemy were directed to all points until about 10 P. M., without their gaining one single advantage, (to which time from the commencement of the attack, an incessant fire was thrown in upon my detachment,) when they were finally and completely dispersed.

"On the commencement of the attack, the enemy were said to number 2590 horse and foot, and during the engagement, they were joined by two strong reinforcements when, from the information I subsequently gained, the numbers cannot be estimated at less than five thousand men.

"The loss on the part of the enemy must have been very considerable, and sixty-four bodies and six or seven horses were left dead on the field; and I have every reason to suppose, that from the time of their retreat till a little before day-break they were employed in removing their killed and wounded, who did not fall in the immediate vicinity of my position. I am led to this conclusion, from the circumstance of numerous moving lights having been seen throughout the night, and also from the reports of the inhabitants of the country. On being repulsed, the enemy withdrew to the left bank of the Turnuck, and moved

off about day-break on the morning of the 30th, since which I have been unable to gain any information relative to their movements, except that it is currently reported that they have all dispersed.

"I cannot omit to mention the ready obedience yielded by the wing of the 38th, when ordered to cease firing at a time when they were exposed to a heavy fire, a measure which was rendered temporarily necessary: after the order was given, not a shot was heard until again ordered to commence, thus affording the most convincing proof of their steadiness and attention to the commands of their officers.

"I have much pleasure in expressing my entire approbation of the conduct of the European and Native commissioned, non-commissioned officers and men of the detachment, and in order that you may be in full possession of my sentiments on this point, I beg to subjoin an extract of an order which I deemed it proper to issue on the subject.—

"It now becomes the most agreeable part of Lieutenant Colonel Wymer's duty to express in detachment orders the very high sense he entertains of the gallantry of the different European officers he had the honor to command in the unequal contest of yesterday—and to request their acceptance of his best and most cordial thanks for the support they so willingly yielded him on the occasion above referred to. Too much cannot be said of the scientific and destructive manner in which the artillery practice was conducted by Lieutenant Hawkins commanding, which created awful havoc in the ranks of the enemy, to the admiration of the troops present.

"The broken nature of the ground on which the action took place, was too unfavourable to admit of any extensive display of cavalry movements; they had however one opportunity of charging the enemy, which charge was perfectly successful, and prevented any renewal of the attack in that quarter. One hundred and fifty of the cavalry also were distributed about the camp, and their good conduct drew forth the praise of the officers under whose command they were placed, and all that could be done by that branch of the service, was most ably executed by Captain Leeson in command, assisted by Lieutenant Moorcroft of the Madras Army, who volunteered his services. To Captain Leeson great praise is due for the expert manner in which the arduous duty of patrolling the hills, right and left of the road, from the period of the convoy's marching from Candahar was conducted.

"To Captain Scott, in immediate command of the wing of the 38th Regiment, Lieut. Colonel Wymer feels much indebted for the valuable assistance he received from him, and for which he thus publicly tenders his unfeigned thanks, and the same are not less due to Lieutenants Poeklington, Tytler, and Farquharson, for the very attentive manner in which they conducted the duties of the posts assigned to their charge, each of which had its due effect in repelling the furious and repeated charges of the enemy for a period of nearly four hours.

"To Lieut. Waterfield, Acting Adjutant to the regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Wymer also feels himself much indebted for the various aids

afforded by him, and the expeditious manner in which the sudden calls for reinforcements were so readily obeyed.

"Lieutenant Jeremie, Staff Officer to the detachment, has, during this affair, proved of the greatest use to the Lieutenant Colonel from his knowledge of the Persian language, and the duties pertaining to his office. Doctor Jacob's professional skill and attention to the wounded in hospital on both sides, need no encomiums from the commanding officer's pen; they have been all that he could wish.

"To the whole of the commissioned, non-commissioned, European and Native officers and soldiers, Lieutenant Colonel Wymer offers his most sincere praise and thanks, for the great exertions manifested by them in this trying contest."

I have, &c.

G. P. WYMER, *Lieut. Col.*
In charge of Detachment.

The next proof on record that the disaffection in the neighbourhood of the Helmund had not been suppressed, is furnished in the following General Order by the Supreme Government, and the dispatch which it publishes:—

"*Notification, Fort William, Secret Department, the 9th August, 1841.*—The Right Honorable the Governor General of India in Council has much pleasure in publishing for general information, the following copy of a dispatch, reporting the signal defeat of a large body of insurgents, by a detachment of His Majesty Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk, serving under British Officers, and His Lordship in Council is glad to express his approbation of the conduct of Captain Woodburn, commanding the Detachment, and cordially concurs with him in his praise of the Officers and Men, by whom, under circumstances of difficulty, he was gallantly supported.

By order of the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council,
T. H. MADDOCK, *Secy. to the Govt. of India.*"

"*Camp Girishk, 5th July, 1841.*

Sir,—“Conformably with the instructions conveyed in Captain Ripley's (Fort Adjutant) letter to my address, under date the 27th ultimo, I have the honor to report for the information of Major General Nott, commanding, the operations of the detachment under my command since leaving Candahar.

"On reaching Kaash-kee-na-kood on the morning of the 1st instant, the Assistant Political Agent with my detachment (Lieut. Pattenson) intimated to me that he had received information of Ukhtar Khan being still before Girishk with a body of 3,000 men, but thought it probable he would move in the direction of Sharuck, on learning the near approach

of my detachment. I therefore determined to march next morning to Sungboor, instead of proceeding by the usual route to Girishk, in order that I might be nearer the enemy in case they should move up the river, and still be able to reach the ford opposite Girishk by the same number of marches.

"On arrival at Sungboor, on the morning of the 2nd instant, I was informed by Lieut. Pattenson, that Ukhtar Khan had not left Girishk, and that from every account received, he was determined to meet my detachment before the place, and oppose my crossing the Helmund. I consequently marched at 8 o'clock in the evening, and reached the ford opposite Girishk a little before day-break on the 3rd instant, when Lieut. Pattenson (who preceded the detachment) acquainted me that all the fords were in possession of the enemy, and that the one at which I had halted was not practicable for either cavalry or infantry, but that at Sumboolee, about three miles further up the river, cavalry could cross, and that the infantry ford was a mile further down. I accordingly directed Captain Hart to ford at Sumboolee with the 2nd Regt. of Janbaz, and to move down upon the enemy while I was crossing the remainder of the detachment at the ford described by the Assistant Political Agent, as only 'knee deep.' In July 1839, I had frequently crossed the river at this ford, and had therefore no reason to doubt the accuracy of Lieut. Pattenson's information, but on reaching the place, was greatly disappointed to find that, owing to the depth and rapidity of the current, the ford was totally impracticable.

"From the high grounds at this place, I could distinctly see the rebel force drawn up on the opposite bank, about half a mile from the river; the Infantry were formed on the open plain, and appeared to number 3000, but the gardens near the fort were swarming with men, who commenced moving out on my detachment coming in sight. I now discovered that Captain Hart had crossed the river, and was moving down the right bank in excellent order, agreeably to the instructions I had given him; and finding that it was impossible for me to cross the river at any of the fords below, I was apprehensive that he might be surprised by the enemy, and be hard pressed before he could regain the ford at which he had crossed. Fortunately, however, he observed that I had not been able to effect a passage, and immediately returned to the left bank of the river at Sumboolee, where I joined him at 8 A. M., and found that the rebels had moved up to the ford, and taken up their position on the opposite bank, but as my men were suffering from extreme heat, and the long march during the night, I contented myself by giving them a few rounds of round shot, which caused them to move off to some gardens and villages two miles further up, when I immediately pitched my camp close to and fronting the ford, determining to suspend further operations till the afternoon, as the ford was not practicable for Infantry, and at the same time I crowned the hills which ran in my rear (from the village of Sumboolee for about a mile up the river) with horsemen, to watch the rebels, and bring instant intelligence of any movement that might take place.

"About 4½ P.M., a stir was perceptible in the rebel camp, and they seemed preparing for a move. I accordingly struck mine, and detached Lieut. Golding with his Janbaz regt. to watch their movements and oppose their crossing the river, should such prove to be their object. About 6 o'clock I received intelligence from this officer, that the enemy had succeeded in crossing the ford (some three miles distant from my position) before he could reach it, and were moving down in large bodies. I immediately changed my front, and took ground a little to the left, which I considered the best position attainable under all circumstances. The guns were placed between the 4th and 5th companies of the 5th Infantry, and the two Janbaz regts. were formed on either flank, and 200 Suwars were posted in rear to protect the baggage and watch the neighbouring ford, in case any portion of the enemy should attempt a passage by it also: in this order I remained until I could discover their point of attack, which was soon unmasked by a large body of Infantry moving towards my left, when I forthwith changed position of the light company of the 5th Infantry, throwing back Lieut. Golding's Janbaz regt., and forward the guns and remaining companies of the 5th Regt. with Captain Hart's Janbaz corps thrown back at a right angle with the Grenadier company of the 5th Regt. to protect the right of the position.

"The attack on the left was made with great boldness, but was repulsed by the well-directed fire from the guns and the three companies on their left. Failing in this, the enemy moved off towards the right, but were again met by a most destructive fire from the guns and the five companies of infantry on their right.

"Large bodies of horse and foot were now seen crowding along the heights to the right of the infantry, and shortly after they moved down on Capt. Hart's Janbaz corps, forcing it back on the baggage in the rear, and a portion of them even succeeded in getting close up to the rear of the three companies of the 5th Infantry on the left of the guns, but were driven back by Lieutenant Clark's facing the rear rank of these companies to the right about and firing a volley. The Janbaz regiments having now got into confusion, notwithstanding the utmost exertions of their officers, and the rear being still threatened, I moved back one of the guns with the Grenadier company of the 5th Regiment to protect it, which was scarcely effected before they were beset by large bodies of horse and foot crowding in on the rear, and who were not driven back and dispersed until three rounds of grape and a volley from the Grenadiers had been delivered, at less than 50 paces distant.

"I then ordered Captain Hart and Lieutenant Golding to move out with their Janbaz corps, and scour the country to the right, which they most ably performed, though in justice to these officers I am compelled to add, but feebly supported by a large portion of their men, who lagged behind, crowded in upon the baggage and rear of the infantry, and could not be induced by any means to behave as soldiers, in following their officers.

" Under these circumstances, I determined to occupy the whole of a melon bed enclosure in which a portion of the 5th Infantry was posted, and to get as much of the baggage within it as possible. This arrangement was soon perfected, and the infantry being secured behind a low wall, which ran round this enclosure, were able, in comparative safety, to repel any fresh attack that might be made, of which there were several, but in every instance, steadily repulsed by the fire from the artillery and infantry.

" At 11 o'clock the heights were again crowded with bodies of horse and foot, and it was now obvious that the rebels were moving off, though they kept up a desultory and useless fire upon the position for hours after, apparently with the object of distracting our attention, and enabling them to carry off their dead, which they did until nearly day-break on the morning of the 4th instant.

" At sunrise on the 4th instant I detached Lieutenant Golding to ascertain the direction in which the enemy had gone, and he reported on his return, that they were posted in considerable strength about two miles up the river, but it was soon ascertained that they had re-forded it, and in a few hours after, information was received of their having reached Hyderabad *en route* to Zemindawur, when I made immediate arrangements for crossing the grain (carried upon asses) upon camels, and at 3 o'clock *p. m.* commenced fording the detachment and baggage, an operation which lasted nearly seven hours, notwithstanding the aid received from the Janbaz regiments by carrying the infantry across on their horses. The detachment reached Girishk this morning at two o'clock, and encamped on the high ground to the west of the fort.

" In both a military and political point of view, it would be of the greatest importance to follow up, and disperse the rebels; but with reference to their numbers, and the notoriously disaffected state of the country, I do not consider that I should be justified in moving after them, with a weak regiment of infantry, two guns, and with cavalry, in which every confidence cannot be placed. However, if the Major General is of opinion that a small increase of cavalry and infantry to my detachment will suffice, no time shall be lost by me in pursuing the rebels, and engaging them in Zemindawur.

" All accounts agree in computing the force of the enemy to have amounted to 6000, of which two-thirds were infantry, and from information yesterday received, they had upwards of 300 killed, and the villages up the river are stated to be filled with wounded men.

" It is a pleasing duty for me to bring to the Major General's notice, the excellent conduct of the European officers of the detachment, as I am much indebted to them for the coolness and energy they displayed in executing my orders and wishes.

" Captain Hart and Lieutenant Golding repeatedly charged the enemy successfully during the night, with such portion of their men as could be induced to follow them; and I only regret that their noble example should have been so partially seconded—the former officer was wounded

slightly on the head and right wrist, but will, I trust, be inconvenienced therefrom, only for a few days.

"Lieutenant Cooper deserves my best acknowledgments for the rapidity and admirable manner in which he brought his guns to play upon the enemy; and I had frequent opportunity of noticing the precision of his practice. His guns are never in difficulty, and he manages to move with less assistance from infantry than most officers I have met with.

"Lieutenant Ross commanded the 5th Infantry on the night of the 3rd instant, and displayed both courage and ability in the trying situations in which he was frequently placed, and the order in which he kept the men was extremely creditable to him.

"Lieutenant Clark commanded the three left companies of the 5th Regiment, and exhibited much coolness in repulsing the frequent attacks made both on front and rear of his position.

"From Mr. Assistant Surgeon Colquhoun, I also derived much assistance during the action, in a variety of ways, and his activity and zeal could not have been exceeded.

"Lieut. Pattenson, Assistant Political Agent, volunteered his services, and throughout the night was most active in conveying such orders as circumstances required, and was consequently of much assistance to me. I regret to state that this officer, while walking over the field towards morning, was suddenly attacked by one of the wounded of the enemy, and severely stabbed in the right side. At first the wound was considered mortal, but I am happy to say, that he has since been declared out of danger.

"It is also my duty to bring most prominently to the Major General's notice, the admirable conduct of the Artillery and 5th Infantry throughout the night of the 3d instant, and to state my conviction, that no troops could have displayed greater coolness and bravery than they did on every occasion. They moved from one position to another, not only without confusion, but with nearly as much precision and regularity, as if they had been going through an ordinary parade.

"Three standards were captured from the enemy, one by Captain Hart's men, another by Lieut. Golding's, and the third by the three companies of the 5th Infantry under Lieut. Clark.

"I have the honor to annex hereto, a list of killed and wounded, and in conclusion to state, that I shall be careful to keep the Major General fully acquainted with all my operations."

I have, &c.

J. WOODBURN, *Captain,*

Comd. Field Detachment on the Helmund.

To Captain POLWHEEL, Major of Brigade, Candahar.

Return of Casualties in a Detachment under the Command of Captain WOODBURN, engaged in a night attack on the bank of the Helmund by Ukhtar Khan, on the 3d of July, 1841.

| Corps. | Killed. | | Wounded. | | | | Horse. | | |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|--------|----------|----------|----------------|--------|---------------------------|---------|----------|
| | Rank and Total. | Total. | Captain. | Sirdars. | Rank and File. | Total. | Total Killed and Wounded. | Killed. | Wounded. |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| Detachment 1st Troop H. A. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Detachment 1st Jaun Baux H..... | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 4 | 11 |
| Detachment 2d Jaun Baux H..... | 10 | 10 | 1 | 1 | 15 | 17 | 27 | 9 | 21 |
| 5th Infantry S. S. Force. | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 0 | 0 |
| Grand Total. | 12 | 12 | 1 | 1 | 26 | 28 | 40 | 13 | 31 |

J. WOODBURN, Captain,
Comg. Detachment Shah Soojah's Force.

List of European Officers attached to a Detachment, under the Command of Captain WOODBURN.

| No. | Rank and Names. | How employed. | Remarks. |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------|
| CAPTAINS. | | | |
| 1 | J. Woodburn, | Commg. Detachment and 5th Infantry. | |
| 2 | L. Hart, | Commg. 2d Jaun Baux. | |
| LIEUTENANTS. | | | |
| 1 | G. L. Cooper, | Commg. Detachment Horse Artillery. | |
| 2 | G. W. G. Golding, | Ditto ditto 1st Jaun Baux. | |
| 3 | A. H. Ross, | Actg. Adj. and 2d in command. | |
| 4 | T. Clark, | Actg. Quarter Master. | |
| ASSIST. SURGEON. | | | |
| 1 | A. Colquhoun, | In Medical Charge of Detachment. | |

Officer Wounded.
Captain Hart, 2d Jaun Baux Regiment, slightly.

J. WOODBURN, Captain,
Commg. Detachment on Helmund.

In the same month (July) intelligence reached Cabul, that the Zemindars and Sirdars of Charekar had refused to pay the revenue due to the Government of Shah Soojah. A corps of Affghan levies under Lieut. Maule was sent to coerce them, and appears to have had little trouble in doing so, although an influential chieftain, named Meer Musjeedee, was still harboured by the people of Nidjrow, and openly threatened to raise the whole of Kohistan, if at any time he should hear of the defeat of our troops elsewhere.

In Scinde, during the month of July, affairs had gone on steadily. After a long period passed in wearisome negotiation, Nusseer Khan came down from the hills and surrendered to Colonel Stacy, tempted by the pacific overtures made on behalf of the British Government, and the hope of being placed on the *guddee* under British influence, which hope was afterwards fulfilled. The death of Mr. Ross Bell, which took place in July, induced the Government to place Major Outram in charge of the Political Agency, and there is no doubt that the judgment and energy of that officer contributed to the maintenance of the peace and order, which for some time subsequently distinguished the whole of Upper Scinde.

The inability of Captain Woodburn to follow up his success in Zemin-dawaur with the small force at his command, (as mentioned in his dispatch given above,) induced Major General Nott to dispatch from Candahar a body of troops, sufficiently large to pursue Ukhtar Khan, and effectually to suppress the rebellion headed by that chieftain.

One of these detachments was placed under the command of Colonel Chambers of the 5th Bengal Cavalry, and the other under Captain John Griffin of the 24th Bengal N. I. They proceeded to different parts of the country, but each was soon engaged with the enemy with good effect. The dispatches of the respective commandants are given below :—

Colonel CHAMBERS' Dispatch to Captain GRANT, Offg. Asst. Adjt. Genl., Cabool.

Camp Kurootoo, 5th August, 1841.

SIR,—“ For the information of Major General Elphinstone, C. B., commanding the Troops in Affghanistan, I have the honor to report that about 8 o'clock this morning, several shots were heard on the left of the valley where our grass-cutters were known to have gone. I immediately ordered a Troop to be saddled.

" Soon after one of Captain Walker's Sowars of the 4th Irregulars came to me with a message, that the enemy were coming down the Sheea Kotil Pass in force, and that he had only a few men with him.

" Lieut. Bazett's Troop being by this time ready, it went off to his assistance with as many of the 4th Ressallah as could be sent, to hold the enemy in check. I followed immediately with five Companies of the 16th Regiment N. I. under Lieut. Colonel Maclaren, and another Troop of the 5th Light Cavalry.

" On passing the Syeeghan Ghaut, I observed a few horse and foot in it, and directed Captain Oldfield to halt at a distance, merely to watch and hold them in check until our return, but after the column had passed, they appear to have increased in numbers and boldness, until they afforded him an opportunity of charging them, of which he appears most ably to have availed himself.

" As my column approached the scene of action, we could distinctly see Captain Walker and Lieut. Bazett with their parties dashing boldly over the hills after the enemy, and driving them off in all directions, in short leaving nothing for me to do.

" I regret exceedingly to state, that Lieut. Bazett is very severely, though I hope not dangerously, wounded."

I have, &c.

R. E. CHAMBERS, Lieut. Col.

Commandg. Detachment.

Return of Killed and Wounded of the Detachment under the command of Lieut. Colonel CHAMBERS, 5th Light Cavalry, on the morning of the 5th August 1841.

Camp Karootoo, 5th August, 1841.

" 5th Regiment Light Cavalry.—Killed, 1 Grass-cutter; Wounded severely, one Lieutenant, one Quarter Master Serjeant, four Horses; Ditto, slightly, one Trooper, three Horses.

" 43d Regiment Native Infantry.—Wounded, severely, one Havildar; Ditto, slightly, one Sipahce.

" 3d Ressallah 4th Irregular Cavalry.—Killed, one Horse; Wounded, severely, two Sowars, one Grass-cutter, ten Horses; Ditto, slightly, one Sowar, one Horse.

Officers Wounded.

" Lieutenant Bazett, 5th Light Cavalry, severely.

" Captain Walker's Charger killed under him.

R. E. CHAMBERS, Lieut. Col.

Commanding Detachment.

Captain GRIFFIN's Dispatch to Captain POLWHEEL, Major of Brigade, Candahar, Camp Khawind, 17th August, 1841.

SIR.—" For the information of Major General Nott, Commanding the District, I have the highest satisfaction in reporting that the combined

Rebel Force, headed by Akram Khan and Ukhtar Khan, amounting to upwards of five thousand Horse and Foot, was this morning totally routed and dispersed by the Detachment under my command, as noted in the margin.

4 Six Pounders.
800 Sabres.
350 Bayonets.

" 2. The loss of the enemy on this occasion is estimated at six hundred killed and wounded. Sixty prisoners were brought into Camp, and among them three Chiefs of note; viz. Khyroollah Khan of Teyna, (since dead,) a brother of Lallo Khan of Bhagran, and Moolah Shurreef of Bhagran.

" 3. The accurate information furnished by the Assistant Political Agent on the afternoon of the 16th, enabled me immediately to comply with his requisition for the dispersion of the Rebels, then within ten miles of my Camp.

" 4. At 4 A. M. I broke ground, and at 7 came up with the enemy, strongly posted in my front, occupying a succession of walled gardens and small forts, under cover of which they immediately opened a fire of juzels and matchlocks, on the advancing columns.

" 5. After a few rounds skilfully delivered by Lieutenant Cooper, commanding the Guns, parties were detached from the 2d Bengal Native Infantry, and 1st Regiment Shah Shoojah's force, to clear and take possession of these enclosures; whilst the 5th Regiment Shah Shoojah's force, posted on the extreme left (flanked by a wing of H. M.'s 1st Cavalry,) deployed into line, advanced at the double, and drove back a body of the enemy's skirmishers, who were for the most part concealed behind a range of broken walls, and whose fire was becoming destructive.

" 6. At the same time, the enclosures in front of the column to the right were speedily and gallantly carried under a heavy fire of matchlocks, by two Companies of the 2d Bengal Native Infantry, under Lieutenants Cooke and Travers, supported by a party of the 1st Infantry S. S. force under Lieutenant Gardiner, in effecting which, numbers of the enemy were shot and bayoneted.

" 7. This object having been accomplished, the whole advanced with the view of attacking the main body of the enemy, who were observed "*en masse*," in rear of the gardens; but before this could be effected, they appeared to be getting into confusion, when Captain Hart's Regiment of Jaun Bauz Cavalry and the wing of H. M.'s 1st Cavalry, charged, broke, and pursued them with fearful vengeance several miles, headed, moreover, by His Royal Highness Prince Suftur Jung in person. I then permitted Lieutenant Golding with his Jaun Baz Regiment, who had been on Rear Guard duty (the baggage being well up and in safety) to join in the pursuit at the request of this officer, whose men were most eager to take a part in the action.

" 8. The Jaun Bauz Cavalry have, in my opinion, fully established, on this occasion by their behaviour, a reputation for gallantry, and every claim to the confidence of His Majesty.

" 9. Our loss has been rather severe, I regret to remark, as will be seen.

by the accompanying Return; particularly in the two companies of the 2d Bengal Native Infantry, who were exposed to a very heavy fire.

" 10. It affords me much satisfaction to record the gallantry with which the Jan Baz Cavalry were headed by Captain Hart, afterwards ably supported by Lieutenant Golding, and the judgment displayed by the former Officer, in seizing the most favourable opportunity to charge and rout the enemy.

" 11. I have a most pleasing duty to perform in bearing testimony to the zeal and ability with which all the Officers under my command conducted their respective duties; and here I must especially notice, that Captain Woodburn, though at the time suffering from the effects of severe illness, and scarcely able, owing to weakness, to sit on horseback, exhibited an instance of zealous and honourable devotion to his military duties in leaving his dooley, mounting his horse, and remaining in command of the 5th Regiment S. S. force till the close of the action.

" 12. To Captains McDowell and McLean, and Lieutenants Cooper and Crawford in command of Corps and Detachments, I am deeply indebted for assistance rendered to me; and a similar expression of thanks is due to the other Officers under and associated with them: while I cannot omit to particularize the just tribute of praise due to Lieutenant Ross, 5th Infantry S. S. force, Detachment Staff, from whom on this, as on all other occasions, since assuming Command of this Detachment, I have received much assistance.

" 13. The Medical Staff; viz. Assistant Surgeons Colquhoun and Rae, have entitled themselves to the highest commendation for their humane and unceasing attention to the wounded men.

" 14. The steady and excellent conduct of the Native Commissioned, European and Native Non-Commissioned Officers and Privates, entitle them to my highest praise.

" 15. A Casualty Roll herewith accompanies, and
I have, &c.

JOHN GRIFFIN, Captain,
Commanding a Field Detachment in Zemindawaur."

Return of Casualties in a Field Detachment, under the Command of Captain GRIFFIN, H. M. Shah Shoojah's Force, engaged in Action with a combined Rebel Force in Zeemendawaur, on the 17th August, 1841.

" Detachment 1st troop Horse Artillery S. S. F. wounded—1 rank and file, 1 horse killed and 1 wounded—Wing of 1st Cavalry, do. killed 1 rank and file; wounded 1 lieutenant, 3 duffadars, dubashies and havildars, and 14 rank and file, 6 horses killed and 18 wounded—1st Regiment of Jan Bauz, ditto, 3 rank and file killed and wounded, 1 Pinjah bashie, 4 duffadars, dubashies and havildars, and 9 rank and file, and 15 horses wounded—2d Regiment of Jan Baz, ditto, 1 rank and file killed; wounded 2 duffadars, dubashies and havildars and 11 rank and file, and 9 horses killed and 14 wounded—Detachment of 2d Regiment of Bengal Native

Infantry, killed 7 rank and file; wounded 1 duffadar, dubashies and havildars, and 29 rank and file—1st Regiment of Infantry Shah Shoojah's Force, wounded 1 duffadar, dubashies and havildars, and 10 rank and file—5th Regiment of Infantry, ditto, wounded 1 duffadar, dubashies and havildars, and 14 rank and file.

Name of Officer Wounded.

Lieutenant Crawford, 1st Cavalry, S. S. F. slightly.

Remarks.—2 Sowars missing.

*J. GRIFFIN, Captain,
Commanding Detachment."*

These two victories produced a very happy effect. The Ghilzie power was considered to have been broken by them. Ukhtar Khan fled to the Hindoo Khosh, and from thirty to forty chieftains tendered their allegiance through Major Leech, the Political Agent at Candahar. Nevertheless, it was deemed necessary by that officer to require, that a large force be sent to the Tezeen valley through difficult Passes, under Colonel Wymer of the 38th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry, who was afterwards joined by Major General Nott himself, on whom the command then devolved.

While matters were thus progressing in the South of Afghanistan towards a settlement of the country, Shah Soojah and the British Envoy felt so secure that the whole of the North had been brought under subjection, that it was broadly given out, that in a few months there would be no further occasion for the presence of a British force. It is quite true that the people of Charekar had but recently refused to pay kist to the Government; that the inhabitants of Cabul and Candahar exhibited their antipathy to the Europeans by continual insults and occasional murders; that Shah Soojah was alienating his subjects by his hauteur, his cruel punishments and oppressions; that one of Dost Mahomed's sons was still in the North; and that not a single month had passed, since the occupation of the country, in which it had not been found necessary to employ troops for purposes of vengeance or coercion; all this was perfectly true, yet such was the infatuation of the authorities named above; such their singular insensibility to the real posture of affairs, that in one fatal moment they concluded they might safely commence a reduction of the sums annually agreed to be paid to the Eastern Ghilzies, and other tribes inhabiting the hills between

Peshawur and Cabul, for the sake of keeping the Passes open, and putting a stop to plunder. The resolution having been come to, the reduction was immediately carried into effect. The consequences were, as might have been expected, most serious. The mountaineers rose as one man—occupied the Passes in great force, and at once cut off the communication between Cabul and India.* It is not easy to say whether this was the designed precursor of the subsequent blockade of Cabul; but there can be little doubt that the Ghilzies, having once committed themselves to an earnest opposition, felt the necessity for organizing a combination with all the disaffected chieftains far and near, a combination which ultimately destroyed our power in Afghanistan, and led to the most disastrous and horrible results.

On the intelligence reaching Cabul, that the Khoord Cabul Passes were occupied by the enemy, Sir Robert Sale was despatched with an adequate force to drive them thence, and re-open the communication. It proved a severer task than had been anticipated; but the troops accomplished it successfully under their distinguished leader, and the following dispatches relate the manner of the achievement:—

From Major General Sir ROBERT SALE, K. C. B. to Captain GRANT, Offg. Assistant Adjutant General, Cabool, dated Camp Bootkhak, 12th October, 1841.

"SIR,—I have the honor to state to you, for the information of Major General Elphinstone, C. B. that the task of forcing the Pass of Khoord Cabool, and defeating the rebels posted within it, has this morning been accomplished.

"After fully weighing the whole of the information brought to me at various periods in the course of yesterday, I came to the conclusion, that the main body of the insurgents was posted behind a breastwork near the middle of the Pass, and that they would defend it, as well as the almost inaccessible heights on either flank of it.

"My plan of attack was therefore arranged as follows: I determined to employ two hundred Juyrailechees, under the well known Sirdar Jan Fishun Khan, to create a diversion by assaulting, in flank and rear, the

* For a proof of the indifference of the Political Officers to, or their ignorance of, the mustering of these Chiefs, the reader is referred to Appendix, No. IV. Capt. Gray's Narrative. The editor of these memorials might also cite the remonstrances of Mohan Lal, Sir A. Burnes' Moonshoe, and Col. A. Roberts, who lost the command of the Shah's troops, from too freely speaking his mind to the Envoy. Sir W. McNaghten and Sir A. Burnes would not believe that a mine was beneath them ready to explode.

precipitous ridge which forms the Southern side of the Durra, whilst the troops under my command entered its gorge, and attacked the enemy in front. The force left camp at 6 A. M. The advanced guard consisted of the two guns of Foot Artillery, under Lieutenant Dawes, two companies of the 13th Light Infantry under Captain Fenwick and Lieutenant George King, the flank companies of the 35th Native Infantry under Captain Younghusband, and a detachment of Pioneers under Captain Broadfoot, the whole being in charge of Captain Seaton, 35th regiment Native Infantry. The remainder of the 13th and 35th, formed our main body. As we approached the insurgents' position, we found that all the reports of our spies had been substantially correct, but that the enemy were withdrawing from behind their breastwork in the valley, and occupying the rocky ridges of the mountains on either side. They opened upon us a well-directed fire, and at the very commencement of the affair, I received a wound from a ball above the ankle, which ultimately compelled me to leave the field. Whilst I remained on it, however, I directed two companies of the 13th, and one of the 35th to ascend the precipices on either hand in face of the enemy, and I must in justice to them mention the gallantry, activity, and perseverance with which this duty was performed, and the enemy driven by our skirmishers from point to point of eminences almost perpendicular. When compelled to retire, I resigned the command into the hands of Lieutenant Colonel Dennie, C. B., and have the pleasure to forward his report, detailing the further progress and completion of the affair.

"I beg to add, that whilst I remained at the head of the Force, the conduct of both Officers and men afforded me the highest satisfaction, and I am greatly pleased with the spirited and judicious manner in which Lieutenant Colonel Dennie brought the matter to a close.

"The exertions of my Brigade Major, Captain Wade, and of Captain Havelock, and Lieut. Airey, of Major General Elphinstone's personal Staff, who attached themselves to me as Volunteers on this service, demand my amplest acknowledgments. The last mentioned of these Officers had a horse shot under him. I beg to forward the casualty return of the 13th: that of the Artillery, Sappers, and 35th N. I. shall follow.

"A memorandum of the Ammunition expended, is also annexed. I am thankful for the promised reinforcement of two Guns; and if the 37th Regt. N. I. can also be promptly sent out, it will relieve the Troops from a part of very harassing out-post duty, in an exposed plain, in the vicinity of mountains.

"P. S.—I ought not to have forgotten to mention, that Captain Bellew, Assistant Quarter Master General, who had previously, under General Elphinstone's instructions, reconnoitred the Passes occupied by the enemy, accompanied me during my march from Cabool, and ably aided me, until the moment of my being wounded, upon which he continued to render valuable assistance to Lieut. Col. Dennie. To Brevet Captain Trevor, 3d Light Cavalry, politically employed on this occasion, I was indebted for the information obtained at Bootkhak;

upon it my plan of attack was based, and it proved correct in every particular; and he was personally active and conspicuous throughout the engagement."

From Lieut. Col. W. H. DENNIE, C. B., Commanding 13th Light Infantry, to Major General Sir R. H. SALE, K. C. B. Commanding, dated Camp Bootkhak, 12th Oct. 1841.

"SIR,—I beg, on my return to camp, to report the details of the progress and completion of the affair with the rebels, in the Khoord Cabool Pass, begun in so spirited a manner under your personal command this morning.

"On receiving over charge of the troops, in consequence of your wound compelling you to leave the valley, I pursued your plan of operations by pressing the enemy as much as the nature of the ground would admit on both flanks, and rapidly moving on the main column and guns, with the intention of dislodging them from their breastwork, if still occupied, but this the insurgents had evacuated, though they ventured to dispute the possession of the precipitous heights, and to direct a well-aimed fire against our main force. Disconcerted, however, by the bold manner in which they were met by our skirmishers, as they scaled the mountain sides, and by the steady progress of the advance, they gradually abandoned their first position, and retired to the highest ridges and pinnacles of the Durra.

"I had resolved from the first not to allow any lateral opposition to divert me from the main purpose of clearing the Valley, and a little after 7 A. M., I had the satisfaction of reaching the southern gorge of the Pass, and establishing there the 35th N. I. and the Guns, in an excellent post, constituted by the walls of a strong and capacious, though deserted, fort. By this time our skirmishers had every where got possession of the heights, and the Affghan Force under Jan Fishun Khan, had also crowned the mountains, and displayed their banners on its summit.

"You are aware, that it was part of your original plan, that the 13th Light Infantry should return to their encampment at Bootkhak—as the columns marched back, the enemy again shewed themselves on several points of the defile, and opened a fire, and some loss was sustained in repelling these attacks, and in withdrawing our flanking parties.

"The Troops finally arrived at Bootkhak about 2 P. M., a good deal harrassed by the exertions of the morning. You will see by the Returns that the Casualties have not been few, which arose from the great advantage afforded by the ground to an enemy trained to mountain warfare.

"Permit me to add the expression of my admiration of the fearless manner in which the men of the 13th, chiefly young Soldiers, ascended heights nearly perpendicular, under the sharp fire of the insurgents. The Sepoys of the 35th rivalled and equalled them in steadiness, activity, and intrepidity. I am happy to say, that no loss whatever of the

Baggage of the Native Infantry was sustained in traversing this valley of plunderers.

"I have not yet received the Casualty Return of the 35th Regiment Native Infantry, but have reason to believe, that it is in amount about equal to that of the 13th, and am informed they have one Officer, Captain Younghusband, severely wounded."

Return of Killed, Wounded and Missing of the Force under the Command of Major General Sir R. H. SALE, K. C. B., in forcing the Pass of Khoord Cabool, on the 12th October, 1841.

| Regiments. | Killed. | | Wounded. | | | | | Rank and Names of Officers wounded. |
|--|----------------------|-----------|-------------|------------------------|------------|---------|----------------------|--|
| | Privates and Sepoys. | Captains. | Subalterns. | Sergeants & Havildars. | Corporals. | Naicks. | Privates and Sepoys. | |
| 2d Company 6th Battalion Artillery, ... | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | | <i>General Staff.</i> Major General Sir R. Sale, K. C. B. Commanding, severely. |
| H. M.'s 13th Light Infantry, ... | 2 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 16 | | |
| 35th Regiment N. I., Sappers and Miners, | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 8 | | Capt. Waile, Major of Brigade, slightly. |
| | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | | <i>13th Light Infantry.</i> Lieut. Mein, severely. Ensign Oakes, slightly. |
| | | | | | | | | <i>35th Regiment N. I.</i> Capt. Younghusband, severely. |
| Total, | 6 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 27 | | |

H. WAILE, Captain, Major of Brigade.

From Major General Sir R. H. SALE, K. C. B. Commanding 1st Brigade of British Troops serving in Afghanistan, to Captain GRANT, Cabool, Camp in the Valley near Teezen, October 23d, 1841.

SIR,—“I beg to acquaint you for the information of Major General Elphinstone, C. B., that the force united under my command, consisting of the 1st Brigade of Infantry, No 6, Light Field Battery, the Mountain Train, the Corps of Sappers and Miners, a squadron of the 5th Light Cavalry, and a ressalah of the Shah's 2d Cavalry, marched from Khoord Cabool towards Teezen yesterday morning. Lieutenant Colonel Monteath, 35th, commanded the advance guard, Lieutenant Colonel Dennie, 13th, the main column, and Captain Oldfield, 5th Light Cavalry, the rear guard, in each of which troops of the several arms were appointed according to the best of my judgment. The force felt its way cautiously through the defiles of the Huft Kotul, occupying with skirmishers the hills on either flank, and leaving parties for the protection of our baggage and rear on selected points. Nothing was seen of the enemy until the advance and main body had halted in the

valley of Teezeen. From this low ground, another vale stretches out towards the south-east, and on the sides and summits of the mountains which enclose the latter, were posted in every quarter bodies of the insurgents, whilst another portion of their force, consisting of foot, led on by sirdars on horseback and their mounted followers, shewed a determination to dispute with us the possession of a conical hill, which partially closes the entrance of the branching valley, and barred our approach to Moohummud Ufzal's fort, a large work backed by gardens, which the rebels still garrisoned. From this eminence, the advance guard under Colonel Monteth drove them by a combined attack, and I then directed the 13th Light Infantry, and a portion of Capt. Abbott's battery to advance under Lieutenant Colonel Dennie, and assault the fort itself. The insurgents, however, abandoned it after directing from it a feeble fire.

"I immediately determined to establish in it a dépôt for my sick and wounded, and to take it as a point of support for ulterior operations, and an appui to my Camp, to be fixed under its walls; but as the enemy continued to occupy in force a nearly circular range of heights, and even boldly to skirmish in a lower part of the valley, it became necessary to drive them from such segments of the mountain as would, if remaining in their hands, have given the power to command our position, and fire upon the troops with advantage at night. This led to a succession of skirmishes which were maintained with great coolness and spirit by several Companies of the 13th and one of the 35th, aided by the Guns of Captain Abbott's Battery and the Mountain Train, and supported by the Cavalry. The combat was prolonged until after dusk, and the ammunition of one of the Companies of the 13th having been expended, it was compelled temporarily to retire, and a very promising Officer, Lieutenant Edward King, was killed at its head. A supply of cartridges and a reinforcement were promptly sent up, and the affair ended by the rebels being pushed off every part of the steep mountains which we designed to retain. The Returns will shew, that our loss has been slight, and I have no doubt that the enemy suffered severely from the fire of our skirmishers and the shot of our batteries. The force bivouacked in position without an attempt being made upon our line. Morning shewed us the heights every where deserted by the rebels, and if a negotiation which they have opened in very humble terms, should not end in their entire submission, I purpose to attack their principal fort to-morrow.

"I regret to have to add, that though every precaution was adopted for the security of our line of communication, a large interval was created between our main body and rear guard, by the circumstance of the latter having to await at Khoord Cabool, the arrival of carriage from the capital for part of the public baggage. A light armed enemy, well acquainted with the country, did not fail to take advantage of this, and I fear that some ammunition and valuable stores have fallen into their hands. I beg to forward the report of Captain Oldfield, detailing every occurrence whilst he commanded the rear guard, also the Returns of killed and wounded, and of ammunition expended.

Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Force under the Command of Major General Sir R. H. SALE, K. C. B. in the attack on the Enemy's position in the Valley of Teezeen, on the 22d October, 1841.

| Regiments. | Killed. | | | Wounded. | | | | | | | Rank and Names of Officers Killed and Wounded. |
|--|--------------|----------------------|---------|--------------|------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|---------|--------|----------|---|
| | Lieutenants. | Privates and Sepoys. | Horses. | Lieutenants. | Sergeants & Havildars. | Corporals and Naicks. | Privates and Sepoys. | Horses. | Mules. | Missing. | |
| 24 Company 6th Battalion Artillery, .. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 9 | 1 | 0 | | <i>Killed</i> —Lt. Edw. King, H. M.'s 13th Lt. Infy. <i>Wounded</i> —Lieut. Frere, H. M.'s 13th Lt. Infy., slightly. <i>Wounded</i> —Lt. Orr, Sappers and Miners, severely. |
| Squadron, 5th Light Cavalry, .. | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | | |
| H. M.'s 13th Light Infantry, .. | 1 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 7 | 0 | 0 | | |
| Sappers and Miners, .. | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 1 | | |
| Mountain Train, .. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | | |
| Total, | 1 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 15 | 1 | 1 | | |

H. WADE, Captain, Major of Brigade.

From Major General Sir R. H. SALE, K. C. B., Commanding the 1st Brigade of British Troops serving in Afghanistan, to Captain GRANT, Officiating Assistant Adjutant General, Cabool. Dated Camp Jugdulluk, October 28th 1841.

"SIR,—I have the honor to acquaint you, for the information of Major General Elphinstone, C. B., that the Force under my Command, reached this place to-day: last night passed over without the slightest insult to our outposts at Kuttah Sung, but during the morning's march we descried small parties at a distance on both flanks, especially near the outlet of the Poree Durree, which afterwards united in a combined attack on our rear guard. Our loss has been small, and the enemy was every where baffled, and held in check by the fire from our Guns and Skirmishers. Owing, however, to the jaded state of our camels, it became necessary to destroy a good deal of Camp Equipage to prevent its falling into the rebels' hands.

"The daily repetition of these attacks has given rise to suspicions of the sincerity of the Chiefs in the mind of the Political Assistant, in which I am compelled to participate, though I shall be happy to find that their submission at Teezeen was made in good faith, and that these petty hostilities are the acts of men not under their control."

From Major General Sir R. H. SALE, K. C. B., Commanding the 1st Brigade of British Troops serving in Affghanistan, to Captain GRANT, Offg. Assistant Adjutant General, Cabool. Dated Camp Gundamak, 30th October, 1841.

"SIR,—Yesterday the Force under my command was again engaged with the Insurgents of these mountains, and the affair was the sharpest which we have had since penetrating the Pass of Khoord Cabool. I experienced little molestation in my Camp at Jugdulluk, but observed, towards sunset and by moonlight, evident indications of the enemy which had attacked our rear guard earlier in the day, being in the act of moving off over the hills, with a view of concentrating between my force and Sookhab. Major-General Elphinstone is acquainted with the localities, and will not have forgotten that the only entrance to the valley of Jugdulluk from the Eastward is by a long and winding Kotul, overlooked and commanded by a lofty range of mountains, partially clothed with bushes and dwarf trees. Of these really terrific eminences, the rebels had, as I had anticipated, taken possession, in more considerable numbers than we have been opposed to since leaving Teezeen. Holding all the salient points of the hills, and secured by breastworks, they shewed a determination to dispute, with the utmost obstinacy, the progress of our flanking parties, and to endeavour to prevent the débouché of our advance and main column. To enable us to effect this, I had to detach Companies from every corps in the force to the right and left, which, aided by the Artillery, won their way inch by inch up the lofty heights: much however remained to be done, and the fire of the mountaineers from several of the tallest summits was unabated, and success was every where doubtful; when a single Company of the 13th, under Captain Wilkinson, was directed to advance up the defile itself. It pressed forward at a rapid pace, supported by all the reserves which remained available, and to the surprise of the whole force, found that the enemy had neglected to guard the main outlet. This vanguard therefore it supports, and the guns were quickly established on the narrow table land, from which they had it in their power to take the whole of the defences of the rebels in reverse. Our troops commanded the route to Sookhab, and the enemy seemed to decline all further opposition. The march was resumed, but as the cumbrous train of baggage filed over the mountain, the insurgents again appearing from beyond the most distant ridges, renewed the contest with increased numbers, and the most savage fury. Our rear guard made the best dispositions for defence, and rescue; but the suddenness of the onset caused some confusion, during which, notwithstanding the efforts of the troops, some baggage and camp equipage fell into the hands of their opponents. Captain Wyndham, of the 35th, was killed at this crisis of the affair; and several brave men of all the corps, fell or were wounded. Soon, however, by the praiseworthy exertions, and cool and soldier-like order and example of Captains Backhouse and Broadfoot of the Shah's service,

and Fenwick, of the 13th, confidence was restored, the aspect of the affair changed, and the rear guard extricated from the defile. It continued in the best order to retreat, and to repel the enemy who had followed it up to the point at which the loftier hills wear away. Our casualties of yesterday and the day before, amount to one hundred and thirty; amongst whom are one Officer killed and four wounded. This loss will not be considered heavy, by those who have seen the heights from which the rebels were driven, and are acquainted with the habits and character of the mountaineers to whom we were opposed. I have to-day marched to this place, without any interruption worthy of mention.

"From the details of this despatch, the Major General Commanding in Afghanistan, will be enabled to draw his own inferences as to the actual state of our relations with the refractory Chiefs who were admitted at Teezeen, into a treaty of reconciliation with the Government against which they had rebelled. But it belongs more peculiarly to my vocation, in the field, now that there is a prospect of brief repose in the vicinity of this Cantonment, to report with much satisfaction the cheerfulness, steadiness, and perseverance with which the troops have performed every duty required of them; since leaving Cabool they have been kept constantly on the alert by attacks by night and day; from the time of their arrival at Teezeen, they have invariably bivouacked, and the safety of our positions has only been secured by unremitting labor, and throwing up intrenchments, and very severe out-post duty; whilst each succeeding morning has brought its affair, with a bold and active enemy, eminently skilful in the species of warfare to which their attempts have been confined, and armed with *juzails*, which have enabled them to annoy us, at a range, at which they could only be reached by our Artillery. Though compelled by the effects of my late wound to witness these conflicts from a *doolie*, I must bear my unequivocal testimony to the gallantry of officers and men, on every occasion of contact with the enemy, and especially in scaling the tremendous heights above Jugdulluk. I enclose Casualty Return.

"I beg to express my sense of the highly able assistance which I have received in all our attacks and skirmishes, and throughout the operations, from Lieutenant Colonels Dennie and Monteath, C. B. I have been much pleased with the address and able arrangements of Captain Abbott of the Artillery, who has twice commanded the advance guard; and the exertions of Captain Wade, my Brigade Major, and of Captain Havelock, Persian Interpreter to General Elphinstone, (temporarily attached to me,) in conveying my orders from point to point, and aiding in the dispositions,—deserve my warmest commendations."

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Force under the Command of Major General Sir ROBERT H. SALE, K. C. B., on the Advance to, and Storming of, the Pass of Jugdulluk, on the 28th and 29th of October, 1841.

| Regiments. | Killed. | | | | | | | | Wounded. | | | | | | | | Rank & Names of the Officers Killed and Wounded. |
|---|-----------|--------------|-------------|-----------|-------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|---------|--------------|-------------|-----------|---|-----------------------|----------------------|---------|---|--|
| | Captains. | Lieutenants. | Subalterns. | Jemadars. | Sergents and Havildars. | Corporals and Naicks. | Privates and Sepoys. | Horses. | Lieutenants. | Subalterns. | Jemadars. | Staff Sergeants and Sergents and Havildars. | Corporals and Naicks. | Privates and Sepoys. | Horses. | | |
| 3d Company 6th Battalion Artillery, | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 2 | <i>Killed.</i> Captain Windham, 24th Regiment N.I. | |
| 3th Regiment Lt. Cavalry, Squadron, | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | <i>Wounded.</i> Lieut. Jennings, 12th Lt. Infantry, severely. | |
| H. M.'s 15th Light Infantry, | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 20 | 0 | Lieut. Holeman, 13th Lt. Infantry, severely. | |
| 20th Regiment N. I. Sappers and Miners, | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 12 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 23 | 0 | Lieut. Coombe, 25th N.I. severely. | |
| 2d Regt. Shah Soojah's Cavalry, | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Lieut. Battray, 13th Lt. Infantry, severely. | |
| Total, | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 23 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 8 | 2 | 74 | 5 | | |

Four days after the conflict described in the latest dispatch, the fearful truth disclosed itself. The Affghans rose at Cabul *en masse*, murdered Sir Alexander Burnes and others, burnt and destroyed their property, and surrounding the British Cantonments, and the Bala Hissar, where Shah Soojah resided, commenced a blockade which the British were unable to raise, and which was only terminated by the Affghans, when starvation, the rigors of a winter, and the weakened state of the beleaguered, had rendered them ripe for the wholesale massacre which ultimately became their portion!

Great was the consternation which the intelligence of their being thus hemmed in, spread throughout the parts of Affghanistan and Scinde occupied by the British; and indeed throughout the whole Indian empire. Sir Robert Sale, meditated retracing his steps, with his Brigade, and raising the blockade by a *coup de main*, but the re-occupation of the Passes by myriads of determined Ghilzies, and the failure of his provisions, forced him to abandon the idea, and to march instantly to Jellallahabad. General Nott, at Candahar, anticipating that the disaffection would extend to the South, prepared to fortify himself and recalled the Infantry Brigade under Col. Maclaren, (consisting of the

16th, 42d, and 43d Regiments of Bengal Native Infantry,) which had commenced its march to Hindostan. Reinforcements were hurried up from Ferozepore, through the Punjab, and from Scinde through the Bolan Pass, and a requisition for additional European troops was addressed to the Home Government. Every where it was prognosticated, that the sun of Shah Soojah and his British allies had set—that, in a word, Afghanistan was lost to us, if the troops could not hold their respective positions through the winter.

In the mean while, the Affghans, alive to the importance of their position, and aware of the retribution which would follow the revolt, lost not a moment in strengthening their hands, and improving the advantage they had gained. A large body of Ghazies was sent immediately to invest Ghuzni, then garrisoned by the 27th N. I. under Colonel Thos. Palmer. The Kohistanes rose in Charekar, and, assailing the Ghoorka Battalion,* cut it up nearly to a man, Major Eldred Pottinger and Lieut. Haughton alone escaping to Cabul. The tribes in the Khyber and the Kojuck Passes—the Ghilzies in every direction,—made common cause with the rebels, for their co-operation was invoked on the grounds of a common religion and the universal hatred of the Peringhee. At Pesh Bolak, in the neighbourhood of the Khyber Pass, Captain Ferris, of the Shah's service, with his little detachment, was attacked by the Ooloos, and, after exhausting his ammunition, was forced to effect an escape to Lalpoorah, with the remnant of his garrison, under cover of night.† A body of 100 men under Capt. Woodburn, marching from Candahar to Ghuzni, was set upon and annihilated, the undaunted Woodburn himself falling covered with wounds. The garrison of Alee Musjeed, occupied by Mr. Mackeson, (brother of the Agent at Peshawur,) and 150 Euzofzyes, was assailed by 2000 insurgent Afredees, and with difficulty held the place. Jellallabad was invested by large bodies of Affghans and Hill Tribes, and the Sirdars in the South similarly surrounded Candahar.

Cut off as were all our posts by distance and by climate from every hope of immediate succour, their retention was entirely dependent upon the sagacity of their respective commanders, and the means at their disposal for a prolonged resistance. Ghuzni fell—and Cabul fell—the former, because its garrison had neither provisions nor ammunition

* See Appendix, No. VI. † See Appendix, No. V.

enough to enable it to withstand a siege, nor to cut its way to Candahar in the face of an overwhelming and well found force; the latter, because the Political authorities were at first averse to evacuate the country at the bidding of a rebel host, and afterwards, when negotiation had stretched into the heart of a severe winter, were driven to such extremities, as to be left to the alternative of dying of starvation, or of marching out, with all the honors of war, and trusting to the mercies of a treacherous foe. Col. Palmer reported his surrender of Ghuzni in the laconic despatch given below.

To the Officer Commanding at Jellalabad.

"SIR,—It is with much concern I acquaint you, that from want of water, and by an overpowering force under cover, and within 50 yards of us in the City, I have been compelled to enter into terms to evacuate the Citadel and Fort, within six days. The Garrison is to occupy the N. E. corner of the Town. The Garrison is exhausted by fatigue and constant duty, and the men have suffered greatly from cold, the thermometer having been 14° below Zero. The terms are honorable treatment and safety whilst here and on the march to Cabool, solemnly sworn to by the Chiefs. In capitulating, I have only acted up to the orders of Major Pottinger and General Elphinstone, who directed me, in an official letter, to evacuate the Citadel and City on the arrival of Roohilla Khan, son of Ameenoolah Khan, Sirdar of Logur. This Chief arrived, and promised to escort us in safety to Cabool. Amoun Shumsodeen Khan, nephew of Dost Mahomed Khan, has also arrived as Governor of Ghuzni, and as Political Agent. I received instructions to march, immediately on his arrival, for Cabool, from the late Sir W. Macnaghten, Bart. Abandoned as this Garrison has been in the very centre of the enemy's country, cut off from all communication with any quarter, and without a sufficiency of water even at this season, with 200 men detached to hold an outpost which is destitute of water, and must have fallen in 48 hours, nothing but capitulation remained. From the outpost falling into the hands of the enemy, they would command our only Well, and commanding the Fort, the whole Garrison would have been destroyed in a few days. The bearer has received only subsistence on the road, and is to receive a handsome reward on delivering this letter. We have upwards of 100 sick and wounded, and 137 casualties. The Officers, including Captain Burnett, 54th, and Lieutenant Crawford, S. S. Force, are all well.

I have, &c.

T. PALMER Lt. Col. Pol. Agent, Commg. at Ghuzni.

"P. S.—There is great reason to fear for our safety, as there are some thousands of Ghazis in the city, whom the Chiefs cannot disperse. The snow is still deep. No tidings from the Southward, but report says, the Troops hold the city of Kandahar, and are daily fighting."

But a fuller account of the beleaguerment will be found in the Appendix described by Lieut. Crawford. The course of events at Cabul, which terminated in the total annihilation of the British force is also narrated, at great length, in the Appendix No. VII. derived from the *Calcutta Englishman*. The Narrative is written by one of the Officers who took an active share in the military operations, and who afterwards became a prisoner to the Affghans, with whom he remained until relieved by the troops sent for that purpose in September, 1842. Other narratives, more or less voluminous, have been published, but the one that has been selected for the purposes of this record has, by the common consent of the Indian Press, been pronounced preferable to the others.

It may be proper however in this place to give a brief account of the events which are detailed more at large in the document to which we refer.

The insurrection broke out in the city on the 2d November, and the Envoy immediately dispatched an officer to the King in the Bala Hissar. To reach His Majesty, he had to run the gauntlet of a heavy fire, and resisted several attempts of an inflamed populace to cut him down; he, however, succeeded in his purpose, and persuaded the King to allow Brigadier Shelton, with nearly two regiments and Capt. Nicoll's troop, to take possession of the Bala Hissar, whence the shelling of the town took place. The following day the insurgents got possession of the Commissariat Fort, in which were stored *all* the provisions of the force. This was a most dreadful *contre-temps*, and it appeared completely to paralyze all in Cantonments, where there were only *two days'atta remaining*. The effect was that of a panic; and the madness of not having their supplies in cantonments, as also the folly of having constructed their defences upon so very extensive a scale as to require all the troops to defend them, now became fearfully apparent. On the previous day, Sir Alexander Burnes, Captain Burnes, and Captain Broadfoot, of the European regiment, were killed;* Sir Alexander's house was completely sacked and then burned, and Captain Johnston's treasury also fell a prey to the flames. He, himself, had fortunately slept in cantonments, whilst Brigadier Anquetil and Captain Troup, who lived in the same quarter, were out riding, and also escaped. An attack was made by the enemy upon another fort, which was also used as a Commissariat depôt, but Captain Mackenzie most gallantly defended it, with a

* See Appendix for detailed account of the murder of Sir A. Burnes.

handful of men, for three days, till all his ammunition was expended, and then brought off his party into Cantonments during the night. Captain Trevor remained in the city, with his wife and children, two days, protected by the Hazarbash, who afterwards escorted them all safely into the Cantonments. Capt. Skinner and Drummond were concealed by friends in the city for some days. Now followed various reverses and success on both sides; two forts close to the camp were taken by us, at the earnest request of the Envoy, as they contained a small quantity of grain; in fact, without adverting to particulars, it does seem to us, that the only energetic measures that were taken, originated with the Envoy, who, when his eyes were once open, was on all occasions strongly in favour of offensive measures, whilst General Elphinstone, from circumstances connected with the force, among whom there seems to have been much vacillation and despondency, appears to have been desirous of entirely keeping upon the defensive. The fighting still continued, and many officers were killed; whilst the news in the mean time arrived of the cutting up of Codrington's corps at Charekar. After some days (our accounts are rather deficient in dates) it was deemed necessary to recall Brigadier Shelton from the Bala Hissar to the aid of the Cantonment force; he came, and brought one Regiment with him; but still the measures recommended by the Envoy, of acting on the offensive, were not adopted; the General is said to have considered any vigorous attack upon the enemy as futile; the minds of the soldiers became imbued with despondency, and but one idea seemed to pervade those whose duty it was, at least, to have made one push previous to securing a safe retreat by a treaty. Matters went on, from day to day, occasionally enlivened by skirmishes with the enemy, which did no good, but weakened and dispirited our troops, who, sent out in small numbers, could not be expected to withstand the immense forces opposed to them, and who were actually driven back on one occasion into camp, by the enemy whom they attempted to dislodge from a hill, after being exposed to a galling fire for several hours; and were only saved from being totally destroyed by the Chief, Osman Khan, withdrawing his troops. The force was again reduced to a prospect of starvation, there being only six days' provisions in camp, and it was now feared that the bribes and promises which had hitherto procured sufficient supplies of atta for the men, would no longer be of avail. One party

then suggested the propriety of an attempt to retire into the Bala Hissar, which Captain Conolly, who was with the King, strongly advocated, and to which the Envoy was quite willing to accede, till informed by the Military Authorities it was impossible, as the dispirited troops were no longer to be depended upon!

The last regiment in the Bala Hissar (the 54th N. I.) was then withdrawn, and the King was left to his own resources for several days. The Envoy still remained firm as to the advocated negotiations, and it was not until he heard that the Brigade he had written for from Candahar, had retraced its steps and that there were no hopes of getting General Sale's Brigade from Jellalabad, nor of any assistance from Peshawur, that he, most reluctantly, complied with the wishes of the General and other Commanding Officers, and entered into overtures for a treaty with the enemy. Several conferences took place between the Envoy, attended by Capts. G. Lawrence and Trevor, and all the Chiefs, outside cantonments, and eventually some twenty articles, drawn up by the Envoy in Persian, were read and approved of. On these occasions, Mahomed Ackbar took the most prominent part; other meetings followed subsequently, at which the Chiefs expressed an earnest desire to bring matters at once to a conclusion, and a message to this effect was brought on the evening of the 22d December, by a cousin of Akbar Khan, accompanied by Captain Skinner, who it appears was still in his power, and on the morning of the 23d Sir Wm. Macnaghten, accompanied by Captains Lawrence, Mackenzie and Trevor, proceeded to the supposed conference; the party had scarcely been seated five minutes, when, at a signal, all were seized. Mackenzie, Lawrence and Trevor were bound to horses, and mounted behind Affghans; the latter, who is represented to have fallen off, was cut to pieces by the Gazees. The Envoy refused to mount a horse and shared the same fate.* The other

* Sir W. Macnaghten, for his political services, had been appointed Governor of Bombay, and was on the point of proceeding to India when the insurrection broke out. The Bombay Government on hearing of his death issued the following Notification.

GENERAL ORDERS BY THE BOMBAY GOVERNMENT.

General Department, Bombay Castle, 21st Jan.—It is with the most unfeigned sorrow that the Honourable the Governor in Council announces that authentic intelligence has been received of the assassination of His Excellency Sir William Hay Macnaghten, Baronet, Envoy and Minister at the Court of H. M. Shah Soojah-Ool-Moolk, and the Governor elect of this Presidency.

"This atrocious crime was perpetrated at Calcutta on the 23d December last, during a conference to which his Excellency had been invited by the leaders of the insurrection at that place, under the pretence of arranging terms of accommodation with H. M. Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk.

two officers were most wonderfully preserved, though a whole host of fanatics cut at them as they were carried off, but being mounted behind Affghans, the mob was afraid to use fire-arms; they were imprisoned for some days, but after some interviews with Akbar Khan, were returned on the 28th December to cantonments.* The negotiations during this time were taken up by Major Pottinger, and on the 6th January the force marched from cantonments with a foot of snow on the ground, and reached Beegroma unmolested, except the rear guard, which was attacked, and Hardyman of the 5th Light Cavalry, and some men were killed. On the 7th the force moved to Bareekhur, the rear guard being on the defensive the whole way; here the three mountain guns were carried off. It now became clear they would have to fight their way onwards. The following morning they found the camp nearly surrounded with enemies, and on Captain Skinner going to Mahomed Akbar, who was on a hill close to our troops, he told him, it was their own fault for leaving cantonments before the troops appointed to escort them were ready, and that the Chiefs had not (save himself) the power to prevent their being attacked; that he was willing still to do this on their giving six hostages, for our not moving beyond Tazeen till Sale's Brigade had left Jellalabad. Major Pottinger,

"Higher authority will pronounce the eulogium so justly due to the eminent talents and distinguished services of this lamented public functionary. But whilst this Government abstains from trespassing on this ground, it cannot refrain, amidst the most unfeigned grief, from recording almost the last public act of Sir William Hay McNaghten's life. When terms dishonourable to the British arms were proposed by the leaders of the Insurrection at Cahool, His Excellency heroically replied, 'That death was preferable to dishonour, that we put our trust in the God of battles, and in his name we defy our Enemies.'

"In consequence of this melancholy event, the flag at the castle is to be hoisted half staff high to-morrow morning at sunrise, continuing so until sunset; and minute guns to the number of seventeen, the number appointed for the rank of the deceased, to be fired from Hornby's Battery on the flag being hoisted; the same ceremony being observed by the Honourable Company's Vessels of War in the harbour, under such arrangement as the Superintendent of the Indian Navy may direct.

"Similar marks of respect will be paid to the memory of Sir William Hay McNaghten, at all the principal military stations subordinate to the government, on the receipt of these orders.

"The Governor in Council is further pleased to direct, that mourning be worn by the Officers of Her Majesty's and the Honourable Company's Civil, Military and Naval Services of this Presidency, for a period of three weeks from this date; an example which government confidently expects will be generally followed by all other portions of the community."

By order of the Honourable the Governor in Council,

J. P. WILCOXES.

Offy. Chief Secy. to Government.

* An authentic account of the manner of the murder of Sir W. McNaghten and Captain Turner will be found in the Appendix, in the letters of Captain Lawrence and Mackenzie, derived from a work lately published by Lieutenant Vincent Eyre.

who was still lame from his wound, offered to go for one, and, at the particular request of Mahomed Akbar, Captains Lawrence and Mackenzie were added; with these, the Khan appeared satisfied, and the troops marched to the Khoord Cabul, but, notwithstanding all the Sirdar's endeavours, he could not restrain the Gazees, who attacked the column at all points. Mahomed Akbar and the hostages followed a few hours after, and witnessed a scene of slaughter, so fearful as to render all description impossible; the remaining gun was deserted. Mrs. Anderson and Mrs. Boyd had each a child carried off; Mrs. Mainwaring was nearly so, but was saved, and Mrs. Boyd's child, a European woman, and a wounded soldier, were also brought back by Mahomed Akbar. The next day the Sirdar said, after lamenting his inability to restrain his people, that the only safety for the ladies would be in their putting themselves under his charge, which they all did, and were received by him *with every attention*. They halted the ladies, hostages, etc., a day or two, and then proceeded towards Jugdulluck, finding the road covered with the dead and dying of the Army; the poor fellows seemed to have fallen victims to the severity of the weather, as much as, or more than, from the fire of the enemy. At Jugdulluck it was said that the Troops had endeavoured to make a stand at an old ruined fort, and did so until only thirty rounds of ammunition remained for each man. They tried to negotiate with the Ghilzies, and Mahomed Akbar assisted them, and asked for General Elphinstone, Brigadier Shelton, and Captain Johnson to be sent to him; this was agreed to, but towards the evening of the next day the Troops, unable any longer to contend against the severities they were exposed to, and maddened by the loss, as they supposed, of the two Chiefs, rushed during the night on to the road towards Jellalabad, at which place only one Officer arrived.

The whole of the officers, the ladies, private soldiers, clerks, soldiers' wives, etc. who escaped the Massacre on the march, or who had given themselves up at Mahomed Akbar's command, were conveyed as prisoners to a fort in the hills between Jellalabad and Cabul, and retained there, under great hardships and privations, for many months.

The first impulse of Lord Auckland's government on receiving certain intelligence of the disasters at Cabul, was to proclaim, in the annexed Government Notification, a determination to dispatch troops to maintain "the honor and interests of the British Government."

" *Fort William, Secret Department, 31st Jan. 1842*—Intelligence having been received which leaves no room to doubt that, after the British force at Cabool had maintained its position against overpowering numbers of Insurgents for more than six weeks, the officer commanding had judged it necessary, in consequence of a failure of provisions, to agree to a convention with the enemy, and to retire, in reliance on the faith of that convention, towards Jellalabad, when the troops exposed to the worst rigors of cold and privation in the mountain defiles, and harassed by treacherous attacks, suffered extreme disaster,—the Governor General in Council deems it proper to notify, that the most active measures have been adopted, and will be steadfastly prosecuted, for expediting powerful reinforcements to the Afghan frontier, and for assisting such operations as may be required in that quarter, for the maintenance of the honor and interests of the British Government.

" The ample military means at the disposal of the British Government will be strenuously applied to these objects, so as at once to support external operations, and to ensure efficient protection to its subjects and allies.

" A faithless enemy, stained by the foul crime of assassination, has, through a failure of supplies followed by consummate treachery, been able to overcome a body of the British troops, in a country removed, by distance and difficulties of season, from possibility of succour. But the Governor General in Council, while he most deeply laments the loss of brave officers and men, regards this partial reverse only as a new occasion for displaying the stability and vigor of the British power, and the admirable spirit and valor of the British Indian army.

" By order of the Right Hon'ble the Governor General of India in Council,

T. H. MADDOCK, *Secy. to the Govt. of India.*"

The intentions of the Government were not rendered very apparent in the foregoing document :—it was not declared that the lost ground in Afghanistan was to be re-occupied, or that signal vengeance would be taken upon those by whose hands so many thousand British troops and followers had fallen ; but the excited state of the public mind afforded no time for enquiry, and the Proclamation was therefore taken as at least an earnest of the Government not to remain quiescent under the indignity.

The first step taken by the Political Officers in close proximity to Jellalabad, was to attempt to dispatch a force to relieve, or strengthen, the garrison of that fortress. A Brigade of Infantry under Colonel Wild had recently arrived at Peshawur, conveying provisions and stores, and Captain Mackeson, the Agent there, considered it might be rendered available for the duty. As a preliminary measure, therefore,

and with the view of keeping open the Khyber Pass, Lieut. Colonel Moseley was dispatched with the 53rd and 64th Regts. N. I., a part of the brigade, to occupy the fort of Alee Musjeed. He marched on the night of the 15th January, and reached the place with little opposition the next morning. Through some mismanagement however—mismanagement incidental to haste—only a proportion of the provisions requisite for the two regiments accompanied them. It became necessary, therefore, to forward the residue without delay, and to this end, and with the purpose of afterwards moving upon Jellalabad, Brigadier Wild advanced from Jumrood, (between Peshawur and the Khyber Pass,) with the remaining two regiments, (the 60th and 30th N. I.,) and four Sikh guns. But the appearance of Colonel Moseley's detachment had alarmed the Afreedies, who now rose, and, closing the Pass, prepared to resist Brigadier Wild's entrance. The Brigadier nevertheless pushed onwards on the 19th January, and encountered the enemy at the mouth of the Pass; but owing to the uselessness of the Sikh guns, and the inadequacy of his force, with so powerful a body of the enemy advantageously placed in his front, his attempt to reach Alee Musjeed totally failed. He was beaten back, with heavy loss,* himself receiving a wound in the face. The following Order was issued by him on the occasion, when the regiments had retraced their steps to Jumrood:—

"Camp Jumrood, Friday, 21st January 1842, Brigade After Orders.—Words cannot express the deep grief felt by Brigadier Wild, at the lamentable result of the engagement of the day before yesterday, at the entrance of the Khyber Pass, whether it have reference to the failure in conveying to the Garrison of Alee Musjid the supplies and Camp Equipage it so much needs, or to the deplorable number of killed and wounded—or, lastly, to the hesitation evinced at the head of the column, to obey the urgent call to advance and follow, addressed to it by the Brigadier and his Staff (as they took the lead) but on the contrary exposing itself to greater danger by crowding together and standing still—firing without orders, in every direction, and generally without aim, and eventually leaving the broken-down gun behind to be spiked—merely because a sufficient number of men would not go forward to drag it away.

"The consequence was, that the enemy, who was previously seen running away from any small party sent to dislodge those that were posted on the lesser hills to the right and left of the column, now gained confidence, and redoubled his destructive fire.

* Amongst the officers wounded, besides the Brigadier himself, were Capt. Loftie of the 30th Regt., Lewis Gwatkin, Phillips, and Montgomery of the 60th N. I., Lieut. Alexander of the Engineers, and Ensign Hallett of the 30th N. I. Lieut. Loch of the 30th N. I. was killed in the conflict.

"The object of the above remarks is less to upbraid, than to call the attention of both officers and men to the indispensable necessity of preserving order and regularity in their ranks; and thus to ensure that steadiness, without which no success can ever be expected; and in the hope that the sad experience of the day before yesterday may not be without its salutary use, and will induce them, hereafter, to observe a strict obedience to orders and regularity in the ranks, incite them to exertions, which at the earliest opportunity afforded may entirely remove the obloquy, which cannot otherwise but attach to the late deplorable failure.

"The Brigadier commanding is willing to make every reasonable allowance for the inexperience of a young regiment, with a large proportion of very young men, but from that very circumstance it becomes the more requisite to point out how necessary steadiness, good order, obedience, and extreme care of their *precious* ammunition are to ensure success, and by doing so cheer them into a confidence of a better result hereafter."

The situation of Lieut. Colonel Moseley, shut up as he was in Allee Musjeed, with scarcely any provisions, now became desperate. He was not long, however, in deciding upon the course which it became a Commanding Officer to take under circumstances of so serious a nature. He determined to cut his way back to Jumrood; but he tells his own story in his dispatch to Brigadier Wild of the 26th January.

From Lieut. Colonel G. W. MOSELEY, Commanding a Detachment, to Captain HART, Officiating Major of Brigade, Camp Kawulsur, 26th January, 1842.

"Sir,—In obedience to instructions communicated in your letter bearing date the 15th instant, placing me in command of the 53d and 64th Regiments, for secret service, I began my march at 10 p. m. of the same day, in progress to Allee Musjid, and reached that place with little opposition at eight o'clock next morning.

"As we approached Allee Musjid, the enemy appeared in considerable numbers to the front and on either flank, and here a few of our men were wounded.

"Detachments were immediately sent off to dislodge the enemy from the heights, a duty which was effected in good style, and without further casualty on our side.

"I now proceeded with the main column round the base of the isolated hill on which the fortress stands, in order to make myself acquainted with its localities.

"Allee Musjid consists of two small forts, which are connected by a weak and dilapidated wall. The low oblong rock on which it stands is commanded by two hills of considerable eminence, of which one is to its South, the other to its West.

" These positions I found to be occupied by small parties of the Jussailchee garrison, but I lost no time in detaching, for their more secure retention, a complete company under an European Officer to each of them. I at the same time strengthened, with the assistance of the Sappers and Miners, the breastworks that had already been erected on them.

" On the morning of the 17th, the enemy appeared in strength on all sides of the fort, and apparently designed to cut off our water, and to drive us from the two heights.

" To frustrate the first of these designs, a party was sent down to the side of the stream, which supplied the garrison,* and assisted by some Jussailchees of the original garrison, whose large rifles carry twice as far as our muskets, it succeeded in maintaining a safe communication between the water and the fort.

" Meantime the companies on the Southern and Western points were actively engaged in repelling the attacks of the enemy, who, (without themselves incurring much exposure,) fired on our men from a distance, and with a precision of aim, which neither the weapon, nor the skill of our Sepoys could equal. In these affairs, many of Captain Mackeson's Jussailchees behaved admirably, and using as they did, with equal aptitude, the same weapons employed by the enemy, their services were of much assistance to us on the present and on all similar occasions.

" I regret to say, that Ensign Swinton of the 53d Regiment was on that day (the 17th) severely wounded, while heading his men in charging a party of the enemy from the immediate neighbourhood of the Southern height, where this is united with a ridge of table-land.

" Other casualties also occurred on that day, as will be seen by the enclosed letters from Major Hoggan, commanding the 53d Regiment, and the late Captain Wilson, commanding the 64th Regiment.

" From this date the enemy, attracted (no doubt) to the mouth of the Pass by Brigadier Wild's demonstrations in that quarter, gradually diminished in force; and we were for some days almost wholly unmolested, and were busily employed in completing the defences of the fort; but on the morning of the 23d, they again appeared in considerable numbers, and we were again engaged all day in checking them.

" The continued occupation of the fortress would however have been a work of no difficulty, and we might have defied the efforts of any number of such an enemy as were opposed to us, had we been adequately supplied with provisions.

" But through some mismanagement, only eighty bullock loads of grain had been brought up by the Rear Guard from Jumrood, on the night of the 15th, whereas I had been led to expect that three hundred would have accompanied me.

" On the morning of the 23d, finding the remnant of our stores to be only five maunds of attah for the subsistence of two thousand and five hundred men,—men who had already been five or six days on half

* This Water Guard was afterwards relieved daily.

rations, and who had been exposed for eight days without bedding and without tents to an inclement climate, and who were daily thronging into hospital,—I reluctantly obeyed an inevitable necessity, and arranged for evacuating the fort, and cutting my way to Jumrood.

"The importance of retaining possession of the post of Allee Musjid was, however, so strongly impressed upon me by Captain Mackeson, the Political Agent, that when about this time, my Detachment Staff, Brevet Captain Thomas, gallantly came forward and volunteered to hold it (with only four or five days' scanty provision,) with one hundred and fifty of the original Jussailchee garrison, I felt it my duty not to oppose the proposition, dangerous as the experiment doubtless would have been, and on the night of the 23d, arrangements were completed by the Political Agent, for making over the command of the higher and smaller of the forts, to Captain Thomas.

"But on the morning of the 24th, Captain Mackeson represented to me, that his Jussailchees had changed their minds, and had resolved not to remain after the departure of the two regiments under my command. The evacuation of the fortress had now become inevitable, and the collective force marched on the morning of the 24th, about daybreak.

"Our return was accomplished in the face of a wary and active foe, whose numbers, always considerable, were invariably found to be greatest above the narrower and more difficult defiles.

"Among the precipitous heights that skirt the Shadee Bugeear and Kafir Tungee Passes, they were especially numerous; and here, in spite of our best exertions in crowning the heights and checking their attacks on the Rear Guard, they directed against us, from beneath the shelter of their steep and scarcely perceptible "*sungas*," a galling fire, which inflicted on us heavy loss in killed and wounded. It was here that that able and gallant officer, Captain Alexander Wilson, fell at the head of the 64th Regiment.

"About this time, finding that the cattle, from having been almost starved during the preceding six days, were too feeble to carry their burdens, I sent orders to Lieutenant Corsar, the officer commanding the Rear Guard, to relinquish all such cattle as had a tendency to delay his movements; and to come up and join the main body. This he accordingly did, and after four hours' hard fighting, we succeeded in reaching Jumrood.

"I have deeply to deplore the numerous casualties that have befallen the Detachment under my command; although it is some satisfaction to know, that the loss on the part of the enemy was likewise considerable.

"Enclosed is a copy of my order on the occasion, in which are enumerated the names of those Officers, who particularly attracted my attention during the engagement. I also enclose a list of killed and wounded.

Finally, I cannot abstain from an expression of my regret, that I should have been unaccompanied by either cavalry or guns. A detachment of the former arm would have been most useful in cutting up the enemy between Allee Musjid and the Kafir Tungee Pass, where the baggage

was chiefly plundered, and where the ground was good for cavalry to act upon.

I have, &c. &c.

G. W. MOSELEY, *Lieut.-Col.*

Commanding the Detachment.

Extract of Detachment Orders by Lieutenant Colonel MOSELEY, Commanding. Camp Kawulsur, 25th Jan. 1842.

"Lieut. Colonel Moseley feels much gratification in conveying to the Officers and Men composing the Detachment under his command, his sentiments on the happy issue of their exertions of yesterday morning, and on the success that crowned their efforts to cut their way through the strongly defended and difficult Passes of the Khyber, from the fortress of Allee Musjid back to Jumrood.

"For these happy results, the Commanding Officer takes to himself no credit. They were mainly attributable to the gallantry and intelligence of those Officers who were engaged in the important duties of crowning the heights, and bringing up the Rear Guard, duties which the nature of the country rendered of no common difficulty and danger.

"The Commanding Officer congratulates the Officers and Men on the courage and endurance evinced by all under his command, and he has no hesitation in declaring his opinion that, nothing would have surmounted the difficulties offered to the passage of the column, short of the determined bearing which was thus displayed.

"Though the brunt of the action fell upon the 64th Regiment, yet both the 53rd and 64th Regiments behaved with equal intrepidity.

"For the valuable assistance afforded him by Major Hoggan, commanding the 53rd Regiment, the Commanding Officer feels most grateful, as also for that afforded him by the late Captain Wilson, who fell gallantly at the head of the 64th Regiment, while opposed to the enemy in the Kafir Tungee Pass. By the death of this able and exemplary officer, the state sustains a severe loss.

"It may not be irrelevant here to state, that the Commanding Officer had the satisfaction personally to express his thanks to Captain Wilson a few minutes before his death, on the steady gallantry displayed by himself and his regiment throughout the morning.

"To Captain Mackeson, Political Agent, and Captain Ferris of the Jussailchee corps, the Commanding Officer feels much indebted for the valuable information they afforded him as to the nature of the country to be traversed, and by which the arrangements for crowning the heights were mainly regulated; as also to Lieut. Becher, commanding the Engineers, for the able assistance he on every occasion rendered.

"Where all behaved with gallantry, it is difficult to draw distinctions, but the Commanding Officer cannot pass unnoticed, the intrepid conduct of Captains Tylee and Campbell of the Grenadier and Light Companies 53rd Regiment, and Captain Prior and Lieutenant Rattray of the Light Company and Grenadiers 64th Regiment, (all of which divisions were

employed in crowning the heights,) and of Lieutenants Corsar and Young, who brought up the Rear Guard without confusion, though not without heavy loss in killed and wounded.

"The Commandant has received with much satisfaction from Major Hoggan, and also from the late Captain Wilson, (just before his death,) assurances of their high estimation of the zealous aid afforded them throughout the whole affair by Lieutenants Hunter and Flyter, their respective Adjutants.

"To Brevet Captain Thomas, 64th Regiment, his Detachment Staff, the Commanding Officer's best thanks are due for his untiring exertions throughout the day; and for the ability, coolness, and celerity with which, whilst constantly exposed on horseback under a heavy fire, he delivered the Commandant's orders, or conveyed intelligence from distant points.

"In conclusion, Lieutenant Colonel Moseley begs to offer his warmest congratulations to the Officers and Men of the Detachment collectively, on their gallant and successful passage through, probably, the strongest fastnesses ever forced by troops, and through which they had to overcome the determined opposition of an enemy, well skilled in the warfare peculiarly adapted to the country.

G. P. THOMAS, *Brevet Captain,
Detachment Staff.*"

*Extract of Brigade Orders by Brigadier WILD, Commanding the Brigades.
Camp Kaulsaur, 29th January, 1842.*

"To Lieutenant Colonel Moseley, who in the first instance so successfully relieved the garrison of Allee Musjid by a night march, and afterwards ably conducted the retreat of the 53rd and 64th Regiments, the Brigadier's warm thanks are due, as also to all the Officers and Men under his command, who have so cheerfully endured the hardships that have befallen them."

List of Killed and Wounded of the Detachment,—53d. Regiment.

| Corps. | Killed. | | | Wounded. | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|-----------|---------|---------|-----------|--------------|----------|-----------|-----------|------------|---------|---------|
| | Subadars. | Naicks. | Sepoys. | Captains. | Lieutenants. | Ensigns. | Subadars. | Jemadars. | Havildars. | Naicks. | Sepoys. |
| 53d Regiment N. I. | 2 | 1 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 7 | 4 | 21 |
| Total, | 2 | 1 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 7 | 4 | 21 |
| Grand Total, | 10 | | | 36 | | | | | | | |

Names of Officers.

53d Regiment, N. I. .. { Ensign J. M. Swinton, wounded severely.
 { Ditto B. F. A. Von Meyern, ditto ditto.

List of Killed and Wounded of the Detachment,—64th Regt.

| Corps. | Killed. | | | | | | | Wounded. | | | | | | |
|------------------------------|-----------|--------------|----------|-----------|-----------|------------|---------|----------|-----------|--------------|----------|-----------|-----------|------------|
| | Captains. | Lieutenants. | Ensigns. | Subadars. | Jemadars. | Havildars. | Naicks. | Sepoys. | Captains. | Lieutenants. | Ensigns. | Subadars. | Jemadars. | Havildars. |
| 64th Regiment N. I., | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 19 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 9 |
| Total, | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 19 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 9 |
| Grand Total, | 22 | | | | | | | 121 | | | | | | |

Names of Officers.

64th Regiment, N. I. .. $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Captain A. Wilson Killed.} \\ \text{Lieutenant T. Rattray, wounded severely.} \end{array} \right.$

After this affair, it became obvious that nothing could be done to succour the garrison of Jellalabad until the force under Major General Pollock, ordered by the Government to proceed to Afghanistan, should reach Peshawur. This force was fully adapted to every service that could be required of it under the circumstances. It consisted of Her Majesty's 3rd Light Dragoons, the 1st and the 10th Regts. of Bengal Light Cavalry, the 3rd Irregular Cavalry, a troop of Horse Artillery, two light Field Batteries, Her Majesty's 9th and 31st Regts. of Foot; the 6th, 26th, 30th, 33d, 53d, 60th and 64th, Regts. of Bengal Native Infantry. One division was placed under the command of Major General McCuskill of the 9th Foot, and Colonel White of the 3d Light Dragoons was made a Brigadier.

While this force, and a large body of Sikh Allies was assembling, Generals Nott and Sale continued to hold their respective positions at Candahar and Jellalabad, in spite of the orders for their abandonment from Major Pottinger and General Elphinstone. The following is a copy of the order addressed to the Political Agent at Candahar:—

" *Caulbul*, 25th December, 1841.—*Sir*.—It having been found necessary to conclude an agreement, founded on that of the late Sir W. H. Macnaghten, for the evacuation of Affghanistan by our troops, we have the honor to request, that you will intimate to the officer commanding at Candahar, our wish that the troops now at that place and at Khelat-i-Ghilzie, together with the British authorities and troops within your jurisdiction, should return to India at the earliest convenient season, Nawab Jubbur Khan, who is the bearer of this letter, will render you all the assistance in his power. He has been appointed Governor of Candahar on the part of the existing Government.

E. POTTINGER.

W. ELPHINSTONE, M. G."

" *P. S.*—If you require two or three days to make your preparations, you must not remain in the city, but proceed to your cantonment. Whatever you are obliged to leave behind, you will make over to the Nubwab Jubbur Khan.

E. POTTINGER,

W. ELPHINSTONE, M. G."

Sir Robert Sale found Jellalabad in a very dilapidated condition, but he was compelled to occupy it, as his position at Gundamuck was untenable, and there is no doubt, that if he had not been precipitate in his movement, the enemy would have anticipated him. The town was found to be without defences which could be of any avail. There was cover for the assailants within range of the dilapidated parapet, and there was but one day's provisions in store. But these difficulties served only to stimulate the officers and men to exertion. They collected provisions from the neighbouring villages, which gave them half rations. They set to work on the defences, repelling every attack of the enemy, and on two occasions, sallying forth, and completely defeating them. The walls rose gradually under their hands, and were soon mounted with nine guns, and their position was rendered impregnable to any Affghan assault. From the 12th of November to the 24th of December, the men had cheerfully worked seven hours a day on the defences; and their holiday was on Christmas-day. Their conduct was throughout exemplary. There was no rum nor spirits in the encampment, and no money. Not ten Rupees was to be found either in the soldier's kit, or the General's chest. At length, on the 27th December, twenty-five horsemen rode into the town from Peshawur, each with 1000 Rupees in his saddle-bags. They had been sent on by Capt. Mackeson, and were followed by others, with the like precious charge.

Several forays were subsequently made, and generally with good effect; from 100 to 700 head of cattle being occasionally driven in when found grazing near the fort. The enemy remained in the neighborhood, but did not molest the occupants of the fortress during the months of January and February, though they carefully prevented any communication (excepting by single cossids or messengers) between them and their friends at Peshawur. Early in March, however, Mahomed Akhbar Khan having arranged affairs to his satisfaction at Cabul, and lodged his English prisoners in the forts of Buddiahbad at Lughman, came to Jellalabad, and took personal command of the rebels who had invested the place. His presence was the signal for active operations, and it was apprehended that amongst other methods of attack, he meditated undermining the garrison. This supposition led to the measures described below in Sir Robert Sale's despatch :—

To Captain PONSONBY, Assistant Adjutant General, Jellalabad, 12th March, 1842.

"SIR,—Do me the favor to acquaint Major General Pollock, C. B., that since I last addressed you, the enemy have, in furtherance of their plan of establishing a vigorous blockade, daily insulted the place by throwing swarms of skirmishers into the ravines and hollows round the walls, and behind the remains of mud forts, which are so extensive, that no industry has enabled us wholly to clear them away. It has been their practice to plant their standards in conspicuous points of the circumference thus occupied, and to keep up a constant fire of musquetry upon our parapets. I have resisted these attempts, by the fire from Batteries, and the occasional aim from our best marksmen. We have sustained few casualties, and those of the enemy have, I suspect, been uniformly serious. On the 10th instant, the covert advance of the Affghans was particularly persevering against our Northern face; towards evening our spies brought us information, that the enemy were driving a mine in this direction, and though I entertained great doubts of the correctness of this statement, I thought it prudent to ascertain the truth by a sortie. On the morning of the 11th, I placed under the orders of Lieut. Col. Dennie, 300 men of the 13th, 300 of the 35th, and 200 of the Corps of Sappers; having at the same time directed Captain Oldfield to move on with the Cavalry into the plain to the southward, and endeavour to fix the attention of the enemy in that direction. The Lieut. Col. sallied out by the Peshawur gate a little after day-break, and his column swept steadily round into the low ground to the northward. Contrary to expectation, this was found to be abandoned; but a strong picquet of the enemy's foot occupied a salient point on a rising ground, which commanded it; from this they were

driven in a most spirited manner by Captain Broadfoot, at the head of the detachment of Sappers and Miners, and he pursued the retreating enemy into and beyond a tower and garden wall, of which he took and kept possession. The 35th, under Captain Seaton, and Captain Wilkinson's Company of the 13th, were then established as skirmishers around the ruins of old forts, whilst the remainder of the 13th were held in reserve. The Cavalry appeared at the same moment, and supported the left flank of our line of occupation: an examination of the ground proved that neither shaft nor gallery had been commenced, and I therefore directed the troops to withdraw. The whole camp of Mahomed Akbar was, by this time, in full alert, and heavy masses of Cavalry, and a cloud of Foot were pressing forward towards our skirmishers. Our detachment, however, retired in the most perfect order, under their fire, and our guns and mortars from the walls, kept the Affghans in check in the most satisfactory manner. On our extreme right, their Horse made an attempt to ride in upon Captain Broadfoot's party, but a volley from the Sappers and Miners brought them to a halt in evident discomfiture. Our loss in wounded was very trifling."

I have, &c.,

R. SALE, *Major General.*

While these events were passing at Jellalabad, General Nott was preparing to receive the enemy at Candahar. The return of Colonel Mac-laren's Brigade, after an ineffectual endeavour to reach Cabul, whither it had been dispatched for the purpose of attempting a relief, rendered the force at Candahar strong enough to resist all imaginable opposition as long as provisions held out. The force consisted of Her Majesty's 40th Regt., the 2nd, 16th, 38th, 42nd, and 43d Regts. Bengal N. I., the 25th Bombay N. I., a large detail of Artillery, and some of Shah Soojah's troops of both arms. Nevertheless, it was deemed necessary to take precautions against surprise and treachery. The detachment at Killa Abdoolla, half way between Quetta and Candahar, was sent back to the former place—a movement which, though rapid, was attended by some loss. The people of Candahar were closely watched, and the guards at the city gates doubled. The detachment at Khelat-i-Ghilzie was considered safe, or its premature withdrawal, at any rate, impolitic. During the month of November and the early part of December, every thing remained quiet at Candahar; but at the end of December, the Jaunbuz Cavalry corps, under Captain Golding, mutinied, murdered their commandant, and fled with the whole of their baggage. They were pursued and overtaken by Captain Leeson's Horse and another Jaun

baux Regiment, under Captain Wilson. The latter, however, hung back at a critical moment, leaving the battle to be fought by Capt. Leeson's party only. The traitorous Jaun bauzees fled after a short conflict (with the loss of 40 killed and wounded) and joined the standard of the Barukzye Chief at Dahla, forty miles from Khelat-i-Ghilzie, the nucleus of the rebellion in the South. Here too the Dooranee tribes assembled; and not long afterwards the Ghilzie chief, Ucktar Khan, heading some thousands of the thirsty mountaineers, presented himself, to share in the battles and the spoils of the rebellion. Nothing more was wanting to render the insurrection formidable than the presence of Prince Suftur Jung, who was then, and for some time previously had been, on friendly terms with the British at Candahar,—and of this the rebels had soon to boast. His Highness fled in the course of December, and early in the following month advanced to Candahar with a large force to attack General Nott.

The General did not wait for the enemy, but went out to meet them, and on the 12th of January 1842, dispersed them with little loss. From this time, and for some weeks subsequently, the city suffered no molestation, but towards the close of February the enemy reappeared in considerable numbers, headed as before. General Nott now determined to read them a severe lesson, driving them to a great distance from his vicinage to ensure to the Candaharies who remained faithful to British interests a long continuance of tranquillity, while he satisfied the disaffected parties within the walls that the rebel chieftains were powerless against a well disciplined army. General Nott's dispatches briefly recite his proceedings on these several occasions:—

To Lieutenant Colonel STUART, Military Secretary to the Government of India. Kandahar, 12th January, 1842.

"SIR,—I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the Right Hon'ble the Governor General of India, that the rebel Army, under the command of Prince Suftur Jung, Attah Mahomed, and other Chieftains, having approached to within fifteen miles of Kandahar, I this morning moved out of the City with five and a half Regiments of Infantry, Shah's 1st Cavalry, a party of Skinner's Horse, and sixteen guns. After a march of four hours over a very difficult country, I came in sight of the rebel army, from fifteen to twenty thousand men, drawn up in a strong position on the right bank of the Urganhab. I immediately crossed the river, the troops

marched to the attack, and in twenty minutes carried their position, and dispersed their whole army. The Cavalry with a troop of Horse Artillery were instantly sent in pursuit, and followed the fugitives about eight miles. The Enemy's loss was severe; their fire was high and wild, and our loss has been very trifling. I enclose a list of killed and wounded.

"I beg to bring to the favourable notice of Government the following Officers who commanded Corps and Detachments:

"Lieutenant Colonel Wymer, 38th Regiment N. I.

"Lieutenant Colonel McLaren, 16th Native Infantry.

"Major Lane, 2d Native Infantry.

"Major Hibbert, Her Majesty's 40th Regiment.

"Captain Dalzell, in charge of a Wing of the 42d N. I.

"Captain MacDonell, Shah's 5th Infantry.

"Captain Anderson, Bengal Artillery.

"Captain Leeson, Shah's 1st Cavalry, and

"Captain Haldane, Skinner's Horse.

"My thanks are due to Captains Polwhele and Scott, Brigade Majors—to Major Sanders, Bengal Engineers, for his constant zeal and exertions—to Lieutenant North, Bombay Engineers, and to Lieutenant Tytler, Assistant Quarter Master General.

"Major Rawlinson, Political Agent, was in the field, and kindly acted as one of my Staff.

"The Troops, both European and Native, behaved with their usual gallantry.

I am, &c.

W. NOTT, Major Genl.

Commanding Kandahar."

Return of the Killed, Wounded and Missing in the Force under the command of Major General NOTT, in the engagement with the Enemy, near Kandahar, on the 12th January 1842. Kandahar, 12th January, 1842.

"Horse Artillery, S. S. F.—Wounded 1 private and 4 horses; missing 1 syce and 2 horses.

"Bombay Artillery, 3d Company 1st Battalion.—Wounded 1 private.

"Her Majesty's 40th Regiment.—Wounded 1 lieutenant, 1 serjeant, 1 corporal, and 7 privates.

"38th Regiment Native Infantry.—Killed 1 naick and 1 private; wounded 1 corporal, 13 privates and 1 bhisty.

"Shah's 5th Regiment of Infantry.—Wounded 1 captain.

"Shah's 1st Cavalry.—Killed 1 private and 5 horses; wounded 1 ensign, 6 corporals, 7 privates and 12 horses.

"Detachment 1st Irregular Bengal Cavalry.—Killed 1 private; missing 4 horses.

"Grand total of killed, wounded and missing, 47 officers and men, and 27 horses.

Officers Wounded.

" Shah's 5th Regt.—Capt. Macdonell, slightly.

" H. M.'s 40th Regt. Lieut. E. Lee, severely.

" 16th N. I. doing duty 1st Cavalry S. S. F., Ensign Chamberlain, severely.

W. NOTT, Major Genl.

To T. H. MADDOCK, Esq.

Secretary to the Govt. of India, Calcutta.

Candahar, 12th March, 1842.

" SIR,—I have the honor to acquaint you, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor General of India, that during the month of February, considerable numbers of the rebel forces, under the command of Prince Suftur Jung and other Afghan Chiefs, assembled in the vicinity of Candahar, plundering the villages, and by every possible means urging the inhabitants to join in an attack upon the British troops. In the beginning of the present month, the enemy approached close to the city of Candahar.

" I made the necessary arrangements for the safety of the city, and leaving a garrison of about 2600 men in it, I on the 7th instant, moved with the remainder of my force against the enemy. They retired as I advanced; they were driven first across the river Turnuk, and then across the Urghundab. They would not allow our Infantry to come in contact with them. On the 9th, we got near enough to open our guns upon them with great effect; they were soon broken and fled; my want of good Cavalry saved them from being totally destroyed; they were dispersed in every direction.

" During a march of five days, opposed to 12,000 of the enemy, who had upwards of 6000 well-mounted Cavalry, continually moving round our column, not a camel was taken or a particle of baggage lost. The troops marched without tents, both officers and men, and the conduct of my Artillery and Infantry was excellent.

" I think this dispersion of the rebel force will have the best effect, as it will convince the inhabitants that the chiefs cannot face us in the field with any chance of success. I am now doing all in my power to conciliate the villagers, and to induce them to return to the cultivation of their lands, and to live in peace under the assurance of protection.

" During my absence, a strong detachment of the enemy made an attempt on the city, and succeeded in burning one of the gates, but they were repulsed with great loss by the gallantry of the troops in garrison, under the command of Major Lane, of the 2d Regiment N. I., whose report shall be forwarded for the information of Government by the first opportunity.

I am, &c.

W. NOTT, Major General,

Comdg. at Candahar."

The report of Major Lane, referred to in the concluding passage of General Nott's letter, is here given. It should be stated, by way of preface, that the garrison left with Major Lane, consisted only of some details of Her Majesty's 40th Regt., the 2d Regt. Bengal N. I., some of the Shah's Infantry, and a small proportion of Artillery.

From Major C. R. W. LANE, Comdg. Candahar Garrison, to Captain SCOTT, Major of Brigade, Candahar, 12th March, 1842.

"SIR,—For the information of Major General Nott, commanding, I have the honor to report the following particulars of an attack made upon Candahar on the night of the 10th instant.

"During the forenoon of the above date, large bodies of the enemy, horse and foot, were observed assembling from all quarters, taking up a position near old Candahar and the adjoining villages; and in the course of the day their number rapidly increased, parties from the main body moving round and establishing themselves in front of the Shikarpore gate. As their object was evidently to attack the garrison, the Political Agent directed the inhabitants to shut their shops and remain within their houses, and precautions were taken to secure the gates by piling bags of grain inside.

"About 8 o'clock P. M., a desperate attack was made upon the Herat gate, and owing to the darkness of the night, some combustibles were placed near it and ignited unperceived, and in a few minutes the gate was in flames. I immediately ordered a party of 100 rank and file from the 2d Regiment, and a company from the Shah's 1st Infantry, to support the guard at the gate, and two guns were also placed in position commanding the entrance.

"Dense masses of the enemy had now collected at this point, keeping up an incessant and heavy fire, which was returned with great effect from the ramparts, but so reckless and daring were the assailants, that notwithstanding the fearful havoc among them, eight or ten men actually forced their way, by tearing down the burning fragments of the gate, and scrambling over the bags of grain: these were instantly shot, and their fate, together with the galling fire from the walls, dismayed the attacking party, who retired about midnight, after four hours' resolute fighting.

"Another attack took place at the Shikarpore gate about 9 P. M., and a similar attempt was made to fire it, which, however, failed, and the assailants were driven back; a small party also approached the Cabool gate, but the garrison being every where on the alert, the enemy was compelled to retire about 1 o'clock A. M. of the 11th, and when the day broke, not a soul was visible.

"The guards over the several gates were so completely sheltered, that not a single casualty occurred, whilst the well-directed and destructive fire which was maintained for nearly four hours, must have done

great execution. Upwards of fifty dead bodies were found in and near the Herat gate, and from the determined assault of the enemy who came close up to the walls, their loss must have been immense: report estimates it at 1000 killed and wounded, and I am informed by Major Rawlinson, Political Agent, that Prince Sufter Jung, Meerza Ahmed, and other Sirdars were present, encouraging the assailants.

"A considerable quantity of grain was unavoidably destroyed at the Herat gate, but as it presented a strong barrier, I trust the sacrifice will be considered unimportant. This gate has been built up, and the others have been temporarily barricaded with grain bags.

"Before concluding my report, I would beg to acknowledge the valuable assistance rendered me on this occasion by Major Rawlinson, Political Agent, and Captain Ripley, Fort Adjutant. The exertions of every officer and soldier in garrison were unremitting, and it affords me infinite pleasure to bear testimony to the admirable conduct of all parties during the attack.

I have, &c.

CHAS. R. W. LANE, Major,
Comdg. Candahar Garrison."

As stated by Major Lane, the enemy broke up their encampment in the night, and immediately sent, from their place of retreat, to the Political Agent, proposing terms. These were not accepted. The rebels did not, however, return to the attack on Candahar, but contented themselves with plundering the well-disposed villagers in the neighbourhood. To put an end to these attacks upon the defenceless, General Nott sent out Colonel Wymer, with an adequate force, and had shortly the satisfaction of receiving from that officer, a report of his movements. This report is subjoined, preceded by the commendatory dispatch which the General addressed to the Government on the occasion of announcing Colonel Wymer's successes:—

From Major General W. Nott, Commanding at Candahar, to T. H. MANDOCK, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Calcutta, Candahar, 28th March, 1842.

"SIR,—Having deemed it desirable to detach a Brigade under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Wymer, for the double purpose of foraging, and giving protection to the numerous villages on the left bank of the Urghundab river, against the marauding system adopted by the rebel army, commanded by Prince Sufter Jung and other Affghan chiefs; I have now the honor to forward to you, for the information of the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General of India, a report from that officer of an attack made on his detachment, and of the

complete defeat of the enemy. I have ascertained that their loss was great, and that several of their chiefs were killed and wounded, while our loss was comparatively trifling.

"On my arrival on the field, I was pleased with the judicious arrangements made by Lieutenant Colonel Wymer; and the cool and determined manner in which he opposed the enemy and protected his convoy did credit to our arms, and I beg leave to bring him under the favorable notice of Government.

"The enemy was finally driven across the Urghundab in the greatest confusion, and with very considerable loss. The Artillery and Infantry distinguished themselves.

I have, &c.

W. NOTT, *Major-General,*

Commanding at Candahar."

From Lieutenant Colonel G. P. WYMER, Commanding Detachment, to Capt. SCOTT, Major of Brigade, Candahar. Camp, Baba Waller, 27th March, 1842.

"SIR,—I have the honor to report for the information of Major General Nott, commanding at Candahar, that in obedience to his instructions, I marched from that place with

1 Troop Shah's H. Arty.
 1 " Haldane's Horse.
 1 " Leeson's Horse.
 16th Regt. Bengal N. I.
 38th Regt. ditto.
 2nd Shah's Regt.

the force noted in the margin on the morning of the 25th instant, with the intention of foraging for the Cavalry and cattle at the village of Seikhchulah; but on receiving a report from Captain Dallas, that the country thereabouts had recently been foraged over, and the water turned off by the enemy, he suggested the advantage to be derived by a move upon Baba Wullee, which was adopted. On reaching that place, I sighted the rebel camp on the opposite side of the Urghundab, distant about four miles, and large bodies of Cavalry grazing their horses between it and the river. I continued my march to the spot selected for my encampment, and shortly after reaching it at half-past 10 or 11, a large body of the enemy's Cavalry was observed, forming and occupying the Pass in my rear; on which I reinforced the rear guard with two guns and a wing of the 38th N. I., placing the convoy under the hills in the rear, and protecting its front and flanks with the force at my disposal, which had hardly been effected, when finding the force above mentioned fast increasing, I deemed it highly necessary to move back for their dispersion, taking with me two Horse Artillery guns under Lieut. Turner, the 38th Regiment, and a party of Skinner's Horse under Lieut. Travers, detaching two Companies 38th Regiment to drive the enemy from the tops of some low hills they had crowned with horsemen on my left, which was speedily done, and the well-directed fire from Lieutenant Turner's guns soon drove in the body of the enemy collected on the Pass, commanded, I am told.

by Salloo Khan and Taj Mahomed, who moved round to join the party then threatening the right flank of the convoy. On this I retraced my steps, and rejoined the convoy, which had been left under Lieut. Col. McLaren's charge during my absence, and who had dialogued a third body of the enemy from the enclosed gardens and villages in his front with a part of the 16th Regiment. On my reaching the convoy, I directed Captain Macan, commanding the Shah's 2d Regiment, to move his corps, supported by two guns and the half of Leeson's Horse under Ensign Chamberlain, against the party on the right flank, which movement had been partly executed, when the force under the Major General's personal command arrived to my support, at the time when the party of Cavalry under Ensign Chamberlain received a partial check from an overpowering body of the enemy, and that officer was severely wounded, and Lieut. Travers slightly, who acted in concert with him.

"Enclosed I have the honor to forward a return of the killed and wounded on the occasion, and to express my entire approbation of the conduct of all officers and men engaged in the action.

"I trust I may be permitted to bring to the Major General's notice, the admirable practice of the Artillery under Lieut. Turner's guidance, every shot from which told with beautiful effect upon the dense masses of the enemy.

"To Lieut. Waterfield, Adjutant 38th Regiment, who acted as my Personal Staff on the occasion, I am much indebted for the very able manner in which he conducted the various duties assigned him.

I have, &c.

G. P. WYMER, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
Commanding Detachment."

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Detachment under the Command of Lieut.-Colonel WYMER, in the engagement with the Enemy, near Baba Wallce, on the 25th Instant.

Camp Baba Wallce, 27th March, 1842.

| | Killed. | | Wounded. | | | | | | | | Missing. |
|--|-----------|--------|-------------|---------|----------|------------|----------------------|-----------|-------|---------|----------|
| | Privates. | Horse. | Lieutenant. | Ensign. | Jemadar. | Havildars. | Naziks and Duffdars. | Privates. | Sycc. | Horses. | Horses. |
| Horse Artillery S. S. F. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| 16th Regiment Bengal N. I. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 58th ditto ditto, | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Shah's 2nd Regiment of Infantry, .. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Detachment Shah's 1st Cavalry, .. | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 0 | 7 | 1 |
| Detachment 1st Irregular Bengal Cavalry, | 2 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 8 | 0 | 5 | 0 |
| Total of each | 3 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 29 | 1 | 12 | 1 |
| Total, | 3 | 5 | | | | 29 | | | | 12 | 1 |

"Grand Total of killed, wounded and missing, forty-two (42) Officers and Men, and 18 Horses.

"Doing duty with detachment 1st Irregular Bengal Cavalry, Lieutenant Travers, 2nd Regiment Bengal N. I., slightly.

"Doing duty with detachment Shah's 1st Cavalry, Ensign N. B. Chamberlain, 16th ditto, severely.

G. P. WYMER, *Lieut. Col.*
Commanding Detachment.

While General Nott thus skilfully maintained his position at Candahar, the Political Officers in Scinde were taking measures to reinforce him with a part of the troops sent from Bombay. A proportion of these troops, under the command of Major General England of Her Majesty's 41st Regt. (successor to Major General Brookes,) consisting of Her Majesty's 41st Regt., two regiments of Bombay Native Infantry, a regiment of Bombay Light Cavalry, some Horse and Foot Artillery, had made their way, with little interruption through the Bolan Pass to Quetta, leaving the remainder of the force, and a convoy under Major Simmons of Her Majesty's 41st Regt. at Dadur, to follow a few days subsequently. On arriving at Quetta, Major General England finding that a halt would probably subject the troops to some inconvenience, from the difficulty of obtaining forage in sufficient abundance, determined to move on to Candahar. And here, in the absence of the dispatch detailing circumstantially the adventures attending this movement, an excellent summary is borrowed from the "*Bombay Times*"—a Journal that has established a heavy claim upon the reading community, for the pains taken by the Editor to accumulate facts connected with the war in Afghanistan.

"The force," says the *Bombay Times*, "which marched from Quetta on the 26th, consisted of 4 guns of the horse brigade, (Leslie's)—1 troop of the 3rd Light Cavalry, 5 companies of H. M. 41st, 6 comps. of the light battalion N. I., with 50 Poonah horse: these having in charge a convoy of $4\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs of treasure, medical stores, and ammunition for Candahar, with 1500 camels, besides other beasts of burthen. The object of the advance was to get into a part of the country where forage for the camels and cattle could be procured—there to await the arrival of the remainder of the convoy, consisting of the other companies of H. M. 41st, details of the 6th and 21st N. I. with 9 lakhs of treasure, and 2000 camels which left Dadur on the 28th March, and reached Quetta on the 4th April. The village of Hykulzye, 31 miles east of Quetta, was the place selected for the halt, which was expected to have amounted to about ten days, when the Brigade under Major Simmons would

have joined, it was supposed about the 7th: the force, by the time amounting to above 2500 men, were then to have proceeded together. Hykulzye was reached on the morning of the 28th. Some slight skirmishing had taken place on the 26th, but no serious obstruction or annoyance had been offered on our advance. A number of stragglers appeared upon the hills, but from all that was known there was no reason to suspect these of being any thing other than roving mountaineers, or marauders generally so placed to watch our movements in every part of the country. So stern and inviolable was the silence maintained in reference to the intentions of the insurgents, that though General England had been received with the utmost cordiality and kindness by the chief men of Hykulzye, only six miles from the Pass, where the most strenuous exertions had for two months been making to construct * barricades now completed, not a word was whispered as to there being any intention whatever to interrupt our progress, even by those who apparently were most interested and anxious for our success. Not only must the construction and condition of the field-works have been generally known to the whole country around, but the chiefs who when closely questioned, professed the most absolute ignorance on the subject, must have been aware that at the very moment they were making the most friendly and cordial professions of confidence, Mahomed Sedeez, the leader of the insurgents south of Candahar, was strongly posted on the hills close by, with the view of obstructing our advance. This furnishes striking proof of our total want of information beyond the line of our picquets, as well as of the extent and compactness of the combination against us. As our force proceeded, it became apparent that the insurgents were prepared to offer us a determined resistance on the rising ground which flanked the line of march on our right, and completely commanded the road along which the Brigade must pass.

"A detachment consisting of four light companies from H. M. 41st and the 25th and 21st N. L. were ordered to charge *en ligne* (not in column,) up the hill, and storm the breast-work on its summit; these amounted in all to 180 men,—while the remaining portion of the wing of the 41st, 220 strong, under cover of four of Capt. Leslie's guns with about 70 men, covered the attack. The remainder of the force, about 600 strong, remained in charge of the baggage, and were, in fact, considering its bulkiness, not more than sufficient for its protection. Until the head of the storming party reached the crest of the exterior defences, the strength of the enemy was completely concealed from us by their field works, which consisted of a succession of breast-works, improved by a ditch and abattis; the ditch is said to have been filled with thorns, and the first outwork to have been commanded by a flanking fire. So soon as we got close up to them, a dense and determined mass burst out with such fury on our men, that with the advantage of the rising ground, of a fire maintained with singular steadiness, precision, and effect from their other works, and of overwhelming number in their favour, the contest quickly became so unequal that the storming party were unable to keep their ground. Here Capt. May of the 41st was

carriage. The Commissariat at Ferozepore and Upper India, generally had the greatest trouble in procuring camels and camel drivers: the sources of supply had been nearly exhausted by the march to, and continued occupation of, Afghanistan, and the drivers entertained a lively horror of a country, whence their professional brethren were daily returning bereft of their toes, fingers, etc., the effects of a Cabul winter, or the revengeful cruelties of the Afghans. Nevertheless, General Pollock felt himself in a condition to take the field, for on the 26th of February, we find him issuing the following, his first, order, to the assembled troops:—

"Camp, Kawulsur, 26th Feb.—The Major-General Commanding deems it advisable to notify to the troops in Camp, that circumstances may occur, which will render an advance on Jellalabad imperatively necessary. Major General Sir R. Sale, C. B., has with his usual gallantry, determined to hold this position to the last moment, and the troops under his command are cheerfully prepared for the contest. The heroic conduct of this little band has attracted universal attention, and every soldier will naturally feel the greatest sympathy in their sufferings and privations, and an eager desire to be instrumental in effecting their relief.

"Sir R. Sale reports, that his men are in excellent spirits, and that every arrangement has been made to withstand a siege.

"Success in relieving these troops will raise for this force the admiration and gratitude of all India, and the Major-General Commanding, feels assured, that Officers and men will cheerfully make any sacrifices to attain so noble an object. He therefore now calls upon the Brigadiers to assemble the Commanding Officers under their orders, and determine on the least quantity of baggage, and the smallest number of Camp followers, with which their Regiment can advance. The success of this enterprise will greatly depend upon the quantity of baggage taken, as from the nature of the country between Jellalabad, the line most consistent with security, must be as little encumbered as possible.

"The Major-General Commanding, trusts, that the confidence he feels in the troops will be repaid by their confidence in him. The soldiers may rest assured, that his thoughts are constantly engaged in ensuring them provisions, and securing their comforts; and they may be convinced, that they will never be called upon by him, to make useless sacrifices, or to undergo unnecessary hardships.

"Arrangements will be made for placing such baggage as may be left behind, in perfect security at Peshawur.

"This order is to be read to each regiment, on parade, and at the head of each company at two successive parades, taking care, that all men absent on duty, or otherwise, may be informed.

"The arrangements made by the Brigadiers, will be communicated to the Major General Commanding, as early as practicable."

From causes to this moment unexplained, the advance did not take place at the period indicated. Whether, as frequently alleged at the time, it was considered preferable to bargain with the Khyberees for an uninterrupted march through the Pass, or whether Lord Ellenborough, the Governor General, who had succeeded Lord Auckland on the 28th February, *then* privately countermanded the expedition,—or whether the carriage department was still inefficient, the troops continued inactive until the ensuing April. Early in that month, however, the first step was taken in advance for the relief of the garrison of Jellalabad, and we now come to a period of the history of the campaign, when the labours of the narrator are almost entirely superseded by the industry of the despatch writers. Nearly every event occurring between this date, until the final evacuation of the country, is recorded in the official communications of the military chiefs. They are presented to the reader with the Notifications which the Government of India, in the fulness of its joy, published to the world by way of introduction.

*" Notification, Secret Department,—Head Quarters, Benares, April 19th, 1842.—*The Governor General has much satisfaction in communicating to the Army, the following Despatch from Major General Pollock, C. B., announcing the successful advance of the Troops under the Major General's command into the Khyber Pass, and the evacuation by the enemy of the fort of Ali Musjid.

" The Governor General has been much gratified by the uniform testimony borne by all the Officers engaged, to the zeal, the gallantry and the perseverance of all the Troops of Her Majesty, and of the Government of India, which had the good fortune to have this opportunity of distinguishing themselves before the Affghan enemy, and his Lordship doubts not that the continued exercise of these, the accustomed military qualities of the India Army, will produce their accustomed result in the achievement of new honor and of new victories.

" The Governor General deems it to be due to the Troops of the Maharajah Sher Singh to express his entire satisfaction with their conduct as reported to him, and to inform the Army, that the loss sustained by the Sikhs in the assault of the Pass, which was forced by them, is understood to have been equal to that sustained by the Troops of Her Majesty, and of the Government of India.

" The Governor General has instructed his Agent at the Court of the Maharajah, to offer his congratulations to His Highness on this occasion, so honorable to the Sikh arms.

By order of the Right Hon'ble the Govr. Genl.

T. H. MADDOCK,

Secy. to the Govt. of India with the Govr. Genl."

TO T. H. MADDOCK, ESQ.

Secy. to the Govt. Political Dept.,

Dated Camp, Lalla Cheene, near Ali Musjid, 6th April, 1842.

"SIR,—It is with feelings of much gratification, I have the honor to report for the information of the Right Hon'ble the Governor General in Council, the following detail of operations undertaken and carried into effect against the Afreedies.

"Yesterday morning, at half past three, the troops were under arms, the Camp struck, and according to arrangements previously made, the treasure, ammunition, and baggage placed on the road, leading from Jumrood towards the entrance of the Khyber Pass.

"The enemy had, for some days, appeared in great numbers at the mouth of the Pass, which they had fortified with a strong breast-work of stone and bushes. The hills on the right and left were rocky and precipitous, presenting great natural obstacles to the ascent of troops. To gain the summit of these heights, defended as they were by a numerous body of the enemy, was an undertaking of considerable difficulty.

"The columns destined to accomplish this most important object moved off simultaneously with the main column intended to assault the entrance, but were compelled to make a considerable detour to the right and left to enable them to commence the ascent.

"The right column consisting of the troops

| | |
|---|------------------------|
| { | 4 Cos. H. M. 9th Foot. |
| | 4 Cos. 26th N. I. |
| | 4 Cos. 64th N. I. |

 detailed in the margin, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Taylor, H. M.'s 9th Foot and Major Anderson, 64th Native Infantry.

"The left column under the command of

| | |
|---|------------------------|
| { | 4 Cos. H. M. 9th Foot. |
| | 4 Cos. 26th N. I. |
| | 4 Cos. 64th N. I. |
| | 400 Jezailchees. |

 Lieutenant Colonel Moseley and Major Huish commenced their ascent; led by Capt. Ferris's Regiment of Jezailchees. Both columns after considerable opposition, which they overcame in the most gallant style, succeeded in routing the enemy, and gaining possession of the crest of the hills on either side. While the flanking columns were in progress on the heights, I ordered Captain Alexander, in command of the Artillery, to place the guns in position, and to throw shrapnel among the enemy when opportunity offered, which assisted much in their discomfiture. As Lieutenant Col. Taylor, from the opposition he had met with, and the extremely difficult nature of the ground

| | |
|---|------------------|
| { | Grenadiers H. M. |
| | 9th Foot, and |
| | 6 Cos. 53d N. I. |

 was some time in reaching the summit of the hill on the right, I detached a party under the command of Brigadier Wild to assault in front; it was, however, so extremely steep near the top, that notwithstanding the undaunted gallantry of the Officers and men, they were unable to gain a footing on the summit, and, I regret to say, the enemy were enabled to throw stones, with fatal effect, upon the leading Grenadiers of the 9th Foot.

" Finding the heights in our possession, I now advanced the main column to the mouth of the Pass, and commenced destroying the barrier which the enemy had evacuated on perceiving their position was turned.

" A portion of the right and left column being left to keep the heights, under the command of Lieut. Colonel Moseley and Major Anderson respectively, Major Huish and Lieut.-Colonel Taylor continued their advance to crown the hills in front, and on each side, which were covered with the enemy, who appeared determined to contest every inch of ground; but nothing could resist the gallantry of our troops, who carried every thing before them.

" A position of considerable strength above the bridge now remained to be carried, and again the Jerailechees were conspicuous in forcing the enemy to relinquish their strong-holds. Crowning parties having taken possession of these heights, all opposition on the part of the enemy may be said to have ceased, as no large body of them has since come in sight. The nature of the arrangements made for the protection of baggage will be best understood when I state, that not a single baggage animal has fallen into the hands of the enemy.

" It now remains for me to perform the pleasing duty of stating how much I feel indebted to the Officers and men, comprising the force under my command, for their zeal, devotion, and unflinching valour in the performance of the very arduous duty which they have so nobly executed.

" From Major-General McCaskill, K. H. Commanding the Infantry Division, and who was on this occasion commanding the rear guard, I have received every assistance, as likewise from Brigadier Wild and Brigadier White.* To Lieut.-Colonel Taylor, K. H., my warmest acknowledgments are due for the spirit, coolness, and judgment with which he discharged the duties entrusted to him. When Officers and

* The following dispatches were not published for sometime after the above.

TO T. H. MADDOCK, Esq.

Secretary to Government, Political Department.

" SIR,—As I am doubtful if the originals, of which the enclosed are copies, ever reached you, I am induced to forward the copies, and take this opportunity of stating, that on the 8th of April the 26th Regiment ascended the height at the entrance of the Pass, and reached the summit under Brigadier Wild. I was obliged to advance before the party did reach the summit, and was not aware that they had done so, till informed of it two or three days ago by Brigadier Wild.

GEORGE FULLOCK, Major General.

Jalalabad, 21st May, 1842."

TO T. H. MADDOCK Esq.

Secretary to Government.

" SIR,—In continuation of my despatch of the 8th instant, I have now the honor to enclose a return of Casualties which took place on the 8th and 9th, that of the latter date occurred in taking possession of Ali Masjid. I am happy to say the amount of our loss is trifling, considering the very great opposition we experienced from the enemy.

men, European and Native, have all so gallantly performed their duty, it is difficult to select the names of particular individuals; but I cannot omit the names of those who so admirably led the troops to storm the heights; viz.; Lieut.-Colonel Moseley, 64th N. I., Major Huish, 26th N. I., Major Anderson, 64th N. I., and Captain Ferris, Commanding the Jezailchees, whose conduct excited the delight and admiration of all who beheld them. Indeed I consider much of the success of the day to be attributable to their gallantry, skill, and perseverance in the most difficult descriptions of warfare.

"I have also to express my satisfaction with the manner in which the Artillery was served by Captain Alexander, Commanding. The precision with which shrapnel was thrown, caused considerable loss to the enemy.

"To Captain Ponsonby, my Assistant-Adjutant General, Captain Codrington, Assistant Quarter-Master General, Captain Macadam, Deputy Judge Advocate General, and to Lieut. Pollock, my Aid-de-camp, I am much indebted for communicating my orders at different times during the day.

"The troops bivouacked about a mile from Ali Musjid, which place I had intended attacking to-day, but early this morning the fort was evacuated, the enemy carrying off the mountain guns which had been brought from Mahomed Akbar's camp. The fort is now in our possession.

"I cannot conclude the dispatch, without requesting that you will bring to the particular notice of the Governor General in Council, the very great assistance I have received from Captains Mackeson and Lawrence.

"In my last communication I inadvertently omitted to mention the name of Lieutenant John Becker, acting Field Engineer, and have to request you will bring to the notice of the Right Honorable the G. C. in Council the very essential services rendered by that officer in clearing the Pass of the impediments constructed by the enemy, which he did with a degree of celerity, notwithstanding their strength and difficulty of removal, that elicited my warmest satisfaction.

I have &c.

GEORGE POLLOCK,

Lalla Chanza near Ali Musjid, 7th April, 1842.

Major Genl. Commanding in Afghanistan.

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the troops under the Command of Major General POLLOCK, on the 5th April 1842.

| | Killed. | Wounded. | Missing. |
|--|---------|----------|----------|
| Staff, | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| H. M.'s 9th Foot, | 8 | 33 | 0 |
| 26th Native Infantry, | 2 | 20 | 1 |
| 30th Native Infantry, | 2 | 13 | 1 |
| 33d Regiment Native Infantry, | 0 | 2 | 1 |
| 33d Regiment Native Infantry, | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 64th Regiment Native Infantry, | 0 | 8 | 1 |
| Jezailchee Regiment, | 1 | 25 | 10 |

GEORGE PONSONBY, Captain,
Assistant Adjutant General.

" Captain Mackeson's knowledge of the localities was invaluable to me, by enabling him to point out those heights which required to be crowned. Both these Officers came into the ground which I now occupy. Captain Lawrence returned to Peshawur yesterday, and Captain Mackeson proceeds with the force.

" Captain Sir Richmond Shakespear volunteered his services to accompany Lieut. Col. Taylor as his A. D. C., and took command of the men lately composing the garrison of Ali Musjid; his exertions throughout the day were most conspicuous and unceasing.

" I must here observe, that from the character of the operations, and the very great numbers of the enemy, estimated at about 10,000, I found the force under my command numerically deficient, and in consequence the troops suffered severely from excessive fatigue.

" There were some of the enemy's horse in the vicinity of Ali Musjid, but I regret they did not wait for Brigadier White and his Brigade to make an example of them."

I have the honor to be, &c.

GEO. POLLOCK, *Major General,
Commanding in Afghanistan.*

" P. S.—I herewith forward reports from Officers commanding detached parties, but have not yet received the return of the casualties, which shall be sent to-morrow. I am happy to say, our loss has been much below what could possibly have been expected."

From Lieut. Colonel. A. B. TAYLOR, to Captain PONSONBY, Assistant Adjutant General. &c. &c. &c., Dated Camp near Ali Musjid, 6th April, 1842.

" SIR,—I have to report for the information of Major General Pollock, Lieut. Col. Taylor's right advance column. C. B., Commanding the Forces in Afghanistan, that agreeably to his instructions, the columns entrusted to my command (as detailed in margin) for the heights on the right of the entrance to the Khyber Pass were formed at day-break on the 5th instant in three divisions of four Companies each, protected on the right flank by a Squadron of Her Majesty's 3rd Light Dragoons under Lieut. Unet, and in this order with skirmishers and supports in front advanced, driving a considerable body of the enemy up the hills, which were scaled and crowned in spite of a determined opposition. This effected, the troops moved to their left to clear the Sungahs commanding the entrance to the Pass, which were abandoned on our approach, the enemy suffering severely in their retreat. Major Anderson, as directed, remained on the heights with his column, reinforced by one Company of H. M. 9th Foot and two Companies of 26th N. I., under Capt. Gahan of the latter Corps, whilst

Lieut. Col. Taylor's right advance column.

Cos. H. M. 9th Foot,
Ditto 26th N. Infy.

Major Anderson's rear right flank column.

41 Comp. H. M. 9th Foot.

41 Comps. 64th N. Infy.

100 Jattalchees (Mackeson's.)

I descended with the remainder to carry into effect the ulterior plan of operations of the Major General, in clearing off the enemy from their positions on the right of the road to Ali Musjid, which was finally accomplished, though obstinate resistance was offered on several points, especially over the Bridge where the enemy had concentrated in force. Having been reinforced by one Company of the 33rd Native Infantry under Lieutenant Watson, I directed Captain Lushington, H. M. 9th Foot, to move with that Company and the Light Company of the 9th Foot to the right, to take the enemy's position in reverse, whilst I attacked in front: this had the desired effect of forcing their immediate retreat and clearing the Bridge. No further opposition was offered by the enemy, who retreated on Ali Musjid, whilst I pushed on and occupied the tower and hill to the left, within about a mile of that place.

"It afforded me the greatest gratification to witness the gallant and persevering conduct of all the troops under my command engaged during the day, in a series of operations requiring great energy and patient endurance of fatigue; and I beg to mention the able assistance and support rendered me by Major Anderson, 64th N. I. (second in command,) and Captain Gahan, 26th N. I. commanding a Division, Captain Lushington, H. M.'s. 9th Foot commanding the Companies of that Regiment, Capt. Sir Richmond Shakespear, who volunteered his services in charge of the Jazailchees, as well as the ardent and praiseworthy zeal of all the Officers and men engaged.

"It is with regret I have to report the death of Lieut. Cumming, H. M. 9th Foot, a very promising officer, who was killed on the heights above the Pass, whilst in command of No. 6 Company. Returns of killed and wounded will be sent in as soon as the Companies with the rear column come in.

I have, &c.,

A. B. TAYLOR, *Lieut.-Colonel, 9th Foot.*

From Major GEORGE HUISE, Commanding 26th N. I. to Captain FOXBORBY, Assistant Adjutant General, dated Camp near Ali Musjid, April 6th, 1842.

"SIR,—Having been honoured with the command of the party as per margin, intended for the capture of the hills on the left of the Khyber Pass, I have the honour to report for the information of Major General

2 Cos. H. M.'s 9th Foot.
4 Cos. 80th N. I.
250 Feroz's Jazailchees.

Pollock, C. B., Commanding the Troops West of the Indus, that the party was formed for that purpose at day-break on the 5th instant, and advanced to the attack in skirmishing order. The height on the left was speedily carried, in the most gallant and determined manner, the summit of which having been attained, the smaller detached hill at the entrance of the Pass was cleared by the fire of my party.

"This being effected, agreeably to the instructions of the Major General, the post was made over to Lieutenant Colonel Moseley, com-

manding the rear crowning column, and the troops, with the exception of two companies of the 26th Native Infantry, descended for the purpose of continuing to scale and clear the heights on the left of the road leading off Alee Musjid.

"At several points, very considerable opposition was made by the enemy, especially at one of the hills in advance of the smaller hill before alluded to, and at the heights commanding the bridge where the enemy were in great force, but were driven from their posts, in the most spirited style, and with considerable loss whilst retreating.

"Having occupied the last height adjacent to the intended encamping ground, I took possession thereon with my party, occupying it during the night, until relieved this morning by a party of the 33rd N. I. under Major Hewitt.

"It gives me great pleasure to be able to report, that this duty, though of the most fatiguing description, scaling heights the whole day, under a hot sun, and in the face of an enemy, was cheerfully performed by all the troops, (European and Native, the sepoys vying with their European comrades,) whose perseverance and good spirit could not be surpassed, and were most gratifying to me; and here I cannot omit to make mention of the Jazailchees, under that able Officer, Captain Ferris, who afforded me most material aid, as also the ready assistance of Captain Tritton, second in command, and the zeal and the gallantry of every Officer and man engaged.

"I do myself the honor to enclose a return of the killed and wounded.

I have the honor to be, &c.

GEO. HUISH, Major, Commanding 26th N. I."

From Major General JOHN MCCASKILL, Commanding Infantry Division, to Captain FOXSONBY, Asst. Adjt. General Dated Camp Ali Musjid, April 6, 1842.

"SIR,—I have the honor to report for the information of Major General Pollock, C. B., commanding the forces, that, agreeably to his orders, I marched yesterday morning from Jumrood, in command of the Rear Guard of the column for the attack of the Khyber Pass, composed of the Troops detailed in the margin.

2 Guns H. Art.
 1 Gun Foot Art.
 2 Sqds. H. M.'s 4th Drags.
 10th Light Cavalry.
 2 Hussahs 11th Cavalry.
 1 Compy. H. M.'s 3d Foot.
 1 Compy. 6th N. I.
 3 Companies 60th N. I.

"The complete success of the attacks made by the force in advance, rendered unnecessary any active operations on my part. At

night-fall, I took the necessary precautions for security, and the Troops bivouacked at a spot about two miles within the Pass, without any molestation from the enemy.

"The Rear Guard arrived in camp at 2 P. M. this day, no part of the baggage having been plundered, nor any loss sustained.

"I have reason to be highly satisfied with the exertions of Lieut. Colonel Tulloch, second in command, of Capt. Smith, Offg. Deputy Assis-

tant Adjutant General, and of every officer placed under my orders in the performance of the duties assigned to them.

I have, &c.

JOHN McCASKILL, *Maj. Genl.*
Commanding Infy. Division."

This brilliant achievement would doubtless have been followed by a further advance, and the raising the blockade of Jellalabad; but the simple fact of its results having been misrepresented to the gallant officer commanding that garrison, led him to adopt a measure which secured to his handful of devoted troops the triumph of their own enfranchisement.

"*Notification.*—*Secret Department, Benares, 21st April.*—The Governor General feels assured, that every subject of the British Government will peruse with the deepest interest and satisfaction, the report he now communicates of the entire defeat of the Affghan troops, under Mahomed Akbar Khan, by the garrison of Jellalabad.

"That illustrious garrison, which, by its constancy in enduring privation, and by its valour in action, has already obtained for itself the sympathy and respect of every true soldier, has now, sallying forth from its walls, under the command of its gallant leader, Major General Sir Robert Sale, thoroughly beaten in open field an enemy of more than three times its numbers, taken the Standards of their boasted Cavalry, destroyed their camp, and re-captured four guns, which, under circumstances which can never again occur, had during the last winter fallen into their hands.

"The Governor General cordially congratulates the army upon the return of victory to its ranks. He is convinced that there, as in all former times, it will be found, while, as at Jellalabad, the European and Native Troops mutually supporting each other, and evincing equal discipline and valour, are led into action by Officers in whom they justly confide.

"The Governor General directs that the substance of this Notification, and of Major General Sir Robert Sale's report, be carefully made known to all Troops, and that a salute of 21 guns be fired at every principal Station of the Army.

"By order of the Right Hon'ble Governor General of India,
T. H. MADDOCK, *Secy. to the Govt. of India.*"

To Captain POXSONBY, Assistant Adjutant General, Jellalabad,
April 7th, 1842.

"SIR,—Information was on the evening of the 5th instant brought into this place in the most positive and circumstantial terms by spies from the enemy's camp, to the effect that the force under Major General


Sketch of the Fortress
of
JELLALABAD
and the Battle fought
7th April 1842.

Original taken from Calcutta

Road from Peshawer

Cantonment
burnt down
by the Enemy

Shah's Gardens
and Enemy's house



Old Walls

High Bank and Ravines

Caubul River

a beautifully cultivated Valley interspersed with Gardens and Forts

Enemy's Regt of Cavalry

Sand Hill

Sandy Plain

Pipers hill

Road to Caubul

Gardens

Advance of the Column of Attack on the 7th April


Enemy's Cavalry dispersed

Enemy's Camp

Gardens

to Lughmann

* General Dering was shot here
while in the act of cheering his
Men on to assault of this Fort



Pollock, C. B., had met with a reverse in the Khyber, retraced its steps towards Peshawur, and about 10 A. M. on the 6th, a *few de joie* and salute of artillery were fired by Mahomed Akbar, which were said to be in honor of the same event. It was on the same day, and through similar channels announced to me, that the Affghans were sending additional reinforcements to aid in defending their frontier Passes. Although I could not wholly depend on these statements which were improbable in themselves, and accompanied by counter-reports of a new revolution at Cabool, which was assigned by some as the cause of the rejoicing and of the defeat of the Ghazees in Khyber, and by an account of the intended and even actual retreat of the Sirdar into Lughman, I adopted, on a full consideration of the various circumstances and rumours, the resolution of anticipating the last mentioned event, if it had not come to pass, by a general attack on the Affghan Camp, in the hope of relieving this place from blockade, and facilitating General Pollock's advance to our succour. I accordingly gave directions to form three columns of Infantry, the centre consisting of H. M.'s 13th Light Infantry, mustering 500 bayonets, under Colonel Dennie; the left one also 500 strong, under Lieut. Col. Monteath, C. B., and the right composed of one Company 13th L. I., and one of the 35th N. I., and the detachment of Sappers under Lieutenant. Orr, (the severity of Captain Broadfoot's wound still rendering him non-effective,) the whole amounting to 360 men, commanded by Capt. Havelock, H. M.'s 13th L. I. These were to be supported by the fire of the guns of No. 6 Light Field Battery under Capt. Abbott, to which Capt. Backhouse, S. S. Artillery, was attached, and by the whole of my small cavalry force under Capt. Oldfield and Lieutenant Mayne. The troops issued from the Cabool and Peshawur gates at day-light this morning. So far from the Sirdar having made any dispositions to avoid the encounter, his whole force, not falling short in all of six thousand men, was formed in order of battle for the defence of his Camp, its right resting on a fort, and its left on the Cabool river, and even the ruined works within eight hundred yards of the place, recently repaired, were filled with Ghilzie marksmen, evidently prepared for a stout resistance. The attack was led by the Skirmishers and column under Capt. Havelock, which drove the enemy, in a most satisfactory manner, from the extreme left of his advanced line of works which it pierced, and proceeded to advance into the plain, whilst the central column directed its efforts against a square fort on the same base, the defence of which was obstinately maintained. With the deepest regret I have to record that, whilst nobly leading his Regiment to the assault, Colonel Dennie received a shot through the body, which shortly after proved fatal. The rear of the work having been finally carried by passing to its left, I gave orders for a combined attack on the enemy's camp; it was in every way brilliant and successful. The Artillery advanced at the gallop, and directed a heavy fire upon the Affghan centre, whilst two of the columns of Infantry penetrated the line near the same point, and the third forced back its left from its support on the river, into the

stream of which some of his horse and foot were driven. The Affghans made repeated attempts to check our advance by a smart fire of musquetry, by throwing forward heavy bodies of horse, which twice threatened the detachments of foot under Capt. Havelock, and by opening upon us three guns from a battery screened by a garden wall, and said to have been served under the personal superintendence of the Sirdar. But in a short time, they were dislodged from every point of their position, their cannon taken, and their camp involved in a general conflagration. The battle was over, and the enemy in full retreat in the direction of Lughman by about 7 A. M. We have made ourselves masters of two cavalry standards, recaptured 4 guns lost by the Cabool and Gundamuck forces, the restoration of which to our Government is matter of much honest exultation amongst our troops, seized and destroyed a great quantity of materiel and ordnance stores, and burnt the whole of the enemy's tents. In short, the defeat of Mahomed Akbar in open field, by the troops whom he had boasted of blockading, has been complete and signal.

"The fall of an officer, so distinguished as Col. Dennie, will be felt as a public calamity. Lamenting it on every account, I must yet share with his country, his regiment, and his friends, in the consolation afforded by the reflection, that he was killed whilst most gallantly performing his duty. I have to express my entire satisfaction with the conduct in this action of Lieut. Col. Monteath, C. B., commanding one of the two infantry columns under my own eye, and of Capt. Wilkinson, H. M.'s 13th light infantry, on whom the charge of the other devolved on the death of his Lieut. Colonel, of Capt. Oldfield and Lieut. Mayne who led the cavalry, and of Capts. Abbott and Backhouse, and Lieut. Dawes, artillery. The able and judicious manner in which Capt. Havelock, H. M.'s 13th light infantry, moved the force under his command, which acted on a line sufficiently distant to render its manœuvres independent of my immediate control, demands my particular and especial commendation.

"My acknowledgments are also due to my Brigade Major, Capt. Hamlet Wade, H. M.'s 13th light infantry, whose exertions were on this day, as they have ever been, most meritorious; to Major Frazer, light cavalry, who acted as my aid-de-camp, and to Capt. Mainwaring, commissariat officer with the force, who was present on and active in the field; Capt. Macgregor, Political Agent, handsomely offered his services with No. 6 light field battery, and was most useful in serving the guns. I enclose returns of killed and wounded, and of ordnance and stores captured. Lieut. and Adjutant Wood, H. M.'s 13th light infantry, made a dash at one of the enemy, and in cutting him down, his charger was so severely injured, as to have since been destroyed. Capt. Havelock reports in the most favourable manner the gallant conduct throughout the day of Lieut. Cox, H. M.'s 13th light infantry, and he was the first of the party which captured two of the enemy's cannon.

"It will be seen from the preceding details that the force employed in this successful enterprise, amounted to about eighteen hundred men

of all arms. The safety of the place was entrusted during the action to the ordinary guards of its gates and our provincial battalion of followers of every description, armed with pikes and various other weapons, who manned the curtains, and made a respectable shew of defence, as they had done on all occasions of attack on the walls. Capt. Pattison, H. M.'s 13th light infantry, was left in charge of this diminished garrison. A sally was made from the Cabool gate towards the conclusion of the engagement, by Lieut. Wade of H. M.'s 13th light infantry into the fort, before which Col. Dennie had fallen, and which the enemy were observed to be abandoning. All that it contained was set on fire, and some of its defenders intercepted and killed.

"The enemy's loss during the day must have been severe. The field of battle was strewn with the bodies of men and horses, and the richness of the trappings of some of the latter, seemed to attest, that persons of distinction had been among the casualties.

"Lieut. Col. Monteath has noticed to me in high terms, the gallant behaviour of Capt. Seaton, 35th N. I., when in command of the skirmishers of that corps, and informed me of the fact of his having been the captor of a howitzer from the enemy.

"We have information to the fact, that the following chiefs were present, and took part in the action, etc.

"Sirdar Mahomed Akbar Khan in person, Umeer Khan, Chief of Bajor, Uzeez Khan, Ghool Mahomed Khan, Mahomed Shaw Khan, Burukut Khan, Azad Khan and Shookoor Khan, principal men amongst the Eastern Ghilzies; Mayan Abdool Rahman of Kama, Meer Ufzul Khan of Ghundaghur, Syud Oosman, and Oosmah Khan, Mohmunds, Syud Mahomed, son of the King of Koener, Syud Hashim, the deposed ruler of the same place, Myah Hyder, Chief of Kivat, Mahomed Jan Khan, head of the Sungo Serai, Abdool Ghuffoor Khan, Achokzye, nephew of Abdoolah Khan of the same tribe, and Abdool Ghuffoor Khan, Barukzye.

Return of Killed, Wounded and Missing of the Force, under the command of Major General Sir R. SALE, K. C. B., Jellalabad, April 7th, 1842.

"No. 6, Lt. Fd. Battery.—Wounded, one N. officer, two serjeants or havildars, one corporal or naick, two privates or sepoyes, one naick and four drivers.

"Mountain Train.—Wounded, one serjeant and two privates.

"H. M. 13th Lt. Infantry.—Killed, one officer and eight privates. Wounded, one officer, two corporals and twenty-nine privates.

"35th N. I.—Killed, two privates. Wounded, one officer, one N. officer, one serjeant, two corporals, and eleven privates.

"Sappers and Miners—Wounded, two serjeants, one corporal, one bugler and five privates.

OFFICERS.

" Killed.—Col. Dennie, C. B., H. M. 13th Light Infantry.

" Wounded.—Captain. Moorhouse, 35th N. I. severely; Lieut. Jennings, H. M. 13th Light Infantry, slightly; 5 Horses Wounded; Asst. Surg. Barnes, M. D., H. M. 13th Light Infantry, slightly Wounded.

" One Tindal and one Bearer 35th N. I. Wounded.

HAMLET WADR, *Captain,*
Major of Brigade.

Return of Ordnance captured by the Force under Major General Sir R. SALE, K. C. B., April 7th, 1842.

" 1 6-Pr. and 1 12-Pr. Howitzer that belonged to the 1st Brigade Horse Artillery.

" 1 Howitzer that belonged to the Mountain Train.

" 1 6-Pr. dismounted, that was left at Gundamuck by the Khyber Corps.

" An inconsiderable quantity of Ammunition was found with this Ordnance, also some half-wrought materials.

A. ABBOTT, *Capt.*
Comd. Arty. Jellalabad.

The successes of Generals Pollock and Sale on either side of the Passes led, of course, to the immediate junction of their forces. Great were the rejoicings at the release of the noble little garrison after so long a period of confinement and comparative privation. The regiments of General Pollock's force vied with each other in attentions to those who had for so many months been objects of anxious solicitude, while the corps composing the garrison experienced pleasure in demonstrating to their brethren from India, that the labor they were obliged to undergo, and the temperance they were compelled to practice during the blockade, had not impaired their health, nor had the successes of their forays upon the enemy's cattle left them any reason to complain of inability to reciprocate hospitalities. In fact, as was jocosely, but truly, observed at the time, the relieving troops looked more like men who had been suffering from confinement and scarcity than the parties they went to succour.

The defeat of Akbar Khan diffused great joy throughout India, nor was it abated when the publication of the following history of the blockade made people acquainted with all that the "Illustrious Garrison" had undergone from the date of its enforced occupation of the town of Jellalabad.

TO T. H. MADDOCK, ESQ.

Secy. to Govt. Pol. Dept.

Dated Camp, Jellalabad, April 19th, 1842.

"SIR,—I have the honor to forward a letter from Major General Sir Robert Sale, K. C. B., detailing the progress of events during the long and perilous siege sustained by the force under his command.

"2nd. The gallantry of the Major General and his small force are too well known to Government to require any commendation from me; but it is very pleasing to me to be the channel through which their many trials are brought to the notice of the Right Honourable the Governor General of India in Council.

"I have had an opportunity of inspecting the works thrown up for their protection, by the indefatigable exertions of Sir R. Sale's force, and my surprise at their strength and extent, has been only equalled by my admiration of the excellent arrangements which must have pervaded all Departments, since after a siege (by greatly superior numbers) of upwards of five months' duration, I find the garrison in excellent health and spirits, and in an admirable state of discipline, with a good supply of ammunition, ready and anxious to take the field, and most willing to advance on Cabool.

I have the honor to be, &c.

GEO. POLLOCK, *Major General,*
Comdg. Troops West of Indus.

Camp near Jellalabad, April 19th, 1842.

TO T. H. MADDOCK, ESQ.

Secy. to Govt. Pol. Dept.

Dated Jellalabad, April 16th, 1842.

"SIR,—The relief of this place having been at length effected by the victorious advance through the Passes of the Khyber, of the army under Major Genl. Pollock, C. B., I conceive that I owe it to the troops who have so long formed the garrison here to address to you a report, which may convey some notion of their conflicts, and the severity of their duties, labours, and privations. It has been made known to Government, that I reached Gundamuck on the 30th of October 1841, under instructions from the authorities at Cabool, and there received intelligence of the breaking out of a terrific insurrection at the Afghan capital on the 2nd November. My retracing my steps on that city was, in a military sense, impracticable, since the first inevitable sacrifice would have been of the lives of 300 sick and wounded, whom I could not have left in dépôt with the treasonable Irregulars at Gundamuck, whilst my cattle was unequal to the transport of my camp equipage, and my ammunition insufficient for protracted operations. In the position

which I occupied, I could not absolutely command a day's provisions, or even water, and should have been hemmed in on every side by hostile tribes, amounting to 30 or 40 thousand men, part of whom might have seized Jellalabad and reduced it to ashes, or, holding it, have left me no alternative but a disastrous retreat towards Peshawur. I therefore came to the resolution of anticipating any movement of this kind, and by possessing myself of this city, establishing a point on which the force at Cabool might retire if hardly pressed, and restoring a link in the chain of communication with our Provinces. Two marches brought me after a successful contest at Futtiahabad to Jellalabad. My breaking up from Gundamuck was followed by the immediate defection of the Irregulars there, the destruction of the cantonment, and a general rising of the tribes. I found the walls of Jellalabad in a state which might have justified despair as to the possibility of defending them. The enceinte was far too extensive for my small force, embracing a circumference of upwards of 2300 yards. Its tracing was vicious in the extreme; it had no parapet excepting for a few hundred yards, which, there, was not more than two feet high. Earth and rubbish had accumulated to such an extent about the ramparts, that there were roads in various directions across and over them into the country. There was a space of 400 yards together on which none of the garrison could shew themselves, excepting at one spot; the population within was disaffected, and the whole enceinte was surrounded by ruined forts, walls, mosques, tombs, and gardens, from which a fire could be opened upon the defenders at 20 or 30 yards.

"The garrison took full possession of the town in such a state on the morning of the 15th of November, and in the course of the day, the plain and detached hills by which on one side it is commanded, were surrounded and surmounted by a force of not fewer than 5000 Insurgents. A general attack on the 14th of November ridded us of these enemies, and a similar array brought against us a fortnight afterwards, was dissipated by a second sally on the 1st of December. But we had seized the town, having in our possession not quite two days' provisions and corn for our men and horses, and beheld the arduous task before us of striving to render the works defensible, and collecting supplies for our Magazine from the midst of a fanatical and infuriated people, with very narrow means in the way of treasure to purchase them. I appointed Captain Broadfoot, Shah Soojah's Sappers, Garrison Engineer, and Captain Abbott, of the Artillery, Commissary of Ordnance. Captain McGregor, Political Agent, gave me the aid of his local experience, and through his influence and measures our dak communication with India was restored, and a great quantity of grain collected, whilst the unremitting and almost incredible labours of the troops, aided by the zeal and science of Captain Broadfoot, put the town in an efficient state of defence. Captain Abbott made the Artillery dispositions in the ablest manner, and used every exertion to add to and economise our resources in the way of gun and musquet ammunition, in both of which we were deficient for the purposes of a siege. Lead and powder were procured in

and about Jellalabad, and a quantity of cartridges discovered in an old magazine, and thus the troops completed to 200 rounds per man. It is to be remarked, that I might in the second week of November have marched upon Pesh Bolak, relieved from investment the corps of Jazailchees under Captain Ferris, and with it operated a doubtful retreat upon Peshawur. But I felt it to be my duty to give support to the last moment of our troops, struggling against their numerous enemies at Cabool, and maintain for them a point on which to retreat and rally if they met with reverse.

"On the 9th of January, I was summoned by the leaders of the Afghan Rebellion to give up the place, in fulfilment of a Convention entered into by the Political and Military Authorities at Cabool, but as I was fully assured of the bad faith of our enemies, I refused to do this, and on the 13th received the melancholy intelligence of the disastrous retreat of our Troops from the capital, and their annihilation in the Ghilzie defiles by the rigours of the climate, and the basest treachery on the part of those in whose promises they had confided. Almost at the same time it became known to us, that the Brigade of four Regiments marched to my succour from Hindoostan had been beaten in detail, and forced to fall back upon Peshawur: my position was most critical, and I might, whilst our enemies were engaged in plundering the force from Cabool, have attempted, and perhaps effected, though with heavy loss, a retreat across the Khyber; but I resolved at all hazards not to relinquish my grasp on the chief town of the Valley of Ningrahar, and the key of Eastern Afghanistan, so long as I had reason to consider that our Government desired to retain it. The discouragements of my garrison at this moment were very great, their duties most severe, their labours unceasing, and the most insidious endeavours made by the enemy to seduce the native portion of them from their allegiance. But their fidelity was unshaken, and their serenity amidst labours and privations unclouded. With reference, however, to the state of fanatical excitement and national antipathy which prevailed around us, I had been compelled, as a measure of prudence, to get rid, first of the Corps of Khyber Rangers, and next of the detachment of Jezailchees, and a few of the Afghan Sappers and a body of Hindoostanee Gunners, who had formerly been in the employ of Dost Mahomed Khan. Works had in the mean time been completed, of which the annexed reports and plans of Captain Broadfoot contain ample details. Generally, I may state, they consisted in the destruction of an immense quantity of cover for the enemy, extending to the demolition of forts and old walls, filling up ravines, and destroying gardens, cutting down groves, raising the parapets to six or seven feet high, repairing and widening the ramparts, extending the bastions, retrenching three of the gates, covering the fourth with an outwork, and excavating a ditch ten feet in depth and twelve feet in width round the whole of the walls; the place was thus secure against the attack of any Asiatic enemy, not provided with siege artillery.

"But it pleased Providence, on the 19th February, to remove in an in-

stant this ground of confidence. A tremendous earthquake shook down all our parapets built up with so much labour, injured several of our bastions, cast to the ground all our guard houses, demolished a third of the town, made a considerable breach in the rampart of a curtain in the Peshawur face, and reduced the Cabool gate to a shapeless mass of ruins. It savours of romance, but is a sober fact, that the city was thrown into alarm, within the space of little more than one month, by the repetition of full one hundred shocks of this terrific phenomenon of nature.

"The Troops turned with indefatigable industry to the reparation of their walls, but at the moment of the great convulsion, Sirdar Mahomed Akbar Khan, Barukzye, the assassin of the late Envoy, and treacherous destroyer of the Cabool force, having collected a body of Troops, flushed with a success consummated by the vilest means, had advanced to Murkhail, within seven miles of our gates. He attacked our foraging parties with a large body of Horse on the 21st and 22d of February, and soon after establishing his Head-quarters to the westward, two miles from the place, and a secondary camp to the eastward about one mile distant, invested the town, and established a rigorous blockade. From that time up to the 7th of April, the reduced garrison was engaged in a succession of skirmishes with the enemy, who, greatly superior in Horse, perpetually insulted our walls by attacks and alerts, and compelled us daily to fight at disadvantage for forage for our cattle. The most remarkable of these affairs were those of the Cavalry under Lieutenant Mayne, commanding detachment Shah Soojah's 2nd Cavalry, and Jamadar Deena Singh, 5th Light Cavalry, already reported; a sally under Colonel Dennie, C. B., to defeat a suspected attempt of the enemy to drive a mine on the 11th of March; the repulse of an assault upon the transverse walls to the northward of the place on the 24th of the same month, by detachments under Captain Broadfoot, (who was severely wounded,) and Captain Fenwick, H. M.'s 13th Light Infantry; the capture of bullocks and sheep by Lieutenant Mayne on the 30th and 31st of January, and the seizure of large flocks of the latter, in the face of Mahomed Akbar's Army by a force of Infantry under Captain Pattison, H. M.'s 13th Light Infantry, and of Cavalry under Captain Oldfield, on the 1st instant. These successes were crowned by Providence by the issue of the brilliant and decisive attack on the camp of the Sirdar on the 7th instant.

"I have to notice as a measure of defence, my having enrolled as a Provisional Battalion a large body of our camp followers, and armed them with pikes and other weapons. On all occasions of assault and sally, these men were available to make a shew upon our curtains, and I have pledged myself to them to recommend to Government, they should enjoy all the pecuniary advantages of Native soldiers beyond the Indus. I at the same time held forth to the troops of Shah Soojah's force, the expectation that they would be put, during the especial service, on the same footing with their comrades of the Bengal Army.

"From the time that the Brigade threw itself into Jellalabad, the Native Troops have been on one-half, and the followers on quarter rations,

and for many weeks they have been able to obtain little or nothing in the bazaars to eke out this scanty provision. I will not mention as a privation the European Troops from the same period having been without their allowance of spirits, because I verily believe this circumstance, and their constant employment, have contributed to keep them in the highest health, and the most remarkable state of discipline. Crime has been almost unknown amongst them, but they have felt severely, although they never murmured, the diminution of their quantity of animal food, and the total want of ghee, flour, tea, coffee, and sugar; these may seem small matters to those who read of them at a distance, but they are serious reductions in the scale of comfort of the hard working and fighting soldier in Asia. The Troops have also been greatly in arrears of pay, besides their severe duties in heat and cold, wind and rain, on the guards of the gates and bastions. The Troops, Officers, and men, British and Hindoostanee, of every arm, remained fully accoutred on their alarm posts every night from the 1st March to the 7th of April. The losses of Officers and men in carriage cattle, camp equipage, and baggage, between Cabool and Jellalabad, were heavy, and their expenditure, during the siege and blockade, in obtaining articles of mere subsistence and necessity, has been exorbitant.

"I feel assured that Major General Pollock will consider it a most pleasing duty to bring the series of labours, privations, and conflicts, imperfectly sketched in the foregoing details, to the notice of the head of the Supreme Government in India, and through his Lordship, to that of the Court of Directors and of our Sovereign, as a claim for public acknowledgment and substantial reimbursement and reward.

"The report of Captain Broadfoot, in his capacity of Garrison Engineer, will meet with attentive perusal. I have already stated how much I have been indebted to his scientific attainments, as well as his distinguished activity and resolution during the siege. His fertility in resource obviated great difficulties in procuring iron, timber, and charcoal, and to the foresight of his arrangements we owe our having had a very ample supply of tools. The Corps under his command performed, from Bootkhak, the duties equally of good sappers and bold light infantry soldiers, and the Afghan, Huzaree, and Eusifzye portion of it have been singularly faithful in time of general defection. The two Infantry Regiments under the lamented Colonel Dennie and Lieutenant Colonel Monteath, have vied with each other in the steady performance of the duties of that arm; and it would be impossible for me to discriminate in favour of either, in awarding praise to the Squadron of 5th Light Cavalry under Captain Oldfield, and the Resallah 2d Shah Soojah's Cavalry under Lieutenant Mayne; Lieutenant Plowden of the former, has been distinguished on several occasions. The Artillery practice of No. 6 Light Field Battery has ever been excellent, and has been equalled by that of the Mountain Train. Captains Abbott and Backhouse, and Lieutenant Dawes have proved themselves excellent Officers of Ordnance. I have more than once brought to notice that Captain MacGregor, Political Agent, has cheerfully rendered very able assistance in serving the

guns in every crisis of pressing danger. Of his labours in his own department, I ought not perhaps to attempt to constitute myself a judge; but I know that they have been unremitting, and their result in obtaining for my force supplies and information, and keeping up our communication with India and with Cabool, and securing for us Afghan co-operation, I may be allowed to appreciate, and am bound to point out to Government.

"The medical duties of the Garrison have been ably fulfilled by Surgeon Forsyth, Superintending Surgeon Shah Soojah's Force, and Assistant Surgeons Robertson and Barnes, H. M.'s 13th Light Infantry, Hare, 35th Regiment, and Brown, late in charge of the Irregulars.

"Captain Mainwaring, Commissariat Officer to the force, has been indefatigable in his efforts to keep the garrison well supplied, and his arrangements in very difficult times have merited my highest praise. Captain Moorhouse, 35th Regiment Native Infantry, has satisfactorily discharged his duties as Brigade Quarter Master; he was severely wounded on the 7th instant.

"It is gratifying to me to forward the opinion of my second in command, Lieutenant Colonel Monteath, C. B., placed on record without solicitation, of the merits of the 13th Light Infantry, of which Corps I am proud of being a member. I fully concur in the sentiments which he expresses, and hope the distinctions which he recommends for the Officers of his own Corps will be accorded. The cheerful and persevering manner in which the Native soldiers laboured with the shovel, mattock, and hand-barrow, were as surprising, as their steadiness and courage in the field were conspicuous.

"I have to acknowledge the zealous manner in which Brevet Major Frazer, Light Cavalry, Brevet Captain Gerrard of the Corps of Jezailchees, Captain Burn and Lieutenant Hillersden of the Khyber Rangers, and Lieutenant Dowson, of the Janbazes, when their services could no longer be available with their Corps, volunteered to do duty with any Regiment in which they could be useful.

"I must finally express my gratitude to Providence, for having placed so gallant and devoted a force under my command; in every way it has exceeded my most sanguine expectations, and I beg leave in the strongest manner to solicit the interposition of Major General Pollock, C. B., who has nobly laboured and fought to relieve it from its critical position in the midst of a hostile empire, in now committing it to the protection and favor of the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council, and, through him, of the Court of Directors, and of our Sovereign.

"I ask permission specially to recommend the following officers for honorary distinctions or Brevet rank, or both; viz. Lieut. Col. Monteath, C. B., commanding 35th Regiment Native Infantry, now second in command; Brevet Major Fraser, Light Cavalry, who acted as my Aide-de-camp on the 7th instant; Captain Abbott, commandant of Artillery and Commissary of Ordnance; Captain Backhouse, commanding the Mountain Train and Senior Officer of the Shah's Troops with

my force; Captain Broadfoot, commanding Sappers and Garrison Engineer; Captain Oldfield, 5th Light Cavalry, Senior Officer of that arm; Captain Seaton, 35th Regiment Native Infantry, particularly recommended for his conduct on the 7th instant by Lieut. Colonel Monteath; Captain Younghusband of the same Regiment, who was distinguished with the advanced guard in the Khoord Cabool Pass, and there severely wounded; Captain Burn, late commandant of the Khyber Rangers and doing duty with the 35th Regiment N. I.; Captain Wilkinson, on whom the command of the 13th Light Infantry devolved in the field on the fall of Colonel Dennie, C. B.; Captain Fenwick, H. M.'s 13th Light Infantry, whose highly deserving conduct in the Pass of Jugdulluk was noticed then in my dispatch; Captain Have-lock, H. M.'s 13th Light Infantry, Persian Interpreter to Major Generals Elphinstone and Pollock and attached to me as Staff, and who commanded the right column in the final attack on Mahomed Akbar's Camp; and Captain Hamlet Wade, H. M.'s 13th Light Infantry, my Brigade Major, whose exertions in the action of the 7th, I have elsewhere highly commended. Both these latter Officers rendered most valuable services throughout the investment and siege. The Officers of all ranks, and Soldiers of all arms, European and Native, I have likewise to represent as generally and individually deserving of reward and encouragement, and I hope that the Government will sanction my calling upon Commandants of Corps and Detachments to send in rolls of such Native Officers as they may deem worthy of the Insignia of the Order of 'Merit and of British India.'

I have the honor to be, &c.

R. SALE, *Major General,*
Commanding Jellalabad."

Officers Wounded.

- " Artillery, Captain Abbott, slightly wounded.
- " Sappers and Miners, Captain Broadfoot, severely wounded.
- " H. M. 18th L. I., Lieut. and Adjutant Wood, and Ensign Oakes, slightly wounded."

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Troops under the command of Major General Sir R. H. SALE, K. C. B., from 22d February, 1842 to April 6th 1842, Jellalabad, 19th April, 1842.

- " No. 6 Light Field Battery.—Killed 1 corporal or naick; wounded 1 European Officer; ditto 1 gunner.
- " Detachment 5th L. C.—Killed 1 serjeant or havildar; ditto 2 sowars; wounded 4 sowars; killed 1 horse; wounded 12 ditto; 1 syce killed, 2 syces wounded, 1 grass-cutter killed.

"H. M.'s 13th L. I.—Killed 4 privates; wounded 2 European officers; ditto 1 corporal; ditto 11 privates.

"35th N. I.—Killed 1 sepoy; wounded 1 naick; ditto 10 sepoys.

"Detachment 2d Cavalry, S. S. F.—Killed 1 trooper; wounded 4 troopers; killed 9 horses; wounded 3 ditto.

"Sappers and Miners.—Killed 4 privates, etc.; wounded 1 European officer; ditto 30 privates, &c.

R. SALE, Major General,
Commanding the Force."

Return of Camp Followers, enlisted on the 15th January, 1842, by order of Major General Sir R. SALE, K. C. B., as a Provisional Garrison, Jellalabad, April 1, 1842.

| | Mustered Followers. | | Not Mustered Followers. | | Total. | Killed during the siege. | Wounded during the siege. | REMARKS. |
|---------------------------------|---------------------|----------|-------------------------|----------|--------|--------------------------|---------------------------|--|
| | Armed. | Unarmed. | Armed. | Unarmed. | | | | |
| No. 8. Light Field Battery, .. | 36 | 0 | 61 | 0 | 97 | 2 | 0 | These Followers that were unarmed were told off to the ramparts, for the purpose of throwing large stones, a great quantity of which were collected; the whole of the ramp rendered much assistance in the conveyance of building material, and working with furrows and spades. |
| Squadron 5th Light Cavalry, .. | 7 | 69 | 6 | 19 | 101 | 0 | 0 | |
| Resallah Anderson's Horse, .. | 4 | 11 | 0 | 57 | 72 | 0 | 0 | |
| H. M.'s 13th Light Infantry, .. | 124 | 258 | 100 | 0 | 482 | 0 | 0 | |
| 35th Regt. Native Infantry, .. | 77 | 46 | 53 | 110 | 238 | 0 | 0 | |
| Sappers and Miners, | 69 | 19 | 49 | 61 | 189 | 0 | 0 | |
| Commissariat, | 163 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 163 | 7 | 6 | |
| Total, | 420 | 333 | 262 | 247 | 1312 | 9 | 6 | |
| | 803 | | 309 | | 1312 | 9 | 6 | |

R. SALE, Major General,
Comdg. Garrison, Jellalabad.

From Lieutenant Colonel J. MONTEATH, Commanding 35th Regiment, to Major General Sir R. SALE, K. C. B., Commanding Garrison of Jellalabad, dated Jellalabad, 16th April, 1842.

"SIR,—The exertions of the garrison of Jellalabad beyond ordinary routine, having ceased since the decisive victory obtained over the enemy on the 7th instant, and now finally terminated by the arrival of the British Army under Major General Pollock, C. B., I trust I may not be considered as going beyond the limits of my proper duty in addressing you to state as follows:—

"As doing but due justice on this occasion to Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, might be looked upon as a highly colored record of the

merits of your own Regiment, and seeing that no such partial bias can possibly be supposed to guide my feelings in the estimate I have formed of their deserts, I have the pleasure in sincerely declaring, that their conduct, throughout the painful perilous position in which they have so long been placed, has been such as fully to deserve the applause and admiration of their country, and the confidence and best consideration of our well-beloved Sovereign.

"You yourself will doubtless detail the work performed by the Regiment; let it then be only my province, who have witnessed their exertions almost hourly during a period of five months, to record that their devoted perseverance and cheerfulness amidst all the gloom that surrounded them, after the destruction of their comrades of the Cabool Force, could not have been surpassed by any troops in the world; and that after months of extreme toil, when an earthquake, such as man is not often in the habit of experiencing, in a moment left scarcely a vestige of their labour standing, their flying, as they did, with redoubled zeal to the work, and completing it in ten days, (so that on the arrival of the enemy before Jellalabad, they declared that the calamity which had befallen the valley arose from nothing but English witchcraft; it being the only place that had escaped uninjured,) was what none but British Soldiers could have performed, and what no price could have purchased, for it was the labour of the heart, work of all others most deserving of distinction and reward.

"In regard to the Native Troops of all arms, I shall refrain from saying much, for a reason which has in a measure induced me to address this letter to you; but as you have yourself been a daily witness of their conduct under every description of circumstance, you have it fully within your own power to say all, of which the Government they serve may very justly feel proud, and it may serve to shew, as an example for imitation, what noble enthusiasm and zeal may be lighted up in their breasts by the high bearing and considerate conduct of determined British Officers.

"I shall conclude by observing, that we can now, Sir, proudly march forth from this garrison with the enemy's standards in our hands, and their captured cannon to fire a salute, on delivering over the care of the honor of the British name, which we have had within our keeping for the last five months, pure and unspotted, and without a single circumstance existing to cast a breath upon its lustre.

"The conduct of the Officers of the 35th Regiment generally, as well as those doing duty with it throughout the siege, I am proud to say, has been such as well to deserve any reward or distinction that can be conferred upon them.

"On those holding the rank of Captain and above it, which enables Her Majesty to advance them a step, I could strongly recommend Captain Seaton, 35th Regiment; Captain Younghusband, 35th Regiment, (severely wounded); Brevet Major Fraser, late 2nd Light Cavalry; and Captain Burn, 1st Regiment Native Infantry, both doing duty with the 35th Regiment.

"Of the Native Officers of the 35th Regiment, I would also strongly recommend, that six should, as a compliment to the Regiment for its gallant and meritorious conduct, receive the Order of 'Merit' and of 'British India;' viz.

Sahib Ram, Subadar,
 Manick Sing, Subadar,
 Derriou Sing, Jemadar,
 Rambuccus Tewarry, Jemadar,
 Hoolass Ram, Subadar, and
 Hurram Sing, Jemadar.

I have the honor to be, &c.

J. MONTRATH, *Lieut. Colonel,*
Comd'g. 35th Regiment."

Capt. BROADFOOT'S Report. Jellalabad, 16th April, 1842.

"On the 12th of November, the Major General Commanding having resolved to occupy Jellalabad, directed me with a Committee of Officers to examine and report on the works of the place.

"The Committee reported unanimously, that they were then not defensible against a vigorous assault.

"As will be seen by the accompanying plan, the town is an irregular quadrilateral, having half of the western side salient, and the southern side broken by a deep re-entering angle. It was surrounded on every side with gardens and houses, enclosed fields, mosques, and ruined forts, affording strong cover to an enemy; these were every where close to the walls, and in many places connected with them. Beyond these on three sides (N. E. and W.) at from 400 to 500 yards run the ruins of the wall of the ancient city, on which the sand has accumulated so as to form a line of low heights, giving cover to the largest bodies of men. Opposite the south-west angle a range of heights, composed of bare gneiss rocks, commences at 330 yards from the works, and extends about 460 yards from N. N. E. to S. S. W.; these completely overlook the town, and, from the vicious tracing of the works, enfilade some of the longest curtains. Parallel to the north side, at 170 yards, runs a steep bank 20 feet high; it extends a considerable way to the west, and several miles to the east, affording a secure and unseen approach to any number of men; it is probably an old bank of the river. From it numerous ravines run up towards the walls, affording the enemy a covered passage into the buildings and enclosures adjoining the works.

"Two very solid walls, 300 yards apart, run from the glacis to this bank, thus enclosing on three sides a space probably occupied originally by the Mogul Emperor's palace, but found by us to contain a large mosque and numerous gardens and houses occupied by fakeers; one of the gates of the town opens into it, and it was traversed by a water-course about ten feet wide, which entered the town by a tunnel under the rampart, large enough to admit several men abreast; a similar tunnel allowed it to pass out of the town on the eastern side.

"The walls of the town extended about 2,100 yards, without reckoning the bastions, of which there were thirty-three. The works were of earth, and in the usual style of the country, viz., a high thin rampart, but in a state of ruin, without parapets, and without ditch, covered way, or outworks of any kind.

"On our throwing ourselves, on the 12th of November last, into the old and ruined town of Jellalabad without money, without food, and almost without protection, with a nation of highly excited and barbarous enemies in arms against us, our situation seemed as hopeless as one as British Troops were ever called upon to confront: notwithstanding which the enemy was twice within twenty days attacked, and on both occasions defeated with signal success.

"The bastions were full, but in some places lower than the adjoining curtains, very confined, without parapets, and sloping downwards from the gorge to the salient, so that the terreplein was completely exposed.

"There were four gates and a postern, all of the usual vicious native construction, and, except that on the northern side, in a ruinous state.

"To give some idea of the state of the works, I may mention that, of the Committee sent to inspect them on the 13th November, not one except myself succeeded in making the circuit: large gaps cut off the communication, or insecure footing compelled the Officers to descend among the adjoining enclosures, from which it was difficult to find the way, while on the south side the rampart was so imbedded in houses and surmounted by them, that its course could only be traced by laboriously threading the lanes of the native town.

"On the north side, the wall rose to a very great height *towards the town*, but sloped down to the exterior in a heap of ruins almost every where accessible; while at the foot were houses and gardens so strongly occupied by the enemy, that during the night of the 13th November, our troops were unable to maintain their posts, and with the exception of the gateway, a line of 400 yards on the northern face was without a man on the works. Had the enemy then attacked us, we must have been reduced to a street combat.

"On the following morning (14th November,) the Major General ordered a sortie in force, which drove the enemy from his positions with such loss, that it was some time before he ventured near enough to disturb our works, which were now as vigorously prosecuted as our scanty supply of tools, and the difficulty of procuring material allowed. We had only the tools, (as per margin) brought from Cabool with the Sappers, for the operations expected in the Tezeen valley, and we were without wood

220 pickaxes.

230 shovels.

With other tools in proportion;
many tools, such as trawels, &c.
have been made here.

or iron. Wood was obtained from the ruins of the cantonment, and from houses demolished in the town. Iron was collected in small quantities, from the neighbourhood, but it was that of the country, good in quality, but imperfectly smelted, and requiring about ten times as much labour and time as English iron. By the persevering labour of the troops, however, much was done, and when the enemy

next attacked us, (1st December,) ramparts had been made, and the guns mounted on the bastions for which they were destined. The water-courses and other passages through the walls blocked up, the foot of the scarps cleared from rubbish, and parapets built in all the bastions and many of the curtains, while much of the external cover was destroyed.

" On the 1st December, the enemy were again routed, and the works proceeded with little or no interruption.

" By the middle of January, (the commencement of the rainy season,) a parapet no where less than six feet high, with a banquette as wide as the nature of the rampart allowed, was completed entirely round the place. The gates were repaired and strengthened by buttresses; two of them were retrenched, and a ditch carried round the north-west angle, while some of the most dangerous ravines were laid open to our fire, and roads were opened into the low ground on the north side.

" By the middle of February, the ditch was carried round the place with as good a covered way as the size of the ditch and supply of earth allowed, while the mosques, forts, gardens, and cover of every description had been destroyed for several hundred yards round the place.

" At this time Mahomed Akbar Khan moved into the valley in order to attack the place: but they were unable to effect more than a distant investment; they frequently occupied the rocks on the south-west, but the parapets and traverses rendered their fire harmless.

" On the 19th February, an earthquake, which nearly destroyed the town, threw down the greater part of our parapets, the Cabool gate with the two adjoining bastions, the north-west bastion, and a part of the new bastion, which flanked it. Three other bastions also were nearly destroyed, while several large breaches were made in the curtains; one on the Peshawur side, 80 feet long, was quite practicable, the ditch being filled and the ascent easy. Thus in one moment the labors of three months were in a great measure destroyed.

" No time, however, was lost: the shocks had scarcely ceased when the whole garrison was told off into working parties, and before night, the breaches were scarped, the rubbish below cleared away, and the ditches before them being cut, while the great one on the Peshawur side, was surmounted by a good gabion parapet.

" A parapet was erected on the remains of the north-west bastion, with an embrasure allowing the guns to flank the approach of the ruined Cabool gate; the parapet of the new bastion was restored, so as to give a flanking fire to the north-west bastion, while the ruined gate was rendered inaccessible by a trench in front of it, and in every bastion round the place a temporary parapet was raised.

" From the following day all the troops off duty were continually at work, and such was their energy and perseverance, that by the end of the month, the parapets were entirely restored, the Cabool gate again serviceable, the bastions either restored, or the curtain filled in when restoration was impracticable, and every battery re-established.

" The breaches have been built up with the rampart, doubled in thickness, and the whole of the gates retrenched.

"It is not easy to give an adequate idea of the extent of the labour performed by the troops.

"The parapets, banquettes, etc., were built of the ruins of the buildings thrown down, cemented with clay mixed with straw and bound together, when requisite, by bond timbers; of this masonry about 104,500 cubic feet had been built before the earthquake, and since then (including new works) about 103,900 cubic feet have been erected, making in all above 208,000 cubic feet of masonry. But the material had to be procured from a distance by the laborious process of demolition, and the ruinous wall had to be scarp'd, cleared at the base, and prepared for the work.

"It will be seen that the largest parties were furnished by H. M.'s 13th Light Infantry, and I know not how adequately to express my sense of the services of this admirable body of men; though having little more than every other night in bed, they laboured for months, day after day, officers and men, with a cheerfulness and energy not to be surpassed. To enumerate all whose zeal and intelligence were conspicuous, would almost require me to go over the list of the Officers, and to mention even many of the valuable Non-Commissioned Officers; but I cannot deny myself the pleasure of naming those whose more extended professional education gave their aid additional value, namely, Captain Fenwick, Lieutenant Frere and Ensign Parker. Separate portions of the works were also entrusted at various times to other Officers, especially Lieutenants G. King and G. Wade, and Ensign Scott, and I had every reason to be satisfied with their execution.

"The 35th N. I. were much employed in destroying the forts and other cover around the place, and it is due to Captain Seaton to mention his great activity and the skill with which, by directing the water-courses used for irrigation on the most massive ruins, he effected a quantity of demolition, which, with our short supply of gunpowder, would have otherwise been impracticable.

"With the exception of a few of the larger bastions, the whole of the batteries were prepared by the Artillery themselves, (both Captain Abbott's battery and Captain Backhouse's Mountain train) under the superintendence of their own Officers. Besides this, a party of Captain Abbott's Artillery-men was always ready to assist in the works generally, and they were most ably superintended by Lieutenant Dawes, to whom I am indebted for aid as constant as it was valuable and willingly given. Captain Backhouse, with his own men and detachment of the 6th Infantry Shah Soojah's force, not only prepared the parapets and embrasures for his own guns, and repaired the damages done to them by the earthquake, but he undertook and completed several of the most useful and laborious operations executed; among others a large and widely branching series of ravines giving cover to many hundred men within pistol shot of a very weak part of the works, was filled up, or entirely laid open to fire, and that with a number of men, which, without his untiring zeal and personal exertion, would have been inadequate.

"The camp followers were distributed to assist the troops, and they followed the example set them and were extremely useful.

" Appended are two plans and some sheets of sections. The first plan shews, in some measure, the way in which the space round the fort was originally encumbered by buildings and enclosures. The second gives an outline of the place as it now stands, while the sections will give some idea of the profile of the works as we found them, and as we leave them.

" The gates have been retrenched inwardly, because from the fall of the ground outside and its conformation, no adequate work could have been raised without a labour we could not at the time spare, and without occupying more time than we could ever reckon on for unmolested work.

" The narrowness and shallowness of the ditch are owing to our want of tools, which limited the strength of our working parties so much, that any thing stronger could not have been carried round in time to accomplish our object—that of interposing an obstacle to a sudden assault and escalade on every side, while the enemy were still numerous and elated by the Cabool disasters.

" The breadth of the berme was necessary from the nature of the soil, a loose sand; and it varies as the necessity of including previous excavations, etc., obliged us to alter the tracing.

" In conclusion, I have to solicit the Major General's indulgence for this Report, which has been prepared while suffering from a wound. If I have been diffuse in noticing the assistance received from the officers and troops, it must be ascribed to the admiration with which I daily, for many months, witnessed their labours, under circumstances of extraordinary discouragement, on short allowance of provisions, with heavy duties of other kinds to perform, and for a considerable time harassed by incessant conflicts with the enemy; during all this time there was not only no murmuring, but the utmost cheerfulness and zeal prevailed. It was not once necessary to resort to punishment, and I never had to make a single report other than commendatory."

GEORGE BROADFOOT, *Captain,
Garrison Engineer, Jellalabad.*

On receiving the foregoing reports, the Governor General issued the following appropriate and gratifying Order:—

General Order by the Right Honorable the Governor General of India, Head-quarters, Allahabad, April 30th, 1842.

" *Political Department.*—The Governor General has received a report from Major General Pollock, C. B., dated the 16th instant, announcing his arrival at Jellalabad.

" The Major General has thus carried into effect the orders of the Government, in a manner which entitles him to the highest approbation.

" Receiving the command of the army at Peshawur under circumstances of peculiar difficulty, he has, in the midst of new and unforeseen embarrassments and disappointments, preserved a firm mind, and justly

relying upon his own judgment he has at last, with equal discretion and decision, accomplished the object he was directed to effect.

"The Governor General requests Major General Pollock to accept his acknowledgments of the good service he has thus rendered to the Government of India, and begs he will communicate to the gallant Officers and troops under his command, the entire satisfaction with which their conduct has been regarded on this occasion.

"The Governor General has already, in communicating the despatch from Major General Sir Robert Sale, K. C. B., dated 7th instant, expressed his high sense of the services of that Officer and of the Garrison of Jellalabad, terminating on that day by a decisive victory, which would have left nothing to desire had Colonel Dennie survived to enjoy it.

"The garrison of Jellalabad having on that day achieved its safety by its own prowess, and being now reunited to the army by the movements of the force under the command of Major General Pollock, C. B., it remains only for the Governor General to testify his opinion of the just claims of that garrison to the gratitude of the Government and of their country.

"The Governor General is pleased to direct that the second company of the sixth battalion of Artillery shall bear upon its appointments, and the fifth regiment of Light Cavalry upon its standards and appointments, and the thirty-fifth regiment of Native Infantry upon its colors and appointments, a mural crown superscribed 'Jellalabad,' as a memorial of the fortitude, perseverance, and enterprize evinced by those several corps during the blockade of Jellalabad.

"The Governor General is likewise pleased, in conformity with the recommendation of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, to direct that 'in order to give additional and lasting honors to the 35th Native Infantry, whilst it benefits the service generally, that corps shall hereafter be made a light infantry regiment,' the duties of which it is already so well acquainted with, and has performed with so much zeal and spirit.

"The Governor General is further pleased to direct, that a silver medal be made for every officer, non-commissioned officer, and private, European and Native, who belonged to the garrison of Jellalabad on the 7th of April, 1842, such medals to be all similar, and to bear on one side a mural crown superscribed 'Jellalabad,' and on the other side the words 'April 7th, 1842.'

"The Government of India will present such medal to every officer, non-commissioned officer, and private, European and Native, belonging to their service, and will request the home authorities to lay before Her Majesty their most humble prayer, that Her Majesty will be graciously pleased to permit the Major General Commanding, and the officers, and privates in Her Majesty's service, who formed part of the garrison of Jellalabad, to receive, and wear a medal similar to that which will be so presented to their brothers in arms.

"The Governor General, taking into consideration the many great privations to which the troops composing the garrison of Jellalabad were exposed during the blockade of that place, and the noble fortitude

with which all such privations were borne, as well as the various losses the troops sustained, is pleased to direct that a donation of six months' batta be made to all the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, European and Native, who composed the garrison of Jellalabad on the 7th of April, 1842.

"The Governor General will request his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief of the Army to give instruction in due time that the several corps composing the garrison of Jellalabad may, on their return to India, be received at all the stations on their route to their cantonments, by all the troops at such stations, in review order with presented arms.

"By order of the Right Honorable the Governor General of India,

T. H. MADDOCK,

Secretary to the Govt. of India, with the Governor General."

For the next military movement on record as connected with the advance, we return to Quetta, where Major General England was awaiting instructions to join the force at Candahar. Receiving the necessary orders, he moved forward towards the end of April, accompanied by the detachment under Major Simmons, which had since joined him from Dardur. He was attacked, however, on the 28th April, (exactly one month from the date of the previous conflict,) upon the very same ground, the heights at Hykulzie, but with a very different result. The force employed consisted of one troop H. Artillery, one Compy. Bengal Foot Artillery, 3d Bombay Cavalry, Poonah Horse, Her Majesty's 41st Regt. the Light Battalion, and 25th N. I., and the following appears to have been the plan of attack :—The heights on the left were first carried by three companies of H. M.'s 41st, and three of the Light Battalion gallantly led on by Major Simmons. The advance was covered by a brisk shelling from four pieces of Artillery. The higher of the two eminences, near which the former check was experienced, having been gained, the column in the hollow lower down dashed up the hill on which the breast-work from which the 41st suffered so severely on the 28th March, was placed. The enemy were instantly dispersed, and pursued from the ground by 100 troopers under Captain Delamain. The Affghans, on being overtaken, jumped from their horses, and furiously rushed on foot at our men, cutting about them desperately on every side. About 300 of the enemy were killed : our casualties were light.

On this occasion, the position of the enemy was turned ; our troops crowned one of the hills which commanded the stockaded post, and rendered it at once untenable. The enemy fled, and suffered severely.

The remains of those who fell in the action of the 28th March, were collected together and interred. General England's dispatch briefly records the action :—

From Major General R. ENGLAND, to the Assistant Adjutant General Candahar, Head-quarters, Scinde Field Force, Camp at Lora River, 29th April, 1842.

"Sir,—I have the honor to acquaint you, for the information of the Major General commanding the troops in Lower Afghanistan and Scinde, that I yesterday attacked the enemy's strong position in front of the village of Hykulzie, with the troops mentioned in the margin, and dispersed them in all directions.

2. "The three columns of attack were well led by Major Simmons, H. M. 41st Regiment; Captain Woodburn, 25th Bombay N. I., and Major Cochran, H. M. 41st; the latter being accompanied by a wing of the 25th Bombay N. I., under Captain Teasdale, commanding that corps.

3. "The reserve was in the hands of Major Browne, commanding H. M. 41st Regiment.

4. "Nothing could be more successful than the combinations, and the insurgents, after a short resistance, fled into the rugged mountains in their rear, leaving their standards, and being closely and gallantly pursued by the 3rd Light Cavalry under Captain Delamain.

5. "The practice of Captain Leslie's Horse Artillery Battery was, as usual, most effective, and the conduct of the troops excellent.

6. "I beg to annex a list of the casualties which have occurred in this affair.

I have, &c.

R. ENGLAND, *Major General,*
Commanding Scinde Field Force."

SCINDE FIELD FORCE.

Return of Casualties in action with the enemy near Hykulzie, Camp, 28th April, 1842.

"H. M. 41st Regt.—Wounded, 2 Rank and File.—3d Light Cavalry.—Wounded, 1 Lieut. 1 Havildar, and 3 Rank and File—Horses, 7 Wounded and 1 Missing.—Light Battalion.—Wounded, 2 Rank and File.—General Staff.—Wounded, 1 Captain.

Officers Wounded.

"Lieut. W. Ashburner, 3d Cavalry, severely, and Captain Deere, A. D. C. slightly.

Remarks—Rank and File.

| | | | |
|---------|---|---------------|---|
| Wounded | { | Severely..... | 4 |
| | | Slightly..... | 4 |

R. ENGLAND, *Major General,*
Commanding Scinde Field Force."

From Hykulzie to Candahar, the General pursued his march unopposed, reaching the latter town on the 9th of May. This accession of strength to General Nott's division was most opportune, for within a week after its arrival information was received, that the fort of Kelat-i-Ghilzie was closely invested by six thousand Ghilzies, for whom, it was apprehended, the garrison of 950, under Captain Craigie, would scarcely be a match. General Nott immediately despatched Colonel Wymer, with Her Majesty's 40th Regt., the 2nd, 16th and 38th Regt. Bengal Native Infantry, Captain Blood's and Captain Leslie's guns, nearly all the Bombay Cavalry, and Capt. Haldane's and a part of Captain Christie's horse. This force had not however proceeded beyond Teer-undaz, when intelligence arrived that the enemy had been driven from the walls by the brave little garrison* with very considerable loss. In giving the official account of the defence, it is due to the 43d Bengal Native Infantry, to preface it by the commendatory Notification of the Governor General.

*" Notification.—Secret Department, Allahabad, 2d July.—*The Governor General has great satisfaction in making public, the following report from Captain Craigie, commanding the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilzie, of the gallant and successful defence made by that garrison against a large force of Affghans by which it was assaulted. On this occasion, the late Shah Soojah's 3d Regiment of Infantry and the detachment of the Bengal 43d Regiment Native Infantry, displayed that decided superiority over their enemies, which has been uniformly manifested by the several Corps composing Major General Nott's army.

" By order of the Right Hon'ble the Governor General,

T. H. MADDOCK,

*Secy. to the Government of India,
with the Governor General."*

From Captain J. H. CRAIGIE, Commanding Kelat-i-Ghilzie, to Captain THOS. POLWHELE, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General.

*" SIR,—*I have the honor to report for the information of Major General Nott, commanding in Lower Afghanistan and Scinde, that Kelat-i-Ghilzie was attacked at $\frac{1}{2}$ before 4 o'clock this morning, in two places; viz. at the long neck to the north-east, and at an outwork constructed last winter by the Sepoys to give a raking fire in rear of the barracks:

" The enemy advanced to the assault in the most determined manner, each column consisting of upwards of two thousand men, provided with

* Of the sufferings of this garrison some idea may be formed, from the extract from a letter which will be found in Appendix VIII.

thirty scaling ladders; but after an hour's fighting, were repulsed and driven down the hill, losing five standards, (one of which was planted three times in one of the embrasures,) and the whole of which are now in our possession.

"Of the enemy's loss I am unable to give any correct account, as their killed and wounded, during the greater part of the attack, were immediately taken to the rear; but 104 dead bodies were left on the slope of the hill, and from 6 A. M. till 3 P. M. the enemy were employed in carrying off such of their dead and wounded as had been taken to the rear.

"The greatest gallantry and coolness were displayed by every Commissioned, Non-Commissioned Officer and Private, (both European and Native,) engaged in meeting the attack of the enemy, several of whom were bayoneted on the top of the sand bags, forming our parapets. On our side, I am happy to say, only six Sepoys were wounded; viz. two of the detachment 43d N. I., and four of the 3d Infantry.

"A body of about 300 of the enemy, when driven back, took shelter under the rocks below the outwork, but were immediately dislodged by a company of the 3d Infantry, which I detached for that purpose.

I have, &c.

*Kelat-i-Ghilzie, 21st May, 1842. J. HALKET CRAIGIE, Captain,
Comdg. Kelat-i-Ghilzie.*

On the arrival of Colonel Wymer at Kelat-i-Gilzie, he proceeded, in fulfilment of the orders that had been given him, to destroy the works, and to withdraw the garrison. He then marched to Ghirisk to relieve the detachment of Irregulars which held the place, and after razing a number of forts to the ground in the Ghilzie country, as far as Dalla up the Urgandab, returned to Candahar. Meanwhile, the rebels had not been idle:—aware of the diminution which the force at Candahar had sustained by the departure of Colonel Wymer, Prince Sufter Jung and Atta Mahomed re-appeared in the neighbourhood of Candahar; but General Nott's despatch shall recount the manner of their reception.

*To T. H. MADDOCK, Esq. Secretary to the Government of India, with
the Governor General. Head-quarters, Candahar, 29th May, 1842.*

"SIR,—Aktar Khan, chief of Zamindawur, having assembled three thousand men, crossed the Helmund and joined the rebel force under Prince Sufter Jung and Atta Mahomed, on the right bank of the Urgundab, taking advantage of the absence of Brigadier Wymer, who had been detached into the Ghilzie province with a large portion of my force, and nearly the whole of my cavalry. The enemy, under an impression that we had not a sufficient number of men to hold the city, and at the same time to attack them in the field, took possession of

some steep rocky hills within a mile of the city walls. I instantly moved out with the troops noted in the accompanying Field return, leaving Major General England, K. H., in command of the city. The Ghazees had about 8000 in position, and 2000 men guarding the Babawullee Pass and roads leading to their camp. Our troops carried all their positions in gallant style, and drove them in confusion, and with great loss across the Urghundab river.

"I was ably assisted by Brigadier Stacy and every Officer present.

"Major Rawlinson, Political Agent, with his accustomed zeal was in the field, and gallantly led a small body of Persian and Afghan Horse to the charge.

"I enclose a list of killed and wounded." I am, &c.

W. NOTT, *Major General,*
Commanding Lower Afghanistan and Scinde.

Return of Killed and Wounded of the Troops, engaged with the enemy near Candahar, on the 29th May, 1842.

"Horse Artillery, S. S. F.—Wounded one Havildar, three Privates and one Syce.

"H. M.'s 41st Regt.—Wounded 11 Privates.

"42d Bengal N. I.—Wounded 1 Lieut. and 6 Privates.

"43d ditto.—Wounded 1 Havildar, 18 Privates, and 1 Bheesty.

"Detachment Shah's 1st Cavalry.—Killed 1 Private and 1 Horse,—Wounded, 1 Ensign, 1 Jemadar, 1 Naick, 5 Privates and 11 Horses.

"Grand Total of killed and Wounded, 52 Officers and men, and 12 Horses.

Officers Wounded.

"Lieutenant J. J. Mainwaring, 42d Regiment Bengal Native Infantry, slightly.

"Doing duty with Detachment Shah's 1st Cavalry, Ensign N. B. Chamberlain, 16th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry, severely.

"Manour Khan, Naib Ressaldar, Shah's 1st Cavalry."

W. NOTT, *Major General,*
Comdg. Lower Afghanistan and Scinde.

The troops engaged in the affair reported in this dispatch were Twelve 6-pounders Shah Soojah's Artillery. H. M.'s 41st Regt. 42d Regt. Bengal N. I. A portion of the 43d N. I. Small Detachments from the Poonah Horse, the Bombay Light Battalion, 25th Regt. Bombay N. I., and 200 of the Shah's 1st Cavalry.

The following more graphic account of the action, than that given in the dispatch, will gratify the general reader.

"On the 29th, a Dooranee Army under Aktur Khan, mustering Horse and Foot, some 6000, crossed the Urghundab, and came down

close to Candahar. Their position was good, and some of their points strong, but they had no reserve, and were somewhat scattered. General Nott sent the 42d and 43rd Regiments with 4 guns, under Col. Stacey, to reconnoitre, who were followed by H. M.'s 41st and Anderson's light guns. At one o'clock the force was in action. The Dooranees crowned the rocks above the city, and on them our force marched,—the light companies as a storming party, supported by the 43rd and the Artillery, who kept up a continual fire. From the position of the enemy, and the character of the ground, some loss followed, about 30 killed and wounded, with some seven or eight Europeans. Nothing could have been better done, it seems; and Chamberlain of the 16th, distinguished himself highly by getting up to the enemy, breaking their ranks with his men, and driving them from the hills. Matters, however, did not end here: but, after this, the hills on the opposite side were covered by large masses of the Dooranees; who however, soon gave way, and in great disorder all fled, striving to gain the Bahawullee Pass. A horrible scene however ensued here. Thinking to entrap us, the Ghazees had barricaded the Pass, and the Dooranees, Horse and Foot, unable to make way, rushed round the base of the hills. Here chase was given by Chamberlain and the guns in splendid style, but unhappily he was here severely wounded by a dagger-thrust in the thigh. Mahomed Atta was at the head of a large number of the enemy, and fought desperately; he is now missing, and was reported killed. The Dooranees were driven completely from their position, and fled to their camp beyond the Urghandab. Here, on the 30th, they were followed by a fresh body of troops, under Col. Stacey, on whose appearance they broke up their Camp, and fled to the Northern hills; the enemy's loss is about 400 killed and wounded. This was a desperate struggle of Aktur Khan's, and our conquest was too complete to leave him any hope of having another fight for his own interest.

"Lieut. Chamberlain of the 16th, and Capt. Mainwaring of the 43rd, only are spoken of as wounded.

"General Nott was delayed at Candahar, and has received orders to destroy the fort of Khelat-i-Ghilzie, which he seems to feel some reluctance at.

"Our Infantry and guns, with the energy of their attack, seem to have astonished the Dooranees. The Parseewan Horse, under their brave leader Agha Mahomed, also did great execution, and were very instrumental in destroying the positions of, and following up, the enemy; much more would have been done at the Bahawullee Pass, but for the winded condition of the horses."

Prince Sufter Jung, soon after this last defeat, surrendered himself unconditionally to Major General Nott, and the confederacy in the Candahar province broke up.

During these operations in Lower Afghanistan, Major General Pollock's force had remained idle, as much from the want of authority as

of means to move towards Cabul. That city had, meanwhile, become again the scene of desperate feuds. Shah Soojah had fallen by the hands of assassins, and the succession of his son, Futteh Jung, was disputed by the Affghans in the interest of Mahomed Akber Khan.* The latter chieftain triumphed, but to suit his own purposes placed Futteh Jung upon the Musnud, contenting himself with the office of Vizier. Dreading the further advance of the British forces, Akbar Khan had previous to this sent in two of the prisoners, first Captain Mackenzie and afterwards Captain Troup, to treat with General Pollock for the release of the whole of the captives, but the uncertainty of Lord Ellenborough as to whether it would be more expedient, under any circumstances, to push the troops on to Affghanistan, put it out of General Pollock's power to bring negotiations to a satisfactory close. Three months were passed in a state of complete inaction. The intense heat of the weather, the uncertainty of their movements, the scarcity of provisions, the crowded state of the encampment, induced much sickness among the troops and the cattle, and caused the loss of the lives of several valuable officers. During this halt also, the unfortunate Major General Elphinstone died a captive in the hands of Akbar Khan, who sent in the body to the British camp, that it might be buried with all the honours due to the remains of a brave but incompetent soldier. Captain John Conolly, another prisoner, likewise died in this interval.

At length, when the patience of the army had been fairly worn out, and a feeling of sorrow and disgust had been created by a conviction, that it was the intention of Lord Ellenborough's Government to withdraw the forces without marching to Cabul and rescuing the prisoners,† an authority reached General Pollock to employ the period which might elapse before the season would allow of the Army's retracing its steps through the Punjab in destroying the forts and other strongholds of the Affghans in the neighborhood of Jellalabad. The refusal of the chiefs in the Shinwarree valley to pay their revenue to the legitimate authority at Cabul, whose interest the British were still supposed to represent,

* For the authentic particulars of the Shah's murder, see Appendix. No. X.

† The partisans of His Lordship have endeavored to make it appear, that no such withdrawal was contemplated; but unfortunately for them, there are official documents on record in the office of the Adjutant General, which put the matter beyond dispute.

constituted a fair pretext for the operations, which were accordingly entrusted to Brigadier Monteath of the 35th Bengal N. I., who performed the duty and returned to Camp, sending in the following report of his proceedings :—

TO T. H. MADDOCK, *Esq., Secy. to Govt., Political Department, dated Jellalabad, 29th July, 1842.*

"SIR,—I have the honor to forward herewith a copy of my letter to the Adjutant-General of the Army of this date, forwarding copies of letters and other documents from Brigadier Monteath, reporting the result of an attack on the enemy in the Shinwarree valley.

"The loss sustained by the enemy must have been considerable, for in a letter which one of the Chiefs addressed to Captain Macgregor on the 28th instant, he states, that they were still burying their dead. The effect in the whole valley by such a complete defeat of the Shinwarrees, and the destruction of so many of their forts, will be productive of the most beneficial effects."

I have, &c.

GEO. POLLOCK, *Maj.-Genl.,
Comg. Troops West of the Indus.*

TO Major-General LUMLEY, *Adjutant General of the Army, Headquarters Simla. Camp Jellalabad, 29th July, 1842.*

"SIR,—I have the honor to forward for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, copy of a letter dated Camp Mazeena, 27th instant, from Brigadier Monteath, C. B., commanding the Troops in the Shinwarree valley, together with copies of the documents to which it refers. Although the loss of the enemy on this occasion has not been stated by Brigadier Monteath, I have every reason to believe from authentic sources it has been considerable. One of the Chiefs, 'Shadoo,' had a nephew and a first cousin killed in the action, and another Chief 'Hossein,' also lost a son.

"The enemy were busily employed during the afternoon of the 26th, in burying their dead, and on the day subsequent to the engagement, the Shinwarree Chiefs sent into Camp to express their willingness to pay the revenue.

I have, &c.

G. POLLOCK, *Maj.-Genl.,
Comg. Troops West of the Indus.*

FROM Brigadier MONTEATH, C. B. *Commanding Field Force, to Captain PONSONBY, Asst. Adjt. Gen. dated Camp Mazeena, 27th July, 1842.*

"SIR,—I have the honor of addressing you to state for the information of Major General Pollock, C. B., that in accordance with the inten-

tion expressed by me in my letter of the 24th instant, I marched out yesterday morning at daylight to attack the enemy with the following troops and guns :—

- Five 9-pounders.
- One 24-pound howitzer.
- Fifty Sappers and Miners.
- One Squadron 1st Light Cavalry.
- Seven Companies H. M. 31st Regiment.
- Seven ditto 33d N. Infantry.
- Seven ditto 53d N. Infantry.
- Ferris' Corps of Jezailchies.

" As the road into the enemy's country was nearly impracticable for loaded animals, and we must have lost a great many Camels, had I attempted to move with our baggage, I resolved on returning to my present position after the operation I had in view had been concluded, therefore having compressed the Camp as much as possible by striking a portion of it, and collecting the tents and baggage on one spot, I left it in charge of Major Hewitt, 33d Regiment, with the following troops :—

- 2 Companies H. M.'s 31st Regiment.
- 2 Ditto 33d Native Infantry.
- 2 Ditto 53d Native Infantry.
- 2 Squadrons 1st Light Cavalry.
- 50 Jezailchies and 100 of Torabaz Khan's men.

" On the troops gaining the left ridge of the Shinwarree valley, which was the most practicable, the enemy retired out of their forts, and I detached Lieut. Beccher of the Engineers, with Sappers and Miners to set fire to them, which he did in succession up to the fort of Sekunder Khan, at the head of the valley, the force moving parallel along the ridge for the protection of the party. Thus at one time the interiors of five and thirty forts were in a blaze along the valley, the enemy contemplating the scene from the heights in the vicinity of Sekunder Khan's fort, where they had taken up positions, and from whence they were driven in gallant style by the advance, consisting of the Light and two battalion Companies H. M.'s 31st Regiment, the Light Companies 33d and 53d Regiments, and the corps of Jezailchies under Major Skinner, H. M.'s 31st Regiment.

" At this moment the guns having been brought into position by Captain Abbott, opened a fire of sharpnell shells upon them, which did considerable execution, and so disconcerted them, that parties left the field altogether, and never returned.

" Having effected every thing in the way of destruction, I caused two companies of the 53d Regiment to be extended along a ridge below that from whence the advance had driven the enemy, of which it remained in possession. In rear of the companies of the 53d, a company of the 33d was extended along the top of another ridge, and in rear of that company on a higher ridge two guns were placed in position to aid in covering the retirement of the advance from the enemy, who were all ready to attack them as soon as they should commence their descent

from the heights. On these arrangements being completed, the recall was sounded to the advance, and, I am happy to say, that the whole joined the main body without a single casualty occurring.

"Major Skinner's party having been exceedingly fatigued, for the heat had been excessive and their labour great, I directed them to fall in with the main column, and ordered out two companies from each of the three Regiments to cover our retrogression homewards. These were formed into two parties, and extended across the ridge in two lines of skirmishers. In rear of the second line, I placed two guns with the company of H. M.'s 31st Regiment flanking each of them, also a party of forty Cavalry, and a line of skirmishers was thrown out along the whole right flank of the column to the edge of the ridge, (where the ground from its broken character was most favourable to the enemy,) and which communicated with the rear line of the covering force placed under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Bolton, H. M.'s 31st Regt., at his own solicitation.

"In this order we retired seven miles and a half over as bad a road as can well be supposed, and, although I had anticipated loss and great annoyance from the enemy throughout the march, yet it seemed as if they had enough, as their attacks were languid and remarkably cautious throughout, and I am rejoiced to say, that at half past 3 P. M., we arrived in camp without loss or injury of any kind.

"It gives me great pleasure to record the zealous conduct of the troops generally, and the cheerful and praiseworthy manner in which the soldiers of H. M.'s 31st Regiment laboured to drag the guns up such places as the horses, notwithstanding their unequalled qualities, were incapable of doing.

"Herewith I beg to enclose Major Skinner's report, and I can myself bear ample testimony to the gallant conduct of himself and those under his command; and I should be unjust were I not to say, that the conduct of Captain Ferris, his native commandant, Hyder Ali, and the whole corps of Jezailchies, was highly distinguished.

"My thanks are very justly due to Lieut. Colonel Bolton, H. M.'s 31st Regt., for the able manner in which he conducted the duties of covering the retirement of the force, and particularly so to Major Skinner, for the zealous and gallant manner in which he led the advance against the enemy. To Capt. Ferris, for the gallant manner in which, with his corps of Jezailchies, he drove the enemy from their position on the heights. To Capt. Abbott and Lieutenant Dawes, for the very successful practice of the guns. To Lieutenant Beecher, for the zealous and satisfactory manner in which he, with the detachment of Sappers and Miners, constructed a road for the guns and fired the enemy's forts in the valley. And to Lieutenant Lugard, H. M.'s 31st Regiment, Major of Brigade, Lieut. Mayne, Assistant Quarter Master General, Captain Lloyd, Sub-Assistant Commissary General, and Captain Robertson, Field Engineer, for the assistance afforded me by them in the field.

"I have also to express my thanks to Captain Macgregor, Political Agent, who, when the opportunity offered itself, served with the guns.

"Enclosed is a sketch of the Shinwarree valley, and the ridge over which the troops passed; a return of killed and wounded; one of the strength of the force employed, and one of ammunition expended.

I have, &c.

T. MONTEATH, *Brigadier,*
Commanding the Field Force.

From Major SKINNER, H. M.'s 31st Regiment, to Brigadier MONTEATH, C. B., Commanding the Field Force.

"SIR,—I have the honour to report to you, that when the advance guard, composed of the following details, viz. the three Light Companies of the Brigade with two Battalion Companies of H. M.'s 31st Regiment, and the corps of Jezailchies reached the crest of the ridge over which the main column was moving, about 8 o'clock A. M., I observed the enemy posted in small bodies upon the different heights and ridges in my front, while several parties occupied gardens and broken walls at the foot of the line of hills I was upon, above the valley on the right hand.

"A sharp fire was opened upon the line of skirmishers, who quickly advanced and drove the enemy off, the corps of Jezailchies swept the front, the left hills were cleared by the light company of the 31st Foot, and the light company of the 33d N. I. on the right skirmished through that part of the valley nearest the ridge, the remaining companies were in support. We advanced to Sekunder Khan's fort of 'Muraiz,' over very broken and difficult country, with frequent descents and ascents; the enemy sometimes keeping up a good fire, but always abandoning the line of heights as we ascended, and falling back to others. I halted at Sekunder Khan's fort, from which a few shots were fired as we advanced, when it was evacuated.

"This fort hangs over a narrow valley on the right hand, fields of rice in many parts of it are now under water. A narrow stony ridge in the midst of the valley was occupied by the enemy, and commanded the post among trees at the foot of the fort which I wished to hold; the enemy was soon driven off the first part of the ridge, and fell back to a higher peak, from which it became also necessary to drive them; this was done by the Jezailchies under Capt. Ferris in very good style, who held it till withdrawn. At the head of the valley in which we now were, there stands a high hill, with a fort upon its summit, a considerable distance off. All the ridges from which the enemy had been driven appeared to draw to a point at this fort, and their retreat was always towards it.

"Many men were collected there, and large parties were sent out to my right; this induced me to draw the companies of the 31st Foot on the left near to me. The enemy soon appearing on the summit of a hill above my left, however, I sent one company of the 31st Regiment

to drive him away, and occupy the hill. This duty was remarkably well performed by Captain Marshall, H. M.'s 31st Regiment, whose company was employed upon it. The enemy retreated with some loss, and took up another position under cover of a Sungah or breast-work of stone within shot. He was driven from it with great gallantry by Lieut. McIlveen of the 31st Regiment, and a party of No. 7 company of the corps. Lieutenant McIlveen,* a very promising young Officer indeed, was, I regret to say killed in the assault upon the Sungah.

"A narrow valley of rice fields, completely swamped, separated the ridge, on which my right was, from two small forts, a garden at one end of the rice valley below the ridge towards the first of the two forts was held by the light company of the 33rd Native Infantry, the enemy descended from a high line of sand hills, and occupying these two forts, annoyed my position a good deal. He was driven from them by the light company and part of No. 6 of the 31st Regiment, who had no other ground to advance on but the narrow ridges that divide the terraces of rice. They moved along these under a sharp fire, and drove the enemy from his position. I occupied these forts, and leaving Brevet Major Urmston, of the 31st Regiment, in command of the post, ceased from further operations. None of the forts I have mentioned were tenable by the enemy; the walls were breached in many places by the earthquake in February last. When I was ordered to fall back on the main body, about half-past 1 p.m., Major Urmston retired in good order, (followed at a distance by the enemy, who had fired constantly into the forts when we occupied them,) over the difficult ground behind him, having set fire to the villages within the two forts before he left them.

"The advance guard being collected together above Sekunder Khan's fort joined the main column. I have great pleasure in assuring you, that during several hours of most active operations, over the difficult country we were in, every officer and man under my command behaved admirably."

I have, &c.

T. SKINNER, Major, H. M.'s 31st Regiment.

* A correspondent of the *Delhi Gazette* thus described the death of this officer:—

"The forts nearest to us were instantly abandoned, but as their wives and children had taken shelter in these more distant, the Afghans disputed the ground stiffly to protect them; but at last, about 10 o'clock, our troops finally drove them out of the valley, and pursued them up the heights beyond, where they made a stand in a stockade for a little while, but yielded to the gallantry of the light company of the 31st Foot, who drove them from it and kept possession. Here Lieutenant McIlveen of the 31st was shot near the heart, leading on his men: five Afghans seeing him fall, rushed down, knives drawn ready to cut him,—but his Light Bobs close by fired and dropped all five, which enabled them to bring off their Officer, who only lived long enough to say to his men:

"If you cannot carry me off, at least take away my sword." His body was brought back to our camp, and interred here this morning."

Return of Killed and Wounded in action under the command of Brigadier MONTEATH, C. B., on the 26th July, 1842. Camp Mazeena, 27th July, 1842.

STRENGTH.

" Capt. Abbott's Battery, 2 Officers E. and N., 2 Serjeants, of N. 6 Light Field Battery.

" Squadron 1st Light Cavalry, 11 Officers E. and N., 10 Serjeants, 129 rank and file.—H. M.'s 31st Regt. 24 Officers E. and N., 34 Serjeants, 500 rank and file.—33d Regt. N. I., 26 Officers E. and N., 32 Serjeants, 494 rank and file.—53d Regt. N. I., 25 Officers E. and N., 42 Serjeants, 542 rank and file.—Jezailchies, 15 Officers E. and N., 32 Serjeants, 343 rank and file.—Grand Total—103 Officers, 152 Serjeants and 2008 rank and file.

Casualties.

" H. M. 31st Foot.—1 Officer killed, 7 rank and file wounded.

" 33d N. I.—1 Serjeant and 8 rank and file wounded.

" 53d N. I.—5 rank and file wounded.

" Jezailchies.—2 rank and file killed; 2 ditto wounded.

" Total.—1 Officer killed, 2 rank and file ditto; 1 Serjeant and 22 rank and file wounded."

T. MONTEATH, *Brigadier,*
Commanding Field Force.

Return of Ammunition expended in action under the command of Brigadier Monteath, on the 26th instant.

" Capt. Abbott's Battery—expended 37 rounds—shells, shrapnel 24-pounders, 6; ditto 9-pounders, 23; and round shot 9-pounders 8.

" Squadron 1st Light Cavalry.

" Her Majesty's 31st Regiment, 4,889 rounds.

" 33rd Regt. Native Infantry, 2,892 "

" 53rd Regt. Native Infantry, 4,954 "

" Jezailchies. 6,678 "

Total, 19,450

T. MONTEATH,
Comdg. Field Force."

Soon after these operations had been concluded, it became suddenly known, that Lord Ellenborough had resolved upon advancing the armies of Generals Pollock and Nott simultaneously upon Cabul and Ghuzni; and the joy which this intelligence diffused was in no slight degree enhanced by the arrival of the orders for the movement. The army under General Nott had for some time been impressed with the belief, that it was to return to India by way of Deyrah Ishmael Khan, or the Bolan Pass, and the dismay and grief which this idea spread throughout the force was not less weighty or acute than that which had affected

General Pollock's army when its retrogression was considered certain. As at Jellalabad, so now at Candahar, the troops were elated at the prospect of again encountering the enemy, and of taking full vengeance for the cruel treachery by which so many thousand soldiers and camp followers had fallen.

The instructions of the Government to General Nott were to take Ghuzni *en route* to Cabul, where he was to meet and co-operate with General Pollock. Whether it was intended that General Nott should reach Cabul first, and enjoy the renown of its capture as the reward of his excellent management in Lower Afghanistan, the editor of this work is not prepared to say; but it is certain that he used all imaginable expedition to be foremost in the race, though General Pollock succeeded in outstripping him. The reader is now presented with the details of the operations of the two generals, preparatory to the evacuation of Afghanistan. Major General England, it should be first stated, had, on the departure of General Nott from Afghanistan moved (accompanied by Prince Timoor Shah) with the 25th Bombay N. L., the late Shah's troops, some Artillery, etc. escorting the women, children, baggage, stores, etc. towards India, by way of the Kojuck and Bolan Passes. The result of this march is given below as the first in point of date:—

TO T. H. MADDOCK, Esq.,

Secretary to the Government of India, with the Governor General.

Dated Camp, near Killa Abdoolla, 19th August, 1842.

"SIR,—I have the honor to report for the information of the Right Hon'ble the Governor General in Council, that the British force at Candahar having evacuated that city on the 7th and 8th, I moved from my encampment near its walls on the 10th, pursuant to instructions with the detachment mentioned in margin *en route* to Quetta, and that I arrived on the ground yesterday.

1 Troops late Shah's Horse Artillery.

4 Guns drawn by Bullocks.

2 Rissalahs Irregular Horse.

1 Rissalah Poonah ditto.

25 Bombay N. L. late Light

Battalion ditto.

1) Regiments late Shah's In-

fantry.

2. "It was communicated to me on the 9th, and subsequently, that the Insurgents were preparing to attack the column and convoy under my charge in its passage, and especially, that they would make efforts to intercept it in the strong country of the Kojuck range, at the northern extremity of which I arrived with little molestation on the morning of the 16th.

3. "Whatever might have been the intentions of the enemy, it was ascertained by reconnoitring, that the highest points of mountain were not yet occupied by them, and I thought it right therefore, notwithstanding that the troops had just completed a night's march of 24 miles, to push forward a light column to seize the summit at once.

4. "This operation was perfected by three Battalions, and the most important ridge and all the peaks commanding the principal Passes were gained by the troops before dark.

5. "On the following morning, the Insurgents began to appear in small bodies on different hills, but the route being flanked, they did little mischief, and the baggage, artillery, and immense retinue under the protection of this camp, including nine or ten thousand beasts of burthen, began the ascent covered by a rear guard of two Battalions and the Cavalry; and I was soon made aware of our good fortune in having seized the heights on the previous evening, for the number of the enemy gradually increased, but all their efforts to capture the baggage, or indeed to interrupt us to any serious extent were frustrated, and the passage across the Kojuck mountains may be said to have been perfected by noon on the 18th.

6. "I have had the highest reason to be gratified with the exertions of all the officers and troops on this occasion, and it is entirely owing to their incessant efforts in duties of great fatigue, under a privation of water, both in climbing up the extreme points of the range, to drive off the enemy whenever they appeared, and in dragging thirteen pieces of Artillery over the ridge, that this service has been accomplished with so little loss on our side, of life or of convoy.

7. "I beg to enclose a list of the casualties in killed and wounded of this column, which have occurred since I left the immediate vicinity of Candahar.

8. "My last accounts of Major General Nott, were of the 13th, three marches north of Candahar.

9. "His Highness Prince Timoor is now in my camp, and every possible attention paid to his comfort and safety.

10. "The Right Hon'ble the Governor General will have been informed, that the chief, Saloo Khan, who had taken service with us after the affair with the enemy of the 18th April, near Hykulzie, suddenly absconded from the military post held by us at this place on hearing of our abandonment of Candahar, and it was presumed, therefore, that he was at the head of the Insurgents in the Kojuck hills; but I am not inclined to believe that he was thus employed, and I think it more probable, that he may have proceeded to join Prince Suftur Jung, who had placed himself at the head of affairs at Candahar.

11. "I have no information to warrant the expectation of any serious opposition between this and Quetta, especially as the Brahoe connection with the Affghans seems severed for the present, and I hope to be enabled to report my arrival at Quetta to his Lordship on the 27th or 28th instant.

12. "Pursuant to the instructions of Government of the 19th of

March, I have assumed the political responsibilities, as well as military command, vacated by the casualty therein contemplated in the departure from those countries, of Major General Nott.

I have, &c. &c.

R. ENGLAND, *Major General, Commanding Scinde Forces.*

Dispatches of Major General POLLOCK and NOTT, descriptive of the operations attending the capture of Ghuzni and Cabul, immediately preceding the final evacuation of Affghanistan. To Major General LUMLEY, Adjutant General of the Army, Head-Quarters, Simla. Camp, Mammoo Khail, August 25th, 1842.

"SIR,—I have the honor to report for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that I reached Gundamuck on the morning of the 23d instant, with the troops as per margin.

1 Squadron 5th Light Cavalry.
Head-quarters and one Squadron
10th Light Cavalry.
No. 6 Light Field Battery.
3 Companies Sappers and Miners.
H. M.'s 9th Foot.
26th Native Infantry.
60th Native Infantry.

"On approaching the ground a few horsemen appeared, but retired as we advanced. I soon learnt that the enemy, under the Chiefs Hadji Ali and Khyrollah Khan, occupied the

village and fort of Mammoo Khail, about two miles from Gundamuck, and I determined upon attacking them the following morning.

"I ordered up a Squadron of the 3rd Dragoons and Captain Broadfoot's Corps of Sappers from General Sale's Camp, and they joined before daylight the following morning.

"At 4 A. M. yesterday morning I moved towards the enemy with the Troops as per margin. On clearing the broken ground in front, I divided the Infantry into two columns with a Wing of H. M. 9th Foot at the head of each, and Skirmishers in front. I directed Captain Broadfoot with his Corps to go to the right. The Cavalry also advanced on the right to cut off the retreat.

1 Squadron 5th Light Cavalry.
1 Ditto 10th ditto.
No. 6 Light Field Battery.
3 Companies Sappers and Miners.
Her Majesty's 9th Foot.
26th Native Infantry.
60th Native Infantry.
Broadfoot's Sappers.

"Captain Abbott's Battery accompanied the Columns, and as we advanced occasionally opened on the enemy who continued in position so long, we hoped they would oppose us with their whole force, but they retired on our approach, and we entered the village.

"The fields in front of the village were purposely flooded to prevent our advance. The left Column then went towards the fort of Mammoo Khail, and the right Column proceeded to Koodee Khail; the ground was impracticable for Cavalry nearly the whole distance, but on one or two occasions an opportunity did offer, and the enemy suffered accordingly. Lieutenant Colonel Taylor, with some Companies of the 9th Foot and 26th Native Infantry, occupied part of the heights in front of the village of Koodee Khail, while Captain Broadfoot and some of the 26th N. I. cleared the hills to the left of Lieutenant Colonel Taylor's position. As Koodee Khail is about two miles from Mam-

moo Khail, and as a position there might have been attended with risk unless very strongly supported, I directed Major General McCaskill to retire on Mammoo Khail. As I considered it of importance to hold Mammoo Khail, which was the enemy's position, I wrote for the whole Camp to be brought here, and it arrived in safety yesterday afternoon.

"I left the Camp standing, and selected Major Davis, of H. M.'s 9th Foot, to command the party as per margin, for its protection; the duty was one of considerable importance, as it was by no means improbable that the enemy would take advantage of our advance to send a party to the Camp. The Squadron of Dragoons having arrived just as I was starting, their horses would not have been equal to a day's hard work, which induced me to leave them in camp. The overthrow of this party of the enemy must, I conclude, have been very unexpected, as the whole of their camp equipage with its carriage cattle, was captured by Captain Broadfoot's Corps and the 3rd Irregular Cavalry.

"I have much gratification in reporting that the troops, both European and Native, of each branch and department, well supported the character of British Soldiers.

"Where all were equally zealous in the cause, and devoted to their duty, my thanks are equally due to all; but I may be permitted to mention the names of Corps and Departments employed—Major General McCaskill, K. H., commanding the right column—Brigadier Tulloch, commanding the left column—Captain Abbott, commanding Light Field battery—Lieut. Col. Taylor, K. H., commanding H. M. 9th Foot—Major Huish, commanding 26th N. I.—Captain Napleton, commanding 60th N. I.—Major Blair, commanding 10th Light Cavalry—Captain Oldfield, commanding squadron of the 5th Light Cavalry—Captain Tait, commanding 3rd Irregular Cavalry—Captain Abbott, Field Engineer—Lieut. Becher, commanding Sappers and Miners, and Superintending Surgeon Stiven, and Captain Nugent, officiating Sub-assistant Commissary General. The officers of the staff who conveyed my orders to the different columns and otherwise aided in the movements of the day were Captain Havelock, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General—Captain Smith, Major of Brigade—Captain Ponsonby, Assistant Adjutant General—Captain MacAdam, Deputy Judge Advocate General—Captain Lane, Commissary of Ordnance—Lieut. Sir Richmond Shakespear, Military Secretary—Captain Codrington, Asst. Quarter Master General—Lieut. Mayne, Officiating Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, who was most active throughout the day—Lieut. Tytler, Baggage Master—Lieut. Pollock, A. D. C., and Captain Macgregor, A. D. C.—to the last mentioned officer I am not only indebted for services in the field, but for valuable information, and for constant exertions to obtain supplies for the force, which his local knowledge and personal acquaintance with the Mallicks enables him to do.

"I have this morning heard from several quarters that the two Chiefs, Hadjee Ali and Khyroolah Khan, have gone to Cabool, attended by about

3 Companies 20th Native Infantry,
2 Companies 60th Native Infantry, and
50 Sowars of the 3rd Irregular Cavalry.

sixty men. If I had removed my camp to Gundamuck yesterday, there can be little doubt that the enemy would have re-occupied this place, and he would have announced to the Cabool authorities he had beaten us back. Koodée Khail has been destroyed by fire—the fort and village of Mammoo Khail have also been destroyed by fire, and before I quit this place, the trees, to which much value and importance are attached, will be cut down.

"I have the honor to enclose a return of casualties. I regret I shall be deprived of the services of Major Huish, 26th N. I., and Captain Edmond, H. M. 9th Foot, for some time, though I hope not long. Lieut. Robertson, of the 37th Regt. of Native Infantry, doing duty with the 26th N. I., is slightly wounded, but will, I trust, soon return to his duty.

"I have the pleasure to enclose Reports from Major General McCaskill, K. H., and Captain Broadfoot.

I have, &c.

G. POLLOCK, *Major General,*
Comdg. in Affghanistan."

From Major General John McCaskill, K. H., Commanding Infantry Division, to Captain PONSONBY, Assistant Adjutant General, dated Camp Mammoo Khail, 25th August, 1842.

"SIR,—I beg to detail to you, for the information of Major General Pollock, C. B., the operations of the right Column in the affair of yesterday, after it had become separated from that of the left, on the complete success of the combined attack on the enemy's position in advance at Mammoo Khail.

"You are aware that this force consisted of four Companies of H. M. 9th Foot and six of the 26th Regiment N. I., under the immediate command of Lieut. Colonel Taylor, K. H., of the former Corps. The enemy had fled before our troops, and abandoned the village of Koodée Khail, but reinforced strongly by the fugitives driven back by Brigadier Tulloch's Column, he assumed a menacing attitude, and occupied in force a range of heights and detached summits in the Soofaid Koh. The most salient of these was a spur of the mountain within long musket range of the buildings of Koodée Khail. From this and from other eminences of the most precipitous character, the Ooloos were dislodged with the utmost spirit and gallantry by the details under Lieut. Colonel Taylor, aided in the most effective manner by a part of Captain Broadfoot's Corps of Sappers and Miners. The enemy were reinforced from time to time, and made many bold attacks, and kept up a sharp fire of Jezails from the loftiest peaks of the mountain; but our troops, though so much pressed as to be compelled to recede from ground which they had gained in our direction, maintained an advance position among the hills until withdrawn by order of Major General Pollock, first into the plateau in front of the village of Koodée Khail, which they burnt down, and then back upon the present site of encampment. In retiring over the plain

between the two principal villages, the movement was covered by a Squadron of the 5th and another of the 10th Light Cavalry, but the attempts of the Ooloos to annoy were timid and feeble in the extreme, and our troops did not sustain a single casualty from their effects, Lieutenant Colonel Taylor speaks in high terms of the support which he received from Major Huish, commanding the 26th Regiment N. I., who was wounded, and afterwards from Captain Handicomb of the same corps, and from Captain Ogle, commanding H. M.'s 9th Foot; and I beg to be permitted to bear my testimony to the merits of the Lieut. Colonel's own exertions on this occasion, as well as to express my sense of the gallantry of all the troops engaged, and to acknowledge the able assistance which I received from Captain Havelock, H. M.'s 13th Light Infantry, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, Lieutenant Mayne, 37th Regiment N. I., Officiating Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, and Lieutenant Bethune, H. M.'s 9th Foot, my A. D. C. The intrepidity also with which Captain Broadfoot's Sappers and Miners aided in the attack on one of the advanced heights, deserves my marked commendation.

I have, &c.

JOHN McCASKILL, *Major General,*
Commg. Infy. Division."

From Captain J. BROADFOOT, Sappers and Miners, Commanding, to Captain G. PONSONBY, Assistant Adjutant General, dated Camp, Mam-moo Khail, 25th August, 1842.

"SIR.—Agreeably to order, I have the honor to report the proceedings of the column entrusted to me by the Major General commanding in the action yesterday.

"I moved, as directed, with the Sappers (about 220 men) and the 3d Irregular Cavalry (250) across the Ravine on the right of the force. We found the enemy strongly posted in an orchard with some enclosures; and the usual field works of loose stones in their front were also occupied. This position flanked the approach of the main body.

"Having formed an attacking party in front, I sent the rest of the Sappers in column, under Lieut. Orr, to turn the enemy's left flank, and Captain Tait's horse still more to the right and in advance, to cut off their retreat. While we waited in this order the advance of the force, the enemy reinforced the orchard and moved out to attack us. I was therefore obliged to advance before the force arrived; the enemy's positions were quickly carried in succession. One party was driven towards the 3d Irregular Cavalry, who pursued, and the remainder fled to the village of Mam-moo Khail, into which the main body of the enemy were at this moment driven by the force of our Artillery. They opened a fire on us, ill directed, but so heavy, that we were obliged to attack the village; they fled when we reached it, and the Sappers pursued to the fort, but were so exhausted by the march from Futteeabad and the previous operations, that the enemy was able to enter and barricade the

gate; their fire was kept down by one party of Sappers, while the rest climbed on each other's shoulders over a half repaired bastion, about eight feet high and covered with thorns; the enemy fled over the walls on the other side, leaving the rear gate barricaded. This, and descending from the walls lost so much time, that pursuit was nearly hopeless as far as our now exhausted men were concerned; we pressed on with the least fatigue, however, and keeping up to the hills forced the enemy into level ground; our Cavalry was approaching, and we had the satisfaction of seeing the Cavalry overtake and attack them.

"Parties were now directed to destroy the forts abandoned on the Cavalry approaching, while with a few men I pushed on to the last village near the hills; where we surprised the enemy, whose Head Quarters were there, driving them out of the village and adjoining camp, and obtaining their tents, cattle, and ammunition, and a good quantity of provisions. The enemy (who were evidently the Jezailchies from Cabool) fled to the hills, the fire from which swept the village.

"I was now directed to take a party of H. M.'s 9th Foot, the Sappers being now worn out, except about six men, and attack the hills; the first and second heights were carried at the point of the bayonet, and flanking parties having turned the shoulders of the high range, we were advancing up it when the main force arrived, and our further progress was stayed. My separate command now ceased, and I was soon after ordered with the Sappers to Head Quarters.

"The conduct of the Troops, Officers and men, European and Native, was admirable, and it is due to the 26th N. I. to mention, that in storming the second height with a party of H. M.'s 9th Foot, a party of the former Corps joined us, and behaved with the same spirit as the rest.

"I have, &c.

G. BROADFOOT, *Captain,*
Commanding Right Column."

Head-quarters, Simla, 21st September, 1842.

"*Political Department.*—The Governor General has this day received the reports of three victories obtained, on the 30th of August, by Major General Nott, over twelve thousand Affghans, 38 miles south-west of Ghuzni; on the 8th of September, by Major General Pollock, over the troops of Mahomed Akbar Khan; and the Ghilzie Chiefs at Jugdulluck.

"On the 3d of September, Major General Nott had advanced to Nanee, a short march off Ghuzni.

"On the 9th September, Major General Pollock had advanced to Kutta Sung, and had experienced no opposition.

"Formed as the troops under Major General Nott have mostly been by four years of constant service, and habituated as they have been to victory under their able Commander, the Governor General had anticipated their success against any force which could be brought against them. It is to the Governor General a subject of sincere satisfaction, that the events of the campaign should have opened a more extensive field to

that brave army on which it may make manifest to the world, the high qualities he has long known it to possess.

"Major General Pollock has through the prudence of his arrangements, and the correctness of the movements directed by him, had the gratification of affording to his troops the opportunity of proving their superiority to the Affghans on the very scene of the last disaster on the retreat from Cabool; and Major General Sir R. Sale, at the head of the garrison of Jellalabad, worthily supported by the re-inforcements from India, has had the glory of leading the army on its triumphant return to the capital of Affghanistan.

"The Governor General regards with the highest admiration the noble ardour which has, in these several operations, been manifested, equally by the officers and soldiers of both nations and of all arms. He sees, in the successes already obtained, the certain promise of other more decisive victories calculated to impress upon all the enemies of the British Government, a conviction of the futility of resistance to the force under his direction, and tending, under the continued favor of Providence, to effect the first object of his desire, the restoration of peace to Asia.

"By order of the Right Honorable the Governor General of India,

T. H. MADDOCK,

Secy. to the Govt. of India, with the Govr. Genl."

Copy of a Letter from Major General G. POLLOCK, C. B. Commanding Troops in Affghanistan, to Major General LUMLEY, Adjutant General of the Army, dated Camp Kutta Sung, 9th September, 1842.

"Sir,—I have the honor to report for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-chief, that I left Soorkhab on the morning of the 8th instant, in progress to Jugdulluck with the troops detailed in the margin.

1st division, under the command
of Major General Sir R. Sale, G.
C. B.

2 guns 3d troop 1st brigade H. A.

6 ditto N. 6 light F. B.

3 ditto Mountain Train.

Her Majesty's 3d L. D.

1 squadron 1st L. C.

3 matalahs 3d L. C.

Her Majesty's 9th Foot.

Her Majesty's 13th L. I.

25th N. I.

33th L. I.

5th company Sappers.

Broadfoot's Sappers.

Mackeson's Biddars.

On approaching the hills which command the road through the Pass, I perceived their summits were occupied by a considerable number of men, and a nearer view enabled me to ascertain the nature of their position, which was one of singular strength and difficulty of approach. The enemy were assembled in bodies, apparently under different

Chieftains, each having a distinguishing standard.

"The hills they occupied formed an amphitheatre inclining towards the left of the road on which the troops were halted, while the guns opened, and the enemy were thus enabled on this point to fire into the column, a deep ravine preventing any contact with them. The practice of the guns was excellent, yet the enemy appeared so determined on making a stand, that the bursting of the shells among them on the right hill, which was of a conical shape and difficult ascent, had not the effect of

making them relinquish it, or of slackening their fire, which now became heavy from all parts of their position, causing several casualties.

"It is with deepest feeling of regret I have to deplore the loss of Captain Nugent, Officiating Sub-Assistant Commissary General, who was shot here, and died almost immediately. I had lately received the most important and valuable assistance from him; the service has lost a promising officer, and the department to which he belonged, a most efficient member.

"As the guns appeared to have little effect in forcing the enemy to quit the heights, I resolved upon attacking them; for this purpose Captain Broadfoot was detached to the extreme left of the enemy's position, and his Sappers commenced ascending a steep hill, on the top of which the enemy were entrenched in a sungah. Her Majesty's 9th Foot, under Lieutenant Colonel Taylor, were directed to cross a deep ravine and assault the hills on the opposite side, where the enemy held a ruined fort, and were with their Chiefs and cavalry in considerable numbers. Her Majesty's 13th light infantry, led by Captain Wilkinson, commanding the regiment, attacked the hill, which may be considered the key of the position. The 9th, accompanied by two companies of the 35th Native Infantry, under Lieutenants Boileau and Trench; the 13th by 130 men of the 26th, led by Captain Gahan, (Major Huish, who although present in the field, was prevented by his wound received at Mammoo Khail from assuming the command,) rushed up the height simultaneously, and the animated and enthusiastic cheer they gave, seemed to strike a panic in the enemy; for they dared not wait the collision, but fled down the hills, and were enabled to escape chastisement by the nature of the ground which was so well calculated to favor their retreat. At this moment Major Lockwood, with Her Majesty's 3d Light Dragoons, galloped up, and had very nearly succeeded in overtaking the enemy's Cavalry, but I am sorry to say, they also effected their safety by flight.

"Capt. Broadfoot had completely succeeded in the attack he made, and the enemy were dispersed in every direction, a large body of them retiring to the summit of a high mountain. On this apparently inaccessible height they planted their standards, and shewed every demonstration of maintaining it. As the achievements of the day would have been incomplete were they suffered to remain, I decided upon dislodging them.

H. M.'s 13th L. I.
One company 26th N. I.
One ditto 35th L. I.
(Sappers under Lieut.)
Bocher.
Broadfoot's Sappers.

The troops named in the margin advanced under cover of Captain Abbott's guns, and those of Captain Backhouse's Mountain Train. Seldom have soldiers had a more arduous task to perform, and never was an

undertaking of the kind surpassed in execution; these lofty heights were assaulted in two columns, led by Captains Wilkinson and Broadfoot, the discomfited Ghilzies not relishing an encounter, betook themselves to flight, carrying away their standards, and leaving our troops in quiet possession of their last and least assailable stronghold.

"It gratifies me to be enabled to state, that we have thus signally defeated with one division of the troops the most powerful tribes and the

most inveterate of our enemies, the original instigators, and principal actors in those disturbances, which entailed such disasters on our troops last winter. The following are the Chiefs who were present in the action :—

" Uzceez Khan, Gool Mahomed Khan, and Saudut Meen Khan, Jubber Kheil, Ghilzie.

" Khoda Baksh Khan, Azul Khan, and Khojeh Mahomed Shah Khan, Chiefs of Tezeen, Babukkur Kheil Ghilzie.

" Sirdar Khyroolla Khan Barukzye, Shah Gazee Khan, Gool Ghilzie, and Hajee Ali Tajick, sent by Mahommed Akhbar Khan from Cabool, to co-operate with the Ghilzie.

" Ibrahim Khan and Mullick Suddoo, Lughman Chiefs.

" The petty Chiefs of Hissaruk were also engaged, and indeed the whole strength of the Ghilzie force may be considered to have been brought against us, numbering on this occasion, from four to five thousand men.

" Let me now express how much I owe to the brave officers and soldiers who have thus gallantly asserted their superiority in arms. Were I to name all who merit eulogy, I should feel obliged to enumerate every officer who was present.

" I feel considerable diffidence in mentioning the name of Major General Sir R. Sale, G. C. B., whose heroic conduct in the field stands so little in need of my commendation. On this occasion, I was an eye-witness to the personal intrepidity of this highly distinguished officer, as he led up the heights in advance of his own regiment under a very hot fire.

" To the officers in command of regiments and detachments, and to the heads of departments, also to the officers of my personal and the general staff, I feel especially indebted for the zealous and efficient manner in which they performed their respective duties; and I trust His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief will bring to the notice of His Lordship, the Governor General, that every individual engaged has exerted himself to the utmost to serve his country.

" I have the honor to enclose a rough sketch of the scene of operations, and return of killed and wounded.

" I have, &c.

GEORGE POLLOCK, Major General,
Commanding in Afghanistan."

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Troops of the 1st Division of the advance under the Command of Major General Sir R. SALE, G. C. B., at the storming of the heights of Jugdulluck, on the 8th Sept. 1842.

" General Staff—Killed 1 Officer, Wounded 1 Officer,—Total of all ranks Killed and Wounded 2—Captain Nugent, Sub-assistant Commissary General, Killed, and Major General Sir R. Sale, G. C. B. slightly Wounded. No. 6, Light Field Battery,—Wounded 1 Native Officer and 2 Privates.—Total of all rank Killed and Wounded 3, Mountain Train

—Wounded 1 Sergeant, 1 Bugler, and 1 Private.—Total of all ranks Killed and Wounded 3, Killed 1 Mule. Her Majesty's 3d L. D.—Killed 1 Horse. Head-quarters and detachment 3d L. C.—Killed 1 Private—Wounded 2 Privates.—Total of all ranks Killed and Wounded 3—Horses—1 Killed and 3 Wounded. 5th Company Sappers.—Wounded 1 Sapper.—Total of all ranks Killed and Wounded 1. Her Majesty's 9th Regt.—Killed 1 Sergeant and 2 Privates.—Wounded 1 Sergeant and 16 Privates.—Total of all ranks Killed and Wounded 25. Her Majesty's 13th L. I.—Killed 1 Private.—Wounded 2 Sergeants, 12 Privates.—Total of all ranks Killed and Wounded 15—1 Dooly bearer Killed and 1 Wounded. 26th N. I.—Wounded 1 Corporal, and 4 Privates—Total of all ranks Killed and Wounded 5—1 Camp Follower Wounded. 35th L. I.—Wounded 4 Privates.—Total of all ranks Killed and Wounded 4. Capt. Broadfoot's Sappers—Wounded 1 Sergeant and 5 Privates.—Total of all ranks Killed and Wounded 6.

G. PONSORBY, *Assist. Adj. Genl.*
British Troops in Affghanistan."

From Major General W. NOTT, Commanding Field Force, Affghanistan, to T. H. MADDOCK, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, with the Governor General. Head-quarters, dated Camp Kareez Oosman Khan, August 29th, 1842.

"SIR,—I have the honour to acquaint you, that on the morning of the 28th instant, a body of the enemy attacked our rear guard, I directed the Officer in command of the Cavalry to detach a party to assist in dispersing it.

"The accompanying letter from Captain Christie details the result.

"I have, &c.

W. NOTT, *Major General,*
Commanding Field Force, Affghanistan."

From Captain J. CHRISTIE, Commanding the Detachment, to Captain DELAMAIN, Senior Officer of Cavalry, dated Camp Kareez Oosman Khan, 28th August, 1842.

"SIR,—Agreeably to the instructions conveyed to me through Lieut. Forbes, Adjutant, 3rd Light Cavalry, I proceeded to the rear with two *ressallahs* of the 1st Bengal Irregular Cavalry and three *ressallahs* of my own Regiment, and now do myself the honor to report the result as follows, for the information of Major General Nott:—

"I proceeded at a trot for about a mile and a half, when we were closing well with the enemy, all of a sudden we came on a ravine with steep sides, which for a time completely brought us up; however, we managed to file down and form again on the opposite side. This delay allowed the enemy to move a long way ahead, but getting the detachment into a smart gallop, we succeeded in coming up with them just as the foremost of them had reached the bottom of the hills. We cut up

about 50 of them. Lieutenant Chamberlain's party from the other flank destroyed 12 more.

"The enemy, I should think, amounted to about 300 horse and foot.

"Every man did his duty, so it is impossible to offer any remark on individuals, and I shall only add, that I was quite satisfied with the conduct of all.

"I beg to return lists of the killed and wounded.

"I have, &c,

J. CHRISTIE, *Captain, Commanding the Detachment.*"

To T. H. MADDOCK, Esq., *Secy. to the Govt. of India, with the Governor General, Head-quarters, dated Camp Gonine, 38 miles South West of Ghuznee, 31st August, 1842.*

"SIR,—I have the honor to acquaint you, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor General of India, that Shumshoodeen, the Affghan Governor of the fortress of Ghuznee, brought nearly the whole of his army, about twelve thousand men, into the vicinity of my camp yesterday, at 3 o'clock P. M.

"I moved out with one-half of my force; the enemy advanced in the most bold and gallant manner, each division cheering as they came into position, their left being upon a hill of some elevation, their centre and right along a low ridge until their flank rested on a fort filled with men; they opened a fire of small arms, supported by two six-pounder horse artillery guns, which were admirably served; our columns advanced upon the different points with great regularity and steadiness, and after a short and spirited contest, completely defeated the enemy, capturing their guns, tents, ammunition, &c. &c., and dispersing them in every direction. One hour's more day-light would have enabled me to destroy the whole of their infantry.

"Shumshoodeen fled in the direction of Ghuznee, accompanied by about thirty horsemen.

"I enclose a list of killed and wounded on the 28th and 30th instant, also a return of ordnance, ammunition, &c. &c. taken from the enemy.

"The behaviour of the troops, both European and Native, was such as I anticipated, and afforded me complete satisfaction.

"I beg leave to bring to the favorable notice of the Right Honorable the Governor General of India, the undermentioned officers; many of them have served under my command for the last three years, and have been conspicuous for their zeal and gallantry in the various affairs which have occurred with the enemy during that period, and especially in the action of the 12th of January last, and have invariably upheld the reputation of our arms and the honour of our country.

Brigadier Wymer, commanding the first infantry brigade, Lieutenant Colonel McLaren, commanding 16th regiment native infantry, Major Hibbert, commanding Her Majesty's 40th regiment, Captain Burney,

commanding 38th regiment Native Infantry, Captains Christie and Haldane, commanding corps of Bengal irregular cavalry, Major Sotheby, commanding the artillery, Captain Blood, commanding Bombay foot artillery, Major Sanders, Bengal Engineers, Lieutenants North and Stoddart, Bombay Engineers; Majors Leech and Rawlinson, of the Political Department, attended me in the field, and rendered me great assistance in conveying my orders.

"My best thanks are due to my Staff, Captain Polwhele, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, Captain Waterfield, Aide-de-Camp, and Lieutenant Tytler, Deputy Quarter Master General.

"Annexed is a letter from Brigadier Wymer, speaking in the highest terms of his Brigade Major, Captain T. H. Scott, of the 38th Regiment Native Infantry. I fully appreciate this excellent officer's merits, he has been with me in four actions; I trust I shall not be thought presumptuous in expressing a hope that he will receive some mark of the favor of Government by Brevet or otherwise.

"I cannot close this despatch without expressing my admiration of the dashing and gallant conduct, rapid movement, and correct practice of Captain Anderson's troop of Bengal horse artillery; nothing could exceed it, and I beg leave to bring this officer and Lieutenant Turner, attached to the same troop, to the particular notice of His Lordship, as officers who have on many occasions rendered me most essential service.

"I have, &c.

W. NOTT, Major General,
Commanding Field Force, Afghanistan."

From Brigadier G. P. WYMER, Commanding 1st Infantry Brigade, to Major General NOTT, Commanding Field Force, dated Camp Chuppakhana, 1st September, 1842.

"SIR,—Adverting to division orders of yesterday, expressive of your praise and thanks to the troops employed under your command in action with the enemy on the afternoon of the 30th instant, I hope you will not consider it ill judged on my part bringing to your favorable notice, the valuable assistance I derived from the active services of Captain Scott, Major of Brigade to the 1st infantry brigade under my command, whose exertions during the fight on that day demand and merit my best praise and acknowledgments. This being the second time of the display of Captain Scott's abilities when in action with the enemy as my personal Staff, will I hope plead my apology for recommending him to your notice, and the favorable consideration of Government, in any way you may have it in your power to mention him as a meritorious and deserving officer.

"I have, &c.

G. P. WYMER, Brigadier,
Comm. 1st Infantry Brigade."

Return of Ordnance, Ammunition, &c. captured in action with the Enemy, by the Field Force under the Command of Major General NOTT, on the 30th August, 1842.

Camp, Guine, 31st August, 1842.

| Description. | No. | Remarks. |
|---|--------|---|
| Carriages, filled with limbers, | 2 | One Carriage broken by our shot, left on the Field. |
| Cartridges, ball, musquet (as originally packed in the H. C.'s magazines,) | 40,000 | |
| Cartridges, filled, 6 prs. | 132 | Destroyed on the enemy's encamping ground. |
| Harness, sets, | 4 | Ditto ditto ditto. |
| Horses, | 4 | Unserviceable. |
| Ordnance, 6 pr. brass, | 2 | |
| Shot, common case, 6 prs. | 9 | Unserviceable. |
| „ round, (hammered) 6 prs. | 24 | Ditto. |

F. S. SOTHERY, Major Comg. Arty.

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Field Force under the command of Major General WILLIAM NOTT, in the engagements with the Enemy on the 28th and 30th of August, 1842.

- “ 2nd troop Bengal Irregular Horse Artillery.—Wounded 1 syce and 1 horse.
 “ 3d company 1st battalion Bombay Artillery.—Killed 1 bearer.—Wounded 1 gunner, 1 trumpet major, 1 private, 1 driver, and 2 horses.
 “ 3d Regt. Bombay Light Cavalry.—Killed 1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, 1 jemadar, 4 havildars, 1 farrier, 10 privates, and 6 horses.—Wounded 2 Lieutenants, 1 jemadar, 1 trumpet major, 5 privates and 4 horses.
 “ 1st Regt. Bengal Irregular Cavalry.—Killed 1 havildar, and 11 privates.—Wounded 1 jemadar, 2 havildars, 12 privates and 16 horses.—Missing 2 horses.
 “ Christie's Horse.—Killed 2 havildars, 5 privates, and 19 horses.—Wounded 1 Lieutenant, 1 jemadar, 13 privates, and 17 horses.—Missing 4 horses.
 “ Her Majesty's 40th Foot.—Wounded 1 Lieutenant, 2 corporals, and 10 privates.
 “ Her Majesty's 41st Foot.—Wounded 1 corporal, 3 privates, 1 tent laicar, and 1 bheestie.
 “ 16th Bengal N. I.—Wounded 2 privates.
 “ 42d ditto.—Wounded 1 private.

Officers Killed.

- “ Capt. H. Perry, 3d Bombay L. C.
 “ Brev. Capt. G. O. Reeves, 3d ditto.

Officers Wounded.

- “ Brevet Capt. G. S. Ravenscroft, 3d Bombay L. C.
 “ Lieut. T. A. Mackenzie, 3d ditto.
 “ Lieut. Meason, H. M. 40th Foot.
 “ Lieut. N. B. Chamberlain, Christie's Horse.

W. NOTT, Major General,
Commanding Field Force.

From Major General J. McCASKILL, K. H. Commanding Infantry Division, to the Assistant Adjutant General. Camp near Cabool, 16th September, 1842.

"SIR,—I beg to report for the information of Major General Pollock, C. B., that the column detailed in the margin, which he entrusted to my command on the 6th instant, completed its advance from Gundamuck to Soorkhab, and again forced its march from Kutta Sung to Tezeen, with little interruption from the enemy. But on the route from Soorkhab to Jugdulluck, and from the latter place to Kutta Sung, the Ghilzies shewed themselves in considerable force, and attacked our columns and baggage with much boldness and perseverance. All their efforts were, however, foiled by the steadiness of the troops, and the good dispositions of Brigadier Monteath, C. B., and Officers commanding our advanced and rear guards, especially Lieutenant Colonel Richmond, 33d Regiment Native Infantry, and Major Skinner, Her Majesty's 31st. It is gratifying to me to have to state, that, a predatory enemy was unable to capture from us the least article of our baggage or stores, and that the only loss sustained of this kind, which could be deemed of importance, arose from the total exhaustion of a portion of our carriage animals, when our march was necessarily doubled, to enable us to rejoin the Head Quarters at Tezeen. I beg to enclose a return of casualties on the 9th, 10th, and 11th instant."

From Brigadier T. MONTEATH, C. B., Commanding 4th Brigade, to Capt. HAVELOCK, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, Infantry Division, Camp Tezeen, 12th September, 1842.

"SIR,—I have the honor, for the information of Major General McCaskill, K. H., to transmit to you reports from Lieutenant Colonel Bolton, Her Majesty's 31st Regiment; Lieutenant Colonel Richmond, 33rd Native Infantry, and Major Skinner, Her Majesty's 31st Regiment, detailing the occurrences on the rear guards, from Soorkhab to this place.

"In regard to those circumstances that came under my own observation and arrangement, I beg to say, that, immediately on leaving Soorkhab, the enemy began to shew themselves on the heights and to fire on the troops, and as we approached the Jugdulluck Pass, observing that their numbers were becoming formidable, and that they were gradually closing in upon our left, it occurred to me that their object was to allow the main column to get through the Pass, and then to attack the baggage when it should be collected at the gorge.

"This opinion (and I found it fully confirmed afterwards) induced me to send and direct Lieutenant Colonel Richmond, commanding the advance, to halt on arriving at the entrance of the Pass, and there wait my further instructions.

" Having halted the main column, I allowed the ammunition and the whole of the baggage to Pass on, and when every thing was up, I then directed Lieutenant Colonel Richmond to proceed with the advance down the Pass, and to occupy the heights on each side, which was very properly done by that officer.

" On this operation being completed, I then passed every thing down, and on the rear guard joining me, I moved off with the main column through the Pass, to the great disappointment of the enemy, no doubt, (as they did not get a single thing,) and arrived in camp at half past 8 P.M., a sharp fire having been kept up on the column throughout the Pass.

" On the march from Jugdulluck to Kutta Sung, from the circumstance of the enemy being in force all round the camp, I directed the advance guard to move off, and allowed the baggage to proceed in its rear, and when about two-thirds of it had left the ground, I followed with the main column, leaving the remainder to the rear guard.

" On this occasion no loss was sustained, except what is detailed in Lieutenant Colonel Richmond's report: the main column arrived in camp at 20 minutes after 4 P. M.

" On the march from Kutta Sung to this place, I despatched the whole of the baggage immediately after the advance guard, then moved in rear of it with the main column, leaving the godown bullocks to be looked after by the rear guard.

" During the march very little molestation was experienced from the enemy; but I am sorry to say, that in consequence of the two marches having been performed in one, an elephant, the camp equipage of Major Delafosse's troop of artillery, many camels, bullocks, and some private property were lost, owing to the cattle, from their previous exhausted state, not being equal to the work.

" The waggons of Captain Alexander's troop required to be pulled nearly the whole way by the men of Her Majesty's 31st Regiment, and one waggon was dragged altogether (the horses having been taken out) by the sepoy of the 33d and 60th Regiments; the main column arrived in camp at 20 minutes past 7 P. M. It may not be unnecessary for me to report, that the sepoy when called upon to perform the labor of dragging the waggon, came forward with a cheerfulness, and did the work with a spirit, that was remarkable, and deserving of the highest praise.

" The march from Gundamuck to Soorkhab was conducted in the ordinary manner, and nothing deserving of mention occurred.

" Enclosed I beg to send a return of casualties."

From Major THOMAS SKINNER, H. M.'s 31st Regiment, in Command of Rear Guard, to Lieutenant LUGARD, Brigade Major 4th Brigade, Camp Tezeen, 11th September, 1842.

" SIR,—I have the honor to report, for the information of Brigadier Monteath, C. B., that when the ground we occupied at Kutta Sung was

quite clear of baggage, I withdrew the picquets from the heights above it, and advanced them to those nearest the ascent to the road above, until the guns and waggons were passed up, which was accomplished by half past 11 A. M. I then withdrew my posts by the heights on my flanks and continued towards Seh Baba, where I arrived without any molestation about 3 P. M., the necessity of dragging the guns up the many hills on the road rendering our progress slow. From Seh Baba to Tezeen, the rear guard was very much delayed by the many animals who fell exhausted from the heaviness of the march. I am afraid there was much loss of grain and baggage cattle. I destroyed, I hope, every thing that had been left in the rear, and that the enemy gained nothing by the failure of our cattle.

"On ascending the hill at the entrance to the Tezeen valley, a party of the enemy, from the base of the hills on our left, fired into us, but without effect; two shrapnel shells thrown among them with great precision silenced their fire, and they fled to the heights out of shot, leaving I think, some killed or wounded below. I pushed on when these people were dispersed, and reached camp at a little before 8, without casualty."

From Lieutenant Colonel A. F. RICHMOND, 33d Regiment Native Infantry, Commanding Rear Guard of the 2d Division, to Lieutenant LUGARD, Major of Brigade, 4th Infantry Brigade, Camp Kutta Sung, 10th September, 1842.

"Sir,—I have the honor to report for the information of Brigadier Monteath, C. B., commanding the 4th infantry brigade, that the rear guard this morning, under my command, did not leave Jugdulluck until the whole of the baggage had cleared the ground about 11 o'clock A. M.

"As the enemy appeared in great numbers all around, and gradually closing on us, I directed the guns to be placed in a commanding position on our line of route, to cover the picquets, which soon after withdrew, on signals previously arranged, and formed on the low ground in front, in skirmishing order, slowly retiring, and ultimately forming on both flanks of the guns. The enemy, as I expected, instantly rushed forward from all directions, except our rear, but were checked by the very effective fire of the guns, ably directed by Captain Lawrence, Political Agent, who volunteered his services, and by Lieutenant Abercrombie.

"As the high ground we occupied afforded good cover, I determined to hold it with two companies of infantry, until the guns could be withdrawn, and dragged up the steep hill in our rear, an operation which required the aid of the remainder of the infantry.

"At this time, the enemy kept up a sharp fire, but all I desired was accomplished in good order; and having secured new positions in the rear, I recalled the two companies, left in position, and commenced my march, occupying new posts, where necessary, which were withdrawn in succession, until the enemy ceasing to annoy us, and the country becoming a little more open, enabled me to recall all the covering

parties, and prosecute my march towards camp, where I arrived about 5 o'clock p. m., bringing every thing safely in, excepting one bullock-load of commissariat grain found on the road, which was given to the men of the irregular cavalry, also a few bullocks and two camels left on the road, which were destroyed, being unable to proceed.

"The troops, both European and Native, were very steady, and exerted themselves cheerfully in dragging the guns.

"Our casualties, I am glad to say, were few, one Officer (Lieutenant Brooke,) two men of Her Majesty's 31st foot, and two sepoy of the 60th regiment native infantry, were wounded."

*Return of Killed and Wounded in the 2d Column. Camp, Tezeen,
12th September, 1842.*

Horse Artillery.—Wounded 2 rank and file, 1 horse and 2 syces; killed 1 syce.

3d Irregular Cavalry.—Killed 2 rank and file, and 2 horses; wounded 1 horse.

Her Majesty's 31st Regiment.—Wounded 2 officers, 2 sergeants, and 17 rank and file.

Wing 33d Regiment Native Infantry.—Killed 1 rank and file; wounded 3 sergeants, and 9 rank and file.

Wing 60th ditto.—Killed 1 rank and file; wounded 1 officer, 2 sergeants, and 9 rank and file.

Jezailchies.—Wounded 1 sergeant, and 2 rank and file.

Sikh Cavalry.—Wounded 5 rank and file, and 13 horses; killed 2 horses.

Sikh Infantry.—Killed 1 rank and file; wounded 2 rank and file.

Remarks.—Lieutenants Brooke and Shaw, Her Majesty's 31st Regiment, wounded slightly.

One Subadar, 60th Native Infantry, wounded slightly.

T. MONTEATH, *Brigade,
Commanding 4th Brigade.*

*General Orders by the Right Honorable the Governor General of India,
Secret Department, Simlah, 30th September, 1842.*

"The Governor General announces to the army and to the people of India, the occupation of Ghuznee by Major General Nott, on the 6th of September, and its entire destruction by the Candahar division of the army.

"Major General Nott had the satisfaction of releasing in the neighbourhood of Ghuznee three hundred and twenty-seven Sepoys, of the 27th native infantry, from the slavery to which they had been reduced by the Afghans.

"The Governor General likewise announces the complete defeat of Mahomed Akbar Khan at the head of 16,000 men at Tezeen, on the

13th of September, by Major General Pollock, and the occupation of Cabool by the troops under that General, on the 16th of September.

"The British flag waves in triumph from the highest point of the Bala Hissar.

"Thus have all disasters been retrieved and avenged on every scene on which they were sustained, and repeated victories in the field and the capture of the cities and citadels of Ghuznee and Cabool have advanced the glory, and established the accustomed superiority of the British arms.

"The Governor General has derived much satisfaction from the report made by Major General Pollock, of the admirable conduct of the troops of His Highness the Maharajah Shere Sing, acting in co-operation with the British army.

"The Governor General rejoices in this new proof of the cordial good understanding which prevails between the British Government and that of Lahore.

"The report of Major General Pollock leads the Governor General to expect, that long before this day all the British prisoners taken by the Affghans will have been brought into the General's camp. Those who had been left near Cabool, were already at liberty.

"The Governor General, in the name of the Government and of all the people of India, offers to Major General Pollock and Major General Nott, and all the officers and troops under their respective commands, his grateful and heartfelt acknowledgments of the important services they have performed.

"The Governor General directs, that the recent successes obtained by the armies in Affghanistan, be fully made known to all the troops at all the stations of the army, and that at all those stations a salute of 21 guns be fired for the capture of Ghuznee, and a similar salute for the capture of Cabool.

"By order of the Right Honorable the Governor General of India,
T. H. MADDOCK, *Secy. to the Govt. of India,*
With the Govr. Genl."

From Major General W. NOTT, Commanding Field Force, Affghanistan, to T. H. MADDOCK, Esq. Secretary to the Government of India, with the Governor General, Head Quarters, dated Camp Ghuznee, 8th September, 1842.

"Sir,—My despatch of the 31st ultimo will have informed you of my having defeated the Affghan army commanded by Shumashoodcen.

"On the morning of the 5th instant, I moved on Ghuznee. I found the city full of men, and a range of mountains running North-east of the fortress covered by heavy bodies of cavalry and infantry; the gardens and ravines near the town were also occupied.

"The enemy had received a considerable reinforcement from Cabool, under Sultan Jan.

"I directed Major Sanders, of the Bengal engineers, to reconnoitre the works, under escort of the 16th regiment native infantry and a party

of irregular cavalry. This brought on some smart skirmishing, in which our Sepoys behaved to admiration. Captain White, of Her Majesty's 40th regiment, commanding the light companies of the army, was pushed forward, accompanied by Anderson's troop of horse artillery, to support the reconnoitring party, and I at once determined on carrying the enemy's mountain positions before encamping my force. The troops ascended the heights in gallant style, driving the enemy before them until every point was gained.

"The village of Bullal is situated about 600 yards from the walls of Ghuznee, upon the spur of the mountain to the North-east, and observing it to be a desirable spot for preparing a heavy battery to be placed 300 paces in advance, I ordered it to be occupied by two regiments of infantry and some light guns, and retired the columns into camp.

"The engineer officers, sappers and miners, and infantry working parties were employed under the directions of Major Sanders, during the night of the 5th, in erecting a battery for four 18-pounders; these guns were moved from camp before day-light on the morning of the 6th, but before they had reached the position assigned them, it was ascertained that the enemy had evacuated the fortress.

"I directed the city of Ghuznee, with its citadel and the whole of its works, to be destroyed. I forward the Engineer's report.

"In these operations, our loss has been much less than might have been expected from the numbers and positions of the enemy, and the fact of the troops having been necessitated to move under range of the guns of the fortress.

"I enclose a list of killed and wounded.

"The exertions of Major Sanders, of the Engineers, were as usual most zealous, and my thanks are due to him and the department under his charge.

"I beg to notice the following officers: Brigadier Wymer; Major Hibbert, commanding Her Majesty's 40th regiment; Captain Evans, in temporary charge of the 16th regiment native infantry; Captain White, Her Majesty's 40th regiment, commanding the light companies of the force; Major Sotheby and officers of the artillery.

"I have every reason to be satisfied with my staff, Captain Polwhele, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General; Captain Waterfield, Aid-de-Camp; Captain Ripley, and Lieutenant Kay, Deputy Judge Advocate General.

"I continue to receive the greatest assistance from Major Leech.

"I have, &c.

W. NOTT, *Major General.*

Commanding Field Force, Affghanistan.

"P. S.—I have recovered about 327 of the Sepoys of the 27th regiment Bengal native infantry, who had been sold into slavery and dispersed in villages, 30 and 40 miles round Ghuznee.

W. NOTT."

MEMORANDUM.

Camp Rozeh, near Ghuznee, 9th September, 1842.

" On the morning of the 5th Sept. 1842, General Nott moved his camp to take up a position before Ghuznee. An advanced party was ordered to protect a reconnoissance of the works undertaken by the engineer department. On the approach of this party to the hills North of the city, it was opposed in force, but was immediately supported by the General, and thus reinforced cleared the hills of the enemy, and took possession of the village of Bullal, within 400 yards of the city.

" The General immediately directed this important point with the heights near the village to be maintained, and they were occupied by two regiments of native infantry and two 9-pounder guns.

" While these operations were going on, the Camp was established at Rozeh, $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the city. The guards required for the protection and general duties of the Camp absorbed so many men, that but few were available for the duties of a siege. The General therefore determined not to invest the place in form, and directed the Engineer to concentrate the resources at his disposal in one spot, where protection might be most conveniently afforded to the siege operations.

" With advertence to these instructions, the Engineer proposed to establish a battery on the ridge of the hill North of the town, in advance of the village of Bullal, and distant about 350 yards from the nearest point of the walls. From this battery it was expected, that the four 18-pounder guns would lay open the thin flank wall connecting the citadel on the West with the town wall in a few hours. The defences of the citadel could be swept from the same point by the light artillery, and the lines of loop-holed wall which would bear on the advance of the storming party, were all viewed in enfilade from the site selected for the battery. The advance of the party to the assault would have been greatly facilitated by the existence of a thick dam of earth across the ditch, immediately opposite the point marked out for the breach.

" It was further proposed, that the principal assault should be supported by two other attacks; one an attempt to blow in the water-gate, (both the others having been strongly built up, and the causeways in front of them cut through,) another to escalate a weak point near the Cabool gate, which would have been greatly aided by the fire of the artillery from the hill.

" This project met the General's approval, and at dusk on the evening of the 5th September, a working party composed of the sappers and of 160 men from the regiments occupying the hill, commenced work on the battery. By 4 A. M. on the 6th September, cover for the party had been secured across the ridge of the hill, and so much progress made in the execution of the work as to lead to reasonable expectations, that the four 18-pounder guns and two 24-pounder howitzers would be established in position, and ready to open their fire during the day.

" Early on the evening of the 5th, a brisk matchlock fire was kept up from the citadel on the hill, but this gradually slackened, and at 10 p. m. had entirely ceased. The enemy's infantry had been observed at dusk crossing the river near the water-gate, with the intention, it was supposed, of attacking the working party during the night; but towards the morning of the 6th, there was ground for believing the fort was evacuated. At day-light this was ascertained to be the case by Lieutenant North, of the Engineers, who took possession at that hour of the water-gate without opposition, leaving Ensign Newton and 20 sepoy of the 16th Native Infantry in charge of the gateway, and returning to the battery for further assistance. The whole of the working party was immediately moved into the town, of which and of the citadel of Ghuznee, they were in possession before sun-rise.

EDWARD SANDERS, *Major,*
Engineers."

From Major E. SANDERS, Engineer, to Major General W. NOTT, Commanding Field Force, Ghuznee, dated Camp Rozeh, near Ghuznee, 9th Sept. 1842.

" SIR,—On the occupation of the fortress of Ghuznee by the troops under your command, I received orders from you to take measures for the destruction of the citadel, to as great an extent as the means at command and the time afforded by a halt of two days would permit.

2. " I have the honor to report, that the Engineer department attached to your force, has been employed during the 7th and 8th instant, on the work of demolition, and to state the progress effected.

3. " Fourteen mines have been sprung in the walls of the citadel, all with good effect. The upper fort has been completely destroyed; the second line of works extensively breached in two places; and the outer and lower walls have their rivetments blown down and greatly injured in three places.

4. " In several spots remote from the mines, the walls, though they have not fallen, are so seriously shaken by the explosions, that unless immediate and energetic measures are adopted, on the departure of your force, for their repair and security, they must crumble down during the ensuing winter.

5. " The gateways of the town and citadel, and the roofs of the principal buildings have been fired, and are still burning."

" I have, &c.

E. SANDERS, *Major,*
Engineers."

Return of the Killed, Wounded and Missing of the Field Force under the Command of Major General WILLIAM NOTT, in the engagement with the Enemy before Ghuznee, on the 5th September, 1842.

| | Killed. | | Wounded. | | | | | | | Missing. |
|---|-----------|---------|----------|-------------------------|------------|---------|-----------|--------|---------|----------|
| | Privates. | Horses. | Ensign. | Jemadars and Duffadars. | Havildars. | Saicks. | Privates. | Syces. | Horses. | Horses. |
| 2nd Troop Bengal Irregular Horse Artillery, | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 0 |
| 1st Troop Bombay Horse Artillery, | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| 3d Regiment Bombay Light Cavalry, | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| 1st ditto Bengal Irregular ditto, | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 7 | 0 |
| Her Majesty's 40th Regiment of Foot, | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Ditto 41st ditto ditto, | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2d Regiment Bengal Native Infantry, | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 16th ditto ditto, | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 27th ditto ditto, doing duty with | | | | | | | | | | |
| 16th Native Infantry, | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 42d ditto ditto, | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 43d ditto ditto, | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total of each, | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 34 | 2 | 13 | 0 |
| Total, | 3 | 3 | | | | 43 | | 13 | | .. |

Grand Total of Killed and Wounded, 46 Officers and Men, and 16 Horses.

OFFICERS WOUNDED.

Ensign Stannus, 16th Regt. Bengal Native Infantry.

W. NOTT, Major General,
Comg. Field Force.

Return of Ordnance and Ammunition captured in the Fortress of Ghuznee, by the force under command of Major General NATT, on the 6th of September, 1842, Camp Ghuznee, 16th September, 1842.

| Description. | Number. | Remarks. |
|--|---------|---|
| Bag, cartridge, dungaree, | 40 | |
| Blue lights, | 300 | |
| Boxes, ammunition, musquet, (filled), | 15 | |
| " " gun, | 25 | |
| " " empty, | 15 | |
| " treasure, empty, with straps, | 20 | |
| Cartridges, balled, musquet, | 25,000 | } 15,000 of these are un- serviceable. |
| " " gun and jingal, about | 2,000 | |
| Carriages, field piece, | 6 | |
| " garrison, | 1 | |
| Charcoal, mammals, | 6 | |
| Hides, buff, | 5 | |
| Jinjals or Wall Pieces, | 7 | |
| Lanterns, tin, | 9 | Unserviceable. |
| Lead, pigs, | 8 | |
| Musquetry, musquets without locks, | 30 | |
| Ordnance, brass, light Field Pieces, mounted, .. | 3 | 3, 6 and 8 pounders. 68 pounder. |
| " heavy, | 1 | |
| " iron, light Field Pieces, | 3 | { 2, 9 and 8 pounders. |
| " " dismounted, | 1 | |
| Powder, ordnance, country, jars, | 10 | About 150 lbs. each. |
| Rope, cotton, pieces, | 1 | |
| Saltpetre, bags, | 1 | |
| Shot, round, English, 6 pounder, | 60 | |
| " " of sorts, | 550 | |
| " jingal, 1 and 2-pounder, | 300 | |
| Sponges, gun, of sorts, | 12 | |
| Jessals, | 5 | |

F. S. SOTHERY, Major,
Commanding Artillery.

*From Major General POLLOCK, C. B. Commanding in Affghanistan, to
T. H. MADDOCK, Esq. Secretary to the Government, Political De-
partment, dated Camp near Cabool, 16th September, 1842.*

"SIR,—I have the honor to forward, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor General, copy of my despatch to the address of Major General Lumley, Adjutant General of the Army.

"I have, &c.

GEORGE POLLOCK, Major General,
Commanding in Affghanistan."

From Major General G. POLLOCK, C. B., Commanding in Afghanistan, to Major General J. R. LUMLEY, Adjutant General of the Army, dated Camp Cabool, 16th September, 1842.

"SIR,—I have the honor to report, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that on the 14th instant, we marched from Khoord Cabool to Bootkhak. I took the precaution of sending parties to crown the heights of the Khoord Cabool Pass, but we met with no opposition. On the 15th, I moved on to Cabool, and encamped on the race course. This morning I proceeded to the Bala Hissar, with the following troops: a troop of horse artillery under Major Delafosse; a company from each regiment of infantry under Lieutenant Colonel Taylor; the 3d dragoons under Major Lockwood; a troop of the 1st regiment light cavalry; a resallah of the 3d irregular cavalry, with the whole of the General and Division Staff. The object was to plant the British Colours in the Bala Hissar on the spot most conspicuous from the city. The Prince Futteh Jung, who joined my Camp at Gundamuck, expressed a wish to go with the party, to which I assented. On our arrival at the spot selected, the colours were hoisted, the Band of Her Majesty's 9th foot immediately struck up the national Anthem of "God save the Queen," and a Royal Salute was fired from the guns of the horse artillery, the whole of the troops present giving three cheers.

"I have left the Colours in the Bala Hissar, to be hoisted daily as long as we remain. The infantry also remain under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Taylor, but they will be relieved on the arrival of Major General Nott, by a native regiment from his force. I expect Major General Nott will reach Cabool to-morrow or the next day. Since our arrival here, we have not been able to obtain any certain information of Mahomed Akbar. It appears, however, that Ameen Oollah has separated from him.

"Neither of them have ventured to return in the direction of Cabool. The following prisoners have come into Camp: Mrs. Trevor, with eight children; Captain and Mrs. Anderson, with three children; Captain Troup and Dr. Campbell. Unless some very unforeseen circumstances occur, I expect to obtain possession of the remainder of the prisoners in the course of eight or ten days, with the exception of Captain Bygrave, who I regret to find, has been taken by Mahomed Akbar, and was with him during the action of the 13th instant. I have, &c.

GEORGE POLLOCK, Major General, Commanding in Afghanistan."

From Major General G. POLLOCK, C. B., Commanding in Afghanistan, to T. H. MADDOCK, Esq. Secretary to Government, Political Department, dated Camp near Cabool, 17th September, 1842.

"SIR,—I have the honor to forward, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor General, copy of my despatch of date the 14th instant, to the address of Major General Lumley, Adjutant General of the Army. I have, &c.

G. POLLOCK Major General, Commanding in Afghanistan."

From Major General GEORGE POLLOCK, C. B. Commanding in Affghanistan, to Major General J. R. LUMLEY, Adjutant General of the Army, dated Camp Bootkhak, 14th September, 1842.

"SIR,—I have the honor to report, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that I marched from Seh Baba on the 11th instant, and arrived at Tezeen the same day, where I was joined by Major General McCaskill, with the 2d division. On the 12th I halted, in consequence of the cattle of the 2d division having suffered from the effects of fatigue caused by their forced march; this halt the enemy imagined to be the result of hesitation, and in the afternoon attacked the picquets on the left flank, and became so daring, that I considered it necessary to send Lieutenant Colonel Taylor, with 250 men of Her Majesty's 9th foot, to drive them back; some sharp fighting took place and the enemy were driven up the neighbouring hills, from the crests of which they kept up a heavy fire. Lieutenant Colonel Taylor, however, with a small party crept up one end of the hill unperceived by the enemy, who were hotly engaged in their front, and lay concealed until joined by a few more of his men, when rushing up on the flank of the astounded Affghans, he inflicted a severe lesson, pouring in a destructive fire upon them as they fled down the hill. A Chieftain was found among the slain, who it is supposed was the brother of Khodabux Khan. The enemy remained inoffensive on our left flank, in consequence of this very well planned and gallant affair of Lieutenant Colonel Taylor's, and withdrew to the right, where they commenced a furious attack upon a picquet consisting of 80 men of the 60th regiment of native infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Montgomery, who sustained the assault with great resolution until reinforcements reached him, when the enemy were beaten off; in this attack the picquet had four killed, Lieutenant Montgomery and 17 men wounded; the enemy came so close that frequent recourse was had to the bayonet. Their attempts on the picquets continued throughout the night, but were invariably unsuccessful.

"The valley of Tezeen, where we were encamped, is completely encircled by lofty hills, and on the morning of the 13th, it was perceived that the Affghans had occupied in great force every height not already crowned by our troops; I commenced my march towards the mouth of the Tezeen Pass, where I left two guns, two squadrons of Her Majesty's 3d dragoons, a party of the 1st light cavalry and 3d irregular cavalry. The enemy's horse appeared in the valley, with the intention of falling upon the baggage, but it gives me very great pleasure to state, that the dragoons and native cavalry (regular and irregular) made a most brilliant charge, and with such effect, that the whole body of the enemy's force was completely routed, and a number of them cut up.

"The Pass of the Tezeen affords great advantage to an enemy occupying the heights, and on the present occasion, Mahomed Akbar neglected nothing to render its natural difficulties as formidable as numbers could make it. Our troops mounted the heights, and the Affghans,

contrary to their general custom, advanced to meet them, and a desperate struggle ensued; indeed their defence was so obstinate, that the British bayonet in many instances alone decided the contest. The light company of Her Majesty's 9th foot, led by Captain Lushington, who I regret to say was wounded in the head, ascending the hills on the left of the Pass under a heavy cross-fire, charged and overthrew their opponents, leaving several horses and their riders, supposed to be Chiefs, dead on the hill; the slaughter was considerable, and the fight continued during a great part of the day, the enemy appearing resolved that we should not ascend the Huft Kotul; one spirit seemed to pervade all, and a determination to conquer overcame the obstinate resistance of the enemy, who were at length forced from their numerous and strong positions, and our troops mounted the Huft Kotul, giving three cheers when they reached the summit. Here Lieutenant Cunningham, with a party of sappers, pressed the enemy so hard, that they left in their precipitation a 24-pounder howitzer and limber, carrying off the draft bullocks. Having heard that another gun had been seen, and concluding that it could not have gone very far, I detached a squadron of dragoons under Captain Tritton, and two horse artillery guns under Major Delafosse in pursuit: the gun (a 12-pounder howitzer) with bullocks sufficient for the two guns were soon captured. The dragoons again got among the enemy and succeeded in cutting up many of them. Captain Broadfoot with the sappers advanced, and with the dragoons happened to fall in with another party of the enemy, of whom upwards of twenty were killed. I have ascertained, there were about 16,000 men in the field opposed to me, a considerable portion of whom was cavalry; Mahomed Akbar Khan, Mahomed Shah Khan, Ameen Oollah, and many other Chiefs with their followers were present, all of whom I have reason to believe have taken to flight. We have gained a complete victory, and our enemies have suffered severely, having several hundreds killed, losing their guns and three standards, one of which was taken from the enemy's horse by the 1st light cavalry. Although many attempts were made at the baggage, none were successful, chiefly owing to the judicious and admirable arrangements of Lieutenant Colonel Richmond, commanding the rear guard, and for which he deserves the greatest credit.

"The Lahore contingent, under the able direction of Captain Lawrence, has invariably given the most cheerful assistance, dragging the guns, occupying the heights, and covering the rear guard. While ascending Huft Kotul and at Tezeen, their long jezails told effectively in keeping the ground.

"Major Skinner, Her Majesty's 31st foot, had been detached with a strong party on the night of the 12th, for the purpose of dislodging a body of the enemy on the heights in front of the camp; this duty was performed with great gallantry the next morning, and his operations contributed much to frustrate the attempts of the enemy on our right flank. As the Major's movements were for some time separate from those of the main column, I deem it expedient to annex his report.

"The enemy being completely dispersed, we pursued our march and encamped at Khoord Cabool without further opposition. The troops on this, as on all former occasions where they have been engaged with the enemy, shewed the most determined valour, and I feel that I cannot too highly praise their conduct: each regiment seemed to vie with the others in their endeavours to dislodge the enemy, which they most effectually accomplished. I have received from Major General McCaskill, K. H., who on this occasion commanded the main column, every assistance, and from Major General Sir R. Sale, G. C. B., commanding the advance guard, the most zealous co-operation. The following officers have also given me every reason to be satisfied with their exertions: Brigadier Monteath, C. B., commanding the 4th brigade; Brigadier Tulloch, commanding 2d brigade, and Brigadier White, commanding cavalry brigade; Lieutenant Colonel Bolton, commanding Her Majesty's 31st foot; Lieutenant Colonel Richmond, commanding 33d native infantry; and Lieutenant Colonel Taylor, K. H., commanding Her Majesty's 9th foot; Major Skinner, Her Majesty's 31st foot; Major Huish, commanding 26th native infantry; Major Delafosse, commanding artillery; Major Crommelin, commanding 1st light cavalry; Major Lockwood, commanding Her Majesty's 3d light dragoons; Captain Napleton, commanding 60th native infantry; Captain Seaton, commanding 35th regiment light infantry; Captain Ferris, commanding Jezailchies; Captain Wilkinson, commanding Her Majesty's 13th light infantry; Captain Broadfoot, commanding sappers; Captain Tait, commanding 3d irregular cavalry, and Captain Lawrence, commanding the Seikh contingent; Captain Abbott, Chief Engineer; Captain Abbott, Commanding light field battery; Captain Alexander, commanding 3d troop 2d Brigade Horse Artillery; Captain Backhouse, commanding mountain train, and Lieutenant Becher, commanding the sappers and miners. The services of Mr. Mackeson, commanding the bildars, have always been conspicuous. Superintending Surgeon Stiven's care in providing for the conveyance and comfort of the wounded has met with my approbation. From Major Thompson, at the head of the Commissariat Department, I have received every assistance; likewise from Captain Lane, Commissary of Ordnance, whose exertions have been unremitting throughout. From the following Officers of my Personal and the General Staff, I have on this as on every other occasion received the most effectual aid: Captain Macgregor and Lieutenant Pollock, Aids-de-Camp; Lieutenant Sir R. Shakespear, Military Secretary; Captain Ponsonby, Assistant Adjutant General; Captain Codrington, Assistant Quarter Master General; Captain Riddle, Pay Master; Captain Macadam, Deputy Judge Advocate General; Lieutenant Mayne, Officiating Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General. The following Officers of the Division and Brigade Staff have also effectively performed their respective duties: Captain Havelock, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General; Brigade Majors Havelock, Smith, Wade, Lugard, and Brevet Captain Fitzgerald, Artillery Division Staff. I must not omit the expression of my regret for the fate of Hyder Ally, the Native Com-

mandant of the Jezailchies, a most gallant and enterprizing soldier, who was killed while attempting to seize one of the enemy's standards.

I have the honor to forward reports from Lieutenant Colonels Richmond and Taylor, and Major Skinner, with returns of killed and wounded, and of Ordnance Ammunition and Stores captured.

"I have, &c.

G. POLLOCK, *Major General.*"

Return of Killed and Wounded of the troops under the command of Major General POLLOCK, C. B. in the Tazeen Valley and on the Huft Kotul, on the 12th and 13th September, 1842.

| | Killed. | | | | Wounded. | | | | Horses. | | Mules and Ya. boos. | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|------------------------|---|---|----|------------------------|---|---|-----|----------------|----|---------------------|----|----------------|---|---|
| | European Officers. | | | | European Officers. | | | | Killed. | | Wounded. | | Remarks. | | |
| | Native Officers. | | | | Native Officers. | | | | Wounded. | | Killed. | | Wounded. | | |
| | Sergeants & Havildars. | | | | Sergeants & Havildars. | | | | Missing. | | Missing. | | Missing. | | |
| | Buglers and Drummers. | | | | Buglers and Drummers. | | | | Rank and File. | | Rank and File. | | Rank and File. | | |
| | Rank and File. | | | | Rank and File. | | | | Rank and File. | | Rank and File. | | Rank and File. | | |
| 3d troop 1st brigade Horse, Art.,... | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 3d ditto 2d ditto ditto, | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2d company 6th battalion Art.,.... | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Mountain Train, | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Her Majesty's 3d Light Dragoons, | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 2 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1st regiment Light Cavalry, | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 3d Irregular Cavalry,... | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 7 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Her Majesty's 9th Foot, | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 8 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Her Majesty's 13th Light Inf.,... | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Her Majesty's 31st Foot, | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 26th Regiment of Native Infantry, | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 33d Regiment, (right wing,) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 35th Light Infantry, | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 60th regt. Native Inf. (right wing) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 22 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Captain Ferris's Jezailchees, | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Captain Broadfoot's Sappers, | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total,..... | 1 | 2 | 1 | 28 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 116 | 14 | 21 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | |
| Total of Killed and Wounded, .. | 23 | | | | 130 | | | | 35 | | 3 | | | | |
| Total casualties,..... | | | | | 162 | | | | 38 | | | | | | |

G. PONSONBY, *Captain, Assistant Adjutant General.*

NAMES OF OFFICERS KILLED AND WOUNDED.

Killed.

Hyder Ali, Commandant, Jezailchie Regiment.

Wounded.

Captain Lushington, Her Majesty's 9th Foot, severely.

Captain Geils, 60th Native Infantry, slightly.

Lieutenant Norton, 35th Native Infantry, severely.

Lieutenant Montgomery, 60th Native Infantry, slightly.

G. PONSONBY, *Captain, Assistant Adjutant General.*

men of Her Majesty's 9th, to the support of the guards in charge of the public cattle feeding on the left of the Camp in the Tezeen valley, which were much pressed by the enemy. On clearing the left piquet, I was joined by Major Huish, with a small party of the 26th native infantry. I threw forward a strong body of skirmishers, who quickly drove back those of the enemy on the plain, pursuing them to a range of low hills, where they made a stand till dislodged by our advance: further on I found the enemy in force, from 5 to 600, had taken post along the crest and on the top of a range of steep hills running near a mile from the Northward into the Tezeen valley; those towards the North were assailed by Captain Lushington, Her Majesty's 9th foot, with the left support and skirmishers, whilst I directed the attack against their front and left flank, which being turned, I ascended the heights between two ridges which concealed my approach till close to the summit and within 20 yards of their main body, consisting of over 300 men. Collecting 30 to 40 men with Lieutenants Elmhirst, Lister and Vigors, I ordered bayonets to be fixed, and the enemy to be charged, which was done with such resolution and effect, that the whole mass taken by surprise was pushed headlong down the hills, nor did they rally till out of musket shot. Their loss must have been very severe, as I observed numbers lagging behind to carry off their killed and wounded. As it was getting dark, I deemed it imprudent to pursue the enemy further, ordered the halt to be sounded, and after remaining in possession of their position for half an hour, retired without molestation. It affords me great gratification to bear testimony to the spirit and gallantry displayed by officers and men on this occasion, especially Major Huish, 26th regiment native infantry, Captain Lushington, and those concerned in the charge, on the enemy.

"I beg to transmit a return of the killed and wounded.

"I have, &c.

A. B. TAYLOR, *Lieutenant Colonel, 9th Foot.*"

Copy of a letter from Major SKINNER, H. M. 31st Foot, to Captain PONSONBY, Assistant Adjutant General, dated Bootkhak, 14th September, 1842.

"SIR,—I have the honor to report, for the information of the Major General commanding the army in Afghanistan, that I ascended the heights above the Tezeen valley, in front of our Camp, with the detachment in the margin, on the afternoon of the 12th instant, and occupied the ridge till daylight next morning. From a communication with Major General Sir R. Sale, G. C. B.; I learnt that I was to take the high peaks to the right of my position, and having driven the enemy from them, continue to operate among the lower hills to the head of the Huft Kotul, on the right flank of the advance guard of the army. These peaks were occupied in some force

1 co. H. M. 9th Foot,
1 " " 12th Light Infy.
1 " " 31st Foot.
1 " 26th Native Infantry.
1 " 35th Native Light Infy.
1 " 33d Native Infantry.
30 Broadfoot's Sappers.
20 Jemischies.

by the enemy, who was, however, easily driven from them, and cleared away to the higher hills on my right. I ascended the first peak, which although the way was steep was not very difficult, in two small columns. The 1st, the companies of Her Majesty's 9th and 26th native infantry under Captain Borton, of the 9th foot; the second under Lieutenant Sayers of the 31st, composed of the two companies of Her Majesty's 31st foot and 33d native infantry, covered by the sappers and jezailchies under Lieutenant Orr. I detached Lieutenant Sinclair, of the 13th light infantry, with the company of his regiment and one of the 35th native infantry, to the higher peak on the right hand, and supported him by Lieut. Orr and the sappers, (after I had possession of the first height,) who ascended by a steep ridge that connected them. Lieutenant Sinclair attained the summit of the hill without loss, driving the enemy away, and held it until the main column of advance came in sight, when he led his column on my right over the hills at the base of the higher mountains. The height I gained descends to the high road by a succession of small peaks, each connected by a narrow ridge; the enemy occupied with small parties each of these peaks, and was driven in succession from them. Captain Borton, at the head of a party of the 9th foot, made a gallant charge upon a strongly posted party of the enemy, and drove them away; he shewed a great deal of boldness however, and made repeated attempts to recover his ground, taking advantage of the necessarily slow advance of the supporting parties, from the steep and difficult nature of the hills. After I gained all the peaks, and the enemy had fallen back, I continued parallel to the main column over the hills to some distance beyond the top of the Huft Kotul; considering the great number that at one time opposed me until the appearance of the main column drew them off, my loss was not great, while the enemy suffered considerably. I beg leave to bring to the notice of the Major General, the very good conduct of the officers and men who were under my command.

"I have, &c.

THOS. SKINNER, Major,
H. M. 31st Regiment."

Copy of a letter from Lieutenant Colonel RICHMOND, Commanding 33d Native Infantry, to Captain POSESBY, Assistant Adjutant General, dated Camp Bootkhak, 14th September, 1842.

"SIR,—Major General Pollock, C. B., commanding the troops, having entrusted me specially with the command of the rear guard of the army from Tezeen through the Huft Kotul Pass, on the 13th instant, and having placed at my disposal the troops detailed in the margin, I have now the honor to report the operations of the day, for the Major General's information. Having made

| | |
|----------------------------|-----|
| H. M.'s 3d Light Dragoons | 100 |
| 1st Regiment Light Cavalry | 205 |
| Det. 3d Irregular Cavalry | 60 |
| Sikh Cavalry | 200 |
| Total, Sahraes | 720 |

| | |
|---|------|
| 8 9-pes. Nos. 6 light Field Battery. | |
| Picquets H. M.'s 9th and 31st Foot. | 143 |
| 4th co. 26th regt. N. I. | 410 |
| Right wing 23d N. I. | 120 |
| 25th native Light Infantry | 294 |
| Picquets 60th regt. N. I. | 124 |
| Seikh Infantry. | 300 |
| Total, Bayonets. | 1200 |

the necessary disposition of my force to protect the baggage in the valley of Tezeen, and to secure the gorge of the Pass, the different picquets were gradually withdrawn to strengthen the latter. Soon after I observed a large body of the enemy collecting near the fort of Tezeen, South East of my position, and directed Lieutenant Douglas, whose guns had been previously posted on a commanding point, to open on them, but the distance proving too great for shells, the fire was discontinued. The enemy I suppose, encouraged by this, formed his cavalry in the valley to the number of about 600 men, with the evident intention of moving towards my post. I instantly decided on anticipating him, and as Captain Alexander's (horse artillery) three guns were still on the ground, I availed myself of his services, by sending forward his guns within range of the enemy, supported by the front squadron of Her Majesty's 3d Light Dragoons under Captain Unett, one squadron of 1st light cavalry under Brevet Major Scott, and the detachment of 3d irregular cavalry under Captain Tuit, with orders to charge the enemy if the ground proved favorable, and an opportunity offered. This soon occurred, the guns having made good impression, and the instant I observed the cavalry advance, the other squadron of dragoons was hurried forward under Major Lockwood, as a support, thus ensuring the success achieved by the spirited and gallant charge of their comrades in front, which completely dispersed the enemy, who left about fifty men on the field, and a standard, the latter taken by the 1st light cavalry, the bearer of which was cut down by Brevet Captain Goad.

"Having accomplished all I wished, the troops returned to their original position in excellent order, covered by the very effective fire of the guns directed by Captain Alexander, and by a company of the 35th regiment light infantry, the latter ordered forward for the purpose.

"As the enemy shewed no disposition to molest us further, and the whole of the baggage having entered the Pass, the horse artillery and dragoons were permitted to commence their march, but before the latter had filed off, the enemy brought two guns to bear upon our position, which obliged me to place the remainder of the cavalry under cover of the high ground in the vicinity; these guns fortunately did no harm, and were soon after either withdrawn by the enemy, or silenced by a fire of round shot from Lieutenant Douglas's 9-pounder, ably directed by that officer, and by Captain Lawrence, Political Agent, commanding the Seikh contingent, who handsomely volunteered his services on the occasion.

"After allowing the main column and baggage to get well forward in the Pass, I directed the remainder of the cavalry to enter, and followed with the infantry, the different parties of which gradually retired on the posts I had previously occupied, the enemy's infantry closing in and opening a heavy fire, which continued till we reached the top of the Pass, a distance of three miles; and although I was compelled to hold

my ground near the top of the Pass for a long time, to admit of the guns and baggage passing over. I am happy to say that the enemy, though he pressed our several posts very warmly, did not then, or at any other time obtain the slightest advantage, and at length desisted from molesting us, which enabled me to reform the troops and continue my march towards Camp, where I arrived about 8 o'clock P. M., with all the stores and baggage, except a few loads of grain; also some camels and bullocks unable to proceed, which were destroyed on the road, agreeably to orders.

"My best thanks are due to the officers and men engaged, both European and Native, for their cheerful endurance of fatigue under an intensely hot sun, and for their gallant bearing when in contact with the enemy; the whole seemed animated with one and the same spirit, which enabled them to overcome difficulties of no ordinary nature, highly creditable to British soldiers, and especially so to the Bengal Sepoys. I feel it also just to notice the useful assistance afforded by the men of the Seikh contingent under Captain Lawrence, who took their full share of duty in the valley of Tezeen, and in defending the different posts in the Pass.

"Accompanying I have the honor to forward a return of the killed and wounded, which I rejoice to observe is not so heavy as might have been expected from the nature of the operations.

"I have, &c.

A. F. RICHMOND, *Lieut.-Colonel,*
33rd Regiment N. I. Commanding the Rear Guard."

"P.S.—On reaching the top of the Huft Kotul Pass, it was reported to Captain Lawrence, commanding the Seikh contingent, that Sirdar Akbar Khan was present in the Tezeen valley, when the troops charged his cavalry.

A. F. RICHMOND, *Lieut.-Colonel.*"

To Major General POLLOCK, C. B. Commanding West of the Indus,
Camp Urgundee, 16th September, 1842.

"SIR,—I have the honor to acquaint you, that Shumshoodeen, Sultan Jan, and other Affghan Chiefs having assembled about 12,000 men, occupied a succession of strong mountains intercepting my march upon Benee Badam and Mydan on the 14th and 15th instant. Our troops dislodged them in gallant style, and their conduct afforded me the greatest satisfaction.

"The artillery distinguished themselves, and I beg to mention the names of Captain Leslie, Bombay Horse Artillery; Captains Blood, Bombay foot Artillery, and Anderson and Turner, of the Bengal Horse Artillery; and the 38th and 43d Bengal Native Infantry. I beg to bring under the favourable notice of Government, Captain White, of Her Majesty's 40th regiment, in command of the light companies of

Her Majesty's 40th and 41st Regiments, and of the 2nd, 16th 38th, 42nd and 43d Bengal Native Regiments, for the able manner in which he carried my orders into effect, and for the gallantry displayed by him, and the companies under his command, in ascending the mountains, and driving the enemy from their positions; I had every reason to be pleased with the conduct of all the troops, European and Native. I forward a list of killed and wounded.

"I am, &c.

W. NOTT, *Major General.*
Commanding Field Force."

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Field Force, under the command of Major General WILLIAM NOTT, in the engagements with the Enemy, on the 14th and 15th of September, 1842.

"2d Troop Bengal Irregular Horse Artillery—Wounded 2 horses.

"3rd Co. 2nd Battalion Bengal Foot ditto—Wounded 2 Magazine lascars.

"1st Troop Bombay Horse Artillery—Wounded 3 horses.

"3rd Co. 1st Battalion Bombay Foot Artillery—Wounded 1 private and 2 drivers.

"3rd Regiment Bombay Light Cavalry—Killed 1 private—Wounded 1 horse.

"1st Regiment Bengal Irregular Horse—Wounded 1 corporal, 4 privates, and 8 horses.

"Christie's Horse—Wounded 1 private and 10 horses.

"H. M. 40th Regiment of Foot—Killed 1 drummer, and 1 private—Wounded 1 Lieutenant and 3 privates.

"H. M. 41st ditto—Killed 1 private—Wounded 1 corporal and 1 private.

"2nd Regiment Bengal N. I.—Wounded 1 Lieutenant and 1 private.

"16th ditto—Wounded 1 sergeant and 1 private.

"38th ditto—Wounded 1 sergeant and 11 privates.

"42nd ditto—Wounded 1 sergeant and 2 privates.

"43rd ditto—Wounded 1 Lieutenant, 1 subadar, 1 sergeant, and 15 privates.

"3rd Regiment Irregular Infantry—Wounded 5 privates.

OFFICERS WOUNDED.

"Lieutenant E. Eager, Her Majesty's 40th Regiment, severely.

"Lieutenant Mainwaring, 2nd Regiment Bengal Native Infantry, slightly.

"Lieutenant G. Holroyd, 43rd ditto ditto, ditto.

W. NOTT, *Major General,*
Commanding Field Force."

In pursuance of the chronological arrangement which has been adhered to as closely as possible in this volume, the Proclamation of Lord Ellenborough, directing the evacuation of Affghanistan is here given. But there can be no doubt that the Generals had received private instructions to bring back their armies *before* this document reached them. A computation of the time occupied in transmitting despatches from Simla to Cabul, will establish the impossibility of a movement being made from Cabul, on the 11th of October, in conformity to orders issued at Simla, on the 1st of that month. The date of the Proclamation must therefore be regarded as having been selected for the sake of a dramatic contrast with that issued by Lord Auckland on the 1st of October 1838, (see page 3,) in which principles the very opposite of Lord Ellenborough's are enunciated. In other respects the date is particularly unfortunate for the Governor General's fame, as it proves, beyond all question, that he had not made the release of the prisoners in the hands of the Affghans an indispensable condition of the evacuation of the country :—

PROCLAMATION.

Secret Department, Simla, the 1st October 1842.

" The Government of India directed its army to pass the Indus in order to expel from Affghanistan a Chief believed to be hostile to British interests, and to replace upon his throne a Sovereign represented to be friendly to those interests, and popular with his former subjects.

" The Chief believed to be hostile became a prisoner, and the Sovereign represented to be popular was replaced upon his throne : but, after events, which brought into question his fidelity to the Government by which he was restored, he lost by the hands of an assassin the throne he had only held amidst insurrections, and his death was preceded and followed by still existing anarchy.

" Disasters unparalleled in their extent, unless by the errors in which they originated, and by the treachery by which they were completed, have, in one short campaign, been avenged upon every scene of past misfortune ; and repeated victories in the field, and the capture of the cities and citadels of Ghuznie and Cabool, have again attached the opinion of invincibility to the British arms.

" The British army in possession of Affghanistan will now be withdrawn to the Sutlej.

" The Governor General will leave it to the Affghans themselves to create a Government amidst the anarchy which is the consequence of their crimes.

" To force a Sovereign upon a reluctant people, would be as inconsistent with the policy as it is with the principles of the British Govern-

ment, tending to place the arms and resources of that people at the disposal of the first invader, and to impose the burthen of supporting a Sovereign, without the prospect of benefit from his alliance.

"The Governor General will willingly recognize any Government approved by the Affghans themselves, which shall appear desirous and capable of maintaining friendly relations with neighbouring states,

"Content with the limits nature appears to have assigned to its empire, the Government of India will devote all its efforts to the establishment and maintenance of general peace, to the protection of the Sovereigns and Chiefs its allies, and to the prosperity and happiness of its own faithful subjects.

"The rivers of the Punjab and Indus, and the mountainous Passes and the barbarous tribes of Affghanistan will be placed between the British army and an enemy approaching from the West, if indeed such enemy there can be, and no longer between the army and its supplies.

"The enormous expenditure required for the support of a large force, in a false military position, at a distance from its own frontier and its resources, will no longer arrest every measure for the improvement of the country and of the people.

"The combined army of England and of India, superior in equipment, in discipline, in valour, and in the Officers by whom it is commanded, to any force which can be opposed to it in Asia, will stand in unassailable strength upon its own soil, and for ever, under the blessing of Providence, preserve the glorious empire it has won, in security and in honor.

"The Governor General cannot fear the misconstruction of his motives in thus frankly announcing to surrounding States, the pacific and conservative policy of his Government.

"Affghanistan and China have seen at once the forces at his disposal, and the effect with which they can be applied.

"Sincerely attached to peace for the sake of the benefits it confers upon the people, the Governor General is resolved that peace shall be observed, and will put forth the whole power of the British Government to coerce the State by which it shall be infringed.

"By order of the Right Honorable the Governor General of India.

T. H. MADDOCK,

Secretary to the Government of India, with the Governor General."

A few days after this remarkable state paper had appeared, the gratifying intelligence arrived in India, of the release of the whole of the prisoners. The official accounts of the very interesting circumstances attending this event are so extremely meagre, that the following graphic narrative, from the pen of one of the emancipated captives, may fairly precede them :—

"It has pleased God to try us in the furnace of adversity for many years; but in every cloud that overhung our path, the rainbow of His

mercy has shone conspicuously, forbidding us to despair, and reminding us that we are the object of His providential care and loving kindness. But how specially has this been the case during the past twelve months of our history! The horrors of war, enhanced by the rigours of climate, encompassed us, and thousands fell victims around us to cold, famine, and the sword, until every door of escape seemed closed. We finally fell into the hands of a bloody and treacherous tyrant, "neither fearing God, nor regarding man," in whose custody we felt less secure than Daniel in the lion's den, because we lacked his super human faith. Yet, for nine tedious months of cheerless captivity, the restraining hand of the Almighty upon our savage keepers preserved us from hurt or dishonour, and when finally a life of wretched slavery seemed our inevitable lot, he sent us aid from an unexpected quarter, and delivered us from all our fears. As the true story of our release may not have reached you, a brief narration may be acceptable. On the 25th August, news having previously been received of General Pollock's forward movement, Mahomed Akbar sent a messenger to prepare us for an immediate march. We were at this time residing in the fort of Ali Mahomed Khan at Sewreckee, about six miles from the city of Cabul, and Akbar had sworn that General Pollock's advance should be the signal for our removal to Turkistan, where he would distribute us as slaves to the different chiefs. At night a Regiment arrived, about 400 strong, the men composing it being all armed with English muskets, and, (having nearly all formerly belonged to different Affghan corps), observing many of the outward forms of discipline. They were commanded by Sala Mahomed Khan, once a Soobadar in Hopkins' Regiment, and who had deserted to Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, previous to Colonel Dennie's action with that chief at Bameean in 1840. For some time previous to our receiving this abrupt summons, sickness had by turns prostrated the strength of almost every individual of our party, and, although the majority were convalescent, two of the ladies (Mrs. Anderson and Mrs. Trevor) were in a state that rendered their removal impracticable. This having been represented to Akbar Khan, he reluctantly permitted them to remain; and Dr. Campbell was likewise suffered to stay in attendance upon them. At about 10 P. M., the bugles and drums of our new escort summoned us to mount, and we soon found ourselves on the high road to Bameean. At Killa Kazee, we were joined by Lieutenants Haughton and Evans, with about 40 European Soldiers, who had been left at Cabul in Hospital under charge of the latter officer. Wretched and disconsolate, we journeyed on; and after crossing four steep mountain Passes, we arrived, on the 3d September, in the valley of Bameean, beyond the Indian Caucasus. Here the European Soldiers were lodged in a small dirty fort, about a mile beyond the celebrated Boodist images, whilst the ladies and officers were permitted to remain in their tents outside until the 9th September, when Sala Mahomed obliged us to remove into another fort, about 100 yards from that containing the Soldiers. The change was greatly for the worse, for the wretched hard hovels into which we were crammed having been recently inhabited by cows, goats,

and sheep, teemed with vermin, and retained the unswept remains of odoriferous filth. A few rays of light penetrated through small holes in the roof, which just sufficed to rescue the apartments from the stigma of absolute darkness. On Sunday, September 11th, Sala Mahomed having received a positive order from Akbar Khan for our instant march to Koloom, the desperate state of our condition induced Major Pottinger to go to him with the offer of a bribe for our release. Captain Johnson volunteered to be agent in the matter, and found our keeper more accessible than was expected. This man had hitherto kept aloof from every attempt at friendly intercourse with the prisoners, towards whom his manner had been invariably haughty, and his language harsh. Great was our astonishment, therefore, to learn, as we did in the course of the day, that he had been seduced from his allegiance to Akbar, and bought over to our side. Meanwhile, the rapid advance of the two English armies upon Cabul, and the probable defeat of Akbar, led us to expect that chief's arrival amongst us as likely to happen at any moment. It was therefore necessary to be prepared against any sudden surprize. The Huzareh chiefs in the neighbourhood were sounded, and found favourable to our scheme. The men composing our guard were gained over by a promise of four months' pay. A new Governor was set up over the provinces by Major Pottinger, the existing Governor, Zooficar Khan, being too much in Akbar's interest to be trusted. Presents and promises were distributed in all directions, and with so much success, that on the 13th September, we had assurances of aid from all the chiefs between the Sir Chushm and Lygham, bodies of whose armed followers were said to have been posted along the road to keep the Passes.

"On the 16th September, the country was considered sufficiently safe to admit of our setting out on our return towards Cabul. We had only proceeded a few miles, when a messenger met us with news of General Pollock's victory over Akbar, which cheering intelligence was shortly afterwards confirmed by a note from Sir Richmond Shakespear, who was hastening to our assistance with 600 Kuzzilbash horsemen.

"On the 17th, we re-crossed the Kaloo Ghat, and encamped about three miles from its base. We had been here about two hours, when some horsemen were descried descending the Pass of Hajeeguk. Instantly Sala Mahomed's men were on the alert, and formed up in line. Judge of our joy when the banner of the Kuzzilbash was distinguished streaming in the air, and imagine, if you can, with what emotions of delight and gratitude we eagerly pressed forward to greet our gallant countryman, Sir Richmond Shakespear, who soon came galloping up to where we stood. For the first time after nine months of miserable thralldom, in the clutches of an unprincipled savage, we felt the blessedness of freedom. A heavy load of care had been removed from our breasts, and from that moment we were altered beings. To God be all the glory, for He alone could bring it to pass!

"But there was danger still around us. Akbar and other powerful chiefs were still at large, and might have followers and influence

sufficient to intercept our flight. Sir Richmond, therefore, having written to General Pollock for a brigade to meet us, hurried us on by forced marches of twenty-five and thirty miles per diem. Re-crossing the Hajeejuk and Oonai Passes, we entered the beautiful valley of Maidan on the 20th September, and as we approached the town of Kot-Ashroo, a body of English Dragoons and Native Cavalry came suddenly upon our view, piqueted in some adjoining fields.

"All doubt was now at an end; we were once more under the safeguard of British troops. General Sale was there in person, and his happiness at regaining his long lost wife and daughter, can readily be imagined. The gallant veteran's countenance was an index to his feelings, and apathetic indeed must have been the heart that failed to sympathize with his holy joy. The camp was still a few miles further on, and we formed a procession of glad spirits as we moved along towards the Pass of Suffed Khak, whose heights we could discern crowned with British bayonets. Those we found to be a part of the brave 13th Light Infantry, who, as the ladies successively ascended the hill, raised three hearty cheers of welcome to each of them: sounds never to be forgotten, producing a thrill of extacy through the whole frame. The mountain guns under Capt. Backhouse wound up the scene with a royal salute.

"On the following evening, we reached General Pollock's camp at Cabul, where the Horse Artillery guns uttered similar sounds of public exultation; such was the history of our wonderful deliverance. Had Sala Mahomed Khan proved incorruptible, no effort of our army could have saved us, and in gaining over him and the Huzzareh chiefs, Major Pottinger was mainly instrumental. To him and Sir R. Shakespear the highest praise is due. General Pollock also, I verily believe, did his best, and our efforts would have been of small avail but for his victorious march on Cabul. To him likewise we ought therefore to be grateful, but most of all to heaven."

The Official details of the release may now be given:—

From Major General GEORGE POLLOCK, C. B. Commanding in Afghanistan, to Major General LUMLEY, Adjutant General of the Army.

"SIR,—I have the honor to report for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that having received intimation from Bameeen, that the Europeans, Officers and Soldiers, prisoners there, had made arrangements by which they hoped to effect their own liberation. I at the suggestion of Mohun Lal, with the concurrence of Khan Sheereen Khan, Chief of the Kuzzilbashes, sanctioned the speedy departure of seven hundred (700) of his Horse on the 15th instant, the day of our arrival here, to meet the party. Some difficulty occurring on the score of money, I advanced ten thousand (10,000) Rupees, which were delivered by Sir R. Shakespear, who accompanied the Kuzzilbashes.

Being apprehensive that attempts would be made to intercept the prisoners, I detached Major General Sir R. Sale, with the troops named in the margin on the 19th instant to the Arghundee Pass, and the circumstance proved fortunate, as a delay of twenty-four hours would have enabled Sultan Jan, who was in pursuit, to overtake our people. I am happy to state, that the whole who were in confinement, (as per subjoined Roll,) with the exception of Captain Bygrave, who is with Mahomed Akbar, arrived in my Camp yesterday evening.

"I cannot conclude, without recording my opinion, that to Khan Sheereen Khan and Mohun Lal, may be attributed the safety of the Prisoners, and I have reason to believe, the Chief of the Kuzzilbashas to be a stedfast adherent to the British Government.

"I have, &c.

GEO. POLLOCK, Major General,
Commanding in Affghanistan."

List of Prisoners released on the 21st September, 1842.

"Colonel Shelton, H. M. 44th Foot.—Lieutenant Evans.—Brevet Captain Souter.—Sergeants Wedlock, Weir, and Fair.—Corporals Sumpter, and Bevan.—Drummers Higgins, Lovell, and Branagan.—Privates Burnes, Crasheim, Cronin, Driscoll, Deroney, Duffy, Mathews, McDate, Marrow, McCarthy, McCabe, Nowean, Robson, Seyburnes, Shean, Tongue, Wilson, Durant, Arch, Scott, Moore, Miller, Murphy, Marshall, Cox, Robinson, Brady, and McGlynn.—Boys Grier, and Milwood.

H. M. 13th Light Infantry.

"Privates Binding, Murray, Magary, Monks, Maccullar, McConnell, and Cuff.

Bengal Horse Artillery.

"Sergeants McNee, and Cleland.—Gunners A. Hearn, Keane, Dulton.—Sergeant Wade, Baggage Serjeant to the Cabool Mission.

Summary.

"Major General Shelton, H. M. 44th Foot.—Lieutenant Colonel Palmer, 27th Bengal N. I.—Major Griffiths, 37th Bengal N. I.—Captains Boyd, Commissariat.—Johnson, do. S. S. 26th N. I.—Burnet, 54th N. I.—Souter, H. M. 44th Foot.—Waller, Bengal Horse Artillery.—Alston, 27th N. I.—Poett, ditto.—Walsh, 52nd Madras N. I. and Drummond, 3rd Bengal Light Cavalry.—Lieutenants Eyre, Bengal Artillery.—Airey, H. M. 3rd Buffs.—Warburton, Bengal Artillery, S. S. F.—Webb, 38th Madras N. I., S. S. F.—Crawford, Bengal 3rd N. I., S. S. F.—Mein, H. M. 13th Light Infantry.—Harris, 27th Bengal N. I. Melville, 54th Bengal N. I. and Evans, H. M. 44th Foot.—Ensigns

position. Our light troops and guns repressed the occasional attacks of their *Jezailehies* from the gardens, who were numerous and most audacious; but when the column arrived in front of the village of *Ismillah*, I resolved to make a combined attack on this point; Brigadier Tulloch's brigade assailed its left, and Brigadier Stacy, making a longer detour, attacked the right.

"I cannot express in adequate terms my admiration of the style in which the former column covered by skirmishers rushed upon the gardens filled with bold and skilful marksmen. Her Majesty's 9th foot, the 26th native infantry, and Captain Broadfoot's sappers, vied with each other in steady courage, and their rapid and unhesitating advance soon left the enemy no resources but flight. Very shortly after this assault, the three light companies of Her Majesty's 41st, the 42d and 43d native infantry, covering their own column, got into action, and on their side stormed the village and vineyard with distinguished gallantry: the combination was steadily persevered in, and though I had few opportunities of using the artillery with effect, I had soon the gratification of seeing the enclosures, forts, heights, suburbs, and town successively won by the two columns. The enemy were driven from them, and pursued with a rapidity which left no time to rally, and a singular spectacle was then presented in the escape up the mountain's side of the women and children from the place, to which no interception was offered; but as detached parties of the beaten *Affghans* still occupied some very lofty heights, the mountain train ascended them by a dizzy pathway, and dispersed the fugitives by its effective fire. Our reserve was now established on the lower heights, and the whole of the place, filled with property of every description, much of it plundered from our army in 1841, was in the hands of our force; two guns, brass field pieces, were also taken, and one of them was seized with such promptitude, that its captor, Lieutenant Elmherst, Her Majesty's 9th foot, turned its fire upon the fugitives with some effect. I directed the town to be set on fire in several places, after taking out various supplies which might be useful to our troops, and the work of demolition is still proceeding under the direction of Major Sanders, of the engineers. Our loss has been trifling, for the advance of our Officers and men was too rapid and decisive to allow of the sharp fire of the enemy telling much upon them, and deceived by the direction of the reconnoissance of the 28th, the *Affghans* had expected the attack on their left, and posted their guns and the elite of their force in that quarter. I have now the pleasing task of expressing the amount of my obligations for their exertions in the field, to Brigadiers Tulloch and Stacy, commanding brigades and columns; to Lieutenant Colonel Taylor, K. H., Her Majesty's 9th foot; Major Huish, 26th native infantry; and Captain Broadfoot, of the sappers, commanding corps on the right, which bore the brunt of the action; to Major Simmonds, Her Majesty's 41st foot, commanding the reserve; to Captain Backhouse, commanding mountain train, and Captain Blood, commanding the battery of 9-pounders; the last was ably aided by Lieut Terry. I have received valuable assistance through-

out our operations from Major Pottinger, C. B., and Major Sanders, engineers, and yesterday from Capt. Mackenzie and Lieut. Airy, H. M. 3rd bufs, and Lieutenant Webb, 30th regiment Madras native infantry, temporarily attached to me, and since we marched from Caboul, as on former occasions, from my own staff, departmental and personal; viz. Captain Havelock, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General; Lieutenant Pollock, Artillery, Aid de-Camp to the Major General, who volunteered his services with me; and to Lieutenant Bethune, Her Majesty's 9th Foot, my own Aid de-Camp. Regarding the last mentioned officer, I take the opportunity of rectifying an oversight on my part. I ought specially to have reported to Major General Pollock, Lieutenant Bethune's valuable services in the recent affair at the Huft Kotul, in which I was entrusted with the command of the main column. Brigadier Tulloch, reports in very strong terms, the good conduct on the present occasion of Captain Smith, Her Majesty's 9th Foot, his Brigade Major. I enclose a return of the killed and wounded, and of the two guns captured.

"I have, &c.

JOHN McCASKILL, *Major General,*

Commanding the Force in the Kohistan."

Return of Killed and Wounded of the Troops under the Command of Major General McCASKILL, K. H. Camp Istalif, 30th September, 1842.

"Mountain Train.—Wounded 1 European commissioned officer.

"3d Company 1st Battalion, Bombay Artillery.—Wounded 2 rank and file.

"Christie's Irregular Cavalry.—Horses, 2 killed and 2 wounded.

"H. M. 9th Foot.—Killed 1 rank and file.—Wounded 1 European commissioned officer, 1 serjeant, and 13 rank and file.

"26th N. I.—Killed 1 rank and file.—Wounded 1 European commissioned officer, 3 serjeants, and 8 rank and file.

"Broadfoot's Sappers.—Killed 2 rank and file.—Wounded 1 European commissioned officer and 6 rank and file.—Horse 1 Wounded.

"H. M. 41st Regt.—Killed 1 European commissioned officer and 1 rank and file.—Wounded 4 rank and file.

"42d N. I.—Wounded 4 rank and file.

Name of Officer Killed.

"Lieut. Evans, H. M.'s 41st foot.

Wounded.

"Lieut. Richardson, horse artillery, slightly.

"Lieut. and Adj. Spencer, 26th N. I., ditto.

"Lieut. Lister, H. M.'s 9th, ditto,

"Captain Broadfoot, Sappers, ditto.

"Lieut. and Adj. Orr's charger wounded."

H. HAVELOCK, *Captain,*

Dep. Assist. Adj. Infantry Division."

From Major McCaskill, K. H., Commanding Infantry Division, to Captain Ponsonby, Assistant Adjutant General, Camp Khwenja Ruwath, 6th October, 1842.

"SIR,—The troops entrusted to my charge for a special service in the Kohistan, having pitched their tents at this place previously to returning to their respective encampments, I take this opportunity of requesting you to solicit the attention of Major General Pollock, C. B., to some points, which, in the hurry of our active operations, I had neglected to dwell upon. I have already intimated, that Brigadier Stacy's report of the part borne by his brigade in the capture of Istalif, on the 29th ultimo, did not reach me till the 2d instant. It will ever be matter of regret to me, if this incidental delay should prevent the merits of some of the Officers and troops under me, being prominently brought to the notice of the Right Hon'ble the Governor General, and His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. The brunt of the action certainly fell on the infantry corps and sappers of Brigadier Tulloch's brigade; but the credit of turning the enemy's extreme right; of allowing him no respite or breathing time on that line; of aiding in completing the capture of the town, when its possession was hotly disputed from behind the walls, and from the tops of houses, from court yards and in winding streets built on steep declivities, is due to the regiment under Brigadier Stacy. My commendations have been especially earned by Major G. Brown and H. M.'s 41st regiment, for the share they took in these gallant efforts, and for the exemplary humanity displayed to the unfortunate families of the vanquished. That corps was zealously emulated and supported by the 42d native infantry under Major Clarkson, and the 43d under Major Sanders, as Field Engineer, I ought to have remarked on the distinguished gallantry, with which he accompanied the heads of columns in the advance of Brigadier Tulloch, against the gardens and town. Neither must I leave without record, the marked intrepidity of Lieutenant Mayne, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, in pointing out the path of the same column amidst the hottest of the fire, and in aiding in following up the victory. I have before mentioned, that the light companies of H. M.'s 41st, and the 42d, and 43d native infantry, covered the manœuvres of their own brigade. This onset was led very bravely by Lieutenant Evans, who was afterwards killed in the town, (and was succeeded in the command by Lieutenant Madden,) and by Lieutenant Woolen, 42d native infantry, and Captain Macpherson, 43d native infantry."

"I have, &c.

JOHN MCCASKILL, Major General,
Commanding Infantry Division."

A sufficient time having been allowed for the troops to rest themselves, and for the collection of provisions, the united armies now turned their faces homewards. Opposition was expected in the passes, and

the order of march was therefore so regulated, that all interruptions might be effectually removed. The annexed letters carry the columns to Peshawur:—

Extract from a letter to Major General LUMLEY, Adjutant General of the Army, from Major General POLLOCK, C. B., Commanding in Afghanistan, dated Camp Khoord Cabool, 13th October, 1842.

"I have the honor to report, for the information of his Excellency

the Commander-in-Chief, my arrival at Khoord Cabool, in progress to Hindostan. I left Cabool yesterday morning, with the 1st and 2d divisions, and the troops under Major General Nott, as per margin, for Bootkhak, having detached Major General Sir R. Sale, with the 1st and 2d brigades, the mountain train, 1st light cavalry, 3d irregular cavalry and Christie's horse, over the Goaspund-durrah Pass, for the purpose of turning that of the Khoord Cabool; in consequence of which movement, we marched through the principal defile without a shot being fired. Previous to my departure from Cabool, I destroyed, with gunpowder, the grand bazar of that city, called the Chahar Chuttah, built in the reign of Arungzebe, by the celebrated Ali Murdan Khan, and which may be considered to have been the most frequented part of Cabool, and known as the grand emporium of this part of Central Asia. The remains of the late Envoy and Minister had been exposed to public insult in this bazar, and my motive in effecting its destruction, has been to impress upon the Affghans, that their atrocious conduct towards a British functionary has not been suffered to pass with impunity."

1st DIVISION.

4 guns 3d troop 1st Brig.
Horse Art.
No 6 Light Field Bat.
2 15-pounders and detail R. Art.
Mountain Train.
H. M. 3d Light Drag.
4 Miskallahs 2d Irr. Cav.
1 squadron 1st Light Cav.
H. M. 8th Foot.
12th Light Infantry.
26th Native Infantry.
25th Light Infantry.
5th Comp. Sappers and Miners.
Broadfoot's Sappers.
Jewell's.
Hildars.
Sikh Contingent.

2nd DIVISION.

2 guns 3d troop 2d Brig. H. Art.
Capt. Blood's Bat. of 9-pdrs.
2 squadrons 1st Light Cav.
H. M. 51st Foot.
3d Regiment Native Infantry.
16th ditto ditto.
Wing 23d Native Infantry.
Ditto 60th ditto.

GENERAL NOTT'S FORCE

1 troop Bombay Horse Art.
1 ditto Guel. S. S. Force.
Detachment Foot Artillery.
3d regiment Bombay Light Cav.
Detachment 1st Irr. Cav.
Ditto 1st Irregular Cavalry.
Christie's Horse.
Detachment Sappers and Miners.
Ditto Madras ditto.
H. M. 40th Foot.
16th Native Infantry.
28th ditto.
2d (late) Shah Sojah's Force.
H. M. 41st Foot.
2d Native Infantry.
42d ditto, 43d ditto.

2d Brigade, 1st Brigade.

Extract from a letter to the Governor General, from Major General POLLOCK, dated Jugdulluck, 16th October 1842.

"It is very gratifying to be able to state, that we have met with no opposition since we left Cabool, except what must always be expected where the whole population is armed, and we have consequently had small parties of thieves occasionally firing on the rear guards. During each night that we have encamped, not a shot has been fired, and on the line of march, not a man is to be seen on the hills."

From Major General J. McCaskill, K. H., Commanding Infantry Division, to the Assistant Adjutant General, Camp Gundamuck, 20th October, 1842.

"SIR,—I beg to report to you, for the information of Major General Pollock, C. B., that the force of the 2d column under my immediate command, as detailed in the margin, was attacked by the predatory tribes of the mountains, on its march from Tezeen, from which point it was separated from your Head Quarters, up to the date of its arrival at Gundamuck. The most serious opposition which it encountered, was in the defile of Jugdulluck, celebrated for the previous conflicts between the Ghilzies and our troops last year, and during the late advance on Cabool.

"I broke up from my encampment at the foot of this Pass, early on the morning of the 18th instant, and made arrangements, as I advanced, in proportion, of course, to my numerical strength, for the occupation of the several strong points which commanded the road. Detached parties began to shew themselves as my force reached the crest of the position, and after disposing flanking detachments on the domineering heights to the right and left, I awaited the approach of Brigadier Monteath with the main body of the column, before I descended into the lower ground beyond.

"The necessity for this caution was soon demonstrated, for as the Brigadier took up his position on the plateau, partially occupied by the ruins of the well known fort, he observed the enemy collecting in force around him. He, therefore, very properly, determined to hold the head of the Pass until the whole of the baggage and materiel had moved down towards the plain below, and the rear guard under Lieutenant Colonel Richmond should have joined him on the eminence. He placed his guns in battery, and their fire and that of the troops, completely held the enemy, who were very numerous, in check, and he reports with much satisfaction, that though the attempts of the Ghilzies were obstinate and persevering, they did not succeed in making themselves masters of a single article of baggage or military stores. A sharp conflict was, however, sustained upon particular points whilst the rear guard was coming up, in the one direction, and our long train of animals descending in the other. The Brigadier finally gave over charge of the position to Lieut. Col. Richmond and his rear guard, whom he counselled to retain it one quarter of an hour after his own troops advanced beyond it. The succession of lower eminences on either flank had, in the meantime, been crowned, so far as our limited means permitted, under my personal direction, by parties from the advanced guard from Jugdulluck to the valley of Soorkhab, and the baggage was thus protected from the attacks of the predatory bodies which were

Artillery.
3 guns of Capt. Alexander's Troop.
Capt. Blood's Battery of 9-pounders.

Cavalry.
Hd.-qrs. and 2 sqdrs. 1st Lt. Cav.
2 Risalaha 2d Irregular Cavalry.

Infantry.
4th Brig. under Brig. Monteath,
C. B., Her Majesty's 21st Regiment.

Wing 22d Native Infantry, reinforced by wing 60th Native Infantry.

3d and 10th Regiments Native Infantry.

hovering around it, along that whole line of road. Lieutenant Colonel Richmond and the rear guard were vigorously pressed by the Ghilzies, as they finally came down from the plateau, but every where most creditably repelled the enemy, and made their way, late in the evening to our encampment at Soorkhab. I have to regret that Captain Burnett, 54th native infantry, who had been recently released from a captivity commenced at Ghuznee, was severely wounded on the heights, having volunteered his services with a party of the 16th native infantry. Brevet Captain Pender, Her Majesty's 31st foot, had received a bad hurt in a previous skirmish near Seh Baba. Throughout these affairs, the conduct of the troops employed, including the 2d and 16th native infantry, temporarily attached to me, has deserved my highest approbation, and I feel it to be my duty to record, that on the advance to Cabool, and in retiring from it, the bravery of that portion of the 4th brigade which took part in the active operations; viz. Her Majesty's 31st regiment, and a wing of the 33d native infantry, (the remaining wing and the 6th native infantry having been detained to garrison Jellalabad and Gundamuck,) as well as their endurance of privations and fatigue, have been beyond all praise. No troops could in every respect have behaved better, and I feel myself to be deeply indebted to Brigadier Monteath, C. B., and to Lieutenant Colonel Bolton, Her Majesty's 31st, and Lieutenant Colonel Richmond, 33d native infantry, for the able and gallant manner in which they have been led.

"I enclose a return of killed and wounded."

From Brigadier T. MONTEATH, C. B., Commanding 4th Brigade, to the Assistant Adjutant General, Camp Seh Baba, 15th October, 1842.

"SIR,—I have the honor of addressing you, to report, for the information of Major General Pollock, C. B., that in consequence of the great delay created by the captured guns, which it was necessary with extreme labor to drag almost the whole way from Khoord Cabool to Tezeen, on account of the badness of the bullocks, and which work was performed in a most admirable manner by the men of Her Majesty's 31st regiment, I did not enter the Huft Kotal Pass with the force under my command, until late yesterday evening.

Rear Guard consisting of
Capt. Blood's Battery of 5-pounders.
1 Squadron 1st Light Cavalry.
2 Bussalahs 3d Irregular Cavalry.
H. M.'s 11st Regiment.
2d Regiment N. I.
33d ditto (right wing).
60th ditto (right wing).
Piquets from:
H. M.'s 9th Regiment.
H. M.'s 13th Light Infantry.
56th Regiment Native Infantry.
21st Light Infantry.

For about one half of the way through, the troops met with no molestation, but as the Pass narrowed and became more difficult for the passage of the guns, the enemy took advantage of stoppages occasioned by them, and from their positions, which the darkness rendered it impossible to perceive, except by the flashing of their fire arms, opened a sharp fire on the troops, which was checked, in a considerable degree, on the right flank of the column by two companies of the 2d regiment and a party of Her Majesty's 31st regiment, detached by me for the purpose.

"As this latter party, from the immediate necessity that existed for their services, was taken by me from the fatigue detail at the guns (with which I happened to be at the time) I sent it out under Brigade Major Lugard, who, in returning from the duty on which he was employed, had his horse severely wounded.

"The enemy having in the end come down sword in hand upon the rear and left flank of the column, I ordered Lieutenant Colonel Richmond, with the wing of the 33d regiment, and the picquets of the old ground that had joined on the march to keep them in check, which was satisfactorily done, until we had cleared the Pass.

"Enclosed I beg to send a return of killed and wounded."

Return of Killed and Wounded in Passing the Huft Kotul, on the 14th October, 1842, by the 4th Brigade and Troops attached, Camp Seh Baba, 15th October, 1842.

"Her Majesty's 31st Regiment.—Killed 1 rank and file; wounded 2 rank and file.—2d Regiment N. I.—Killed 1 rank and file; wounded 1 officer, and 4 rank and file.—16th Regt.—Wounded 1 rank and file.—33d Regt.—Killed 1 rank and file.—60th Regt.—Killed 2 rank and file; wounded 1 rank and file.

"Remarks.—Lieut. Mainwaring, 2d Regt. Native Infantry, wounded slightly.

"Brigade Major Lugard's charger wounded severely."

"T. MONTEATH, Brigadier, Commanding 4th Brigade."

From Brigadier T. MONTEATH, C. B., Commanding 4th Brigade, to Captain HAVELOCK, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, Camp Gundamuck, 19th October, 1842.

"SIR,—I have the honor of reporting, for the information of Major General McCaskill, K. H., that on arriving yesterday morning with the main column of the division into the Jugdulluck Pass, I observed that the enemy were collecting in force on the heights; therefore, conceiving that an attack would be made upon the baggage, as well as upon the rear guard, I determined upon taking up a position, with the whole of my force, at the head of the Pass, until all the baggage and materiel had gone through, and I had been joined by the rear guard under Lieutenant Colonel Richmond.

"In pursuance of this determination, I placed the troops and two 9-pounders in position on the plateau at the head of the Pass, from whence the heights on both sides are commanded for a considerable distance.

"The fire of these and of the guns, completely held the enemy, who were very numerous, in check, and I had the satisfaction of seeing the whole of the baggage out of the Pass without a single thing having been obtained by them; and on the arrival of Lieutenant Colonel

Richmond with the rear guard, I resigned the position to him, and marched on to protect the baggage, which had then become placed between the advance and the main column.

"Lieutenant Colonel Richmond, who had been directed by me to remain in position for a quarter of an hour after my departure with the rear guard, consisting of six hundred and nineteen rank and file and two guns, reports that on his withdrawal, the enemy, to the extent of about six hundred men, came forward in a very determined manner, and followed him up for a considerable distance, although frequently driven back by the fire of the troops and guns.

"Enclosed I beg to transmit a return of killed and wounded, and ammunition expended in the main column and rear guard during the day."

Return of Killed and Wounded, in action with the Enemy in the Jugdulluck Pass, on the 18th October, 1842, Camp Gundamuck, 19th October 1842.

"3d Irregular Horse.—Killed 1 rank and file, and wounded 1 sergeant.

"Her Majesty's 31st Regiment.—Wounded 1 officer, 1 sergeant, and 4 rank and file.

"2d Regiment N. I.—Killed 2 rank and file, and wounded 9 rank and file.

"16th ditto ditto.—Killed 2 rank and file; wounded 1 officer, 1 sergeant, and 12 rank and file.

"33d ditto ditto.—Wounded 1 officer, 1 sergeant, and 4 rank and file.

"60th ditto ditto.—Killed 2 rank and file, and wounded 1 rank and file.

"Remarks.—Brevet Captain Pender, severely wounded.

"Captain Burnett, 54th N. I., severely wounded, when with a detachment of the 16th N. I.

T. MONTEATH, Brigadier,
Commanding 4th Brigade."

From Brigadier T. MONTEATH, C. B., Commanding 4th Brigade, to Captain HAVELOCK, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, Camp Gundamuck, 20th October, 1842.

"SIR,—I have the honor of transmitting a report of the occurrences which took place with that portion of the force under my command, in the Jugdulluck Pass, on the 18th instant.

"As from what I have learnt, I have reason to think, that the reports of the former march from Soorkhab to Tezeen, when the casualties in the force amounted to sixty-two, have not been forwarded to Government; and as I consider it very desirable it should be on record that the toils, dangers, and deserts of my brigade have not been in a degree less than those of the other portions of the army, I have to request,

that Major General McCaskill will be good enough to express to Major General Pollock, my wish that my three reports may be forwarded for the information of the Governor General."

To T. H. MADDOCK, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Camp Jellalabad, 23d October, 1842.

"SIR,—I have the honor to forward for the information of the Right Hon'ble the Governor General of India, copy of a letter which I yesterday addressed to the Adjutant General of the Army, reporting my arrival at this place. I have also the honor to forward copy of a letter from me to the same address, transmitting a despatch from Major General Nott.

"I have made preparations for the destruction of the fortifications here, and trust to be enabled to march in progress to Peshawur on the 25th instant. I will write again on this subject directly I have heard from Major General Nott, whose arrival here is still uncertain.

"I have, &c.

GEORGE POLLOCK, Major General,
Commanding in Afghanistan."

To Major General LUMLEY, Adjutant General of the Army, Jellalabad, 22d October, 1842.

"SIR,—I have the honor to report for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, my arrival here this morning with the first division of the troops. Major General McCaskill will arrive to-morrow, and Major General Nott on the day following.

"I withdrew from Gundamuck the detachment which had been left for the purpose of keeping open the communication; the wing of the 33d N. I. has joined the head-quarters of the regiment, which is with the 2d division, and the wing of the 60th, joined by that left at Gundamuck, is attached to the 1st division, as are also the squadrons of the 5th and 10th light cavalry.

I have, &c.

GEO. POLLOCK, Major General, *Commanding in Afghanistan."*

To Major General LUMLEY, Adjutant General of the Army, Camp Jellalabad, 23d October, 1842.

"SIR,—I have the honor to forward a despatch from Major General Nott, detailing his progress over the Huft Kotul, with a return of casualties. I have understood that the column under Major General McCaskill has experienced some loss, but I have not as yet received a report from that Officer.

"I have, &c.

GEORGE POLLOCK, Major General,
Commanding in Afghanistan."

From Major General W. NOTT, Commanding Division of the Army, to Captain G. PONSONBY, Assistant Adjutant General, dated Camp Giant's Tomb, 15th October, 1842.

"SIR,—I beg to report for the information of Major General Pollock, C. B., that the rear guard of the force under my command, was yesterday attacked by large bodies of the enemy in the Huft Kotul Pass. I sent 200 sepoys and a wing of Her Majesty's 40th Regiment, and two companies of Her Majesty's 41st, under command of Major Hibbert, to the assistance of Captain Leeson of the 42d Regiment Native Infantry, who had charge of the rear. Our sepoys defeated and dispersed the enemy; Captain Leeson speaks in high terms of the gallantry of the officers and sepoys under his command.

"Major Hibbert and the wing of Her Majesty's 40th Regiment and the two companies of Her Majesty's 41st, under Captain Blackburne, behaved with their accustomed gallantry; my thanks are due to all the troops engaged. I enclose a list of killed and wounded.

"I have, &c.

W. NOTT, Major General."

Return of Killed and Wounded during the attacks on the rear guard of Major Gen. NOTT's Force, on the evening of the 15th, and morning of 16th Oct. 1842.

| | KILLED. | | | | | | WOUNDED. | | |
|---|----------------------|---------|--------------|---------------------|------------|--------|----------------------|----------------|---------|
| | Privates and Sepoys. | Horses. | Lieutenants. | Assistant Surgeons. | Havildars. | Naiks. | Privates and Sepoys. | Horse-keepers. | Horses. |
| 1st troop Bombay H. A. | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 5 |
| Christie's Horse, | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 5 |
| Her Majesty's 40th Regiment of Foot, .. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| 38th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry, .. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| 3rd Regiment Irregular Infantry, | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| 43rd Regiment Bengal | | | | | | | | | |
| 2nd Brigade } Native Infantry, | 9 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 23 | 0 | 0 |
| 43rd ditto, | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| 1st Regiment of Irregular Cavalry, (Haldane's), | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Total of each, | 12 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 36 | 1 | 10 |
| Total, | 12 | 3 | | | 49 | | | | 10 |

Grand Total of Killed and Wounded—Sixty-one Officers and men; thirteen horses.

OFFICERS WOUNDED.

"Lieut. and Bt. Capt. W. Jervis, 42d Regt. Bengal N. I.—Lieut. N. W. Chamberlain, Christie's Horse.—Asst. Surgeon J. H. Serrell, 42d Regt. Bengal N. I.

"N. B.—One Havildar, one Naik, and one Sepoy, of the 27th N. I. doing duty with 43d N. I. are included in the above.

W. NOTT, Major General, Commanding the Field Force."

From Major General GEORGE POLLOCK, C. B., Commanding in Affghanistan, to T. H. MADDOCK, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Camp Ally Boghan, 27th October, 1842.

"SIR,—I have the honor to report for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor General of India, my departure from Jellalabad, with the whole of the troops excepting General Nott's division, after destroying the fortifications of that city.

"I have, &c.

GEO. POLLOCK, Major General,
Commanding in Affghanistan."

From Major General W. NOTT, Commanding Field Force, to Captain PONDSNEY, Assistant Adjutant General, dated Camp Gundamuck, 20th October, 1842.

"SIR,—I have the honor to acquaint you, for the information of Major General Pollock, C. B., that a large body of the enemy attacked my rear guard yesterday, which was under the command of Major Simmons of Her Majesty's 41st regiment: the enemy was defeated with considerable loss. I have every reason to be satisfied with the arrangements made by Major Simmons, and of the conduct of the men under his command

"I return a list of killed and wounded.

Return of Killed and Wounded, during the attack on the Rear Guard of Major General Nott's Force, on the 19th October, 1842.

"Her Majesty's 40th Foot.—Killed 1 private; and wounded 1 ensign, 1 corporal, and 1 private.

"Her Majesty's 41st Foot.—Killed 1 private, and Wounded 2 privates.

"38th B. N. I.—Wounded 2 privates, and 2 doolee bearers.

"42d B. N. I.—Wounded 1 captain, and 1 private.

"43d B. N. I.—Wounded 1 captain, and 3 privates.

"Grand Total of killed and wounded, seventeen (17) officers and men.

OFFICERS WOUNDED.

"Captain Dalryell, 42d Bengal Native Infantry.

"Lieut. and Brevet Capt. H. W. Matthews, 43d N. I.

"Ensign McGowan, Her Majesty's 40th Foot.

W. NOTT, Major General,
Commanding the Force."

General Pollock reached Peshawur on the 25th October, meanwhile General England had accomplished his march into Scinde from Lower Affghanistan, and with his report of the manner of the undertaking, and the prefatory order of the Governor General, the military records of the Four Years' Campaign in Affghanistan terminate:—

" *Secret Department, Simla, the 20th October, 1842.*—The Governor General has much satisfaction in announcing the successful termination of the arduous and difficult operation confided to Major General England, of withdrawing, through the Kojuck and Bolan Passes into the valley of the Indus, a portion of the force lately stationed at Candahar, and all the scattered garrisons of the intermediate places, between the Eastern face of the Kojuck mountains and the plains of Cutchee.

"The operation, less brilliant in its circumstances than that entrusted to Major General Pollock and Major General Nott, was yet one which demanded the greatest prudence in the making of every previous arrangement for securing the safe descent of the several columns, and which called into exercise many of the higher qualities, which must contribute to form the character of an accomplished General.

"The Governor General could not but regard with some anxiety the progress of this movement requiring so much of delicate management in its execution: and it is a subject of extreme satisfaction to him, that the same complete success should have attended this, which has, during the present campaign, attended every other part of the combined operations of the armies beyond the Indus.

"The Governor General requests, that Major General Sir Charles Napier will express to Major General England, and to all the Officers and troops which were under his command, the entire satisfaction with which their whole conduct has been viewed on the occasion.

"The Governor General also requests that Major General Sir Charles Napier will communicate to Major Outram, and the other Political Officers, his thanks for the zeal and ability they have manifested in the means of carriage, and in their various transactions with the native chiefs and tribes, tending to facilitate and secure the descent of the several columns of the army.

"By order of the Right Honorable the Governor General of India,

T. H. MADDOCK,

*Secretary to the Govt. of India,
with the Govr. Genl."*

To T. H. MADDOCK Esq., *Secretary to the Government of India, with the Governor General, dated Sukkur, 12th October, 1842.*

"SIR,—I lose no time in forwarding the enclosed despatch from Major General England, which has this moment reached me. I hope I

may be allowed to offer my congratulations to the Governor General on the successful termination of so arduous and difficult an operation.

"I have, &c.

C. NAPIER, *Major General.*"

To T. H. MADDOCK, Esq., *Secretary to the Government of India, with the Governor General, dated Camp near Dadur, 10th October, 1842.*

"SIR,—I have the honor to acquaint you, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council, that the troops destined to descend to the Indus by the Bolan Pass, finally evacuated Quetta on the 1st instant, and have accomplished their march through that defile without much difficulty.

"2. In order to facilitate the movement of this large body, which with the acquisition of the garrison of Quetta, consisted of more than seven battalions with details of cavalry, eighteen pieces of artillery, and an increased retinue of invalids, and of stores, I divided it into three columns of route, retaining the last in as light a form of equipment as possible, in the hope and supposition that, if the tribes through whose country we should pass were inclined to attack us, they would prefer to make their chief efforts on the last departing division; and I, therefore, sent the greater portion of the sick and public stores with the leading divisions accordingly.

"3. It has proved that this conjecture was right, because the two preceding divisions have been wholly unmolested in their progress through the Pass, whereas on the morning of the 3d, I found the Kakurs posted in some numbers on the steep ground, which commands the upper extremity of the narrow zigzag near Sir-i-bolan.

"4. These insurgents, however, had only time to deliver a few rounds on the column, when their attention was fully engaged by the flanking parties which covered our left, and which I now reinforced by a strong detachment of the 6th Regiment Bombay Native Infantry, and by nearly the whole of the 5th Regiment Irregular Infantry, under Major Woodhouse and Captain Macdonell, respectively.

"5. I had every reason to be satisfied with the handsome manner in which our troops ascended these stupendous heights, and cleared them of the enemy. Major Woodhouse speaks very highly of the conduct of a party of Brahoe horse which accompanied him in this affair.

"6. On this occasion also, Major Outram gave me his able assistance, as well as in flanking the lower extremity of the Bolan Pass near Kundy, where I had good reason to expect again to meet some hostile tribes; but the total disappointment of the Kakurs on the 3d, and the effectual flanking arrangement made on all occasions by our troops, seem to have prevented any renewal of interruption.

"7. I beg leave to enclose a list of the casualties, which have occurred during the passage of the Bolan defile.

" 8. As I now consider the chief difficulties of this march to have terminated, I trust I may be permitted to bring to the notice of His Lordship, the Governor General, the general good conduct of the troops I have had the honor to command during these prolonged and laborious operations; and I venture to submit the names of Major Waddington, Commanding Engineer; Major Wyllie, Major of Brigade; Major Boyd, acting Assistant Quarter Master General; Captain Davidson, Deputy Commissary General, and Surgeon Wight, in chief medical charge; and to claim His Lordship's favorable estimate of the exertions of these Officers in their several departments and capacities; and it is with the utmost satisfaction I am enabled to assure His Lordship, that owing to the discipline which has been exacted, these British columns, in emerging from the Bolan Pass, will leave amongst the peaceable inhabitants of the countries they have quitted, a well merited character for forbearance and humanity; whilst in the deliberate and systematic order of their march, during which every enemy has been beaten off, and no stores lost or captured, the power of our arms has been alike equally and imperiously made manifest.

" 9. The garrison of Sebee will be withdrawn to-morrow, and that of Dadur on the 12th or 13th, when I propose to resume my progress to the Indus.

" I have, &c.

R. ENGLAND, *Major General.*

Commanding Scinde Field Force."

Return of Casualties in skirmishes with the Enemy, since the march of the Head-quarters from Quetta on the 1st, to its arrival at Dadur on the 9th instant, Camp Dadur, 10th October, 1842.

" Killed.—20th N. I. 1 Assistant Surgeon. 5th Irregular Infantry (late Shah's) 1 private.

" Wounded.—6th N. I. 1 private; 20th do. 2 do. and 1 bheesty; 6th Irregular Infantry (late Shah's,) 1 subadar, 5 privates and 1 tent lascar, Poona Auxiliary Horse.

" Missing.—20th N. I. 4 dooly bearers.

" Remarks.—Assistant Surgeon J. Brickwell, killed.

" The Brahoce chief, Mahomed Khan, slightly wounded, and one horse killed.

H. WYLLIE, *Major,*

Major of Brigade, Scinde Force."

" Dangerously wounded 1 private.—Severely do. 3 privates, 1 bheesty, 1 tent lascar.—Slightly do. 1 subadar and 4 privates."

The troops hurried through the Punjab, and the Governor General prepared for their due reception at Ferozepore, and took measures for putting a climax to the Afghanistan episode in the History of the British Indian Empire. His first act was to restore the Ex-Ameer Dost Mahomed and his family to freedom; a measure which, while it relieved the Government of a burthensome charge upon its finances, gave to at least one of His Lordship's acts, an air of rationality and clemency. The ostensible motives for the release of the state prisoners are set forth in a Notification, bearing date 25th October, which is here subjoined:—

Secret Department, Simla, 25th October.—"The advance of the British armies to Ghuznee and Cabool, having led to the restoration to freedom of the British prisoners in the hands of the Affghans, Dost Mahomed Khan, his wives and family, and the wife and family of Mahomed Akbar Khan and many Affghan chiefs, remain in the absolute power of the British Government, without having any means of procuring their liberation.

"To this condition of disgrace and danger has Mahomed Akbar Khan reduced his father, and his wife, and his family, and the chiefs, his countrymen, by making war upon women, and preferring the continuance of their captivity and suffering for objects connected only with his own safety, to the general exchange of prisoners, which was offered by the British Government, and the consequent restoration to liberty of those, whose honor and whose happiness should have been most dear to him.

"But the British Government is desirous of terminating, at the earliest period, all the evils which have arisen out of the Affghan war; and the Governor General, enabled by the recovery of the British prisoners who were in the hands of the enemy, to follow the course most in accordance with clemency and humanity, declares that, when the British army, returning from Affghanistan, shall have passed the Indus, all the Affghans, now in the power of the British Government, shall be permitted to return to their country.

"The Affghan chiefs who are thus released, will before they pass the Sutlej, present themselves at the *darbar** of the Governor General in his camp at Ferozepore.

"The wives of Dost Mahomed Khan and Mahomed Akbar Khan, and all the ladies of the family and household shall be conducted with all respect to the frontiers of Affghanistan."

* This was subsequently dispensed with.

As a set-off to the grace and common sense of this act, Lord Ellenborough subsequently indulged himself with the extraordinary freak disclosed in the following General Orders :—

General Orders by the Right Hon'ble the Governor General, Political Department, Simla, the 16th November, 1842.

"Major General Nott having, in pursuance of his instructions, removed the gates of the temple of Somnauth from the tomb of Sultan Mahomed, of Guznee, and brought them with his army to India, the Governor General is pleased to make the following orders; with a view to the secure and honorable transmission of those illustrious trophies of victory, to the temple from which they were taken by Sultan Mahomed, in the year A. D. 1020 :—

"Major General Nott will select an officer from amongst those who were present at the capture of Ghuznee, to accompany the gates of the temple of Somnauth, and to communicate with the several chiefs, through whose territories the trophies will be carried, for the purpose of making every necessary previous arrangement for their safe reception and transmission, and for the avoiding of confusion on the march.

"This officer will receive an allowance of 1,000 rupees a month.

"Major General Nott will likewise select, from amongst the officers and soldiers present at the capture of Ghuznee,

"1 Captain; 1 Lieutenant; 1 Assistant Surgeon; 2 Subadars; 2 Jemadars; 10 Havildars; 10 Naicks; 101 Sepoys and 2 Native Doctors.

"These Officers and Soldiers will form the escort of the trophies, from the bridge of the Sutlej to Somnauth.

"Captain Herries, of H. M. 43d Regiment, A. D. C. to the Governor General, and a detachment of the Body Guard, will accompany the escort.

"The Officers and Soldiers escorting the trophies, will receive double batta during their special service; and all the Native Officers and Soldiers, will have one year's furlough granted to them on their return to their respective Regiments.

"By Order of the Right Hon'ble the Governor General of India,

T. H. MADDOCK,

Sec. to the Government, with the Govr. Genl."

"Notification.—Political Department, Simla, 16th November.—The Governor General is pleased to direct the publication of the following letter, which translated into the Hindee language, has been transmitted to the several Princes and Chiefs to whom it is addressed, and circulated generally throughout India.

"By Order of the Right Hon'ble the Governor General of India,

T. H. MADDOCK,

Sec. to the Government of India, with the Govr. Genl."

From the Governor General to all the Princes and Chiefs and People of India.

" *My Brothers and my Friends*,—Our victorious army bear the gates of the temple of Somnauth, in triumph from Affghanistan, and the despoiled tomb of Sultan Mahmood looks upon the ruins of Ghuznee.

" The insult of 800 years is at last avenged. The gates of the temple of Somnauth, so long the memorial of your humiliation, are become the proudest record of your national glory, the proof of your superiority in arms over the nations beyond the Indus.

" To you, Princes and Chiefs of Sirhind, of Rajwara, of Malwa, and of Guzerat, I shall commit this glorious trophy of successful war.

" You will, yourselves, with all honor, transmit the gates of sandalwood through your respective territories to the restored temple of Somnauth.

" The Chiefs of Sirhind shall be informed, at what time our victorious army will first deliver the gates of the temple into their guardianship, at the foot of the bridge of the Sutlej.

" *My Brothers and my Friends*,—I have ever relied, with confidence upon your attachment to the British Government. You see how worthy it proves itself of your love, when, regarding your honor as its own, it exerts the power of its arms to restore to you the gates of the temple of Somnauth, so long the memorial of your subjection to the Affghans.

" For myself, identified with you in interest and in feeling, I regard with all your own enthusiasm, the high achievements of that heroic army; reflecting alike immortal honor upon my native and upon my adopted country.

" To preserve and to improve the happy union of our two countries, necessary as it is to the welfare of both, is the constant object of my thoughts. Upon that union depends the security of every ally, as well as of every subject of the British Government, from the miseries whereby, in former times, India was afflicted: through that alone has our army now waved its triumphant standards over the ruins of Ghuznee, and planted them upon the Bala Hissar of Cabool.

" May that good Providence, which has hitherto so manifestly protected me, still extend to me its favor, that I may so use the power now entrusted to my hands, as to advance your prosperity, and secure your happiness, by placing the union of our two countries upon foundations which may render it eternal.

ELLENBOROUGH."

At this puerile piece of business, the common sense of the British community at large revolted. The ministers of religion protested against it as a most unpardonable homage to an idolatrous temple,—the Hindoo rejected the notion of a restoration which existed only on the fancy of the Governor General, for the crumbling edifice at Som-

nath had long been tenanted and defiled by the Mussulman; and the Mussulman "Chiefs and Princes" were offended at a compliment attempted to be paid to the Hindoos at their expense. Ridiculed by the Press of India and of England; laughed at by the people of his own party in Parliament; Lord Ellenborough halted the gates at Agra, and postponed, (*sine die* it is to be hoped,) the completion of the monstrous piece of folly, he had more than begun to perpetrate.

Turning from the piece of silliness, it has been rather a matter of duty than of pleasure to record, let us close this "strange eventful history" of the campaigns in Afghanistan and Scinde, by a summary of the measures taken by the Government, for recognising the distinguished services of those, who had been employed in rendering political and military service.

The returning army was received on its arrival at Ferozepore under triumphal arches, the Army of Reserve presenting arms to the illustrious Garrison of Jellalabad; the Generals were *feted* at balls and dinners; the dignity of Grand Cross of the Bath was conferred upon Generals Nott and Pollock, the intermediate grades being over-leapt; Medals cast for the occasion at the Calcutta Mint, were conferred upon the Heroes of Ghuzni and Jellalabad; the men who had composed Shah Soojah's Regiments at Candahar and Jellalabad, were incorporated into the regular army, as a reward for their good conduct, and a similar honor was paid to the regiment commanded by Captain Craigie at the defence of Khelat-i-Ghilzie. On Sir William Nott was bestowed the lucrative office of Envoy at the Court of Lucknow; while a further Queen's Brevet raised many of the Captains, who had been most prominent in the campaigns to the rank of Field Officers, and a liberal distribution of the Order of the Bath decorated the breasts of all who had commanded regiments, or otherwise distinguished themselves in the arduous service. Pensions were granted by the Queen's Government and the Court of Directors to Colonel Dennie's daughters; General McCaskill was made a Knight Commander of the Bath; the Bengal Civilians presented Sir R. Sale, with a sword; the Society of Bombay made a similar gift to Major Outram; Medals were struck and distributed to those who served under General Nott at Candahar and Ghuznie; and while the 13th Light Infantry resolved to perpetuate

Dennie's bravery by a monument, the inhabitants of Bombay determined to erect one to the memory of *all* who had perished in the four years' campaign. The surviving officers who had delivered themselves up to Mahomed Akbar Khan during the disastrous retreat; Colonel Palmer who had surrendered Ghuzni; Major Pottinger who had signed the convention; and General Shelton who had otherwise, it was supposed, infringed the articles of war during the blockade of Cabul, were subjected to the ordeal of Courts Martials; but a full and honorable acquittal was the result of each trial, and they were restored to the service to become, hereafter, it is to be hoped, the more valuable to their country, by reason of the experience they have acquired on the field of adversity.

APPENDICES.

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APPENDIX.

APPENDIX.

No. I.

THE PURSUIT OF DOST MAHOMMED KHAN.

By MAJOR OUTRAM, of the *Bombay Army*.

The army of the Indus resumed its march towards Cabul, on the 30th July, leaving the Bombay Brigade to follow it with Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk, and his contingent. On the 1st and 2d of August, we advanced two marches to Hyderzye, halting on the 3d to enable His Majesty to overtake us.

Authentic accounts having here been received of the flight of the Ameer Dost Mahommed Khan towards Bamian, and the abandonment of his Artillery at Meidan, two thousand of the Shah's Affghans, under Hadji Khan Kakur, or as he was officially styled, Nusseer-ood-Dowlah,* were ordered to proceed in pursuit; the under named British officers, with one hundred of our own Cavalry, regular and irregular, volunteering to accompany the party under my orders, for the purpose of stimulating their exertions, and checking the commission of barbarities, in the event of the fugitive and his family falling into our hands. Captain Wheeler, Major of Brigade, Bengal Cavalry Brigade; Captain Backhouse, M. B. Bengal Artillery Brigade; Captain Troup, M. B. Shah's Contingent; Captain Christie, Commanding Regiment Shah's Cavalry; Captain Lawrence, Bengal Cavalry; Lieutenant Ryves, Adjutant 4th Local Horse; Captain Keith Erskine, Poona Auxiliary Horse; Lieutenant Broadfoot, Shah's Goorkah Battalion; Lieutenant Hogg, Bombay Staff; and Doctor Worrall, Local Horse.

At 4 p. m. our party assembled, according to orders, at the tents of the Envoy, where the Affghans were also to have been in readiness; but although we waited until dark, not more than three hundred effective men could be mustered, the residue of those present consisting of from four to five hundred Affghans, mounted upon yaboos, and starved ponies. It was however stated that all who were still deficient would shortly fol-

* The Defender of the State.

low, and our detail was for the present reinforced by one hundred of Captain Christie's Horse. Hadji Khan Kakur was extremely desirous that we should pursue the high road as far as Meidan, in order to take up the tract of the fugitive thence; nor was it until I had repeatedly urged upon him the obvious impossibility of our ever, by such a mode of proceeding, overtaking Dost Mahommed Khan, who had already obtained a start of twenty-four hours, that he would ultimately consent to furnish guides, who were instructed to lead us across the hills by the nearest route, so as to intersect that of the Ameer about three marches beyond Meidan.

We marched during the first night about thirty-two miles, crossing several ranges of hills, and winding along the channels of many rivers, until 7 A. M. when we reached Goda, a small village situated in a confined but fertile valley. But although several halts had been made, in order to admit of the stragglers closing up, not more than one hundred of the Affghans had arrived with us; the rest dropping in during the day, bearing unequivocal evidence of the cause of their detention, in the plunder with which they were laden.

4th. Resumed our march in the evening, Hadji Khan being however, most reluctant to advance. The road which was extremely bad, wound along the channels of mountain torrents, and the face of precipitous hills. After proceeding ten miles, we bivouacked until 2 o'clock, when the moon having risen, we pushed on again until 7 A. M. of the 5th, surmounting the Pugman range by a lofty and precipitous pass, and finally encamping at a small village called Kadur-i-Suffeid, which, however, afforded no food for the people beyond parched corn. Barely fifty of the Affghans came up with us, but the rest straggled in before the evening. Information being here received that Dost Mahommed Khan was at the village of Yourt, one march in our front, Hadji Khan became urgent to halt, in order that we might send back for a reinforcement, declaring that the Ameer, who has upwards of two thousand followers, is far too strong to be encountered by our present force, with any chance of a successful issue.

Having insisted, however, upon going on, I ordered a muster of the Affghans at 4 P. M., but waited until sun-set before they could be assembled, in all to the number of about seven hundred and fifty, not more than three hundred of these being mounted on war horses. With extreme difficulty, and after much altercation, these were at length induced to proceed, with the prospect of overtaking the fugitive in the morning at Hurzar, his next halt beyond Yourt; but whether through accident or design, we had not advanced four miles, before the guides, who were under charge of Hadji Khan's men, were reported to have deserted. It was then pitch-dark, and being left in the midst of interminable ravines, where no trace even of a foot-path existed, we had no alternative but to halt until day-break, and did not in consequence reach Yourt until 7 A. M. of the following day, the 6th. At this time few of the Affghans were

forthcoming, and no arguments could at first prevail on Hadji Khan to advance sixteen miles further to Hurzar, where we had positive intelligence of the presence of the object of our pursuit. At length, however, he was induced to promise most solemnly, that he would press on in the evening, and as some consolation for the present delay, we now entertained hopes of being enabled to beat up the Ameer's quarters during the night.

Having mounted, according to previous agreement, at 4. r. m., we proceeded to the tent of Hadji Khan Kakur, with a view of ascertaining the reason that the Affghans were not prepared. He now entered into a long story, setting forth the hardships endured by his men, who, in the absence of any thing to eat, would, he averred, be in no condition to face Dost Mahommed Khan until reinforcements should arrive; and the discussion having been continued in this strain until sunset, it terminated at length in his promising to make a forced march in the morning of double the distance, although nothing should induce either him or them to advance another step that night. Possessing no authority to act without the Affghans, or indeed to do more than second them if necessary, and Dost Mahommed Khan's escort being, moreover, unquestionably too strong for our own small party, which consisted of no more than one hundred horse, I was again compelled to rest satisfied with the Khan's assurance, and most reluctantly to delay our advance.

All accounts agree in representing the fugitive to be escorted by at least two thousand followers, of whom nearly five hundred are said to be superior cavalry, whilst the rest consist of matchlockmen and jussailchees; but their progress being retarded by the sickness of one of the young Princes, who is compelled to travel on a litter, our prospect of overtaking the party is greatly increased, and I have therefore distinctly informed Hadji Khan that in event of his hanging back on the morrow, we shall pursue the Ameer with our small detachment alone; troubling him for none of the assistance which he appears so reluctantly to afford.

Shortly after nightfall, Hadji Khan Kakur came over to my tent, and long endeavoured to impress upon me the rashness of our overtaking Dost Mahommed Khan, whose party so greatly exceeded our own in numerical strength; hinting, that whilst many of our own Affghans were traitors upon whom in the hour of need no dependence could be placed, the followers of the Ameer's fortunes were desperate, and bound in honor to sacrifice their lives in defence of their families by whom they are accompanied. To this I replied, that he was at liberty to act as he thought proper, but that for our own parts, whenever we did come up with the fugitive, it was our determination to attack him, whether he assisted us or staid behind. The waiting for a reinforcement, I informed him, was tantamount, he well knew, to giving Dost Mahommed Khan a free passport through the country; as it was not probable that the Ameer would await its

arrival. Failing in his object of shaking our resolution therefore, the Khan at last left the tent, and seating himself a few yards from the door, conversed in the dark, in an undertone of voice, with three or four of his chiefs, for more than an hour. The latter were overheard to upbraid him for assisting the Feringees in their endeavors to arrest Dost Mahommed Khan, enquiring wherein the Ameer had ever injured him; and although the result of their deliberations did not transpire, Hadji Khan was heard to admit the truth of all that they had advanced. It rained and hailed violently during the night, and our people have had nothing to eat for the two last days, except a little parched unripe corn.

7th August. We marched at day-break, and on arriving at Hurzar, found traces of the Ameer's encampment of yesterday. Perceiving these, Nusseer-ood-Dowlah stopped, on pretext of affording a little rest to his men, and was anxious to induce us to follow his example; but I insisted upon advancing at once with our own detachment. About a mile farther on the road, we were met by deserters from the camp of Dost Mahommed Khan, who informed us that they had left the Ameer early this morning at Kalloo, and that there were then no signs of his being about to depart. I rode back instantly to Hadji Khan to apprise him of this piece of intelligence, entreating him to come on at once with his Affghans; but he again loudly protested against the madness of such a proceeding, declaring that we must inevitably be defeated, and thus bring disgrace upon the head of the Shah;—that by our precipitation we should drive the Ameer to desperation, whereas by his own *tudbeer* (precautions) he had closed the roads beyond Bamian, whence the fugitive could not possibly escape; and if we were but prudent, must assuredly fall into our hands. The Affghans, he added, were weary and hungry, and their immediate advance was therefore out of the question. Finding it impossible to overcome his scruples, I arose, and was proceeding to mount my horse, when Hadji Khan following me, seized me by the arm, and loudly entreated me not to think of advancing, threatening rather to detain me by force, than to permit my rushing on certain destruction. Upon this I broke from him with the assurance, that although he might come on or tarry as he pleased, it was my full determination to march upon Kalloo, and finding Dost Mahommed Khan there, to attack him, when, should I prove unsuccessful, *his* would be the disgrace, and *he* should answer for the consequences.

At 3 p. m. we reached Kalloo, only to have the mortification of finding that Dost Mahommed Khan had departed so many hours previously, that he must ere then have surmounted the Kalloo Pass, the highest of the Hindoo Koosh. With horses and men knocked up, night fast approaching, and no signs of support from the Affghans, every one of whom had remained behind with the Khan at Hurzar, it was of course perfectly useless to proceed further. We had already been nine hours in the saddle, and had crossed the Hajee Guk Pass, twelve thousand feet above the

ocean; the snow, from that height, being observable, lying at least fifteen hundred feet below us. When compared with the cross-paths by which we had previously advanced, however, the road from Yourt had proved excellent. In the evening we were so fortunate as to obtain a meal of flour for our men, encamping for the night at the foot of the Koh-i-Baba, literally 'the Father of Mountains.' The summit of this peak, which has derived its name from the circumstance of its being the loftiest of the Hindoo-Koosh, is elevated twenty thousand feet above the level of the sea, and is covered with eternal snow.

On the morning of the 8th, we were joined by Captains Taylor and Trevor, with a reinforcement of thirty troopers, and about three hundred Affghans—whose presence appeared to have inspirited Nuaseer-ood-Dowlah into coming up also; although he had not scrupled yesterday to leave us to face Dost Mahommed Khan by ourselves, and, equally unaided, to repel the *chuppao* or night attack, which he confidently predicted would be made on the part of the Ameer, and of which he himself entertained great alarm. Being ourselves, however, well aware that it was the sole object of the fugitive to escape, we had felt convinced that no attempt of an offensive nature would be made. Here Hadji Khan again urged upon me the necessity of our halting for further reinforcements, averring that Dost Mahommed Khan would undoubtedly make a determined stand at Bamian; beyond which place there was no prospect of his escaping, all the roads having been closed by the arrangements which he had made to raise the Huzarabs and other tribes. To this I again replied as before, that it was only by overtaking Dost Mahommed Khan at Bamian, that we could feel at all assured of his making a stand there; whereas by delaying, we, in my opinion, rendered the escape of the fugitive certain, my reliance on his (Hadji Khan's) *tudbeer*, being, at best, very slender.

He then went over the old ground, and reiterated the certainty of our being defeated, to the tarnishing of the Shah's fame; but I informed him that there was in our dictionary no such word as *retreat*, and that we did not choose, under any circumstances to risk our own fame by suffering Dost Mahommed Khan to effect his escape unmolested, so long as there existed the most remote prospect of our being able to overtake him—concluding by assuring him, that the disgrace would fall upon those who hung back from the encounter, and would in no degree attach itself to us, so long as we strove, at all hazards, to effect the object upon which we had been despatched by the Shah. On my proceeding to mount my horse, the Khan again laid hold of me, and after endeavouring by entreaties to detain me, had recourse, as before, to menaces, of force, which ended in his actually withholding the guides. Breaking from him, however, and marching on my men without them, I was soon afterwards agreeably surprised at perceiving the Hadji also advancing,—a step to which he had, I presume, been forced by very shame.

In the course of this day, we surmounted the pass of Shutur-i-gardan, or the Camel's Neck, of which the altitude is not given by Sir Alexander Burnes, who, finding it impassable from snow in the month of May, was obliged to adopt a more circuitous route. We estimated the height to be at least three thousand feet above the pass of Hadjee Guk over which we had travelled yesterday; the acclivity being so extremely steep, that we were compelled to lead our horses the whole way up; and the descent although less abrupt, being even greater than the ascent.

Arriving after dark, at a deserted village at the foot of the ghaut, we halted on the banks of a stream which flows into the Oxus, less with a view of resting our fatigued horses than to admit of the Affghans coming up. On learning from me my intention of pressing on to Bamian at 2 o'clock in the morning, Nusseer-ood-Dowlah implored me not to think of advancing until dawn, few of his own people having yet arrived, and there existing, in his opinion, no probability whatever of Dost Mahommed Khan's escaping beyond that place. At length, finding that all other arguments failed in shaking my determination, he plainly informed me that he was so surrounded by traitors amongst the Affghans, that he could not venture to march with them at night. "In broad daylight," he continued, "I may be able to take them on, but if you do encounter Dost Mahommed Khan, not one of the Affghans will draw a sword against him, nor will I be responsible that they do not turn against yourself in the *mêlée*." On my return he insisted upon sending a guard with me, having previously stated, that it was not safe that I should proceed unattended amongst the Affghans, so far even as my own bivouac.

This refusal on the part of Hadji Khan Kakur, added to the fact of our horses being completely knocked up by the day's work, compelled us to wait patiently until day-break, sending on, however, two officers of our party to reconnoitre, with instructions to gallop back from Bamian with information of any symptoms that might be observed, of the intended departure thence of Dost Mahommed Khan, in order that we might in that case hasten our advance accordingly. In the mean time a council of war having been held, it was resolved that on the Ameer turning to oppose us, of which, on our overtaking him to-morrow, as we expect to do, there can be no doubt, the thirteen British officers who are present with this force, shall charge in the centre of the little band, every one directing his individual efforts against the person of Dost Mahommed Khan, whose fall must thus be rendered next to certain. It being evident that all the Affghans on both sides will turn against us, unless we are immediately successful, this plan of attack appears to afford the only chance of escape to those who may survive; and it is an object of paramount importance to effect the destruction of the Ameer, rather than to permit his escape. Although crowded as usual into one small rowtie, (marquee,) with little to eat, nothing whatever to drink, and no bed on which to lie, saving our

sheep-skin cloaks, our little party, always cheerful and merry, has never been more happy than on this night, under the exciting expectation of so glorious a struggle in the morning. All prospect of danger on such occasions as these is met by the soldier with the gratifying conviction that should he fall, he will have earned an enviable place in the recollection of those loved, though distant friends, in whose memory he most desires to live.

THE ESCAPE OF DOST MAHOMMED KHAN.

9th August. Whilst in the act of mounting our horses at break of day, information was brought in that Dost Mahommed Khan, instead of halting yesterday at Bamian, as from the reiterated assurances of Hadji Khan we had been led to anticipate, had on the contrary passed through that place in the forenoon; and his family having previously been sent on, had himself pushed forward at once to Akraabad, another march in advance. This morning he was to be at Sygan, twenty-five or thirty miles further, on the verge of the Shah's territory; and to-night at Kamurdunda, under the protection of the "Waly," an independent Uzbek Chieftain, who is at enmity with Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk. Upon receiving this intelligence, I informed Nusser-ood-Dowlah, that should it prove to be correct, he should answer with his head for the escape of the Ameer Dost Mahommed Khan.

Arriving at Bamian, twelve miles in advance, we there found about seventy horsemen who had shortly before been dismissed by the Ameer; and they, as well as two spies belonging to the mission, whom we also found, confirm the information received this morning, together with all that had previously been reported to us respecting the strength of his escort. They also state, that the young Prince is now sufficiently recovered to be able to exchange the litter in which he has hitherto travelled, for the back of an Elephant. There being, under such circumstances, not the smallest hope of our now overtaking the fugitive within the Shah's territories, to which we have been restricted, or indeed of inducing the Affghans to advance one step further,—the officers of our Cavalry having, moreover, represented that their horses are incapable, through want of food and rest, of making further forced marches immediately, we have here been compelled to relinquish the pursuit, nothing being now left for us but to await the result of a letter which I yesterday forwarded through Hadji Khan Kakur, to the Chiefs who accompany the Ameer. Here we have obtained both green corn and peas for our people, and although no grain is to be had, there is abundance of good forage for the horses.

10th. Early this morning, a message from Nusser-ood-Dowlah requested my attendance at a meeting, already convened, of all the Affghan Sirdars. Accompanied by Lieutenant Hogg, I repaired thither immediately,

and found him, along with about twenty of the Chiefs, seated in an open field, and surrounded by a mob of followers, who on our approach met me with clamorous demands to return,—Hadji Khan himself taking the lead, and declaring roundly that having no food for his people, neither he nor they would stay a minute longer. I replied that my people were as badly off as his, but that they were content to subsist upon parched corn in preference to giving up the service upon which they had been sent out; that it behoved none of us to go back until we had received the Shah's orders, or at all events, until sufficient time had been allowed for an answer to arrive to the letter which had been addressed yesterday to the adherents of Dost Mahommed Khan. Nusseer-ood-Dowlah continuing obstinate, I informed him that he might go or stay as he pleased, but that we should remain where we were, and should make him answer to the king for any consequences to ourselves from his desertion.

I then returned to my own tent, whither both Hadji Khan and the Chiefs shortly followed me, the latter in order to beg that I would reconsider my rash resolve, and depart at once. "We have arrived," they said, "thus far without molestation through the protection of the Khan alone, and once deprived of it, cannot fail to be destroyed by the surrounding tribes, which are now only restrained by their awe of his presence." To all this, however, I did but repeat my determination not to move until at least time had been given for the arrival of an answer to our letter; whereupon the Khan immediately applied for a written paper authorizing his own departure. This I of course refused, assuring him at the same time, that his going would be his own act and deed, and none of my bidding. Then turning to two of the principal chiefs, whom I knew to be independent of Hadji Khan, I stated distinctly to them, that although I cared not whether the Khan went or staid, I should nevertheless expect them to remain. From an apprehension of offending Nusseer-ood-Dowlah, I conclude, they returned no answer at the time, although, they afterwards sent to promise adherence to us. Hadji Khan, on rising to retire, exclaimed "Well, I shall wait until to-morrow morning"—and then taking off his turban, he added, "and I call upon you all to witness that bare-headed I have entreated the Sabib to return; the consequences of his not accompanying me to-morrow are therefore now on his own head." Information was brought to us in the evening that Hadji Khan's people had been overheard remarking amongst themselves that they, as well as the inhabitants of the country, had been ordered to do us all the injury in their power after the departure of the Khan in the morning.

11th. The Chiefs who had promised adherence to us came betimes to complain that, on learning of their resolution last night, Hadji Khan had severely abused them; but failing to shake their resolution, had himself been ultimately obliged to relinquish his intention of leaving. Horses were nevertheless saddled, and every preparation having been made by

the Khan for departure, he sent to request an interview. I returned for answer that he was already in possession of my sentiments, and that as they were unchangeable, further communication was useless. He came over in spite of this, and with the deepest hypocrisy declared, that although most of his followers had deserted, he had himself determined not to leave us, and would stand by us to the last. I replied that although I should not have regretted his departure, it was perhaps well for himself that he had altered his mind; adding, that I now suspected he had never forwarded any letter whatever to the adherents of Dost Mahommed Khan, inasmuch as four days were amply sufficient to have put us in possession of a reply; and I concluded by informing him, that unless an answer should be received by noon of the following day, it was my intention to return to the Shah, having received from himself no assistance whatever towards provisioning my men, notwithstanding that I was well informed of his having levied from the district, on his own account, one hundred sheep, and seven kurwars of grain. I then addressed to the Envoy and Minister, the following letter:—

Bamian, 11th August, 1839.

SIR,—On my arrival at this place on the 9th instant, I had the honor to address you with information, that the Ameer Dost Mahommed Khan had escaped beyond the frontier; expressing at the same time my intention to await the result of a letter that had been addressed to his adherents by Nusseer-ood-Dowlah, myself, and others, or the receipt of further orders from yourself.

"The accompanying extracts from my journal will explain to you, the circumstances under which I have been compelled to resolve on returning from Bamian to-morrow, at mid-day, unless supplies, reinforcements, or orders to the contrary, shall be received by that time; when, having completed three days at this place, a sufficient period will have elapsed to admit of an answer arriving from the adherents of Dost Mahommed Khan, to the letter addressed to them on the 8th instant, if it ever was really despatched by Hadji Khan Kakur, which I have now reason to doubt.

"You will regret to observe, that the conduct of Nusseer-ood Dowlah if not criminal, has been most blameable, throughout; his backwardness having favored the escape of the Ameer Dost Mahommed Khan, whose capture was inevitable, had the Khan pushed on, as he might have done, as I repeatedly urged him to do, and as his troops were perfectly capable of doing.

"It will be seen from the diary, that the fugitive might have been overtaken at Hurzar on the morning of the 6th instant, had not our guides, who were under charge of Nusseer-ood-Dowlah's people, deserted us during the night; that the Khan then insisted on delaying at Yourt, only half way to Hurzar, instead of pushing on as urged by me to do; and that

although he promised to make up for the delay in the afternoon, he ultimately refused to go on; thus retarding our advance till next morning, the 7th instant, when we expected to overtake Dost Mahommed Khan at Kulloo, to which place, in that hope, I was compelled to proceed with the British detachment alone, unsupported by Nusseer-ood-Dowlah or any of the Affghan troops, who remained behind at Hurzar, notwithstanding my personal solicitations to that Chief.

"It will be further seen, that he next day again endeavoured to prevent our following the fugitive; that he deceived me by repeated false assurances of Dost Mahommed Khan's escape being cut off; and, finally, that he formally announced to me his inability to face Dost Mahommed Khan with his own Affghans, not a man of whom, he declared, would fight against the Ameer; even hinting his belief, that they were more likely to turn against ourselves.

"The whole of the proceedings of Nusseer-ood-Dowlah have thus displayed either the grossest cowardice, or the deepest treachery, and I have now performed my duty in making them known to you.

"I have the honor to be, &c."

12th. Retraced our steps at mid-day, twelve miles to the village situated at the foot of Kulloo Pass, our route following the channel of a stream which falls into the Oxus.

13th. Marched again at day break, the ascent of the Pass occupying two and a half, and the descent, one and a half hours. Halted at the foot of the Hajee Guk Pass, after being in the saddle five and a quarter hours; the distance we estimated to be twelve miles. Hadji Khan Kakur urges our marching to-morrow to Oomje, seven or eight miles beyond Yourt, this being at least seventeen miles further than we could induce him to march during our advance, when expedition was so great an object, and while our horses were far more fresh than they now are. On that occasion, no entreaties could prevail on him to come on from Yourt to our present ground, where Dost Mahommed Khan was then supposed to be; but having himself halted with his Affghans nine miles short of this place, he suffered us to proceed by ourselves to encounter the Ameer.

14th. During last night the water in our wash-hand basins was frozen over. Marched to within a short distance of Gurdan Dewal, over a good horse road. An easy ascent of about half a mile leads to the top of the Hajee Guk Pass, on the summit of which we found the pools frozen. Thence the path descends down the bed of a stream the whole way to the Helmond river, on which Gurdan Dewal is situated. We were five and a half hours in the saddle, and estimated the distance at eighteen or nineteen miles.

15th. To Sir-i-Chushma, nominally the source of the Cabul river, but we had in reality followed a rivulet for ten miles before reaching these

copious springs which here unite with it. Five hours in the saddle. Estimated distance seventeen or eighteen miles, the first five or six leading over numerous steep stony ascents and declivities to the summit of a Pass, the name of which has escaped me—and thence descending the whole way through a narrow valley.

16th. Kot-i-Ashroo. Five hours, seventeen miles; the road being a continuation of the same valley, which widens and terminates at Meidan.

17th. Over the Oomje Pass to Cabul, six hours. The path easy, and not very steep, and the estimated distance twenty miles.

19th. Nusseer-ood-Dowlah arrested by order of the King on a charge of treason, and for having favored the escape of Dost Mahommed Khan:—undeniable proofs against him having now been obtained, in addition to the palpable obstacles which he threw in the way of our pursuit of the fugitive, and his personal refusal to advance when the Ameer was known to be within our reach.

I here take leave of Hadji Khan Kakur, but the reader will find his early history in a paper by Mr. Masson, in the Transactions of the Bombay Geographical Society for May last.

From what I personally gathered, it appears that he commenced life in the humble capacity of a melon vender, and raised himself to the highest rank by cunning and enterprise, though, strange to say, invariably changing sides when his interest prompted him to do so. Having deserted Dost Mahommed Khan to join the Candahar Sirdars, he abandoned the latter on our approach to that city, thus forcing them to fly without striking a blow. For this service Shah Shooja ennobled him by the title of "Nusseer-ood-Dowlah," and conferred on him a jaghire of three lacs of Rupees annually, in the vain hope of purchasing his fidelity; but it has now transpired, that he had actually leagued himself with others to attack the King on any change of fortune, and with this view had stood aloof with his Affghans until the day after Ghuzni fell, when he presented himself with the most lavish professions of devotion. Again, he was entrusted with the pursuit of Dost Mahommed Khan, it being naturally supposed that he was too deeply committed against that Chief, to admit of a possibility of their coalition, but he was nevertheless engaged in a correspondence with him during the whole proceeding, and the result has been shewn in the foregoing pages. It is now only necessary to add, that he is a State prisoner at Chunar.

APPENDIX.

No. II.

ROUGH NOTES

*By CAPTAIN LEWIS BROWN, of the 5th Regiment Bombay Native Infantry,
of a Trip in the Murree hills, and detention in Kahun.*

Having been appointed to the command of a detachment about to occupy Kahun, a walled town in the Murree hills, I proceeded to Poolajee en route, in company with Lieutenant Clarke, 2d Grenadiers, on the 8th April 1840.—On the morning of the 8th I reached that post, and found the following detachment assembled :—

300 Bayonets, 5th Regiment, under Ensign Taylor.

2 12-Pr. Howitzers, Lieutenant D. Erskine.

50 Scinde Irregular Horse, Lieut. Clarke.

50 Patan Horsemen.

With this detachment I was to convoy up 600 camels, bearing supplies for four months, and Lieut. Clarke was to return with the empty camels, with an escort of 80 infantry and 50 horse, and bring up four months' more. I left Sukhur in a great hurry, but on my arrival at Poolajee, was detained in consequence of delays in the commissariat department, until the 2d May. About the 15th April the weather became excessively hot, the thermometer ranging to 112° in my tent, in the middle of the day—the consequence was some sickness in the detachment: Lieutenant Erskine and Ensign Taylor were both attacked with fever, and one subadar died from a "coup de soleil."

April 20th—At the requisition of the political agent I despatched Lieut. Clarke and his horsemen in the direction of Shapoor, there to be joined by 100 men of the Beelooch Levy, under Lieutenant Vardon, and from thence to proceed S. E., in the direction of the hills, to try and surprize a party of Culpore Bogties. The Chuppao failed, in consequence of treachery in the guide. The sufferings of the party, from the heat, and want of water, when crossing the desert on their return, were beyond any thing conceivable. The Beelooch Levy alone, left 25 men behind, 3 of whom died.

27th.—Received an express from the brigade major, directing me, in consequence of Erskine's sickness, to order the guns back to Lehee, and proceed with the cavalry and infantry alone to Kahun. Dr. Glasse joined to-day.

29th.—This morning I received such strong reports of the intention of the Murrees to oppose us at the Pass of Nufoosk, and again in the Fort, that I immediately, on my own responsibility, made a requisition on Lehee, for one of the guns to be sent back under a native officer. Having been before over the hills, with the detachment under the late Major Billamore, I knew the almost utter impossibility, if opposed, of getting my convoy up safe without artillery.* Erskine having somewhat recovered from the fever, came himself with the gun.

May 2d.—There being some dispute about finding the Patana in provisions on their way up, and not myself thinking they would be of much use to me, having been present in November 1839, when they turned their backs on the enemy, without drawing a sword, I at once ordered them back to their quarters, and the commissariat having reported the four months' supply being all ready, I this morning commenced my march into the hills, leaving behind 1 gun and 50 horse.

Marched 6 miles into the hills direct east; the last 4 miles very heavy for guns, being nothing but the bed of a dry river, with deep sand and pebbles. Encamped close to a delicious stream of water. Wood and grass were in abundance, but the heat between the rocks was excessive. Ensign Taylor became too sick to proceed, and returned to head quarters, leaving only one officer (myself,) in charge of 3 companies.

3rd.—Marched on 8 miles, starting at 2 A. M. and arriving at 7. Road very heavy, encamped in bed of river. Forage abundant. Sulphur rocks close by. This was the hottest day I ever remember to have felt in India; the thermometer rising to 116°, with a hot wind like a furnace blowing.

4th.—Marched on 7 miles, not getting over more than a mile an hour, the road being so heavy. Water nearly the whole way, which was most acceptable, as the hot wind of yesterday continued during the whole night.—Encamping ground as yesterday.

6th.—Marched on 6 miles, the wheels of the gun and waggon becoming rickety from the stony state of the road, lightened them by loading the ammunition boxes on camels. A sepoy died here from the effects of the sun.—Encamping ground as yesterday.

7th.—Marched on 12 miles, 5 along the bed of the river, then over some table land, to a drop leap into the river again, down which the gun and carriages were obliged to be lowered by ropes. Strong reports reached

* This was a most fortunate circumstance: in more instances than one, the gun became of double value, and I obtained not only one of the most pleasant and cheerful companions, during our lonely life in Kahun, but a most staunch and able assistant in my difficulties.

us of the enemy getting ready to oppose us, and that they were busy getting in their crops. From this encamping ground there are two roads to Kahun, one round by Deerah, distance 74 miles, and the other a short cut, over the mountains of Surtooff, and Nuffoosk, distance only 20 miles, but very difficult for guns. Being left to my own judgment by the brigadier, I decided on the short cut, having been over the same road before, with artillery, trusting to arrive in time to save some of the crops.

8th.—Left the bed of the river, and marched over a table land, to the bottom of the Surtooff, distance 6 miles, which took us 5 hours, there being some very bad nullahs on the road for guns. Encamped at the foot of the hill, where we found a beautiful stream of water, and abundance of forage. At 4 p. m. we commenced ascending the hill; the camels going up first. The distance is but a mile, but so steep, that the last camel did not reach the top until day light, exactly 12 hours. The labor of getting up the gun and carriages, was trying and laborious in the extreme: some parts of the hills were almost perpendicular, and not one inch up would the bullocks pull. Here, while all hands were engaged in this labor, the Beloochees began first to shew themselves, in small bodies, annoying our flanks and rear.

8th.—Encamped on the top of the hill, but in consequence of there being neither water or forage, obliged to send down all the animals to the bottom again, the men going down by divisions.

9th.—About 150 Beloochees assembled below the hill, evidently with the intention of attacking the watering party, in consequence of which I reinforced them with 100 men under Clarke, when they immediately dispersed. Marched on over a fine table land, to the foot of the Nuffoosk Pass at 6 o'clock this evening, distance only 6 miles, but from the number of small nullahs, and the overloaded state of the camels, we did not reach our ground until day-light.

10th.—Ascended the Nuffoosk Pass this morning with 100 men. No appearance of an enemy, although we found that they had built up breast-works across the road, in 3 different places; removed them, and commenced getting up the gun, &c. which took us from 6 in the morning until 4 o'clock in the afternoon, the bullocks being perfectly useless. This was an exceedingly hard day's work, the heat being excessive, and a great want of water. In fact, none at all for the cattle. Commenced passing up convoy at 4 p. m., the last camel not reaching the top until 3 a. m., although the distance was only $\frac{1}{2}$ of a mile. This was caused from the overloaded state of the camels, and there only being one camel-man to 6 and 7. The camels fell down and gave in by dozens, and many bags were dropped. To obtain these last, some 60 Beloochees who had been watching us all day, followed up the rear-guard, when a few shots were exchanged, and Clarke and myself took post with 12 men on some ridges overhanging the road. When the moon went down, the Beloochees

made many attempts to get up the Pass, but were easily kept at bay. A great deal of ammunition was wasted, without much effect, from the darkness of the night. This was the third night we had been under arms.

11th.—From the top of the hill we saw several fires in the Kahun plain. Commenced descending at day-light. Descent one mile in extent. Immediately the rear-guard left the top, it was crowded by about 60 Beloochees, who commenced a sharp fire, but at a long distance. Clarke and myself having remained in the rear, to try and bring on some of the bags dropped, we received some special marks of their favor. One Beloochee appeared to be a particularly good shot, for he managed to wound (slightly) Clarke and his servant,—and a havildar, standing close by, was only saved by the ball lodging in a small Mussuck he had slung on his shoulder. We were obliged to put up with this annoyance for some time, being too anxious to get my convoy safe to Kahun, to think of returning up the hill to attack these people. The cattle were almost dying for want of water. By 2 p. m. we got guns and all safe to the bottom, only leaving two bags behind, and encamped for an hour in a nulla, clear of the hill. At 5 p. m. moved on Kahun, distant 5 miles, over a fine level plain, reaching it at 7, and finding it completely deserted, and the gates removed. Thus ended this arduous and trying march. The difficulties we encountered from the nature of the road, being entirely through beds of rivers, and over hills, and the want of water at the latter, were great indeed. The heat was excessive, and as the bullocks refused to put their shoulder to the collar, the labour of getting the guns over the hills, fell entirely on the sepoy. The convoy often stretched for 2 miles, therefore to properly guard it on all sides was out of the question; but through the strenuous exertions of officers and men, all was got up safe, without loss or damage. Encamped under the walls of the fort for the night, all hands being completely done up. It was a delightful sight to see the camels and bullocks rushing to the river. I thought they never would have stopped drinking.

Kahun is a large, irregular sexangular walled town, 900 yards in circumference, with 6 bastions and one gate-way. The walls are about 25 feet high, but so thin in some places, that they are seen through half way down. There is no ditch, but a tank in front of the gate-way, which fills after a heavy fall of rain. The houses inside are in very fair order, they principally belong to the Banyans, the Murrees (with the exception of the chief, his brother, and a few followers,) inhabiting the plains outside building mat huts in the summer, and retiring to the narrow Passes on the hills in the cold weather. The plain on which Kahun is situated, is about 15 miles long and 6 broad. The air is very pure, and heat not nearly so great as it is in the plains.

12th.—I got the detachment into the fort during the day, and found the inside of all the bastions destroyed, some still smoking. A sepoy strolling out without his arms, was cut down within 500 yards of the fort, and

his head severed from his body. Clarke, with 20 horsemen, had a long chase after the enemy, but could not touch them. However, he sent in information of some grain, still standing, and I sent out a party and secured 50 camel-loads of wheat, in stalk. The party also found the gates* of the fort in a field about two miles off.

13th.—During the night, the Beloochees commenced burning the wheat they could not carry away in the day time, so I sent out another party, and secured 50 more camel-loads. I commenced clearing out the large well, into which the Beloochees had thrown large logs of timber, and other kinds of lumber. An unfortunate dooly-walla was smothered in going down to fasten on a rope.

14th.—I was busy all day in repairing bastions and putting up the gate: in the former, I found layers of cow-dung, covered over with earth. Some still smoking, and water† seems to have no effect in putting out the fire.

16th.—The return convoy under Clarke, started this morning at 2 A. M. en route to Poolajee. I had received instructions from the brigadier to increase the number of infantry, if I thought it necessary. I did so, with a subedar's party, consisting of five havildars and 80 rank and file. Clarke took them over the first hill, when, I suppose, finding no opposition at the difficult Pass of Nuffosk, he sent them back, proceeding on himself with the original party, and 700 empty camels. About 12 o'clock a dooly-walla (a dooly and 6 had accompanied the subedar's party,) came running in with the dreadful report that every man of the subedar's party had been massacred! The dooly-walla was the only man who escaped, and his is the only account we have of this melancholy affair. He says that "the subedar on seeing the last of the camels over the hill began "to descend on this side. That when half way down, they all of a sudden "saw the top and bottom covered with Beloochees; that the subedar "then commenced a double march, and took up a position on some rising "ground, forming square. The Beloochees, to the number of 2,000 then "completely surrounded them, and after receiving two volleys, rushed "boldly in on them, and began to slaughter them right and left. He saw "the subedar fighting to the last. He himself managed to escape, by "hiding in a nullah, where an old Beloochee found him, and after stripping "him of what he had, let him go." The poor subedar was one of the best native officers in the regiment. He belonged to my light company, and was a great favorite of mine. We had been much together during our former campaign in these hills, and I felt his loss very much.

17th.—In great suspense about Clarke and his convoy. A spy came in from the enemy to-day, and was very inquisitive as to what number of

* These gates were afterwards invaluable to us, as also the wheat grass, when no forage was procurable for our horses.

† One bastion took us ten days watering before we succeeded.

men were left to defend the fort, etc. I put him close prisoner, with orders to shoot him on the first approach of the enemy. We were busy all day strengthening our post, the detachment being now reduced, in consequence of this unfortunate affair, to 140 bayonets and one gun, rather too few to man 900 yards of walls. I got the gun on the bastion next to the gate-way.

18th.—About sixty horsemen passed coolly round the fort, at a hand-gallop, waving their swords, giving us much abuse, but taking very good care to keep well out of range of musket-shot, also from the gun side. I offered 150 rupees to any man (follower) in the fort, to take a tapaul down to the plains, but none would venture.

19th and 20th.—All hands during these two days were employed in repairing bastions, etc.

21st.—A cossid came in this morning with a note from Lieutenant Vardon, containing the most melancholy intelligence of poor Clarke's death, and the defeat of his party. It would appear that they had got as far as the bottom of the Surtoff mountain, 13 miles from Kahun, when the Murrees were seen assembled in large numbers at the top. Clarke, after placing his convoy, and part of his infantry, to the best advantage round his convoy, proceeded a little way up the hill, with about 30 infantry, to attack the most forward of them, and after fighting most gallantly for two hours, the ammunition being all gone, he with the rest of the men who were with him, were all killed. Clarke himself killed two of the Beloochees with his own hand, and a third he seized round the waist, dashing him to the ground. He was then seen to stagger, as if wounded, and some of the Beloochees on another part of the hill, seeing a bugler, Clarke had sent down, bringing up ammunition, called out "Now charge them, they are out of cartridges!" They did, and every man fell. The Beloochees then fell on the convoy. The horsemen made for Poolajee at speed, and the rest of our unfortunate sepoy were all massacred, save one havildar and 11 privates. The number of Beloochees present, appears, from all accounts, to have been 2,000. The loss they suffered is unknown, and ever will be. They only acknowledge to 25. They secured every camel, tent, etc.

Poor Clarke! Although having only known him for 8 or 9 months, still it was during scenes when months become years, and friendship becomes firm and lasting. We first met in November 1839, when he joined a field detachment (of which I was staff-officer) proceeding against the Beloochees in these same hills. He at this time commanded 150 of the Scinde irregular horse. From the day he joined, he was the life and soul of the party, and, although a stranger to most of us, soon gained the esteem of all. Before he arrived, the country around had been subject to almost daily plundering. Enthusiastically fond of his profession, more particularly of his new command, the horse, he sought daily and hourly opportunities of distinguish-

ing himself. He was in the opinion of all, the "beau ideal" of an irregular horseman. Brave and daring himself to a degree, he soon inspired his men with the same spirit—men, who were before almost a perfect rabble, became, through his bright example, most excellent soldiers in a short space of time. The men became fond of him to a degree, and with him at their head seemed to think any odds against them of no moment. During our short campaign of four months, he was engaged in every skirmish we had. A few days after he joined, being detached to a post nine miles off, without information, and perfectly ignorant of the country around, he succeeded in surprising 60 Beloochees plundering some fields, about an hour before day-light. At the time he fell in with them, he had only ten men up with him, but not hesitating a moment, he dashed in amongst them, killing seven and taking three prisoners, the rest escaping through the thick jungle. Again, when the Boogties attacked a party under Lieut. Raitt, in the hills, he distinguished himself greatly, charging through and through the enemy, and killing three with his own hand. On our march up to Kahun, he was of the utmost assistance to me, not only in commanding the rear-guard the whole way up, but in his strenuous exertions throughout. When wounded on the thigh at the last hill, his coolness and courage shewed themselves conspicuously. Thinking the ball had gone through, (he afterwards described the feeling to be just the same as he felt, when wounded at Kurrachee, when the ball went right through his thigh,) he said to me, "Don't say a word, it has gone right through me, but I do not want to shew those fellows their shot has taken effect." To this day the Murrees speak of his bravery,* calling him the "Bura Bahadoor." He now lies buried half way up the Surtoff. Thus did the 5th regiment Bombay native infantry lose in one day, killed

| | |
|------------|--------------------|
| 1 Subedar, | 5 Havildars, |
| 1 Jemadar, | 139 Rank and File. |

* I have been exceedingly sorry to see in one of the Bombay papers (*Courier*, 1846 June 20) attack on poor Clarke for rashness in this melancholy affair. The writer could never have seen the country he had to pass through, or he would have abstained from his remarks, which were both unkind and uncalled for, being given merely on the report of an ignorant Belooch guide. The real truth will perhaps never be known. I mean his reasons for attacking the enemy. But in my humble opinion, for the following reasons I think he was right. From the spot where the fight took place, is 40 miles to the plains, through beds of rivers the whole way, with high rocks on each side. The camels (700) under his charge, would stretch at least 2 miles through these ravines: with only 80 infantry and 50 horse and one European officer (himself) how was it possible to guard them at all points, when followed up by some 2000 Beloochees? No: I think it very likely that, seeing the hopelessness of getting his convoy safe to the plains, and having too much pride and daring to desert it, to save his party, he not unreasonably thought a check to the enemy at first starting would dishearten, and deter them from following him up, and there was every chance of success! Until then the Beloochees had never crossed bayonets with the sepoys, and had the utmost dread of them, and from what I have since heard, I firmly believe that had not the bugler been killed bringing up the ammunition, and the sepoys with him had had any left, he would have beaten them off. Although 20 to 1, the Beloochees never attempted to charge him, until they saw that all the ammunition was expended.

21st.—Despatched a cossid on return to the plains; and knowing the anxiety that would be felt regarding not only our present but future fate, reported to Brigadier Stevenson, my having still four months' supply of provisions left, and that I would do my utmost to hold the fort.

24th.—Thinking there was not much chance of another convoy coming up, I took a strict account of the provisions, putting the men on half rations. All hands were busy strengthening the fort. I divided the detachment into four divisions, giving each a side to defend, and was obliged to bring every man* on duty at night for fear of a surprise. From this to the 27th, we were busy clearing the ground of every thing in the shape of trees or shrubs for 200 yards round the fort outside.

27th.—An express from Lieutenant Loch arrived to-day, saying, he was coming up with 200 horse, to see what had become of us, and to open the communication. Sent back the cossid immediately to tell him on no account to attempt it, as, if defended, he could never force the Nuffook Pass, particularly with horse.

28th.—This morning, when the foraging party were out, some horsemen were seen prowling about the bed of the river. The "assembly" was sounded, and some seven or eight horsemen, more bold than the rest, came within long musket-range, and a sepoy shot one. They then moved off at speed, Erskine getting a long shot and killing another.

29th, 30th, and 31st.—Busy cleaning out tank, which had become most offensive, and also commenced digging deep trenches along the foot of the walls inside, planting sharp-pointed stakes in them: pulled down all houses touching the walls, to prevent the enemy landing, should they succeed in mounting the walls in overwhelming numbers. This gave them a drop-leap of 25 feet on to a body of stakes.

June 3rd.—Heard that the old chief Dadah had tried all in his power to prevent his tribe attacking Clarke's party, and that on their leaving for that purpose, exclaimed—"Ah! there you go, selling your country for 500 camels." The Beloochees are on the move in every direction, but keeping at a respectful distance: I am prevented, in consequence, from sending out foraging parties.†

4th.—Commenced digging a fresh well; the other wells containing very bad water, causing bad ulcers on the men. But finding water at all in the fort, was a most fortunate circumstance, as any party sent down to the river, would certainly have been cut up. Received an express from the Political Agent, intimating that I must not expect re-enforcements from

* This fatiguing duty continued until the day we left the fort (September 23th) and was submitted to by the sepoy, with the utmost cheerfulness.

† From this day I was obliged to keep all the cattle inside, allowing the camel men and others to pick up and bring in what forage they could, which was but little. The river which was only a mile off, was almost dry, and the banks were high enough to conceal 1000 horsemen. It, therefore, became necessary to use the utmost caution, not being able to afford the loss of a single man.

Sukkur, but that a request had been made to Captain Bean at Quetta to obtain, if possible, the assistance of a tribe called Kahurs, inhabiting the hills in the Bolan, and deadly enemies of the Murrees.

7th, 8th, and 9th.—Nothing new stirring, and working parties are employed strengthening an old inner fort, which, in case of our being hard pushed, will contain all the supplies, and two wells out of the thirty. The Banyans employed in filling all the empty grain bags with sand. Lascars busy cutting good stout clubs for all the followers. I commenced bringing the latter on duty at night, as look-out-men, a fourth part of them being attached to each division. The enemy are getting more harassing daily, firing at every man who appears 200 yards from the walls. I finished the new bastion on the opposite fort for a gun. We can now ply it from both sides having a good road made from one bastion to the other.

15th.—Cossids came in this morning, bringing intelligence of the Murrees and Boogtees having agreed to stand by each other, and attack the fort on the approaching dark nights, with their whole force. I got the front of the gate-way well palisaded; from this to the 25th nothing new, all working at the defences most cheerfully, and every man seeming to think that the safety of the whole depends on his individual bravery. Treat sepoy's kindly, and I do not think they will ever fail at the push. Nearly fourteen years of uninterrupted regimental duty I think, entitles me to give an opinion on this point, and that before formed, is now fully confirmed.

25th.—An old acquaintance of mine, Sheer Beg Boogtee, who had acted as guide to us through these hills last year, paid me a visit. I had had the means of shewing him some kindness. During the campaign he had been taken prisoner, and plundered of many head of cattle; and I having obtained his release, and clothed him, he has followed me like a shadow ever since.

29th.—No appearance of any night attack, as reported, but this morning about 150 Beloochees came sweeping round the fort. Unfortunately 20 bullock drivers were out foraging, more than a mile across the river, contrary to my most positive orders. The consequence was, they were cut off, and surrounded by the enemy, who commenced a regular slaughter. Fortunately Erskine managed to screw round the gun, and I threw out about 40 men in the direction, well flanked by the bastions. By these means we managed to save 10 out of the 20. A shell from the gun sent the enemy to the right-about, and the party served as a rallying point for those who could manage to escape. One of the latter, who managed to conceal himself under a bush, heard our poor fellows beg for mercy; but Kurree Khan, the chief, who was superintending the slaughter, kept crying out "Maro, Maro." This all took place in the bed of the river, and was not visible from the fort. He also says, he saw the shrapnel burst right in amongst them, knocking over three, and dispersing the rest. I had an opportunity this morning of promoting two sepoy's for bravery.

They were out cutting forage near the fort, with some 8 or 10 camel-men, when about 20 Beloochees rode at speed at them. Instead of running for it, the two sepoy coolly stood still, and fired into their faces, wounding one of them. This was quite sufficient for the Beloochees, who turned and fled. Had the sepoy retreated under the walls, the camel-men must have been cut up. This morning was full of adventures. We nearly lost the only sheep we had left. The Beloochees got between them and the fort, but were too eager to cut up the camel-men, to see them. They would have been a sad loss to us, for not another could we get.

30th.—I let loose the old spy to-day, tired of keeping him any longer; besides we have neither guards nor food to waste on such kind of people. He is quite welcome to report to the enemy all he has seen, which is but little.

July 3d.—Sheer Beg again made his appearance agreeably to promise, bringing with him 45 sheep and goats, a most welcome supply, as we were almost reduced to the last goat. The sepoy not having tasted any meat for two months, highly enjoyed the treat. He tells us, that it is the Murrees' intention to attack the fort on the night of the 6th instant, when the moon goes down, with 50 scaling ladders; their Syud having persuaded them that our leaden bullets will not kill, in proof which he had a bullock placed 100 yards off and had 300 bullets (taken from Clarke's party) fired at it, without effect! This story frightened my naib (a Belooch) so that he came to me with a most serious face, and begged that I would procure iron bullets for the two first rounds, and that then the Beloochees would run away. These Murrees seem to have a great name amongst the other tribes.

7th.—An express arrived from Captain Bean at Quetta, offering me assistance, and regretting the position in which I was placed. The same post also brought a letter from the Political Agent at Shikarpoor, to say, it was intended to act on the defensive until the season opens. Fifty Beloochee horsemen kicked up a great dust this afternoon. Erskine emptied three of their saddles. They had been snugly hid all day in the river, ready to cut off any parties who ventured outside.

9th.—We are getting used to the Beloochees' visits. Indeed, we are glad of anything in the shape of excitement to change the monotonous life we are leading. Unfortunately we can not afford to expend much gun ammunition; we can therefore only take a shot occasionally, which is always a source of great amusement to all in the fort, particularly when it falls in amongst the Beloochees, who retaliate by heaping abuse on us, as they scamper off. Sheer Beg came again to-day, bringing a few chillies and sugar, for which he obtained enormous prices. No doubt he is a spy in a small way, but being the only face we see, save the cossids who are decided spies, he is too useful to quarrel with. He puts me in mind of the old beggar Edie in the Antiquary. Whenever he makes his appearance, the word

is passed from bastion to bastion, and all the fort turns out to meet him, being delighted to see him, not only for old acquaintance, but for the few trifles he always brings. The camels are now beginning to break up for want of grain and forage. Ditto gun bullocks. Shot five of the former this evening, in consequence of their being in a dying state.

11th.—About 200 head of cattle going across the plain about a mile and a half off—most tempting, but very suspicious; but the first we have seen. It is no doubt a trap, and plenty of horsemen are in the bed of the river, ready to cut in between the party and the fort, if we sallied out. The sepoya are mad to go after them. Perhaps they will come a little nearer by and by, and give us an opportunity.

13th.—An express arrived from Lehree, with intelligence, that instead of the Kojucks and Kahurs coming to our assistance, the former had joined the Murrees against us, and that the latter had attacked Captain Bean himself at Quetta on the 22d ultimo. They excuse themselves from attacking the Murrees until September, on account of the great heat! It is fortunate that we did not depend on these allies.

14th.—The men are suffering very severely from ulcers, upwards of 90 of all ranks being laid up with them, and several not able to put on their belts in consequence. Still they all manage to go to their posts at night, although several cannot stand sentry. The dobeewalas, camel-men and bullock-drivers now become useful, having gone through a kind of drill.

18th.—A tremendous storm of wind and rain came on, and lasted the whole night. I thought the old fort was going to be washed away. At day-break, got all hands to work, to drain the fort, the water having lodged in every direction, and threatening to undermine the walls. The tank filled, and country around completely flooded.

25th.—At 12 o'clock to-day about 200 horsemen came galloping round the fort at a quick pace. I thought at first they were going to assault the fort, but after a shell or two they retreated. They have now become very cunning, and instead of appearing in a large body as formerly, they sail along "Indian File," like a flock of wild ducks, and it is very seldom we can get a shot at them. In the afternoon they were seen cultivating the fields in all directions,—quite an enlivening scene.

36th.—A horse was this morning found dead where Erskine's shell fell yesterday, so it is to be hoped there was some mischief done amongst the enemy—at the time, there was so much dust that we could not see any distance. The Beloochees have now completely surrounded the fort, but little parties, like pickets, appear seated around in every direction. This looks bad for our communication; but as yet the tapaul has arrived pretty regularly once in eight days, and has been a source of great amusement to us. Much fever is now prevailing amongst us; I am myself attacked, and Glasse is also very sick. The sepoya and followers are coming into hospital as many as six and seven a day. The Beloochees are advancing closer and

closer every day. Their matchlocks, I really believe, carry twice as far as our muskets. From this to the 6th August nothing new. The same daily routine of duty, with generally a "fall" of rain in every twelve hours. I am laid up with fever, and prevented writing.*

August 6th.—The men still continue very sickly, 33 in hospital with fever. Glasse is very unwell, and unable to leave his bed. We are out of the most useful medicines, and hot water is the order of the day, and found to be a very good substitute, being of a very purgative nature. I made a kind of truce with a Murree chief, called Hybutt Khan, who acknowledged himself the owner of most of the flocks grazing around, also of some of the land now being cultivated. He told us to look out for Lali Khan and some 150 of his people, a day or two hence.

7th.—The Beloochees are on the "*qui vive*," and fired two shots at us, as we were walking in front of the gate-way. Hybutt Khan wants 40 rupees to take our tapaul to Lehree. He is evidently a doubtful character, and thinks to take us in, and has refused to sell us one sheep.

8th.—Had a slight skirmish this morning with Beloochees. When taking our walk, some Beloochees appeared about the nulla, evidently up to mischief. We enticed them out with a few men, when 50 or 60 of them immediately sprung up, and a little file-firing commenced. I withdrew the party to allow Erskine to have a shot, which fell into the midst of them, whether with any damage or not, we know not, the jungle being so thick; however they immediately bolted at their best pace.†

9th.—The Beloochees are up to some mischief at the Nufoosk Pass, and are going up there in small bodies of 20 and 30, destroying the road up, I suspect.

10th.—For the last four or five days the flocks have been coming closer and closer to the walls, eating up what little grass there was left. I had warned Hybutt Khan of this three or four times, and had also offered to purchase 100 at his own price, but he declared I should not have one. Erskine and myself had finished the last but one, of those we procured from old Sheer Bheg. We have both excellent appetites, although shut up in a fort. To-day two large flocks of sheep and goats came most temptingly near, and the sepoya earnestly entreated for some fresh meat. Watching our opportunity (no Beloochees being then in sight) we slipped out about 30 sepoya, flanking them with two bastions filled with men, and Erskine got the

* We did not see another could until the 18th August, some twenty days, during which time we were perfectly ignorant of everything going on in the plains, and had no means of sending a tapaul, as not a man could be persuaded to leave the fort.

† I have since heard from one who was then in the Murree hills, that this was an intended attack on the fort, and that Lali Khan with 500 men was close by at the time, intending to rush into the gate-way after us, as we retreated in, but that hearing the gun which the Hyd had agreed to render harmless for that morning, and seeing the effect of the two shells thrown by Erskine, (15 Murrees were killed and wounded by them,) they gave up the idea.

gun round to bear in the direction. There were only three Beloochees just then in charge. They immediately ran off for their lives, and the goats, by some instinct, and to our great annoyance, followed them at speed, like dogs. Two horsemen then came up, looking very fierce, but soon rode off on getting a shot. To describe the delight of all on getting this flock inside the fort is impossible. There was a perfect uproar. On counting our plunder, we found we had secured 300 sheep* and 57 goats. Most of the latter were milch goats, so that the highest castes shared the enjoyment; we immediately made a division of the whole, charging one rupee on the head of each, for the benefit of the widows of those who fell on the 16th May. That evening the fort became one large cook-shop.

11th.—Hybutt Khan came to-day to try and recover his sheep, and told us that Nusseer Khan had driven all our detachments into Sukkur. He also brought a note from Dodah, the chief, desiring us to leave his fort forthwith, and that he and his army would escort us down to the plains! When Hybutt found he could not get back his sheep, being told that most of them were already killed, he flew into a great rage, and declared he would come and attack the fort, for which treat I told the sentry to give him a shot, when he quickly departed.

15th.—A cossid, to our great joy, came in this morning, after a lapse of twenty days. I could have hugged the old rascal, although I knew him to be the greatest of spies. A letter arrived by him from the Political Agent, saying, it was contemplated to try and throw in supplies, through the agency of Jeytt Sing,† and Meer Hussain, to save moving the troops up with a convoy.

16th.—Another cossid this morning. The system mentioned yesterday of throwing in supplies is discarded, being found impracticable—and the welcome, most welcome intelligence of the following detachment leaving Sukkur for our relief—

Detachment of H. M. 40th Regiment,

1st Grenadiers, 4 Guns,

2nd ditto,.....200 Horse,

under the command of Major Clibborn, 1st Grenadiers. We received information that it was arranged between Hybutt Khan and the rest of the chiefs, that the former, in making a truce, should encourage us to go out foraging, and then cut us up.

* These sheep were a great addition to the half rations; the latter alone being but poor food for men working all day, and on guard every night.

† Jeytt Sing is a Shikarpore merchant immensely rich, and has great sway with all the Beloochees around. Our loss is always his certain gain. He buys back our stolen camels for 15 or 20 rupees, and sells them again to our Commissariat for 30 or 60 Rs! A positive fact. Meer Hussain, I am almost positive, was the cause of poor Clarke being attacked; and it is fully proved it was he who led Major Clibborn's watering party into the ambuscade. I hope he will yet meet with the punishment he deserves.

17th.—Two Beloochees disarmed a sepoy most beautifully to-day. He was sitting down, and had placed his musket and pouch-box a little on one side. The two Beloochees dashed up at speed, dismounted, picked up the musket, etc. before the sepoy could jump up, and went off, waving their booty in triumph. A sharp touch of an earthquake to-day.

18th.—A little skirmish with the Beloochees outside. We tried to draw them on towards the fort, but failed.

20th.—Six Beloochees made a dash around the fort on a plundering expedition, and captured three Banyan's donkeys. The same animals have now been stolen and re-captured three different times.

21st.—Received a message from Dodah's brother, to take care of ourselves, as the whole body of them would assemble ten days* hence, and put us all to the sword.

24th.—Another cossid arrived to-day, bringing the welcome intelligence of the convoy being actually on their march up, with a reduced detachment—having left behind detachment 40th—all but the light company 2d grenadiers, and one gun. To describe the joy of all hands, on my immediately giving out this news, is impossible. Those only who have suffered a four months' imprisonment, with the addition of never lying down to sleep without a chance of having to turn out for an attack, can conceive it.

28th.—Received the following amusing information from Hybutt Khan:—"About two months ago, their Syud, in whom they place great faith, having agreed to render our guns and muskets harmless, the whole of the tribe under Lall Khan† and Dulleel Khan, assembled to attack the fort. In the mean time, they got information from one of our cossid spies that we were at work from morning till night, and had built up two extra forts inside, and had also dug a well under the gateway. Upon hearing this, the Syud had a most convenient dream; declared he would have nothing to do with the business, and strongly recommended no attack. On this the tribe, immediately broke up". This agrees with the report mentioned on the 3d July. Hybutt also told us, that the Murrees are now‡ assembled to the number of 3000, behind the hill N. E. of the fort; and that they intend to have three fights with the coming convoy, for the honor of their land: 1st, at the Pass of Nuffook,—2nd, where they now are,—and then, if beaten by us in both, to fall back on Meer Hadjee's fort of Barkor, where they will fight to the last.

* This turned out but too true, so far as regards the assemblage of the whole tribe to a day, as on the 11st, exactly ten days, the fight of Nuffook took place.

† An amusing anecdote is told of this chief. When assisting in getting one of the guns left by Major Clibborn, up the Pass, it slipped back and smashed one of his limbs, which caused his death a fortnight after. When dying, he called some of his people around him, and warned them never to go near our guns, as "sleeping or waking they would always be their destruction." This chief was a grand limb lopped off the Murree tribe, being their greatest leader. He lost his only son in Clarke's fight.

‡ Altho' I did not place much credit on this information, thinking it a bit of bravado, yet I much wished to send it to Clibborn, but had no means.

26th.—Captured two bullocks, which we found a great treat, not having tasted beef for a long time. The convoy can now be only two marches off—cheering news!

31st.—A day of great and almost overpowering excitement. It commenced about 5 o'clock last evening, when the plain and hills became alive with Beloochees, and at dark, large signal fires on the tops of all the hills. At day-break, large parties of horse and foot were seen hurrying across the plain to the Nuffoosk Pass, on the opposite side of which, we soon learnt of the arrival of our convoy, from the report of one of their guns, a signal agreed upon between us. About sun-rise, we saw collected on the very top of the Pass about 2000 Beloochees, and others prowling about in all directions; the distance, as the crow flies, from the fort to the Pass, is about four miles. In fact, we were completely behind the scenes, and saw all that the Beloochees were at; and fully expecting to see our comrades crown the top every hour—we were highly amused and excited. Two p. m. no sight of the convoy coming over the Pass—they must be repairing the road up. Three p. m.* saw the shrapnel flying over the hill, and bursting in the midst of the enemy with the most beautiful effect. Five p. m. still no sight of the convoy. Beloochees still crossing the plains towards the seat of action. Erskine scattered a small body of them with a shell. Eight p. m. heavy firing of guns and musketry for ten minutes, when all was silent for the rest of the night. I should be very sorry to pass many days of my life like this. I would ten thousand times sooner have been in the thick of it: the excitement and suspense was beyond anything I ever felt before. Knowing the difficulty of the Pass, and not seeing our people crown the top, I felt certain there must be much bloodshed going on.†

Sept. 1st.—Not a single Beloochee to be seen on the top of the hill at day-light: but several passing across the plain in that direction. No sight or sound of the convoy all day! I am sadly perplexed to know what has become of them; and conclude, that finding the Pass too strongly defended yesterday, they have fallen back to go round by the Deeyrah road, as I first recommended.

2d.—Beloochees in all directions, and busy as bees. Another day of suspense and excitement. After 11 o'clock they pitched one of our sepoy's

* Between 2 and 3 o'clock the fight of Nuffoosk commenced.

† I have since heard some surprise has been expressed that we could not see and hear Clibborn's shells, and not rush out to his succour! Had we done so, the labor and perseverance of four months would have been thrown away in an hour, and the Beloochees would have gained the very object they had been trying for without effect, since the day we entered the fort, namely, to entice us out; but the thing was out of the question. Between us and the Pass were 4 miles of plain, 1 of a mile of the most dangerous ravines I ever passed through, a mountain a mile in extent, and last though not least, 2000 Beloochees! I might perhaps have mustered 100 bayonets, but must have left some 40 sick behind. But the best reason of all is, that it was not until the 7th September, (eight days afterwards) when we first saw the guns in the enemy's hands, that we had the slightest idea of the disaster that had taken place. Up to that date we anxiously looked out to see the convoy coming round the Deeyrah road, thinking they had found the Nuffoosk Pass too difficult.

tents about half way up the hill, up and down which hatches of loaded and unloaded camels are going. I suppose the convoy must have dropped some of their baggage and stores in the hurry of their departure. About 12 o'clock much firing commenced, and continued, with intervals, until 2 r. m. From the sound, it would appear the convoy had fallen back in the direction of the Deeyrah road, some 20 miles. Cannot now expect to see them for the next six or seven days. How tantalising, when they were so close. Not a drop of spirits, a cheroot, or a cup of tea left; nor have we, indeed, tasted any for some time. The sepoy's are very weak from short rations; there are only six bags of flour left. A bad look-out. Cannot help thinking of our having got our convoy over so snugly in May, when we had only a third of the number of the present convoy.

3rd.—Still in suspense. No communication from outside, but all are on the look-out, particularly at night. Upwards of 100 loaded camels are going across the plain, being some distance off. Whether these are horses or camels cannot be clearly ascertained without a glass. I persuaded the people in the fort that they were the former, although the sepoy's made the shrewd remark, that they never saw horsemen look so large, or go along one after the other, so regularly. About 20 horsemen, with 8 or 10 spare horses came down from the hill to water near the fort. This looks as if the owners of the latter had been killed. Two bodies are carried across the plain on *charpoy's* with a kind of funeral party following them. I suppose they are two chiefs. At 3 r. m. saw a large body of Beloochees pitching a sort of camp within 1½ mile of the fort. There is no mistaking our sepoy's tents, also one officer's tent—five of the former and one of the latter, exactly the number they took from Clarke's party. I trust they are those only, but appearances are very suspicious. Just as it was getting dark, we saw the whole body assembled in one dense mass, in front of their tents. I warned all hands to keep a bright look-out when the moon goes down.

4th.—To-day some horsemen came and informed us "that they had cut up our convoy, taken the guns, and all the stores and supplies, and had killed all the Sahib-log, except three, who were prisoners in their camp." In proof of which assertion, they offered to show the guns to any person I chose to send, who could also bring a chit from the prisoners. This offer, however, I refused, firmly believing the report to be altogether untrue, and made with a view of getting hold of one of my people for information. They also said, that if I would leave the fort and go to the plains, they would not molest me. We had a very heavy fall of rain about 4 r. m. More tents are springing up in the Murree camp. About 300 Beloochees are seated on a rising ground on our flank, and I have great amusement in watching their movements. Having a good glass, we could almost see into their very tents.

5th.—A person came under the fort calling out, wishing to give us the news; but we had already quite enough of these people's stories, so sent

a bullet or two after him, to hurry his departure. All in the fort are sadly perplexed to know what to think of affairs. Beloochees are on the move in every direction—100 passed this morning in the Deeyrah direction, the road from which we are expecting the convoy. The Beloochees do not seem in good spirits, not like men who have destroyed a large convoy; there has evidently been mischief somewhere. A storm occurred about 4 o'clock, which, to our great delight, blew down all the Beloochee tents; they, however, soon had them up again.

6th.—No grain is left for camels or bullocks, and little or no forage—they must take their chance, poor creatures. Nothing is now left but a few bags of rice and three or four of flour; ten bags of the latter, which were thrown aside as being half sand, now came into use, and were greedily devoured by the sepoy. A camel-man shot himself, being detected in a theft.

7th.—I half expected, on taking a look at the Beloochee camp this morning, to find them all decamped; but a sad reverse met our sight—the three guns belonging to the convoy staring us in the face! They are placed on a piece of rising ground on one flank of their camp, their muzzles pointed toward the fort. What can have become of Major Clibborn and his convoy? Many officers and men must have lost their lives before they gave up the guns. There is no doubt now that something most disastrous must have occurred, and we must prepare for the worst. The sepoy keep up their spirits amazingly well, not the slightest sign of flinching being developed, although they seem to be aware, that their situation is rather perilous. Luckily they cannot see the guns with the naked eye, on account of the jungle. There are chances in our favour yet,—that the guns will not be of much use to them. 1st, They may be spiked; 2ndly, they may have no ammunition; and lastly, they know not how to load or fire them. Luckily they are howitzers instead of field pieces. Ten a. m. all the Beloochees are assembled round the guns, and peeping into their muzzles,—quite playthings to them.

8th.—Small parties of horsemen are prowling all round the fort, watching us, I suppose, knowing we must soon take to flight for want of provisions. They need not be in such a hurry, as we have still some rice and gun bullocks left.

9th.—Loaded camels are still going across the plain. The Beloochees are mounted on artillery horses. There is no mistaking them, from their size, and their having blinkers on; which they were determined should not escape our sight, as they galloped up and down in front of the fort for an hour.

10.—Our old friend Sheer Bheg came in this morning, but in such a suspicious manner, that I put him prisoner. He tells us the Beloochee report of having destroyed our convoy is all true. He mentions poor Raitt and Moore as being two of the killed.

11th.—Made some horsemen, who were grazing their horses rather too close, scamper off, and received much abuse from them for my pains.

The Murrees acknowledge to their having had 80 killed and 80 wounded in the fight. Our old acquaintance Hybutt Khan, and his son are, it is stated, both killed, also Kurreem Khan, who superintended the slaughter on the 29th June.

12th.—I saw a very pleasing sight this morning; nothing more or less than the Murrees moving away the guns. They appear to be taking them to pieces, and away. This looks very much like a bolt on their part. Perhaps they have got intelligence of another convoy coming up. The Beloochees are rather quiet, and allowed two camelmen to loot them of three mares out grazing. One hundred and sixty killed and badly wounded, will make a hole in their tribe.

13th.—About 1 A. M. there was great noise and many fires in the direction of the Murree camp. At day-light not a single tent to be seen, but loaded camels going off by dozens. The Murrees are all off, and our eyes are no longer made sore by the sight of the convoy's guns. Every one is delighted beyond measure—this is quite a reprieve.

14th.—Sent off Sheer Bhag with a message to Major Clibborn, to say we were all well in the fort. This is the first opportunity that has offered of sending anything in the shape of a letter since the 26th ultimo. We captured two camels this morning with the C. D. mark fresh upon them, and there is no doubt from whence they came! I feel the want of a drop of spirits or a cup of tea most sadly, when keeping watch at night. Water (and such water too!) is but cold comfort.

17th.—About 12 o'clock last night a cossid arrived with an official letter from the Brigade Major at Sukkur, informing us of the full particulars of Major Clibborn's disaster, and leaving me to my own resources, it being found impossible to send me any further relief. Well, this decides the matter at once. The number of sick, and the weakly state of the rest of the detachment, give little chance of escape by a night march, and I do not suppose the Murrees will agree to any terms I may offer. We put the best face we could on the matter, and on making a calculation, find we can last out until the 15th October on quarter rations, and the gun bullocks. We decided on holding out, unless we get honorable terms. Perhaps something will turn up in the mean time, and if it come to the worst, we must try and make our way down to the plains. Replied to the Brigade Major, but, in conformity with my decision, did not allow the cossid to enter into the fort, knowing he would not have the most cheering news for the people inside. The sepoy are in excellent spirits, although well aware that there is some mischief in the wind. From this to the 22d instant, nothing extraordinary occurred.

23rd.—Sheer Bhag returned from the plains to-day, but without any reply to my letter, having had it taken from him. He tells me that "Dodah sent twice to him, immediately after the fight, knowing he had access to the fort, to say, he should be happy to make any terms with

me, as long as I would leave his fort, and that he had sent two people to me, but that I would not listen to them, firing upon and driving them away." The Beloochee who came on the 5th, and whom we treated so roughly, must have been one of these peaceable messengers! Well, this seems an opening for obtaining favourable terms, particularly as old Dodah has made the first advances; and knowing the impossibility of holding the post much longer for want of supplies, I opened a communication with the chief, Sheer Bheg and my naib being the bearers of the following proposal:—

"Dodah Murree, I will give you back your fort on conditions, viz. that you give me personal security for my safe arrival in the plains. If not, I will remain here two months longer, having provisions for that time."

24th.—The deputation returned, informing me, that on receiving the communication, the whole of the chiefs had assembled together, and after some consideration, took a solemn oath on the Koran, that if I would leave the fort in three days, they would protect me from all opposition down to the plains; ending by saying that, "whatever my wishes were, should be their law." Two hours afterwards a cosaid brought a letter from Dodah himself, in answer to mine, containing an agreement on oath, to my proposal. He said, he would send his nephew to pay his respects to me, and to see the agreement conformed to by all his people.

25th.—I replied to Dodah's letter, to the effect, that I would give up the fort three days hence, on the above terms. I am surprized at their letting us off so easily, namely, simply to return to the plains without let or hindrance from his people, on condition of giving up the fort, which Dodah must well know we cannot hold a month longer. There is plenty of room to suspect treachery, but we must run the risk. This evening Guamanul Khan came near the fort, and sent a message to say, that he feared to venture inside; that if I would meet him outside without my troops, he would ratify the agreement. Wishing at once to see whether it was to be "treachery, or no treachery," I agreed, and with Erskine and four native officers, met him about a mile from the fort. I never saw a man in such a fright in my life. Although he had 30 horsemen, armed to the teeth, and there were only six of us, he retreated twice before he would venture near us. He thought, from our coming alone, there must be treachery; that some men were hidden somewhere. Even after we had met, he had his horse all ready close by for a start. Down we all sat in a circle. A wild scene; his followers appeared to be exceedingly well armed, and all fine stout-built men. After compliments, etc. the nephew began to talk very reasonably. He expressed a hope that "there would now be a lasting peace between his tribe and the British. That they had only fought at the Nuffoosk Pass to save their country, and their lives. That it was the least they could do, when they had the fate of Bejah Khan staring them in the face. That they had never killed any of our people after the fight, and

that all the prisoners had been fed, clothed, and set free." He concluded saying, that "he should remain near the fort until we left, to prevent any disturbances between his people and mine; and that he would furnish me with trustworthy guides down." There was not the slightest appearance of treachery. Thus ended this most interesting conference. It will not, I think, be easily forgotten by either Erskine or myself; so much depended on it, to ourselves and the whole of the detachment. We found these Beloochees the most civil and polite of men! The confidence placed in their word, by meeting them in the way we did, seemed to please them much, and from having been deadly enemies five long months, became in one hour the best of friends. No doubt their joy was just as great in getting rid of us, as our's was in obtaining our freedom.

26th and 27th.—We are most delightfully employed in preparing for a start. Only ten public camels are left, and those as thin as rats; none are here procurable—the number of sick amounts to 40, and these require carriage. Then there are the rations, ammunition, both gun and musket, water and tents. In fact, I found I could not move without sacrificing *all* private property, and half the ammunition and tents. I was obliged to call on officers and men to give up what private camels they had. This was most willingly agreed to; and all kit, even to our bedding, was left behind—the gun ammunition I was obliged to take, as I rather expected opposition from the Boogties, through whose country we had forty miles to go. At first we were almost afraid we should not be able to bring down the gun, from the wretched state of the bullocks, and weakness of the men. However we determined to try, and leaving the waggon and forage-cart behind, picked out thirty of the best for the gun alone. The sepoy's thinking we were going to leave it behind, came and begged me not, as they themselves would drag it down, and defend it with their lives! When Erskine was burning the forage-cart and waggon, the Beloochees outside, thinking we were setting fire to the fort, sent to beg us to spare it.

28th.—We turned our backs on Kahun this morning at 2 o'clock. We had much trouble in getting off, in consequence of the number of sick, and were obliged to tie some of the poor fellows on the camels. We commenced the ascent of the big hill at 6, and after immense fatigue and labour, got the gun to the top by 2 p. m. The sepoy's were regularly overpowered with the fatigue half way up. The call for water now was dreadful, all that I had brought with me in the mussucks being expended. About 9 o'clock about 300 Beloochees had assembled in our front, rear and right flank, perched on the tops of the hills. They seemed highly amused at our getting the gun up: but when they saw the sepoy's completely done up with thirst and fatigue, they called out "Ah! you will never get the gun down to the plains; you had better give it to old Dodah." I offered them money to shew us some water, and they said they would for 1000 Rupees! After some talk, they agreed to shew us some for 100 Rupees, which was immediately given them,—there was just enough to give each man a handful

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or so, and then they set to, and got the gun up. I really thought at one time we must have left it behind. At the very top of the Pass were about 50 of Hybutt Khan's followers. These men swore we should not go any further, until we had paid for the flock of sheep we captured on the 13th August. However, when it came to the point, and seeing the gun too close to be pleasant, they thought better of it, and begged 100 rupees for Hybutt Khan's family, who they said, were very poor. It was as much as I could do to restrain myself from giving the party a round of grape. It's well I did not, perhaps, as it would most likely have embroiled me with the rest of the tribe, and the detachment was not in much of a fighting condition!

It was 4 p. m. and we had still to descend the Nuffoosk Pass to water, which our Murree guide reported was in abundance three miles from the bottom, in consequence of much rain having fallen. We commenced descending, when a spectacle, the most horrible to be conceived, met our sight—the bodies of all our poor fellows, both officers and men, who fell on the 31st August, lying* unburied, with all their clothes on! having been merely dragged off the road. Raitt's body was the first, being almost on the top of the Pass. Through this dreadful scene, we had to lower our gun down the hill, inch by inch. I would have given worlds to have buried the poor fellows, but this was out of the question. We had then been fourteen hours under arms, and had still to seek for water; besides which, we had no intrenching tools. The bodies were lying in heaps, which shews what a bitter fight it must have been. The Murrees spoke highly of poor Raitt's bravery in being at the head of all. They had buried all their own dead at the bottom of the hill, but although I offered them any money they chose to ask, they refused to bury our's, in consequence of the state of decomposition they were then in. After much labour, we got the gun down the hill, and proceeded along the table-land until 7 o'clock, when we found water in abundance, in a deep water-course, on the bank of which we bivouaced for the night. Although the men had no food all day, they all (save the picquets) immediately fell asleep, without tasting a bit. They had been nineteen hours under arms, the bugle having been sounded at 12 o'clock last night. Had this water been found when the fight of the 31st took place, what a different tale would have been told!

29th.—Marched this morning to the top of the Surtoff mountain, 4 miles; descended the hill, lowering the gun down with drag ropes, and reached the bottom at 10 o'clock. On examining one of the gun wheels, I found the iron work of the axle-tree box split in several places. From the appearance it seemed impossible to repair it, or that the gun would travel any further; but Erskine, by great exertions, got it bound up, and on we

* Since writing this, I am happy to say, I have succeeded in getting all our comrades buried. Their remains now lie in one large grave in the ground on which they fought so gallantly. Munsod Khan, nephew of Begah, accomplished this desired object for me, in which he was assisted by some of the Murrees engaged in the fight.

went again, starting at 2 P. M., but did not reach our ground until 10, having lost the road, and got jammed between ravines. I should have wished to have made only one march a day, in consequence of the weak state of the men, but there was no help for it; on we must go, night as well as day, having only two days provisions with us. Here no water was procurable. Luckily the *sepoys* were so done up, that they soon fell asleep, and did not complain at all about their thirst. Received an express from the Assistant Political Agent, warning us to expect opposition from the Nagtias, in whose country we are now, in not much of a fighting condition, half the men being on camels; but with the gun I think we have not much to fear from them.

30th.—Started at 5 A. M. and arrived at 10 at a beautiful stream of water. On this march I was obliged to throw away all the ammunition, save a few rounds of grape, otherwise I must have left eight or ten sick behind. Both men and camels regularly gave in during the march, and how we got all safe up, I hardly know. Remaining with the rear-guard, I thus cheered them on as well as I could, but one poor fellow died on the camel's back. Our Murree guide, who had behaved as yet very well, did an act of extraordinary kindness for a Beloochee. Hearing that one of our people was left behind for want of carriage to bring him on, he went back of his own accord, mounted him on his horse, and brought him into camp, walking himself by his side. From this ground, I sent off an express by our Murree guide, (the only man who would venture) to Poolajee, for some spare camels and gun-bullocks, and we proceeded on another eight miles, at 4 A. M., getting to some water about 10 o'clock.

October 1st.—Started at 3 A. M. and marched on eight miles. Soon after our arrival, to our great delight, up came our Murree guide, with some Sind horse, spare camels and gun-bullocks. We proceeded on to Poolajee at 4 A. M. reaching that post at 12, distance fourteen miles. On coming out of the hills into the plain, I fired off our howitzer, to give notice to our friends at Lehree, the head quarters of the 5th Regiment, of our safe arrival.

Thus, after a detention of five months in the fort of Kahun, was our escape from that position and the Murree hills, accomplished. The hardships and privations circumstances forced on us, were most cheerfully borne with by all. After the attack on Major Clibborn's party, it often appeared impossible to expect a release, yet not a murmur was heard. On no one occasion had I to find fault with the men, and the alacrity and cheerfulness with which they performed the exceedingly onerous duties which I was forced to exact, reflects, in my humble opinion, great credit on the Kahun (5th) Pultan and small detachment of Artillery. Of the constant aid afforded me on every occasion by Lieut. Erskine and Lieut. Glasie, I note nothing—it can never cease to be fresh in memory; and their rank is too near my own to admit of my saying all I could wish, or they deserve, even in this my private journal.

APPENDIX.

No. III.

Narrative of a Disaster which befel Skinner's Horse in the Bolan Pass.

Extract of a letter from Captain Haldane.

Camp Quetta, 10th May, 1841.—I was left at Dadur with orders to escort the Battering Train through the Pass, but this arrangement was subsequently altered by the arrival of orders for the Train to remain at Sukkur. I had consequently nothing to do but to join my Brigade (which had already gone into Quetta) as soon as possible, and with that view I applied for Commissariat Cattle and Provisions for the trip up the Bolan Pass, a distance of seven long marches over a road of loose stones, or rather the bed of a nulla. Commissariat carriage (in sufficient quantity) could not be furnished, but as I did not like to stay behind, I determined on accomplishing the distance in five days, and applied for Camels to carry four days provisions, as I knew I could get plenty of provisions on the fifth day, when I reached Camp. I succeeded in obtaining 28 Camels, which assisted a little; though they were such wretched animals that they could not carry more than two maunds each. I started on the 23d ultimo, the men carrying what the Camels could not, and the first march was got over without accident. The second march we lost two Camels, but this was of little consequence, as the daily consumption of grain reduced the loads. The third day we had to march a distance of 22 miles over a terrible road, with no water for the last 13 miles, and reached our tents at 2 p. m. Then came the distress of the camp followers;—numbers of them fell for want of water, and would not come on; while, to add to our misery, eight of the Camels died, leaving the attah, etc. on the road. As soon as I reached the ground I sent back water to those left behind, most of whom were Camel men (150 of this class accompanying the detachment) and at last all the people reached the camp; but it was then dark, and as all hands were completely knocked up, I was unable to march again the next morning; besides I wanted to send back for the grain, etc. left on the road. This was

done early in the morning, and in the evening we made a march of six miles to Sir-i-Bolan, where we passed the night, intending to march to Dust-i-Budowlut (18 miles) in the morning; but finding all the party, men and animals, much fatigued with their previous exertions, I finally determined to give them till the afternoon to recruit themselves. We started therefore at 1 P. M., and had gone about two miles when it came on to rain, though not heavily.

We had now reached the narrowest part of the Pass, not more than 20 or 30 yards wide, and I had sent on 100 Suwars, the Camel men and all the baggage, with instructions to keep close together, and was bringing up the rear with about 80 horse, when just as I entered the narrow Pass and came to a turn, I saw a body of water, about a foot deep, rushing round another turn with tremendous force, and immediately after another wave full three feet higher: on the right and left there were no means of escape, the rocks being perpendicular, so we went to the right about and galloped back, just reaching an accessible place as the water was upon us. The stream now rolled past with awful velocity, and rapidly increased to ten feet in depth:—then came a dreadful scene, men, horses, camels, etc. were swept past us, and dashed to pieces against projecting rocks over which the water flew twenty feet high. No assistance could be afforded, for the stream ran faster than a horse could gallop. I stood upon the bank quite horror-struck, for I believed, and so did we all, that every one ahead of us had perished. In a few moments the destruction was complete, and we felt like men cast upon a desert island, without a particle of food, wet to the skin, a cold cutting wind blowing on us, and no means, from the nature of the country, of ascertaining the extent of our loss, as until the water went down all communication with any of the party who might have been saved was completely cut off. About sunset the water had nearly subsided, and I then found how matters stood; the loss of life was (as the accompanying list will shew) 33 men and 101 animals. We passed a miserable night, but no more rain fell; and in the morning we pushed on to one of our outposts, eight miles from Dusht-i-Budowlut, and about an equal distance from our Camp. Two Officers of the Madras Engineers, who were with us, have lost every thing they had, and the Risallahs have been ruined, nor can they replace the things lost here. We trusted to recover some of the property in the morning before starting, but found very little, for such was the force of the stream, that the matchlocks belonging to the men drowned had the barrels broken in two, and some of the bodies were found by the dawk man at Beebee Narree, 20 miles below the spot where the accident occurred. The only people in the torrent who were saved happened at the time it met them to be near a place where they could scramble up. All the Company's Camels but six were lost.

CASUALTY LIST.

| Commissariat Macedum. | Ditto Camel Man. | Coolie. | Surwana. | Sowars. | Writer. | Syces. | Horses. | Tattoes. | Camels. | Commissariat Camels. | Bullocks. | Property Rs. 12,439 : 10. |
|--------------------------|---------------------|---------|----------|---------|---------|--------|---------|----------|---------|-------------------------|-----------|------------------------------|
| 1 | 1 | 1 14 | 4 | 1 11 | 35 | 47 | 13 | 3 | 4 | | | |

All Ammunition, Doolies, and every thing lost, 33 Men and 101 Cattle.

APPENDIX.

No. IV.

Narrative of CAPTAIN GRAY'S escape from the Ghilzies.

I commenced my march from Cabul at daylight, on the morning of the 2nd of October, with an escort of twenty Hazir Bash horsemen, furnished me by Sir A. Burnes, and had proceeded as far as a village called Boodkhah, about six miles from Cabul, when one of the dak runners came up to me stating that a Kafilah had been plundered by the Ghilzies the previous night, at a place called Tazeen, and advised me not to proceed till I had heard from Sir A. Burnes, to whom they had reported the circumstance. I in consequence went off the road, and remained there till I could hear something further, but was not kept long in suspense, when I perceived a horseman galloping up in my direction; it was one from Sir A. B. with a note for me, wishing me not to proceed any further, as the Pass was not safe, but to go into the village of Boodkhah, and there remain till I should hear from him again. I therefore took his advice, and on the evening of the 3rd I got another note from him, saying there was a party of four hundred horsemen going in my direction, and that I might embrace the opportunity of accompanying them as far as Gundamak; that the Chief was a very respectable and trustworthy man, requesting me at the same time to be altogether guided by his advice. I accordingly left the village, and joined his camp on the evening of the 3rd; and at daylight, on the morning of the 4th, we commenced our march towards the Khoord Cabul Pass, and on gaining the mouth of it, found it in possession of the Ghilzies, and so strongly posted on the heights, that the Chief thought it advisable not to attempt it, but endeavour to get through another Pass called the Chinaree; we then shaped our course for it, and on reaching it found it also in possession of the enemy. Finding this to be the case, the Chief held a consultation with his sirdars, when they unanimously agreed to try another Pass, stating at the same time, that the natural difficulties of it were so great, that he was afraid we should not be able to

surmount them; however it was decided that the attempt should be made, and I am happy to say, we surmounted every difficulty, and got safe through by 4 o'clock *p. m.* and took up our camp in the dry bed of a river between Sa Baba and Tazeen; and every thing appeared to be quiet till between 8 and 9 o'clock, when some people appeared on the hills that surrounded us, and challenged some of our escort, saying that if they would give up the two Officers, K. and myself, they should receive three thousand rupees for each of us, and that the escort would be permitted to proceed without molestation. The answer they received from our party was 'that the Officers were under their protection, and protect them they would to the very last.' The sentence was scarcely finished, when a shrill whistle was heard in the hills and followed by a tremendous volley from the sides, and directed on my tent, which was the only one in our camp. I immediately jumped out of bed, put on my clothes as quick as possible, and had the tent struck; got our escort to saddle their horses and be prepared in case the enemy might descend; but finding they had no intention of doing so, but were determined to pick us off without exposing themselves, our party thought it necessary that they should be dislodged, and commenced ascending the hills on each side, the enemy all the time pouring on us a most destructive fire: and after a contest of several hours, they succeeded in driving them from the heights. We were engaged from between 8 and 9 o'clock (at which time the moon had just got above the hills that surrounded us and threw her light on our party below) till 4 o'clock the following morning, the 5th.

On the return of our party a council of war was held, to which we were invited. The Chief said he had sent for us to know what our wishes were, whether we wished to proceed or return, that the whole of the Passes of Gundamuk were in possession of the Gilzies, and that one of them had 5,000 men in it, and that none of his escort had a single ball left. I replied 'if such is the case, I would certainly advise our returning to Cabul;' when a very young man, a sirdar, son of the Naib Shurreef's at Cabul, started up, and said, 'I am directed to escort these Officers as far as Gundamuk; we have sustained the attack of last night, and why should we fly? No, forward is the word with me;' and stroking his beard at the same time, which is considered in the light of an oath with them, they all followed his example, saying '*Peah*,' which is '*Forward*.' The Chief then directed me to have my cattle loaded, and to disguise ourselves, which I accordingly did, borrowing from amongst them, one thing or another, and by day-light on the 5th, we were on the move towards Gundamuk, and on reaching the Parree Durra, or Fairy Pots, we found it literally alive with the Gilzies. We in consequence halted for a few seconds to consult; however, it was thought advisable not to attempt it, but to take another direction across the Doble and Udrak Budruk Mountains into the Leighnan Valley, which we did; and it is only wonderful how we ever

effected it. The ascent was dreadful, and only one at a time could ascend; however we got over the difficulties, keeping on at a pretty good pace for fear of the enemy overtaking us, which they did not do till about the close of the evening, when they came up with our straggling rear, cutting up every one they could lay hands on. We had a great many camp-followers that were returning to the Provinces, and mostly all on foot; they were all cut up, poor fellows! and several servants of K—— (six of them,) his tent, bed, clothes, and two tattoos; and it was not till about 4 o'clock on the morning of the 6th, we halted at a village called Mumrour, our party coming in by twos and threes, having been on the move for 23 hours, without even a halt. You may guess the state we were in, when I tell you that the moment we got into the village, K—— and I just tied our horses to a tree, and fell down fast asleep in one of the public roads of it, and had scarcely laid an hour, when the chief sent for me, and informed me that we were not safe in the village, and that he advised our proceeding on to one that we would be safe in. Away we started, and between 7 and 8 o'clock that evening reached the fort of Teer Ghurree, as it is called; we were then put into a hut, which was surrounded by a high wall, and there remained for seventeen days, expecting every moment to have our throats cut. On the morning of the 7th, the chief of our party, Mahomed Uzzen Khan, came to me and said he had something to communicate; I consequently took him aside, when he told me, that he was very much alarmed for our safety; in fact, that the whole of Affghanistan were determined to make one cause of it, and to drive out and murder every Feringhee in the country; and that there was not the least reliance to be placed in our escort, and that the country round about, and Cabul itself, was ready to break out. On hearing this from so respectable a chief and several other people, I thought it my duty to apprise Sir A. Burnes of it. I immediately sat down and wrote him an *official letter*, acquainting him with what was going on, and that treachery was at the very threshold of their doors, and also informing him of the attack upon us near Taseen. A new difficulty now presented itself,—how the letter was to be conveyed to him; however, this was very soon settled by the chief, who said that he would give the man that took it and brought back an answer, twenty rupees and a *khelut*: it was taken and delivered to Sir A. Burnes, and the bearer of it brought a letter to the chief, acknowledging its receipt. But I never heard a line from Sir A. B. This can be easily accounted for,—the idea of my writing and telling such big-wigs that treachery was on foot! Had I been a *little* 'Political,' they might have given ear to it! What has been the consequence of his incredulity? Why, he, his brother, Swayne, Robinson, and Raban of ours, and several others were murdered in his house! I only regret I did not keep a copy of the official letter I wrote, for I certainly would publish the whole transaction. As it was official, Burnes ought to have laid it before Sir Wm. Macnaghten and the General. I am not

aware he did not, but strongly suspect so; otherwise he would not have suffered as he did. Why, to tell you the whole of the business from first to last, would take several sheets of paper, but I'll give all the leading particulars. Whilst we were I may say prisoners, several old moolahs used to come in and see us, and I very soon found out the drift of one man's visits, and therefore begged of K—— to let me conduct the whole of our plans for leaving the place we were in. During our confinement I had received several letters from Capt. P. Burn at Gundamuck, requesting me to proceed, with the escort with me, to his support. On the receipt of his letter I sent over to the chief of our party and requested him to allow me to take the party to his assistance; he said he could not, that he was sent for the sole protection of the property in the Lughman Valley, and that on his leaving it, the Ghilzies would immediately attack the place and destroy the whole valley. I wrote to Burn to this effect, acquainting him at the same time that the party was not under *my* command; but on the contrary, that my hands had been completely tied by Sir A. B. previous to my leaving Cabul, by being solely guided by this chief, and not in any way to act contrary to his wishes, but to be guided *solely* and altogether by him. However several notes passed between Captain Burn and myself, and his chief object appeared to me, to get us out of the dilemma we were in, and wrote rather a severe letter to the chief, who appeared to be much annoyed, and came over to us and asked me if we were anxious to go? I replied, we were; and that if he would give me twenty horsemen I would make the attempt to Gundamuck; he said, 'Very well, the day after to-morrow be ready to start; in the mean time I will send out people and find out the state of the Pass to Jellalabad.' I said I wished to go to Gundamuck to Captain Burn: however before the day arrived for our departure, he came and said it was impossible to go, as we were literally surrounded by the Ghilzies; and put us off for a couple of days more. We were obliged to submit, but at the same time determined not to be put off another day, and made every preparation for starting. The two days previous to our leaving, the old moolah came in and asked me, if we had made up our minds as to when we would leave, and in what direction; I told him that we had, that we should leave on such a day and go to Gundamuck; but at the same time I must tell you, I had a most faithful and intelligent spy in my service, my muleteer. Through him I heard of all that was going on; consequently on the morning we started, he took me on one side, and told me that the moolah had been very busy in planning our destruction; that he had taken the Ghilzies off the Pass leading to Jellalabad and had placed them on the road to Gundamuck. I told him not to say a word to a soul. Shortly after this, the chief sent word that he was ready to start; we did so, at daylight on the morning of the 23d October, all the party fully expecting that Gundamuck was to be our destination, and on our reaching the junction of the two roads, I asked the chief to let

me have fifty men, and that I would make the best of my way to Jellalabad and not to Gundamuck. I was determined on doing so, and by 5 o'clock that evening reached it, a distance of forty miles. I went and called on the Governor of the place, and requested him to give me protection, which he did: halted the 24th, and by the 28th, reached Peshawar, where I considered myself safe; halted a day there, and in fifteen days reached Ferozepore; halted there four days, and Loodiana two, and arrived at Kurnaul on the morning of the 3d December, a complete Afghan, with a beard, etc. as long as my arm. My disguise saved me many a pot shot; and, thank God, got through all my difficulties, without a scratch.

APPENDIX.

No. V.

Attack on, and CAPTAIN FERRIS Escape from, Pesh-Bolak.

Pesh-Bolak is situated half way between Lallipoorah and Jellalabad, and there is a cantonment there for one of Shah Sooja's Regiments, the "Jezailchees," or Rifles, commanded by Captain Ferris.

The Officers attached to this Corps were Captain Gerrard, second in command, Lieutenant Lukin, Adjutant, and Dr. Ritchie.

Captain Gerrard with 300 men had been detached to succour Captain Burn's post at Gundamuck; this with various demands upon his Regiment, left Captain Ferris but 250 men, to defend his post, keep open the communication, and guard treasure to the amount of 50,000 rupees.

Near the cantonment is an old fort, ill-calculated to stand a siege; indeed you might have marched a section through a breach in one of the curtains, and His Majesty's Regiment of Jezailchees, or that portion of them at Pesh-Bolak, would ere this have had their quietus, but for some slight suspicions respecting the fate of the surrounding country, which induced Captain Ferris to stop the gap in the wall, and he was enabled to do so with a number of bricks which lay close at hand.

In the early part of October, Captain Ponsonby, Assistant-Adjutant-General, Lieutenant Harrington, 5th Light Cavalry, with twenty-four Troopers, and Dr. Stiven, Superintending Surgeon, halted at Pesh-Bolak, at the recommendation of the Political Agent, Captain Mackeson, as the country a-head was said to be in a state of insurrection. A Parsee merchant with a large and valuable investment also took refuge at Pesh-Bolak.

Matters continued tranquil until the 13th November, when at half-past ten at night, the picquets were attacked, but without sustaining any loss; a bearer of Dr. Stiven's was killed, and a troop horse wounded; the enemy were driven off. We the next day endeavoured to discover who were our foes, and we had just come to the conclusion they were common thieves, when about 3 o'clock p. m., there issued from the Golahi

forts, close to the cantonments, some two hundred men, who opened a sharp fire, and advanced upon the Officers' bungalows.

To repel them, the Troopers of the 5th Light Cavalry (late of the 2nd) and a Company of Jezailchees turned out, and a very pretty affair commenced in skirmishing order. Although the ground was not favorable for Cavalry, the Troopers behaved well, and one man, Ram Singh, a Rajpoot, displayed signal intrepidity; he was met with equal courage by two Affghans on foot, one of whom shot him through the body. The moment he fell from his horse, a Jezailchee, a mere youth, mounted the animal, and taking a deliberate aim at the two Affghans who were quenching their thirsty swords in the blood of the Trooper as he lay on the ground, shot one of them dead on the spot.

The enemy being compelled to retire by the superior fire of the Jezailchees, we commenced our work to render the ricketty old fort defensible: there were neither loop-holes nor banquettes; to remedy the first deficiency, moorchus of loose bricks were constructed, and a portion of the inside of the wall, cut away, served for the latter.

The Officers were enabled to get most of their baggage out of the bungalows into the fort; the Parsee's investments had been lodged there some time before.

Our enemies were rapidly increasing in numbers, and soon returned filling the air with horrid yells, brandishing their swords, and cutting all sorts of war capers and antics, a mode of horrifying their enemies generally adopted by Eastern nations.

During the remainder of the day and the whole of the night, a continued fire was kept up on the walls, and well replied to by our men, who were enabled to pick off a number of the enemy, by the strong light of the bungalows and lines which they had set fire to. On the 15th, the Shin-warries, the Sungoo Kail, Deh-Suruk men, and Pesh-Bolakchees, besides a numerous body of Kochees, or wandering Ghiljies, joined the Golahi men, comprising altogether a force of 5000. They surrounded the fort, and became bold even to rashness.

To cool their ardour we contrived, with immense labour, to raise the only gun we had, a six-pounder, and getting it into position on the centre bastion at the west-side of the fort, a few round shot from it caused them to approach with more caution in that position. Our men behaved nobly, poor fellows; obliged to work day and night they had no rest; they seemed, however, to consider it good sport, and when any of the enemy were knocked over they crowded amazingly.

At length the miserable intelligence was communicated to us by the Adjutant, that we had but one day's supply of ammunition in the magazine! Captain Ferris had sent in his indents to Cabool six months before! Comment is unnecessary—he had represented the state of the fort, too, but who cares for an out-post?

In this most depressing state of things, we tried negotiation; but the villains knew we were in need both of men and powder, and swore they would give terms to none, except the ladies.

Here, I must pause to implore my fair country women in India, never to place themselves in the situation of these poor ladies at Pesh-Bolak.

Affghanistan is a land of blood, the work of destruction is about to commence, and no one can predict where it is to stop. During this month, there have fallen by assassination and in action, more Officers than are usually sacrificed in a dozen battles.

To attempt a description of the sufferings of Mrs. Ferris and her sister, would require an abler pen than mine; we, in the contemplation of them, felt our very heart-strings wrung, and were compelled to seek relief from such torture by resorting to the stern work before us. And we did serve out the "turbaned warriors;" they went down one after another like nine pins, and a round of grape judiciously pitched into a lump of them, sent a dozen by the shortest route into Paradise.

The Adjutant, Lieutenant Lukin, deserves the credit of that shot, and his Addiscombe education taught him to lay the guns as well as any of our Artillery Officers could have done it.

We now made a discovery calculated to appal the stoutest heart; we had enemies inside the fort as well as out. Treachery was at work, and the knowledge of the fact threw a dismal gloom over the spirits of the Officers, already low enough. Captain Ponsonby, on going to his post at night, called for the Native Officer under him; he was replied to by the snap of a pistol, which fortunately missed fire. Seeming not to observe the circumstance, Captain Ponsonby ordered the man to mount the wall, which he did.

The following day the Native Officers reported that one of their number was corresponding with the enemy; they undertook, however, to manage him in their own way—they harangued him, taunted him with perfidy, and succeeded in making him ashamed of himself, and finally made him swear upon the Koran to be true to his salt. His conduct eventually proved his sincerity, for he exerted himself most strenuously against the enemy.

On the morning of the 16th, we were informed the enemy were preparing mines; they had previously made an attempt to place dried bullrushes at the gate, in order to burn it, but were compelled to "leave that."

We had sent letters for assistance to Jellalabad, to Tora Buz Khan, the Mohumudan Chief at Lalpoorah, and to Captain Mackeson at Peshawur; but it was evident none of them had been received. We had, in vain, tried negotiation, and having only 25 rounds per man left, we held a council of war,—our deliberations were brief enough,—we decided upon cutting our way through the multitude around us—better to die like men, than like rats in a hole.

Meantime we plied the gun, and gave no indication that could lead the enemy to guess our intentions. Our own men, however, had observed

the failure of the ammunition, or apprehended something had gone wrong, and several of them threw their bundles over the wall, preparing to desert; five of them led the way, jumped into the ditch and ran off to the enemy, who at once cut them in pieces before the eyes of the garrison, upon whom the lesson was not lost, as no more tried the experiment.

The shades of evening fell upon friend and foe alike, and the tired, and war-worn garrison of Pesh-Bolak, prepared for a still greater trial than any they had yet been put to.

It was decided that not a particle of baggage should be taken, indeed there was no possibility of doing so.

The two ladies were placed on horseback behind two of the Native Officers, the garrison was disposed so as to render their fire effective in front, to both flanks and to the rear, and the Camp followers were securely placed between the main body and rear guard.

Every thing being arranged, the gates were opened, and a few of the rear guard continuing to fire from the walls to lull suspicion, the word to march was given, and at about half past six or seven we issued forth. On we moved and silently, until clearing the lines, we were challenged; the answer was a bullet, and in a moment all was a blaze of fire, the balls whistled from every quarter, while above the universal din of fire arms were heard the shrill cries of the Affghans, who charged sword in hand up to the column.

Ferris' orderly was cut down and his horse shot in the mouth, blows fell hard and fast, and many of our men fell under them, but still we fought the good fight, and pressed on.

I know not how the guides managed to lead the way, for there was a thick darkness caused by a cloud of dust and smoke, through which the flashing of jezails was alone visible.

The enemy not relishing the unexpected entertainment we carried out for them, began to sheer off, probably attracted by the plunder of the fort, where they were well rewarded for their labour, but it is to be hoped, they cut each other's throats while squabbling over the spoil.

We had yet to sustain the fire from a fort that lay in our road, but we passed it unhurt, and had the satisfaction of continuing our march without interruption, until we reached the Pass above Huzar-nou, when about 40 men attacked the rear guard, but were beaten off.

The Huzar-nou people were lying in wait for us on the high road; but as we proceeded by a different route, they were disappointed. At 3 o'clock on the morning of the 17th, we reached Girdee, where we found Tora Baz Khan, who received us hospitably, and at day-light conducted us to Lall-poorah.

A large body of Momurds were assembled here, and indicated by their looks, what infinite pleasure it would afford them to pounce upon us, and they even solicited their Chief to hand us over to their tender mercies, or

at all events to seize and send the Feringees to Azeez Khan. This latter bit of humane advice originated with Khaled Khan, the Chief of Ghoshtah.

We heard too, there were 4,000 Kochees on the watch, and Tora Bas Khan frankly declared, that Lallpoorah was no place of safety for us. The Khyber was closed too, and the Kyberries at that moment surrounding Ali Musjid. What was to be done? We possessed nothing but our arms and the clothes on our backs, and it was necessary, to better ourselves, to quit a land where we had but one friend, and he unable to assist us for any length of time.

In this juncture, we offered the Khan the sum of Rs. 3,000 on reaching Peshawur, if he would conduct us thither, being aware there was a road through his country leading to Tatterah, which lies East of the Khyber.

He consented, and ordered his nephew, Hyder Khan, to go with us.

The road was stated to be such as a goat might, with tolerable ease to himself, travel over, and on the evening of the 18th, the ladies being provided with doolies, we crossed the river and marched about six miles.

On the morning of the 19th, we commenced an ascent of the utmost difficulty, which occupied us all day, and during our progress, we had to clamber with hands and feet on the sides of the most stupendous precipices.

How the horses managed to get along, was matter of astonishment to us all; they threw their shoes, poor creatures, and were dreadfully bruised in the feet, and swollen in the legs.

We bivouacked at night in a most villainous looking spot, where the Khan's men entreated once more to be allowed to put an end to our troubles, and Hyder Khan had to use threats before he could silence them.

In the morning of the 20th, we were told that the road we had come over, was a bowling green, compared to what we had yet to pass, and it was so.

As I feel quite sure that no written account can convey an adequate idea of its nature, I shall not attempt to describe it; let it suffice to say, it was all but impossible, and that after a march which continued from day-break until night-fall, we bivouacked on the plain of Peshawur, and next morning marched a distance of twelve miles into Peshawur.

Most of us are compelled to wear native costume, as Peshawur contains few means of supplying our wants in the way of clothing and equipment; we are, in fact, destitute of every thing, even the commonest necessities, but our escape has been a miraculous one, surrounded as we were by a host of enemies.

Our loss, in killed and wounded, has not been so severe as might have been expected, yet in proportion to the number of our force, it is considerable.

Cavalry—Killed 4 Troopers; 2 Syces; 3 Horses. Wounded 2 Troopers; 4 Horses. Infantry—Killed 18; Wounded 24.

A number of the Camp followers were cut up, each Officer having lost three or four servants.

APPENDIX.

No. VI.

Narrative of the destruction of the Shah's 4th or Goorka Regiment of Light Infantry at Charekar, by HAVILDAR MOOTEE RAM, of that Regiment.

I am a Native of Kameroon. My name is Mootee Ram Haid. I am of the tribe of Konwar Rajpoots. The name of my village is Mirkooly, twelve miles from Lohoghat. A little more than three years ago, Major McSherry sent letters amongst us, saying he was raising a Hill Corps at Loodeeanah to go to Caubul, and wanted Recruits. I and a great many more of the men at Kameroon enlisted accordingly in the Shah's 4th Regt. composed of men from different parts of the Hills. During the march of the Shah's force to Caubul, I was much employed as orderly to Major McSherry, whom I have known from my boyhood. I was one of the party who attacked and destroyed the Dacoits at Muckloor. I was also one of the Shah's 4th detached to attack the Gazies in the hills close to Guzni on the day preceding its capture. On that occasion I took with my own hands one of the enemy's flags, having shot its bearer. I served in the action at Rolati. I was with the 5th and 6th Companies of the Shah's 4th. When under Quarter Master Serjeant Douglas at Kamran, we had heavy fighting there against immense odds. I was present in the action at Bedjgah, where we defeated Mahomed Akbar, the same who is now uppermost at Caubul. He fled back to Balk on that occasion. At Badjgah I was wounded by a stone in the head. I beg to observe that the Affghans throw stones with great force and correctness of aim. I was in the fight at Suffeed Dust at Syga. When cooking our dinner, the bugles summoned us from them. We left our cooking utensils and never saw them again. We were called to guard the guns, the capture of which it was thought the Shah's Regiment of Affghans meditated. We marched for Bameean. I was in the actions fought by Colonel Dennie there, against Dost Mahomed. I was one of the Goorkas who captured the Dost's two guns; on this occasion we suffered much from the Affghans of Captain Hopkins' corps, who had deserted to the enemy with their arms and ammuni-

tion; they had been drilled in the English manner. I got this wound close to my knee from one of them—but we killed numbers of the deserters. We returned to Caubul, where we were quartered some time. The 4th Regiment was sent to Charekar in the month of May. We were placed in garrison in the Gurree then in progress of erection. Major Pottinger and some other gentlemen were in another Gurree, distant about a coss from our's, and called Killa Lakman. To this latter fort we furnished a party of 100 men under a Subadar, this party was relieved weekly. The Gurree of Charekar in which we were placed was quadrangular in figure, 100 yards long in each face, and having a Bastion at each angle—the ditch from which the earth had been excavated to build up the walls, at the deepest was only three feet, in other parts not more than two feet deep. A Khutria, named Hur Sing, was engaged in building the Gurree by contract. To this Gurree of Charekar there were two gateways, with gates one to the west, another to the east. At one gate was the quarter guard of the Regiment, its rear guard outside of the gate; at the other were a number of huts inhabited by the Bazar people of the 4th Regt.; in this gateway was placed a long and heavy native gun,—I should think an eighteen pounder: on each of the two Bastions marked 3 and 4 was placed one of the Shah's six-pounders. A small thread of water was conducted from the neighbouring hills, and a hollow formed from working up the earth with water to raise the wells of the Gurree; after the flow of water into this hollow was stopped by the Affghans, there continued stagnant in it about fifteen mussucks. There were no guns on the Bastion. I have shewn how all the Artillery we had—the three guns already mentioned—were disposed of. The huts for the Sepoys were arranged along the interior sides of the Gurree, connected together and flat roofed.

There is no water within the fort of Charekar, which stands on a plain—no hills approaching it nearer than four miles. Our officers' quarters were at the Westward gate. In front of the Eastern face of the fort of Charekar, and distant from its Wells 150 feet, ran a Canal with shelving banks 20 feet in breadth at the top, and about 15 feet deep. The water which ran in it was generally waist deep—this Canal was fed by a river to the North, and about six miles distant from Charekar; the road to Lukman crossed the Canal, on which there is a Bridge—this road is marked 8888, and to prevent injury to the cultivation, was made to wind considerably to the N. E. of Bastion. About 26 yards off was situated a Fuckhir's hut and takeah. To the South of another Bastion distant also some 200 yards, there was an extensive vineyard; about the same distance, there stood to the S. W. of another Bastion, a Musjid. There were three tombs of European Officers, nearly, I should say, 400 yards from Bastion No. 6. The Target practice, was distant from, and north of the same Bastion, 350 yards. There was a small Gurree behind the Fuckhir's hut, and 500 yards from the fort of Charekar.

A few days before the Dewallee,* Mr. Rattray, who commanded one of the Affghan corps, was lured out from the fort of Lukman by Shah Mahommed of Nijram, to look he said at some recruits which he brought with him for service. They were mounted men. As Lieut. Rattray was examining them drawn up in a line, Shah Mahomed gave his Troopers a wink, when they wheeled up from the right and left, and enclosed Mr. Rattray, who was shot with a pistol, and the body, which was afterwards recovered, hacked to pieces. I heard this from the Goorka Moonshee, Mohun Bheer, who accompanied Mr. Rattray, but escaped under the horses' bellies.† The men who murdered Mr. Rattray now made a dash at the fort of Lukman. Mr. Rattray's Regiment of Affghans immediately joined the assailants. The attack had continued for the space of two hours, the Affghans being kept at bay by our guard. Captain Codrington then directed Lieut. Haughton to take the 2d and 8th Companies to re-inforce Lukman. Our men took each 60 rounds of ammunition in their pouches. When they had expended 50 in skirmishing, and killing numbers of the Affghans, they were ordered to close and charge; they did so: a great number of the Affghans sought refuge in a vineyard, but were almost entirely destroyed by the bayonet and cookry‡—all the Affghans who had been attacking the fort of Lukman drew off, and our two Companies returned to that of Charekar, which they reached at 3 o'clock p. m. A few hours afterwards firing was heard at Lukman: the Affghans were fired on by our people when endeavouring to remove their dead. The following morning it was observed, that the Enemy were very numerous about Lukman, and pressing its garrison hard; so at 6 o'clock a. m. the 1st, 3d, and 6th companies of my Regiment with a six-pounder drawn by bullocks, under the command of Lieut. Haughton, issued from the Gurree of Charekar with the view of assisting our Troops at Lukman. We advanced until we arrived within half a mile of Lukman without opposition; at this point, a body of 1000 of the Enemy's Infantry, with a few horsemen interspersed amongst them, attempted to cut our way: this party we easily repulsed. We now had arrived at a Bridge near Lukman on which our six-pounder was placed—suddenly from all quarters a rush was made for the gun by immense multitudes of Affghans, who had concealed themselves in the vineyards and different buildings round about. It is difficult to form any accurate notion of the number of our assailants so scattered, but it struck me there must have been 25,000—all the villages of Kohistan, Punchaze, and Goraband, poured forth their inhabitants against us;—the whole

* The Dewallee (we may mention for the home reader's benefit) is a Hindoo festival, occurring annually about the beginning of October, but the precise date we know not.—En.

† This was the Moonshee who subsequently heard Akbar Khan say he had himself shot the Envoy.—En.

‡ The cookry is a Goorkah weapon, something of a cross between the cleaver and the sword, and of exceeding efficiency in hands that know how to use it.—En.

male population in this quarter of Affghanistan had taken the Ghazi's oath. Our front, rear, and both flanks were attacked simultaneously, but the most serious attack was in front, or from the Lukman side, the plain between which and where we were, was completely crowded with Affghans. We repulsed them all with great slaughter, but suffered severe loss ourselves. Lieut. Salisbury was killed—shot in the chest,—and placed in one of the two doolies we had with us. The Quarter Master Serjeant was wounded—the Sobadar of my Company, the 6th, Singh Beer by name, and a most gallant officer, was put in the second doolie. The Quarter Master Serjeant was able to walk supported by two sepoys. We had now been absent three hours from the Gurree of Charekar, a great part of which time we were seriously engaged. It was now observed, that heavy bodies of the enemy were against Charekar itself. We were ordered to retrace our steps, the 1st company was thrown out as skirmishers to cover our retreat; those badly wounded it was impossible to carry off with us, we were so hotly assailed. The Affghans quickly killed them, and seemed to take much delight in mutilating their dead bodies, and pitching their several members to a distance from each other. We fought our way back to the Gurree of Charekar, which we reached about ten o'clock a. m. The Affghans now surrounding the fort of Charekar, and seeking shelter from our fire behind the walls of the vineyard, the target practice butt, Officer's tomb, Musjid and Fuckhir's hut, annoyed us very much; it rained bullets. Leaving 200 men in the fort, and taking out the two six-pounders, Capt. Codrington drove the enemy from all the positions they had taken up around us. At the second discharge one of the six-pounders broke down. The Affghans entirely vanished for the present, but water ceased to run in the canal B B B. We found afterwards that the Affghans had diverted it to the eastward at the point marked L. Our casualties in the whole of this day were very numerous. About ten o'clock p. m. when the canal had become dry, the enemy appeared again, retaking possession of all their former positions, and of the now dry canal, besides the banks of which effectually secured them from our fire. Towards morning, the attack on the fort became more feeble, until at last it ceased altogether; however, about seven o'clock the whole mass of the enemy precipitated itself against the fort; horse and foot, leagured us round on every side—the two six-pounders (we had mended the broken one in the course of the night) were taken out with the greater part of the regiment, while the long gun fired from the gateway on the enemy. One of the six-pounders again broke down: the bulk of the enemy were again beaten off, but a continued skirmishing amongst the vineyards and different buildings was kept up until nightfall: half the men of the regiment remained in the fort, while half skirmished, and thus relieved each other alternately. At ten o'clock p. m. Major Pottinger, another gentleman, and the party from Lukman which had been as busy as ourselves, joined us. The want of water began to be felt severe-

ly by us; there was scarcely any provision within the fort. We did not mind that so much as the torments of thirst. The enemy continued attacking us daily. On the third day, as well as I can remember, all the Affghans collected in a body to capture the long gun at the gateway; there were whole beegahs of gleaming swords moving towards us, and shouts of 'Chariyar Ali Mudut,' rent the air. We answered them back at every discharge of the long gun, 'Gorucknath-ke-jy.' This assault was by far the most severe we had yet experienced. Major Pottinger and the other European Officers said, they never witnessed such a conflict. Capt. Codrington was shot through the chest. He was carried to his quarters alive, but died shortly after. Major Pottinger was wounded in the thigh. We charged the Affghans, and drove them in the direction of the point where the water was turned off. On this occasion, we partially destroyed the Puckhir's Tukeah, where we always observed the Affghans clustered thickest. Next day, a seer of water was served out to each man by Lieut. Haughton; this water was obtained from the hollow marked 5 in the sketch. The second day after, half a seer was supplied; in a few days it diminished to a chittack, and at last ceased altogether. Some doombahs [sheep] were given to us by the officers; we found relief from sucking the raw flesh, and some of the men placed the contents of the stomach of the sheep in cloths, and wringing them very hard, obtained some moisture to assuage their raging thirst. The sick and wounded now increased to a frightful amount, and were continually screaming for water in piercing accents. Our muskets were so foul from incessant use, that the balls were forced down with difficulty, although separated from the paper of the cartridge which usually wraps them round. The lips of the men became swollen and bloody, and their tongues clove to their palates.

I ought to have mentioned that the day Captain Codrington was killed, your old Shikarree* at Lohooghat, Nur Sing, was also slain. He was the best shot among us; every time he fired he killed an Affghan. The European officers were so pleased with him, that he was to have been made a Jemadar. Days and nights rolled on. We were continually engaged with the enemy; the men used to steal out in the night to the spring which formerly supplied the hollow marked 5, but which the Affghans turned off in another direction. Those who had the canteens you sent up with the last Goorkah Levies, used them; those who had lotahs only, took them with them, covered in cloths, lest the glitter of the metal should lead to detection; those who had neither lotahs nor canteens, resorted to the use of cloths, which they dipped in the fountain, and brought back saturated with moisture. When any of these adventurous spirits

* Your old Shikarree—Motee Ram was addressing this narrative to Major McSherry personally.—Fn

returned to the fort, all struggled round them to procure one precious drop. The Affghans, however, found out the practice, and shot down all those who approached the spring. For two days there was not a single drop of water within the walls of the fort; the men were mad with thirst, and demanded to be led against any perils to procure water. Accordingly, at midnight, Lieut. Rose* conducted a party of 100 men, taking with them all the lotahs and canteens they could carry, and all the bhistees and non-combatants to the spot marked M, where the water from the new cut had overflowed its banks, by the route marked by arrows pointing from the Gurrce of Charekar. Having luxuriated for a short time in the delicious element, and filled our vessels with it, Lieut. Rose took us to a field of radishes marked N. Here we crammed as many as we could into our mouths, and stuck our belts full of more for our comrades in the fort, to which we set out on our return. Shah Mahomed with a body of 3,000 men had taken post at the spot marked O, at an early hour of the night, and erected his standard at P.† A great number of his men were in the now dry bed of the canal B B B; they seemed to keep a negligent look out. Lieut. Rose said to us, 'give them one volley, then the steel you know how to use so well.' The non-combatants carrying the water were placed out of harm's way behind a wall. We fired together by word of command from Lieut. Rose on the slumbering crowd of faces, within fifty yards of them. We then charged, shouting 'Goruknath-ke-jy,' and set the bayonet and cookry to work with a will. A company drawn up in readiness at the gateway to assist us should we require their aid, heard our battle cry, rushed down to the canal B B B, extended itself along its banks on the Charekar fort side, and slew the Affghans as they tried to scramble out on that side. On the opposite we were performing the same operations. Those who had cookries did most execution; there is no weapon like the cookry for a hand-to-hand fight. Mahomed Shah himself was killed, and we captured his green flag, and carried it off in triumph to the fort of Charekar. Shah Mahomed's flag was a very magnificent one; its staff was surmounted by a trident [crescent ?] and ball of gold, and the flag itself was six feet long and equally broad, made of the finest green broadcloth with a figure of the sun splendidly embroidered in the centre. It was an old acquaintance of ours, and changed bearers frequently, as we successively shot them during our long term of fighting. We had somewhat spoiled its beauty too, by piercing it with bullets, the artificial sun shining in the light of the real one as it waved out in the breeze, offered a famous mark. We were as happy in Charekar that night as we could be under the heavy loss of our fallen comrades, and in sight of the sufferings

* Ensign A. Rose, 31th N. I.—Ed.

† There are references to a plan which has been mislaid.

of those wounded, who were stretched on the ground thickly around us. The thirst of all was completely relieved, and their hunger partially so. Our officers were proud of us, and we were proud of ourselves and of each other. The officers said Shah Mahomed's flag should be ever retained in the regiment as a memorial of that night's achievement. For some days after the capture of Shah Mahomed's flag, and the death of its owner, the enemy relaxed his efforts and we our fire. This interval of comparative repose was most grateful and refreshing to us. The number of Affghans had very perceptibly diminished in our vicinity. Five days passed when the horrors of thirst began to assail us again—at last a message was received from the treacherous inhabitants of the town of Charekar that they dare not turn the water down to us themselves, as they would assuredly be murdered if they did so, but that we might come and throw a dam across the new cut at L., remove the other dam, and cause the water to flow in its wonted channel again. Two hundred men, accompanied by Lieutenants Haughton and Rose and taking our fourohahs, or digging tools with us, proceeded along the banks of the canal B B B. to L. On the road we had some skirmishing, but not much. As soon as the men came in sight of the water at L. many of them rushed madly forward, and began to drink; while in the act of doing so, a heavy fire was suddenly opened upon them by the ambushed Affghans in the gardens, houses, and behind the walls of the town of Charekar; this fire caused great havoc amongst us, and we were forced to retreat without effecting our object. Dying of thirst, lamentably reduced in numbers—weakened by toil and hunger, the Affghans clung more closely round as our exertions in our own defence became less energetic. A mine, the shaft of which commencing at the Fuckhir's Tukceah C and passing by Bastion 3 terminated in a chamber at Bastion 4, was sprung. A third of the Bastion 4 was destroyed, two men were buried in its ruins. The dotted line from C to Bastion No. 4 shews the course of the shaft of the mine. The Affghans are very expert miners—they learn the art from continually digging 'Careezes.' The explosion of the mine in question seemed to be the signal for another determined onset on the part of the Affghans. The stock of grape shot originally brought from Caubul had been expended, bags were filled with musket balls, and loaded with these; the heavy gun at each discharge cut long lanes in the throng of Mongelas, while we kept up a continual fire from the roofs of the Barracks; the Musselmen pressed on nevertheless. The party protecting the gun below was annihilated, and the cannon almost in the clutch of the enemy, when Lieutenant Haughton called out, 'Down from the walls every man of you, and rally round the gun, which is nearly in the hands of the enemy, and with it go the lives and honor of us all.' We every one of us rushed out of the gateway and charged the enemy, who recoiled from the shock as far as the canal B B B, to which they confined themselves, keeping up

a dropping fire on the walls of the Gurree. We buried this day within the fort, the bodies of Captain Codrington, Lieut. Salisbury, the Serjeant Major, and upwards of 200 of the Sepoys of the 4th Regt. The following day the Lohar Mistree [gunsmith] of the 4th Regt., and who was a native of Hindoostan, and who served in the regiment from the time it was first raised, but was a Mussulman and married to an Affghan wife of Charekar, together with the gunners, who were all Mussulmans from the Punjaub, plotted to leave us, and go over to the enemy. In attempting to put this into execution they proceeded to the gateway, but as they were going out, Lieutenant Haughton seized the jemadar of the Golandauze to detain him: the latter immediately drew his sword, cut at Lieutenant Haughton, and wounded him in the hand severely, and breaking loose Lieut. Haughton called out, 'Shoot these *nimuck harams*,—they are off to the enemy.' We fired at the party as they ran in the direction of the canal, and dropped five of them. The third day after this event, our number brought down to a little more than 200 men, fit for action, without water, without food, and only thirty rounds of ammunition per man remaining, it was determined to evacuate the Gurree of Charekar, and endeavour to fight our way to Caubul. At midnight we moved out; we had only two doolies, in which were placed Major Pottinger and Lieutenant Haughton, the bearers of all the others were either killed or had died. Nearly 300 of our comrades dead, dying, or so badly wounded as to be unable to walk, were left behind within the Ghuree of Charekar. I don't know whether the guns which were also left behind were spiked or not. I think from the death of Lieut. Rattray until the period of our finally evacuating the Gurree of Charekar, twenty-one or twenty-three days must have elapsed. I had too much to do to take account of time. I cannot give dates, but I narrate events in their order of succession to the best of my memory. I ought to mention, that the walls of the Gurree of Charekar had only reached the height of one cubit above the roof of the Sepoy's Barracks when the fighting began, consequently so low a parapet gave us little protection from the enemy's *jasails*, which told on us from a distance, one-half of which only, muskets could carry to with effect. The day after Capt. Codrington's death, to remedy this defect, the officers tore up their own Tents, and made bags of the canvas, filled them with earth, and placed them on the walls, to cover us from the Affghan's fire.

At the time hostilities broke out, there were two Goorkha Fackhirs in the fort, who were visiting on a pilgrimage the different Hindoo Shrines in Affghanistan. They demanded that arms and ammunition should be given to them. Our officers complied with their request, and these sturdy and holy personages astonished us all by their feats in action: there were none of us who fought the Affghans better than they did. We marched on during the night without molestation until we arrived at a village near

Kara Bagh, the second regular marching stage from Caubul on the Charekar road. Here opposition commenced, and we advanced, skirmishing until we reached Kara Bagh, about 3 o'clock A. M., by which time our movements became generally known, and our enemies were getting round us in hopeless numbers every minute. The road ran through the middle of the town of Kara Bagh with walls and vineyards on either side; these the Affghans lined, and from them poured a deadly and frequent fire on us. Numbers were killed—we were totally vanquished. There was a gateway into a vineyard on one side of the road; I rushed through it; an Affghan laid hold of my clothes to detain me, but I shook him off, and continued my flight, taking care to carry off my musket with me, for which I had only five rounds remaining in my pouch. I ascended the summits of the hills, and ensconced myself in a hollow far up in the mountain, where there was water, during the day. On the coming of night I endeavoured to make my way to Caubul; I had arrived within two miles of the British Cantonments there, when the dawn discovered to me that I had got into the middle of the Affghan troops besieging the place at the time. I saw at once all hope of further escape was gone. I had 100 rupees in my kumnerbund, which sum I amassed in the Shah's service. I took it out and buried it, placing a stone which I thought I could again recognize, over it, and sat down quietly to wait what might happen. Shortly a party of horse, about twenty-five in number, belonging to Hajiz Khan and Bahahdeen approached the spot where I was, and they immediately dismounted, some seized me by the feet, some by the shoulders; one man taking up my own musket snapped it three times at me. I am a Musselman, said I; God does not will that you should kill me—the musket went off. The fatalist I addressed threw down the musket, drew his sabre, and with its sharp edge pressing on my throat called on me to say the Kulma, else he would immediately sacrifice me. I did repeat the Kulma; the sabre was removed from my throat and they carried me to Bahahdeen, first depriving me of my coat, pantaloons, a silk handkerchief, a pistol, my shoes and some other articles, leaving me only a pair of pajamaha. Bahahdeen gurree is situated I should think about three coss from the city of Caubul. While I remained with Bahahdeen for five days, the people of the village continually threatened to put me to death. Bahahdeen at length released me, giving me an old tattered loonghee for a turban and my own chagah, and saw me across on my road. After he left me I had proceeded half a coss when a man ploughing on the road side seized me, and threatened to kill me unless I worked his plough. I did so until evening, when he took me to his house and he gave me a scanty meal. This man employed me ten days in guiding his plough. While with him, I suffered severely during the night-time—the weather was bitter cold, and I had nothing to cover me but my chagah. I examined the roof of the house during the day, and it appeared to me that by removing a few of the bricks

from a sort of chimney I might get out unobserved. At night I did so, and effected my escape for the time.

I had got five coss further on the road to Jellalabad, when the son of a sirdar who was fighting at Caubul, (I don't know his name,) sent some horsemen to take and bring me to him. I was taken to the gurree, all the inmates of which, young and old, male and female, gathered round, exclaiming, 'a Kaffir or Ferringhee: kill him—kill him:' but the young chief protected me from violence, and told me to groom his horse. This young man was continually looking in the direction of Caubul, through a telescope, which he said Sir A. Burnes had given his father as a present. I was hard worked, and ill-fed in this family. I remained with them about eight days, when the young chief transferred me to a native of Gorabund who came to his village, and rented his grazing ground for a large flock of camels. I was employed tending these camels for some twenty days. I was not well fed. I had made acquaintance with a servant of my compulsory master. This servant was a Hizara, who received one rupee two annas a month as wages. He became kindly disposed to me, and one day told me that our master designed to sell me to some Bhokara merchants, with whom he was at that moment driving a bargain about me. I immediately ran away, to escape the intended sale. On crossing the river at Bhootkhak five Affghans seized me, and asked me if I were a Ferringhee; I replied in the negative, and stated that I was a discharged camel man of Shah Soojah's: they asked me why Shah Soojah had discharged me; I answered that the King, being mewed up in the Balla Hissar, said he had no employment for camel men at present. Fakeera, my new captor, took me to his house, where I remained some time, hard worked and ill-fed, as usual. While tending Fakeera's dhoombahs in the jungles, I heard a youth say, 'Akbar Khan has allowed the Ferringhees to depart to-day, and our people are following them from Caubul.' When night came on I went to the spot where I had deposited my rupees and regained possession of them. I set off after the British force and overtook it at Khoord Caubul as it was setting out from thence. At Jugdulluck the British force was girded round by Akbar Khan's horsemen, who were killing all they could. I extricated myself from this scene of carnage, and sought safety once more in the hill-tops. I remained a day high up in the hills. I had tasted no food for 26 hours from the time I made my last insufficient meal. I was benumbed by the cold. I could no longer contend with the never-ending dangers and hardships which beset me. I wished for death to release me from sufferings now become intolerable. I descended to the roadside, determined to declare myself to the first Affghan who approached, and court the blow of some pitying sword. I saw a party approach, and concluded the hour of my death had arrived. The party turned out to be five Hindoo Cutries; these Cutries said, 'As you are a Hindoo we will save your life—you must pay us for doing so though, and to make sure of it we will ex-

act payment beforehand.' They then searched me, and took the 100 rupees out of my kummerbund, and returned me ten of them—they conducted me to a Dhumsalah in which there was a Hindoo Fuckhir. His protection I also sought, and gave him my remaining ten rupees. He dressed me up in the red dress of a Fuckhir, and rubbed wood ashes over my face; I was to pass for his chela, or disciple, and he said I was to accompany him in the character of such on a pilgrimage he proposed making to Hurdwar. A party of fruit merchants shortly after arrived. The Fuckhir, the Cutries and myself joined them. We descended the hills by a road considerably to the left of Peshawur. I begged my way until I got to Sir Jasper Nicoll's Camp, one march this side of Loodianah. The sketch I have drawn shews pretty correctly, I am convinced, Charekar, and all it embraces; you had taught me how to make such sketches. You have known me many years, and you know if I ever told you a lie or brought you false information. You will therefore attach such credit to my tale as your appreciation of my character, so familiar to you, may adjudge.

Simla, March 31, 1842.

T. MacSHERRY, Major, 30th N. I.

Late Ghoorka Recruiting Officer, S. S. F.

P. S.—In taking down Mootee Ram's Statement, I have followed in my English translation, as closely as I could, the idiom of the language of Kumaon in which he said he could best tell his tale. Mootee Ram is anxious that it may be clearly understood that B B B in the sketch was a 'Coul' or superficial Canal, not a 'Careez' or subterraneous water-course. The Careezes are those gushing arteries of life and fertility to the vast regions of Central Asia, which without them would, except in the neighbourhood of rivers, become tenantless deserts. The 'Careez' is formed first by sinking a vertical shaft; then excavating a horizontal gallery to a distance of 40 feet from it, when another vertical shaft is dug to facilitate the removal of the earth, and so traverses the country, collecting all the springs it passes through, until a stream of water flowing with rapidity and of considerably volume, results. Had B B B been a 'Careez,' still some water would here and there well out to the South of the dam at L.



APPENDIX.

No. VII.

Narrative of the Events in Cabul between the 2d of November 1841, and the middle of September 1842. By a QUONDAM CAPTIVE.

On the morning of the 2d Nov. 1841, the grass-cutters of the 5th L. C. then encamped with Shelton's Brigade at Seah Sung, returned at about 7 o'clock, saying, that the gate of the city, through which they passed, on their way to the grass-ground was shut, and that there was a disturbance in the town, with the firing of musketry. This and the noise of the shots, which now became audibly distinct, put us all on the *qui vive*, and when about 9 A. M., Capt. Sturt, E. E. arrived from cantonments, bearing orders from Major General Elphinstone for the 54th N. L., Nicholl's H. A., the Shah's 6th and Head-quarters of the 5th L. C., to hold themselves in readiness to march to the Bala Hissar, he found every officer on the alert, and instantly at his post, and eagerly expecting orders to march; when a note came from Capt. Lawrence, the Envoy's military secretary, saying, "Stay where you are, all is quiet for the present," and dated Bala Hissar, 10 A. M. This indeed surprised us, the firing continued brisk in the city. After waiting another hour under arms, the Brigadier ordered Sturt to go in and see what was going on in the Bala Hissar, and accompanied by eight squadrons of 2d Shah's cavalry he set out. Poor fellow; in half an hour, Capt. Lawrence returned to say, Sturt had been badly wounded, entering the Palace gates, and bearing orders for our immediate advance. Forward was the word, and eagerly anticipating our attack on the city, we gladly set out, having heard in the mean time, that the rebels had burnt down the houses of Sir Alex. Burnes and Capt. Johnson, and were now attacking the treasury of the latter officer. Unopposed, we arrived in the presence of the king, and to our sorrow, instead of receiving orders to enter the city, he almost rudely enquired, "Why we had come, and what we were going to do?" After standing under arms for another hour, firing being heard in the direction of the Shoor bazar, (a mart for provisions and leather, running up to the city side of the Bala Hissar,) the

Killa Karree
Jubbar Khan's Fort

Second encamping ground
of the Army in 1859

Sketch of CAUBUL, BRITISH CANTONMENTS and the Surrounding Country.

An extensive and highly cultivated Valley

Caubul River

Village

Imperial Baber's Tomb

Musulman Burial Ground
American Burial Ground

Lahore Gate
of City

Lahore Gate
of Bala Hissar

Mahomed Khan's Fort

Shah Baug

Mahomed Sherief's Fort

Parade Ground

Dey Maroo

Goodness Villages and Forts

Low Marshy Ground

Lord Keane's Hill

Encampment of the Army in 1859

Road from Kandahar

Steep Sing Camp

Caubul River

Kisha Bisha Fort

Fort

Road to Kandahar



Brigadier sent Lieut. Melville, 54th N. I., to try and discover whence it proceeded. On his going down to the Ghuznee gate of the fort, on which side lay also the city, Lieut. M. found the fugitives from Campbell's regiment, (a corps which had been sent early in the morning into the city for the purpose of quelling the insurrection,) flying into the fort, and reporting that their corps had been entirely routed, and half the men cut to pieces. On his taking this information to the Brigadier, he ordered Lieut. M. to take his company (the light) down to the Ghuznee gate, and while taking charge of it, to protect and cover, as well as he could, the retreating regiment. On arriving there, after leaving one section in charge of the gate, the remaining three were marched to the entrance of the Shoor Bazar, and formed up facing the street. The fugitives kept coming in, and in about four minutes after Lieut. M. had taken up his position, he observed a disorderly rabble retreating at a quick pace towards him pursued by a large body of Affghans, who, from the house windows and tops kept up a brisk fire on them. Immediately the colours had gained the rear of the detachment, Lieut. M. retreated, slowly facing the enemy towards the gate, pouring a volley upon them whenever there was an opportunity, which, however, owing to the protection afforded the enemy by the parapets and windows, did but little execution; on reaching the fosse, he formed up again to allow the guns, two in number, to pass to the rear, but the Affghans again made a rush, and the Golaundauze of the king took to a disorderly flight. As the attempt to rescue them with his three sections would have been madness, and the enemy appearing in force, both on the left and front, Lieut. M. sent Ensign Macartney of the Shah's 6th, who at the moment arrived with one company to his assistance, to man the walls over the place where the guns had been left, and by opening a strong fire on them, prevent the enemy carrying them off. This being most successful, and the rebels retiring with some loss, Lieut. M. led a few of the Golaundauze, whom he had been able to collect, back again to the guns, one of which was spiked; but owing to the whole of the drag ropes, &c. being gone, and one of the guns dismounted, he was unable to bring them in, with his few men, in the face of such a superior force, the enemy now amounting to more than a thousand, all of them crack marksmen, and protected by excellent cover. Lieut. M. was therefore compelled to retire inside the gate, having lost of his own company one subadar, and three men wounded, and of the King's Orderly Regt. above 200 men killed and wounded, the latter of whom, bore fearful witness to the prowess of the Affghan knives, and were indeed a ghastly spectacle. On arriving inside, Lieut. M. was reinforced by some of the men of Captain Nicholl's troop of H. A. and again returned, protected by the fire from the walls, to attempt to bring in the two guns, but owing to the same reasons as formerly given, again unsuccessfully. A gun was, therefore, mounted on the walls, and brought to bear on the abandoned guns, and the shot told so effectually, that

the carriages were completely broken to pieces, rendering them not only totally useless in case they should ever fall into the hands of the Affghans, who are incapable of either repairing or making gun carriages, but also as long as we kept possession of the Bala Hissar, rendering them impervious to the many attempts made by the enemy to carry them off. At this time, being accidentally wounded by a bayonet thrust from one of the King's sepahces in the groin, Lieut. M. was compelled to retire to the rear, making over charge of the Ghuznee gate to Ensign Macartney. The king who had been in a great state of excitement during the day, on hearing of the loss of his guns, and that 200 of his orderly regiment had been killed and wounded, became excessively agitated; the more so, as immediately on the rebellion breaking out almost all his Pesh Khedmuta and Shad Gafsees had deserted him. The officers and men who had been ordered out at a moment's notice for emergent service had not brought even their cloaks with them, and when instead of returning as they expected they should have done, the same evening to cantonments, they found themselves, occupants for an unlimited period, and closely besieged in the Bala Hissar, without a single servant, their feelings may be better conceived than expressed.

The strength of the detachment had been augmented during the course of the afternoon by the arrival of one hundred men of H. M. 44th Regt. under Brevet Capt. Souter, but again, they had lost all our cavalry, who had been sent to escort all the baggage from the camp at Seah Sung into cantonments, where they had been ordered to remain. His Majesty sent an Affghan dinner to the detachment at about nine o'clock at night, which was greedily devoured by them all, having fasted for thirteen hours.

On the morning of the 3d, at about four, a considerable firing of musketry was heard in the direction of Seah Sung, which greatly surprised them all, and the troops stood to their arms, but it gradually ceasing they returned to their rest; they afterwards learnt that it was the 37th N. I. under command of Major Griffiths, returning from its encampment near Kabree Jubbah, which very gallant regiment had been attacked during the whole of its night march (a long and tedious one, through the Khoord Kabool Pass) and with slight loss repelled its assailants, bringing in the entire portion of its camp equipage and baggage, Lieut. Green, in command of three guns of the mountain train, having done most excellent service. This morning the troops in the fort were allotted to their different stations, though in consequence of a great portion of the 54th Regiment being still in cantonments, no permanent division could take place. One of the most important posts in the Hissar, was a tower, on the summit of the hill, which was held by one hundred of our men, and one hundred of the King's Jesaulchees, with two officers. The centre square being a most commanding position over the town, was occupied by four companies of the Shah's 6th, two guns of the troop of H. A., and some large guns of the King's; the Lahore

gate, by one hundred of the 54th, fifty of the King's orderly regiment, one brass 9-pounder, and one small iron gun, under a European officer, and a subadar of H. M. own Golundauze. The Ghuznee gate was held by two companies of the Shah's 6th, one gun H. A., and two European officers with Lieut. Stuart, H. A. The remainder of the troops were held in reserve in the Palace-square, each man having his post allotted in case of an attack. During this-day, many projects were entered into for the purpose of putting down the insurrection, but none were carried into execution, although the troops, officers, and men, were burning with anxiety and eagerness, to revenge the murders which they had been given to understand had been perpetrated, and the outrages committed. Although reports were rife, that Sir Alexander Burnes and his brother had escaped disguised, and were concealed in the Wuzzer's house, yet the more authenticated intelligence that they had fallen victims to the bigotted rage of the Moslem rebels, was generally believed, and excited pity, mingled with a thirst for revenge in the breasts of all. That he, the gallant soldier, the talented official, the warm friend, should, just as he had arrived at fame and fortune, at the pinnacle of his ambition, fall murdered in his own house by the reeking hands, red with his brother's blood, of these remorseless barbarians, while it excited our deep commiseration for the victim, roused equal feelings of hatred and longings for revenge against the sanguinary perpetrators. The Wuzzer went by the king's order into the town for the purpose, if possible, of addressing the mob or its leaders, accompanied by Shah Pooru, the king's youngest and favourite son, but was compelled to return, after a short and fruitless journey.

The king, sent in the course of the day, a letter to Sir William Macnaghten, proposing that a free pardon should be offered to all offenders, and that all should be forgiven and forgotten, if the leaders of the insurrection would come to his darbar, and acknowledging their fault, return to their allegiance. This of course was never carried into execution. In the course of the day, Captain Corri arrived from cantonments, bringing with him four companies 54th Regt. N. I., one iron nine-pounder, and one twelve-pounder howitzer, also two five half-inch mortars, and two guns of the mountain train, under command of Lieut. Green. Though fired on the whole of the way from Muhmood Khan's fort to the Bala Hissar, yet their loss in wounded (none killed) was very trifling, though the Cavalry escort which accompanied them, was attacked on its return, and lost a Duffadar and two men killed, eight horses wounded. Four or five of the enemy were also supposed to have fallen. About mid-day, Major Swayne, 5th Regt. N. I., was sent with the grenadier company H. M. 44th, and one company 5th Nizam's, accompanied by two guns H. A. under Lieut. Waller, for the purpose of first clearing the gardens of the rebels, in the immediate neighbourhood of cantonments, and then proceeding on to the Lahore gate of the city, having blown it open to take possession of it:—a party of the 5th

Cavalry was also sent out for the purpose of forming a junction with Major Swayne, which, owing to some accident, was not effected. The detachment was met when about half a mile from cantonments, by a party of the enemy, whom they defeated with some loss. But owing to the rebels appearing in great force in front, and fearing the effects of even a repulse, at so early a period of the insurrection, it was thought better to retire, which they did, the object for which they went out, not having been carried into effect.

On Captain Corri's arrival, he was warned for duty in the city with two companies of the 54th, to pass by the head of the Shoor Bazar, and join Major Swayne and his party at the Lahore gate. Providentially, the order was not (owing to a misunderstanding on the subject) carried into execution, or not a man would have returned to tell the tale. Captain C.'s detachment, on its way from cantonments, had lost the whole of the baggage of the grenadier and light companies of the 54th Regt., so that the poor fellows of them were exposed to the rigorous nights of this season of the year, without a single article of clothing. In cantonments only three day's provisions were left, and should our godown fort be captured, destruction to the force must be the result, as all communication between us, the city, and the surrounding country, is cut off, and neither the King or the Envoy and Minister, have it in their power to be of the slightest use to us in this respect, the latter of whom, never had more than three or four Afghan servants in his employ, who, being composed merely of a news-writer and moollah, with a couple of cossids, can be of no service to him. In the Bala Hissar, the same scarcity of supplies was felt, and great alarm was excited as to how our artillery horses and troops were to be fed; but owing to the very great exertions of Captain Kirby, 54th, and acting assistant commissary general, and Captain Conolly, assistant political agent, a very large supply was laid in. Immediately in the neighbourhood of the Bala Hissar, were fields of wheat, second crops about half a foot high, stretching out for many acres, which, having been purchased from its owner Timoor Khan, an Armenian merchant, was found to be the best possible food for the H. A. horses and public cattle. The groves of fruit trees in the neighbourhood were also cut down by the King's permission, and served out to the bivouac fires of the troops every evening, as long as they lasted.

This morning early, Captain Trevor, Superintendent of Afghan horse came in with his wife and family, who, seeing no hopes of assistance from cantonments, and no prospect of abatement of the rebellion, and at the same time, as he was merely involving the party of Jan Baza, who had hitherto remained faithful to him, and the whole of their families in trouble, by detaining them longer from their homes, he determined on an attempt to save himself and family (wife and seven children) during the night, and happily succeeded; a great portion of his Afghan horse, having

escorted him to within a short distance from cantonments. So soon as his flight was discovered, his house was attacked by the rebels and plundered of every thing.

During this day, the insurgents were in great force, having taken possession of Mahmood Khan's fort, the Shah Bagh, Mahomed Shireef's fort, and the garden between the godown fort and H. M's. 44th Bazaar. Our guns from the south bastion opened early, and played almost all day on the former fort, and on any bodies of Affghans that made their appearance. Lieutenant Warren, 5th regt. N. I. and commanding garrison of the godown fort, wrote in to the General to say, that unless a reinforcement was sent to him, he would be obliged to evacuate his position, which was surrounded by the enemy, and who were, he feared, mining the walls. In the afternoon, a party of cavalry and infantry were sent down with orders to assist him in withdrawing his party; the above detachment were shortly after obliged to return to cantonments, having suffered severely in men and horses, having been fired on from behind every tree and loophole of Mahomed Shireef's fort, without even seeing their enemy. Some hours previous to this, another party, consisting of two companies H. M's. 44th and one of the 37th N. I. being sent by a different route, to try and effect the same object, they brought on a smart affair with the enemy, attended, however, with great and melancholy loss on our side, Captains Swayne and Robinson of the 44th, and Ensign Gordon of the 37th, being killed; this detachment also was compelled to return, not having effected its object.

On hearing from the Assistant Adjutant General (Capt. Grant) of the object of the above detachments, Capt. Boyd, Senior Commissariat officer, went to the General, and urged, in strong terms, the necessity of, instantly withdrawing the garrison of the Commissariat fort, or immediately strengthening it, stating, that on its preservation, depended the safety of the whole force, as it contained our only magazine of supplies, with the exception of Captain Johnson's, situated some three miles off and closely besieged in the city. In the evening, as no reinforcements had as yet been sent, Captain Boyd, accompanied by Captain Johnson, the Shah's Commissariat officer, again went to the General, and informed him of there being but two days' provisions in cantonments, and of the fears they entertained of being unable to procure any from the surrounding country while in its present distracted state, and urged that the godown fort should be kept possession of at all hazards. The General approved of the opinions expressed by these officers, and signified his intention of reinforcing the garrison, but subsequently listened to the advice of others of his staff, who were averse to the proceeding, as involving too much risk. During this discussion, another letter was received from Lieut. Warren by his Adjutant, stating, that, unless instantly reinforced, he would be compelled to abandon his position, as several of his guard had effected

This man was the Najib Shireef Khan, a Kuzzilbash of influence and great wealth. To add to these horrors, a report was this day brought in, that Captain Maule and Lieut. Wheeler, the commandant and subaltern (local) of the corps stationed at Kardurrah, and denominated the Kohistan Rangers, had also been massacred with their Sergeant-major and Quarter-master Sergeant, by the men of their own corps; and great fears began to be entertained as to the fate of the Shah's 4th Infantry Regt., composed entirely of Goorkas, encamped at Charekar, in the Kohistan, as the insurrection was known to have spread in that direction, as also generally throughout Afghanistan.

A report was this evening brought in to his Majesty, at the Bala Hissar, that the rebels had mined from the Shoor Bazar to immediately under the imperial palace, which said mine was to be sprung the same evening. His Majesty instantly left the palace, and took up his abode at the gate of the Haram Serai, or women's apartments, where he remained during the remainder of the siege, and all day seated at a window commanding a fine view of cantonments, telescope in hand, he watched with great anxiety the course of events in that place. He was at this time sunk quite into a state of despondency, would gladly seize any opportunity of asking the opinion of even the most junior officers, and putting off for a time, all the insignia of royalty, which in most Asiatic countries, and particularly in Afghanistan, are carried usually to an extreme, made us sit by him on chairs, and forgot for the time that he was a king. The officers having been for the last four days, notwithstanding the arrival of a few things from cantonments, perishing with cold, this day his Majesty took pity on them, and supplied us each with a silk resui and pillow; not that I had suffered so much, as others, as owing to my wound, the king, had shewn me every kindness, and supplied all my wants. The Guznee gate had been built up with solid masonry, as it was from that side an attack was apprehended. The enemy had already made two several attempts to carry off the guns left under the walls near the Shoor Bazar, both unsuccessful, and in which they had to retire with some loss; they are most splendid shots, and this morning killed two of our best artillerymen at one loop-hole, the space not being more than a foot square, and the distance from which they fired at least three hundred yards. This loss is the more felt, as having but one troop of horse artillery in the whole force, the lives of each of the European gunners are most precious, and their services very valuable.

During the course of this day a party of infantry and two guns under the command of Major Swayne, was ordered out for the purpose of taking Mahomed Shireef's fort. Lieut. Eyre, Deputy Commissary of Ordnance, commanded the battery, and was directed to place his guns on the Kohistan road, outside the cantonments, and keep up a heavy fire on the fort, while Major Swayne with the infantry was to advance rapidly, and with powder bags, blow open the gate. Lieut. Eyre, according to orders, kept up a most

destructive fire, doing much execution, but expended the whole of his ammunition, ere Major Swayne's party, which had taken shelter under cover of some walls, running parallel to the fort from the heavy fire of the enemy, were led to the attack—and the consequence was, that his party were obliged to return to cantonments, having suffered some loss, both in his own and Lieut. Eyre's party, who also had some horses killed. Thus was the only opportunity of retrieving our loss of the morning, and striking fear into the hearts of the rebels, gone. The enemy gained in confidence what we lost, and they themselves have since said, that the events of this disastrous day did more harm to our cause than all the others put together; they decided the minds of the wavering, planted fresh courage in the souls of the disheartened, gained many new proselytes (amongst whom were the Kuzzilbashes, who had until now remained neuter, and were one of the most powerful bodies of men in the kingdom,) and the report of the immensity of the plunder taken from the Feringhees, spread like wildfire over the country, and the ploughman forsook his plough, the shepherd his flocks, and all ranks hurried to the capital, to share in the booty and spoil of the English dog. The Kuzzilbashes, whom I have mentioned above, are the descendants of those Persian soldiers, brought into the country by Nadir Shah, and are perfectly distinct from the Afghan nation; they have always hated our rule with a mortal hatred, as we overthrew a monopoly which they under former kings had always possessed,—that of supplying the nation with soldiers. While they hated us, they equally feared our power, and it was that fear, which until this day had caused them to be merely spectators of the strife, as they never supposed the rude attempts of an unorganized, and at the commencement, weak faction, could have so far prevailed, over the prowess and discipline of their Feringhee rulers. Being, soldiers, as well as excessively wealthy men, their open decision tended greatly to our final downfall. To sum up their qualities, they are the most dissolute and free living race of all the Mussulmans of Afghanistan, notorious drunkards, and breakers of nearly every law and commandment which the true believers generally consider so binding, but are, at the same time brave and hardy.

Nov. 6th.—The king sent down strict orders to allow no one ingress or egress at the Lahore gate, without a pass from either him or Capt. Conolly, Assistant Political Agent, except the suwars in charge of the public cattle, which went out at eight *p. m.* every morning to graze under the walls, and returned at two *p. m.* They were placed under my orders, and I had four look-out men on the walls, who in case of any large body of troops making their appearance immediately brought intelligence to me, when, on my waving a large white flag, the whole of the cattle instantly returned. The suwars who accompanied them, are, without any exception, the worst put up and most disorderly body of troops, calling themselves a regiment, that I ever saw; their horses ill-conditioned, their

arms and accoutrements almost nominal, as each man dressed as he pleased, and a bayonet on the end of a stick, was the sole offensive weapon of many of them, and this was the imperial guard of the King of Afghanistan—a rabble of low caste Seiks. In making these remarks, I beg my readers will not confound the above mentioned mob, with what are generally denominated the Shah's force, which is a body of troops officered from the line, and subsidized by the Company to the Shah, and who, considering the many disadvantages they laboured under, and the difficulty encountered in obtaining recruits for them, are a most superior and efficient body. I had associated with me at the gate, Rajah Jemuhl Sing, a man whose father was Prince of an extensive territory lying near Cashmere on the side of Thibet, and who, when Shah Soojah in the year 1809 was a fugitive and exile, flying from the country he was unable to govern, received him most kindly, gave him all he asked for, and escorted him with honour and safety to Hindostan, notwithstanding repeated orders from Runjeet Sing, his immediate feudal Lord, then in the zenith of his power, to give him up to him: offering large rewards and increase of territory if he complied, and threatening the severest punishment did he not. On his non-compliance, the Lion of Lahore sent a large army into his Raj, of which he deprived him, and sent him and his sons to prison in Lahore, where the former soon died. His two sons made their escape and joined Shah Soojah at Loodianah, accompanied him, on his unfortunate expedition in 1833, when he attempted to regain his country, and again in 1838 when he took a British army with him, expecting, on the Shah, for whom they had lost every thing, regaining his empire, they would be put in some office worthy their rank and descent. Their Raj brought in four lakhs of rupees, or forty thousand pounds a year, and on the King of Afghanistan re-ascending the throne of his ancestors, he gave them munificently two rupees eight annas (five shillings) a day! Verily you should not put your trust in Princes.

This morning Mahomed Shireef's fort was taken by a force sent out from cantonments, under command of Major Griffiths, 37th Regt. consisting of one company H. M. 44th (the Light) under Lieut. Raban, one company 37th under Lieut. Steir, and one company 5th Regt. N. I. under Lieut. Deas; Capt. Bellew, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, accompanied the detachment carrying the powder bags, for the purpose of blowing open the gates. The breach which had been reported practicable by the Executive Engineer, was attacked by one party, while another carried the powder bags for the purpose of attacking through the gates. Both succeeded, but having driven the enemy from the gates and breach, they took to the houses in the fort, and opened a brisk fire on our troops, killing and wounding several. Our men quickly advanced, and driving the enemy from their cover, occupied it themselves, but there being a small wicket in the rear of the fort opening into the King's garden, unknown to our troops, the rebels took to flight by that road. Lieut. Raban, while

in the act of gallantly encouraging his men, and waving his sword above his head, received a shot through his heart, which caused instant death. Lieut. Deas was slightly wounded by a ball in the head. Major Swayne, a senior officer, having arrived with reinforcements, Major Griffiths made over the command of the garrison to that officer, and returned to cantonments. This small fort, from its commanding position, the Major General was most anxious to take possession of on the breaking out of the rebellion, but Sir William Macnaghten objected to it on the ground that it would be *impolitic* to do so, to the detriment of the owner. Captain Mackenzie left cantonments with a small party of Jezailchies, for the purpose of keeping in check some of the enemy who had been observed assembling in some walled gardens, on the south-west front of the Shah Bagh. These excellent Light Infantry succeeded to admiration in effecting their object, but with considerable loss to themselves. Towards the afternoon a *rossallah* of the Shah's 2d Cavalry who had been thrown out on the Dey-maroo Hill, as a picquet of observation, fell back on two guns which were also placed in observation on the plain below, protected by a squadron 5th L. C. under Captain Blair of that corps. About this time a relief of Cavalry being sent out from cantonments, was detained, in consequence of the enemy appearing in force on the hill, from whence the picquet had just retired. Hearing this, Captain Anderson also went out to head the detachment of his Regiment, when a smart affair took place. Captains Anderson and Blair, Collyer commanding one troop 5th L. C., and one troop 2d Shah's Cavalry accompanying them, gallantly drove the enemy before them, until their arrival at the extreme spur, when they came upon a small fort, which, from its peculiar localities, had been, until then, masked from their view. From this issued a large body of matchlock men, under whose support the enemy's cavalry rallied, and for a time forced back our horse; but the latter on reaching the side of the hill, where they were covered from the fire of the matchlock men, were again rallied by Capt. Anderson, who accompanied Cpts. Bott and Collyer 5th L. C., and Capt. Walker commanding detachment 4th Local Horse, and about thirty of his own men, again returned to the spot, where they were met by about the same number of the enemy's cavalry, protected a short way in the rear by a strong body of matchlock men. The former immediately charged, when a hand-to-hand encounter took place, in which both officers and men distinguished themselves greatly; each officer being personally engaged, and Capt. Anderson killing four men with his own hand, one of whom was the brother of Abdullah Khan, one of the chief leaders of the insurrection. But owing to the enemy's matchlock men being in such great force, the small body of Irregular Cavalry were again obliged to fall back on their guns, the detachment accompanying which had been further strengthened by two companies of the 37th N. I. under that gallant officer Lieut. Hawtrey. Again Cpts. Anderson and Walker observing the enemy in posses-

fact they had but two guns, which were taken in Captain Warburton's house in the city, and these, they know not how to serve.

Nov. 9th.—Late this evening orders arrived for the departure, during the night, of Brigadier Shelton, accompanied by the detachment H. M. 44th, Shah's 6th, and one gun H. A., one mountain train. Accordingly this morning at about four a. m., the above troops set out, and arrived ere day-break at cantonments, without having met with any opposition on the road, although a ludicrous incident that occurred was nearly sending the whole detachment back to the Bala Hissar. The Brigadier being a little way ahead of the column, observed, on reaching Seah Sing, what he thought was a party of the enemy's jezailchies, and was about to order a retreat, when a young officer who had ridden on ahead returned and reported the supposed enemy to be some harmless pariah dogs!

The king is getting worse and worse; he has quite lost his self-possession. If he is acting a part, he certainly performs it admirably. He has warned the women in his seraglio, amounting in number to eight hundred and sixty, that in the event of the cantonment falling into the hands of the rebels, he should administer poison to them all. Major Ewart, 54th Regiment N. I., (Brigadier Shelton having departed,) had assumed command of the garrison; and the disposition of the troops in it, is now as follows:—At the Ghuznee gate, two companies 54th, one gun H. A.; at the centre square, above the palace, two companies 54th, two guns H. A., one twelve pounder howitzer, and one five-and-half-inch mortar; a little below, another mortar of the same calibre is placed along with a nine-pounder of the King's. The Seik horse are encamped in the square also. At the Lahore gate with Lieut. Melville one hundred men, 54th, fifty jezailchies, and one six-pounder, and a small iron gun of the King's. On the upper tower of the Hissar, commanding the whole, one hundred, 54th, one hundred jezailchies, and one gun, mountain train. The remainder are in reserve in the Palace square, every man knowing his post in case of alarm.

We were thus prepared at all points, and ready to give the enemy, should they come, a warm reception. On this day all the troops in the Bala Hissar were put upon half rations, in consequence of the great supplies of atta required to be sent into cantonments, where they were even worse off than we were here; and Captain Kirby had orders to store all he could lay hands on, and hold it in readiness for despatch at even a moment's notice. This active officer did all that lay in his power, and four hundred maunds of grain were immediately ready for cantonments.

Nov. 10th.—This morning opened brightly and auspiciously for us, and it proved though a bloody, yet a glorious day.

Sir William Macnaghten, accompanied by his Military Secretary (Capt. Lawrence) was standing at the bastion of cantonments, when they observed considerable bodies of the enemy, both infantry and cavalry, moving under the Seah Sung hills for the purpose, as they supposed, of taking pos-

session of the Reika Bashee's* and three other forts in the neighbourhood. Sir William immediately went to the General, and strongly advised him to be beforehand with them, by occupying and instantly garrisoning the said forts. This both the General and Brigadier Shelton, who was present, demurred at, observing that they could not afford the loss of men which would be consequent on such an undertaking. Sir William replied, "Sir, if you take them not to-day, you must do so with three-fold loss to-morrow." The General then said, "Will you take the responsibility?" and received in reply, "On my shoulders be it." Accordingly, a detachment of the following strength was ordered to be in readiness for the purpose of immediately putting into execution the above-mentioned design: H. M. 44th, 37th N. I., Shah's 6th and two six-pounders, 1 mountain train gun, under Lieut. Eyre, the whole commanded by Brigadier Shelton.

They left cantonments at about eleven a. m., embrasures having been previously cut in the wall of the mission compound for the purpose of placing in position two guns, from which, and the north bastion, a heavy fire was opened on the Reeka Bashee fort, while the party under Brigadier Shelton, advanced to the attack. At this time, not only were the enemy in great strength inside the fort, but they had taken possession of every ditch and piece of broken ground commanding its approach, from which our party suffered great annoyance. The fort had its principal gateway facing the north-east, and also a small wicket south. Brigadier Shelton determined on blowing open the latter with powder bags, which was accordingly done; and the enemy being more intent on protecting the former, against which they evidently expected our chief attack would be made, as also from its being more covered from our fire from cantonments, a small party of H. M. 44th under Mackerell and McCrea, and a few sepoys 37th N. I. under Captain Westmacott, followed by Lieut. and Adjutant Bird, of the Shah's 6th, had effected their entrance, almost before the enemy were aware of it. Most unfortunately at this time, and without any order given, a bugle from the outside sounded the retreat: the remainder of the detachment outside immediately faced to the right about, and commenced retreating to cantonments; thus leaving the party inside without any support, which was to a man cut up, with the exception of Lieutenant Bird, and one sepoy 37th, who luckily got shelter in a small stable, and most gallantly maintained his position for a space of some minutes in the following manner:—having effected his entrance, he instantly barred the door, Lieut. B. had his own two barrelled gun and the sepoy his musket; the former fired through the chink of the door while the latter loaded the other, and thus did he keep up a constant fire while at the same time anxiously watching the proceedings of the enemy who,

* The name of the head of a tribe of Afghans.

were generally the average of killed or wounded. The above mentioned Khan was the most influential and powerful leader of the insurrection; owing to his wealth, and the large extent of territory he was chief of, he was looked up to by all, as the main-spring of the rebellion—Lord of the Loghur valley, and having some thousand followers obeying his nod, his open declaration at an early period in favour of the insurrection, caused him at once to be looked upon by all, as he whose authority was to be respected and feared; old, palsy-struck, and speechless, he was still powerful. He had been deprived by Dost Mahomed Khan of his territory and banished to Candahar, but being one of the first to join Shah Soojah on his arrival, he was, by the influence of Sir William Macnaghten, reinstated in his estates, and his gratitude was entering into a conspiracy to murder him!!

Nov. 15th.—This morning Major E. Pottinger, C. B., Political Agent, Turkistan Frontier, and Lient. Haughton, Adjutant 4th Regt. S. S. F, both severely wounded, arrived from Charekar, bringing the harrowing intelligence, that the whole of the unfortunate corps lately stationed there, and every officer, save themselves, had fallen victims to the sanguinary rebels. After a struggle carried on with the greatest bravery and determination on the one side, and the most blood-thirsty ferocity on the other; after having undergone hardships and privations, suffering the one with patience, the other with endurance, out of seven officers and six hundred brave men, with their wives and families, two of the former, and a few stragglers of the latter, have returned to tell the melancholy tale.

To relate fully the particulars of this heart-rending narrative would, from the want of all notes or even memoranda on the subject, be impossible; but to bear testimony to the bravery, the self-devotedness of the officers, and until maddened by hunger and thirst, the obedient alacrity of the men, is a task which my pen, however feeble, shall still attempt to portray.

It appears that the insurrection did not fully develop itself in that quarter, until the 3d instant, when a number of chiefs having come to a conference at Major Pottinger's fort, about four miles from the place where the 4th Regt. was stationed, managed to entice Lieutenant Rattray, Major Pottinger's assistant, into the garden, when one of their number deliberately shot him. Upon this, Major P. immediately barricaded his fort, and with his small number of personal guards, contrived to baffle all the attempts of the insurgents until the night of the 4th, when he managed to effect his escape to the fort in which the 4th Regt. commanded by Captain Codrington, were besieged. He found the garrison, although they had a few day's provisions, yet sadly straightened for want of water, the only place from which the latter was procurable, being two miles distant from the cantonment fort! On the 5th, Capt. Codrington, accompanied by Major Pottinger, made a gallant sortie, driving the enemy before them for some miles.

but melancholy to relate, the former received a wound, of which he afterwards died, and the latter a ball in the leg, from which he is, even now, six months after the event, suffering severely; Lieutenant Salisbury, quarter master, having been killed the day before, when gallantly leading a detachment for the relief of Major Pottinger's party.

By the 12th, a small supply of water which had been stored up by Captain Codrington was entirely consumed, and the troops during the whole of that and the following day, suffered the torments of an unquenchable thirst. The artillerymen, composed entirely of Seiks, had deserted in a body to the enemy, the jemadar, who commanded them, having previously severely wounded Lieut. Haughton. In this state the men, nearly each of whom had a wife and family, decided on a sally for water, the want of which, and the very desperate state of affairs had destroyed all order.

On the evening of the 13th, Ensign Rose, with the exception of Dr. Grant, the medical officer, being the only one left unwounded, headed the Regt. (who had loaded themselves with treasure, and every sort of disposable property,) for the purpose of sallying to the water, and then proceeding as best they could to cantonment at Cabool, a distance of forty-two miles. The men rushed to the springs, and lying on the ground eagerly drank, while a party, consisting of Major Pottinger and Lieutenant Haughton, both suffering severely from their wounds, and the latter of whom had just undergone amputation of his arm, accompanied by a few Sepoys, proceeded as a sort of advanced guard in front, expecting to be followed by the main body of the Regiment. However, after proceeding some way, all trace of the rear party being gone, Major Pottinger and his young companion taking unfrequented bye-paths, at day-light found themselves more than half way on their road, having providentially escaped molestation. During the day they lay concealed in the bed of a small watercourse in the mountains without food of any kind, and the next night, after many hair-breadth escapes, having passed, unrecognized, through the midst of the city, arrived at five and a half A. M. in cantonments exhausted beyond description, having ridden forty-two miles; one officer, with a fresh ball wound through his leg, the other, having had his arm just amputated; the latter officer had again to suffer this painful operation.

From all that can be gathered from the reports brought in, it appears, that the devoted corps had struggled on to Kar Durra, gallantly headed by Ensign Rose and Dr. Grant, where it was cut to pieces. The former officer fell, having first killed four of the enemy with his own hand, and the latter, although he contrived to escape from their murderous hands at Kar Durra, yet just as he had arrived in sight of the haven of his hopes, within three miles of cantonments, was massacred by some wood-cutters, and thus fell, the young, the gifted, the talented, and the brave; peace and honour to their ashes! To add to the gloomy horrors, which daily

faithful and attached troops in his service. Most lucky was it that he did so, as it was discovered, from secret information sent in during the day, by Mohun Lall, that the traitor had sold the tower to the rebel Sirdars for 100 gold mohurs. The man returned in the evening, and, when questioned, answered with the utmost *sang froid*, that he had only been on private business into the city, and angrily demanded why he had been deprived of his command! He was heavily ironed and plunged into the fort prison. Mohun Lall said he had promised to give up the tower that same night, to a party of the enemy who were to come round by the back of the hill. Had this plot succeeded, we should have lost the Balla Hissar.

Accounts from Jellalabad stating, that Sale had had a glorious fight there, and defeated the enemy with serious loss, had strengthened his position, was getting in supplies fast, and that he was good against all Afghanistan for months.

A detachment was warned to take Mahomed Khan's fort this evening, and all was in readiness for the expedition, when, melancholy to relate, the order was, for reasons best known to the authorities, countermanded on the eve of execution!

Nov. 22d.—The enemy still continue daily to take up a position in the village and the hill of Dey Maroo, thereby not only putting a stop to our commissariat purchases, but, from the proximity of the village to the mission compound, greatly annoying the troops located there. We have now, however, through the exertions of the commissariat, got twenty days' supplies at half ration to the troops and non-combatants in store, which will enable us to hold out until the anticipated relief from Candahar arrives. This day the General ordered out a detachment under Major Swayne, for the purpose of occupying the village of Dey Maroo; the party was, however, forestalled by the enemy, and after a fruitless attempt to dislodge them, they were under the necessity of returning late in the evening to cantonments, having lost two men H. A. and Lieut. Eyre wounded.

Nov. 23d.—In conformity with orders issued late last night, the following detachment, four comps. H. M. 44th, four comps. 37th N. I., 5th N. I., one squadron 5th L. C., one ditto Anderson's H. one hundred Sappers and Miners, with one 6-pounder, left cantonments at two A. M. under command of Brigadier Shelton, accompanied by Captains Troup and Mackenzie, acting staff, for the purpose of driving the enemy out, and taking possession of Dey Maroo. The Brigadier's plan of attack was to gain during the night possession of the hill immediately over the village, and from that commanding position, to make a descent upon it. The hill was gained by five A. M., and the troops remained there until close upon dawn, when a cluster of the enemy being perceived around their watchfires in the village, our gun (the only one taken) opened upon them; this was followed by a volley from a part of the detachment, which quickly spread a panic through the enemy, a great portion of whom, fearing a nearer encounter, took speedily to

flight. After two or three more rounds from the gun, day having broken, Brigadier Shelton desired Major Swayne, with a small party of Europeans and three companies of his own corps, to attack the village. In the meantime, the noise of the firing having reached the city, some of the Sirdars had collected their followers, and were beginning to make their appearance at the further end of the Dey Maroo hill, in the direction of Kulla Balund, when the Brigadier, leaving Major Kershaw, H. M. 13th L. I., in command of a small party of 37th Regt. to retain possession of the knoll over the village, proceeded with his detachment, and the gun, immediately over the gorge which separated him from that portion of the height occupied by the enemy, where he took up his position. Major Swayne, in obedience to the Brigadier's orders, descended to the attack on the village, but having missed his road wandered to a part of the wall where there was a wicket, weakly barricaded, when having but a few men, and being himself shot through the neck he retired up the hill, thus defeating the principal object of the expedition. The enemy now began momentarily to increase on the hill opposite the Brigadier's position; and also collected in great numbers principally cavalry, in the plain to the North-west. For a considerable time our gun kept the enemy at bay; but eventually, from the incessant firing, the vent became so hot that the artillerymen could not serve it; of this the enemy's infantry on the height from behind the breastworks, which they had thrown up with incredible rapidity, did not fail to take advantage, and with their long juzzails, dealt death among our troops, while the muskets of the latter were almost harmless, from the foe being out of their range.

Between the Brigadier's position and the bottom of the gorge were several small hillocks, which extended more than half way down the ascent. Under cover of these the enemy were enabled to crawl a considerable way up without being perceived by our party, who were at that time suffering severely from the fire on the opposite hill. It is here with great sorrow and reluctance I am obliged to state, that the detachment became almost panic struck, so that when the Brigadier, perceiving the enemy's progress up the hill, ordered them to advance and repel them, not a man, European or native, would stir; notwithstanding the repeated and urgent entreaties of their immediate commanding officers. Here fell Capt. Mackintosh, 5th N. I. and Brigade Major of Shelton's Brigade, and Lieutenant Laing, 27th N. I., whilst striving, by their gallant example, to compel the men to advance. Here also were wounded Lieutenants Evans and Swinton, H. M. 44th, whilst gloriously employed in the same task. The enemy were not unobservant of this, and with loud shouts rushed at, and captured the gun. Our men retreated along the crest of the hill in the greatest confusion. I must here, however, pay a tribute to the gallant conduct of the men of the H. A., who notwithstanding the bad example shewn them

by their companions in arms, maintained their ground until overpowered by numbers.

At this time, and while our troops were thus behaving, the enemy's cavalry in the plain had been thrown into great confusion by their chief Abdoollah Khan Atchukzye being mortally wounded, and had themselves commenced a disorderly flight. Our party having retreated about one hundred and fifty paces rallied, and seeing that the gun was in possession of but a mere handful of the enemy, again advanced, and recaptured it, the enemy carrying off with them the limber and horses. The Affghans, both cavalry and infantry, continued their retreat with the greatest precipitation towards the city; but being there met by a very considerable reinforcement, crowded a second time to the former scene of action, while Brigadier Shelton still maintained his first position.

In the meantime, perceiving from Cantonments what had occurred, the Major General sent out to the Brigadier fresh horses and a limber, as also some loads of ammunition; the enemy could not be less now than six thousand infantry on the hill, and the whole plain to the north-west was completely blackened with their cavalry. They had evidently determined on this day to make one desperate effort to rid themselves of their Feringhee rulers. Our 6-pounder again opened its murderous discharge upon them, while they in return with their long juzzails mowed down our ranks in numbers. Not a head could shew itself but it was an instant mark for the too unerring aim of the foe; again did our men become panic-struck. Their officers urged, entreated, and implored them to uphold the well-established credit of the British arms, and to advance so as to bring the enemy within range of their muskets, but although many a noble example was set them by their officers, not a man was found to second them. Again were large portions of the enemy perceived at their former manœuvre of crawling up the hill, on the summit of which, no sooner had they made their appearance, than the whole of the detachment fled in the greatest dismay, nor stopped from their fear-impelled flight until brought up by the walls of Cantonments, when the General in person attempted to rally them, but in vain. The men of H. M. 44th, native infantry, and cavalry mingled in one confused mass, spread horror and dismay through the Cantonments, and had the enemy followed up their success by a bold attack on them, frightful indeed must have been the result; as it was, they seemed almost astonished with their own success, and after mutilating in a dreadful manner the many bodies left on the hill, they retired with exulting shouts to the city.

In concluding the account of this disastrous event, I cannot refrain from offering a few comments on the immediate causes of so signal and bloody a defeat as was here suffered by a body of eleven hundred British troops, led on by their own immediate officers in as gallant a manner, as ever troops were led. The great, the fatal error, the first and most important

cause of this sad day's reverse, the most bloody for the numbers employed in the annals of Anglo-Asiatic warfare, was the small proportion of artillery sent out on the occasion. I grant the enemy were nine thousand strong; I grant that a panic was struck into the hearts of nearly all our troops engaged; but from what cause? Had one more gun accompanied the detachment, there is not a doubt on the minds of any of the spectators of, or actors in the struggle, that the result would have been widely different. Our artillery is the most effective and terror-striking arm of our force. There was no scarcity of either materiel or guns in Cantonments, and yet a detachment of the above strength was, in direct defiance of general orders on the subject, allowed to leave its fortifications, and encounter this superior enemy with only a single piece of artillery! The consequences are evident enough, the vent gets heated, it misses fire at a time when a brisk discharge of grape or canister might have changed the fate of the day, and all is lost! Flight—a dishonorable and disastrous flight—ensues; and the conviction which, until this moment, had pervaded the hearts of the Affghans, of the discipline and obedience, even unto death of our troops, European and Native, is gone!

Here amidst so much that was condemnable, let me again bear just and heartfelt testimony to the behaviour of that brave though small body of men, whose conduct on this and every other occasion during the war was that of a band of heroes, and who, preferring death to dishonour, met their fate nobly fighting to the last for the gun they had so ably served. I alluded to the H. A., when Serjeant Mulhall and six gunners, whose names I feel deep sorrow I cannot here record, sword in hand awaited the advance of the foe, and it was not until they saw themselves alone in the midst of thousands of the enemy, that they dashed at full gallop, cutting their way through them down the hill; and though surrounded by cavalry and infantry, yet they managed to bring their gun safely to the plain, where, however, only three of them being alive, and they desperately wounded, they were obliged to leave it, and contrived to reach Cantonments, to the great joy of all who had anxiously witnessed their gallant efforts from the walls. So gallant did Sir William Macnaghten consider the behaviour of the above named Sergeant, of which from the ramparts he was an eye witness, and his conduct having been previously meritorious, that he promised to bring the same to the notice of Government, in the hope of obtaining some preferment worthy his great desert.

It may be remembered, that a detachment was left under the command of Major Kershaw, H. M. 13th, consisting of 3d Comp. 37th N. I., over the village of Dey Maroo; and it is indeed a gratification to be enabled to except this party, from the sweeping condemnation passed on the others. Owing to the admirable dispositions of this able and gallant officer, assisted by Lieutenant Hawtrej, although bearing the brunt of repeated attacks of large bodies of the enemy for several hours, yet he nobly

maintained his position. Nor was it until he saw our troops (till then, concealed by the hill from his view) in a disorderly flight on the plain below, and he, and his detachment surrounded and nearly cut off, that he commenced, cutting his way through the enemy, his retreat to Cantonments, where he arrived, though not until he had suffered the loss of one-third of his gallant little body. Our loss on this day was exceedingly severe.

Colonel Oliver, Capt. Mackintosh, and that most gallant fellow Walker, 4th Locals, who, for the last week, had been nightly conveying ammunition to, and bringing back supplies from, the Balla Hissar, and Lieut. Laing, killed. Major Swayne, 5th, Lieutenants Evans and Swinton, H. M. 44th, Captains T. Bott, 5th L. C. and Mackenzie, wounded.

H. M. 44th—90 killed; 39 wounded; 4 died of wounds.

37th N. I.—80 killed; 10 wounded.

5th N. I.—Loss considerable, but unknown.

H. A.—4 killed; 6 wounded.

The enemy most dreadfully mutilated the bodies. Colonel Oliver had his entrails cut out and stones put in their place, and his head and hand cut off; all the bodies were also more or less thus treated.

In the Balla Hissar, when the General observed so strong a body of the enemy engaged, near Dey Maroo, thought it a good opportunity to send out a party of Light Cavalry to the Seah Sing hills, to dislodge some few of the rebels, who formed a picquet of observation there; and ordering them, at the same time, to protect and cover a party of eight horsemen, who were proceeding to Cantonments with a letter for Sir Wm. Macnaghten, from Capt. Conolly, acquainting him that reinforcements of more than 5000 men had passed to the rear of the Dey Maroo Hill, which the situation of the Cantonments prevented them seeing. The Punjabi horse, in number about 300, escorted the men safely to the plain near cantonments, and put to flight the enemy's picquet, but a body of the enemy, of about equal numbers, and headed by Mahomed Shah Khan, a principal Ghilzee Chief, having issued from Mahomed Khan's fort for the purpose of encountering them, they hardly waited their arrival ere they took to a dastardly flight, having one man wounded! Observing this, the enemy grew bolder, and sent a party of Jezailchies to within almost gun-shot of the Balla Hissar, when the wuzer accompanied by Prince Futteh Jung, the king's second son, went to Lieutenant M. and requested he would send fifty Jezailchies to a hillock opposite the one forming the enemy's cover, and at the same time take a party of his infantry out as a support; this he did, and some smart skirmishing ensued between the two bodies of Jezailchies, who eventually succeeded in driving the enemy back on Seah Sing with some slight loss. We remained at the position until evening, when the enemy retiring, we fell back on the gate with heavy heart, having witnessed our friends' misfortunes in Can-

tonments, and with fearful anticipations of the result. The Prince sent Lieutenant M. a very handsome Persian dagger and a set of gold studs.

Nov. 24th.—On this day, a small body of the enemy commenced to burn down the bridge over the river which was very little more than musket shot from Cantonments, and were actually allowed to proceed in their work of destruction, without even an attempt being made to drive them away! This requires no comment. The General made this day an official communication to the Envoy and Minister, expressing his opinion, that it was not practicable to hold the country, unless we received immediate assistance in either troops or provisions. Sundry discussions were entered into as to the expediency and propriety of retreating to the Balla Hissar, though nothing was decided on. But there is not a doubt on the minds of those who have thought on the subject, that had we done so, we should not only have saved that hecatomb of victims, who have since fallen by the hands of the enemy; but that a retreat would have been avoided, and all the treasure and park of artillery, with the immense masses of public and private property, which has since been sacrificed, would have in a great measure been preserved. Provisions were secreted in large quantities, and by turning out the natives, would have been discovered. The rebels would on the advance of winter, have been obliged to disband their troops, and been totally without money; and in the end, the day would have been ours; as it was, they paid their men with our money, and before the winter had well set in, our inglorious retreat had been decided on.

Nov. 25th.—This day two deputies arrived from the enemy, and taking post at the bridge, requested that some number of accredited agents might be sent on our part to meet them. Captains Lawrence and Trevor were accordingly dispatched by the Envoy, and met the two former, one being Sultan Mahomed of the Baruksye tribe, the other Meerza Ahmud Ali, Kuzilbash. After a conference of two hours duration, nothing having been decided on, owing to the very preposterous terms offered by, and the inflated tone of, the latter, they requested to see the Envoy in person, and accordingly they removed to the officers' quarters, in the Seah Sing gate of cantonments, where the Envoy awaited their arrival. After a further conversation of three hours duration, in which, from the same reason as before, nothing was decided on, Sultan Mahomed being exceedingly hostile in his remarks, and saying that the Sirdar had conquered us, so we could not expect favourable terms, but that we must give up all our arms, ammunition and treasure, and surrender at discretion, prisoners of war, and submit ourselves to their mercy,—*their mercy!*—the conference was concluded by the Envoy writing a note to the Sirdars, stating the grounds on which he was prepared to treat; and while the Meerza took the letter in, Sultan Mahomed, accompanied by Captains L. and T. awaited at the Bridge for the answer. After a considerable period had elapsed, it arrived, and contained the same unconscionable and arrogant terms as before, and

offered unconditional submission to the honor and mercy of a nation of wolves. The Envoy indignantly rejected the terms proposed, and on some insolent remark being made by Sultan Mahomed as to our utter helplessness, the Envoy remarked, "I leave the issue in the hands of the God of battles." And thus the first overtures of peace were rejected with animosity on both sides. During the conference, salutes were being fired in the city in honour of the arrival of "Sirdar Mahomed Akbar Khan," who had just come in from Kooloom, and who was henceforth to play so conspicuous a part in the concluding and most tragic scenes of this fatal war. He had been for the last two years a wandering exile in the plains of Turkistan, or prisoner in the hand of the king of Bokhara.

He is the second and favourite son of the Ex-Ameer Dost Mahomed, and is looked upon as the best soldier of the Affghan nation, as well as being politic and wise. His advent was hailed with rejoicing, and he immediately took the lead in all counsels or actions. However, by us, also, pleasure was felt when we heard of his arrival, knowing the great stake he had in the country, and that his father, children, and wife, being in the hands of the Government of India, we had some security, should matters come to the worst, of his good treatment, and the weight of his interest on our side. How vain were our hopes or anticipations; how futile our reliance, the sequel proved. Either he is the worst politician in the world, giving the lie to all reports of his wisdom, or he is actuated by feelings of the deepest and most rancorous hatred towards us and our government, or he would never have hunted us to death as he afterwards did.

Nov. 26th.—Accounts were this day received from Jellalabad, stating that General Sale had fortified himself most strongly, was well off for provisions, but rather short of ammunition; also informing us, that the Khyberries had risen *en masse*, shut the Pass, and closely invested Ali Musjid, the fort, at its entrance; however, the Political Agent, Captain Macgregor, mentioned that he hoped in a few days it would be open again, as Captain Mackeson at Peshawur, and he from Jellalabad were using their utmost exertions to effect that object. Nothing of any importance occurred from this date until the first of the ensuing month. The enemy took every opportunity of molesting and annoying us, while we did nothing in return; not a man could shew himself outside the walls of cantonments without being immediately a mark for their sharp-shooters, whose long rifles carried with a too unerring aim.

Ammunition was being sent during the night in large quantities into the Balla Hissar, which was considered the safest place, and as the question of a retreat on that fort was still being agitated, and should it take place, it was advisable that as little baggage as possible should accompany the troops, therefore the more they could send away the better.

Nov. 27th.—For the last two or three days, Osman Khan, nephew of Zuman Khan, (brother of Dost Mahomed,) had been to and fro, between Sir Wm.

Macnaghten and the Sirdars, trying to enter into negotiations, but to very little purpose. They still assumed the high tones of conquerors, and offered the most preposterous terms, which of course ended in nothing. At last he ceased coming, and the war "which for a space did fail," began again in earnest. Zuman Khan, whom I have mentioned above, had been proclaimed king by the rebels; all orders were issued in his name, and the "fatiha," or Mahometan prayer on the accession of a new sovereign, had been read in all the mosques. He perhaps (although possessing little real power) is the most polished and humane nobleman of all the Affghan tribes, has always been favorably disposed towards us, and "the quality of mercy," which is a rare jewel here, seems to have taken firm root in his breast.

Dec. 8th.—In consequence of the provisions for the troops having been all consumed, a military council met this morning, and was unanimous in its opinion, that nothing but a retreat was left for us. This decision being communicated to the Envoy, he expressed great repugnance to the measure, and prevailed on the General to promise another attempt to secure supplies. With this object in view, the General assembled at his quarters in the evening, all those officers, whose local knowledge was supposed likely to be available in this emergency. From what I could gather of the proceedings of the council, it appears that the practicability of surprising some forts in the neighbourhood was discussed; and, as frequently happens, a great deal of extraneous and angry argument was brought on the tapis, and Sir William Macnaghten, who was not present, was handled somewhat severely. He was accused of remissness in not having possessed himself of more local information, and more accurate knowledge of the capabilities of particular forts and villages. His political measures next fell under the lash of sarcasm, and I hear that attempts were made to saddle on Sir William, all the responsibility of our ignorance of the extent of winter stores likely to be found in the surrounding villages. On this, Captain Mackenzie who was present, and attached to the mission (a most energetic and active military man) rose and expressed his disapprobation, that a deliberative military council should be made the arena of personal abuse, more especially of a man who, he being in political employ, was his immediate head.

Although the General repeatedly called the disputants to order, yet another senior officer in the room expressed his opinion, that Sir William and his measures were fit subjects of attack. After a considerable time thus lost, the business of the meeting was resumed, and Sir William was written to, for information regarding some villages in the neighbourhood. He answered the note in person, and laying before the council the despatch of our situation, he ultimately succeeded in prevailing on the General to attempt an enterprise on the fort of Khoja Ruwash, about four miles to the northward of Cantonments. The strength of the party was then decided on, and the General called on Brigadier Shelton

to name the officer to whom the expedition should be entrusted. But the Brigadier making no reply, it was concluded that he was asleep, more particularly as, although several times addressed, no answer was received, and the General, therefore, referred to another officer, who mentioned the Field Officer next for duty, which however was suddenly negatived by the Brigadier, who, although asleep, had mentally kept pace with the discussion. Here Captain Lawrence, who had been a staunch advocate for active measures, being referred to by the Brigadier in rather an unpleasant manner, immediately volunteered to head the Envoy's escort on the occasion, and take all the responsibility of the protection of the gun. It was at length finally settled that the 6th Shah's H. A. gun, the Envoy's escort, and a squadron of Irregular Cavalry should leave Cantonments for the purpose of surprising Khoja Ruwaaah, at 3 A. M. on the 9th, and Brigadier Shelton was requested to see to the execution of all minor details, to order the bridge to be laid down for the exit of the Cavalry and guns, and the Council dissolved itself at 1 A. M.

The troops were ready at the hour appointed; but strange to say, on the H. A. and Cavalry arriving at the Kohistan Gate, and expecting to find the bridge down, and nicely covered with straw, to prevent their exit being heard, Captain Lawrence was told by the officer on duty there, that up to that moment not a single order had been received. This being immediately reported to the Assistant Adjutant General, (Captain Grant,) who was consulting with Captain Hopkins, which officer having been named to command the detachment, had, it seems, communicated some rumours that the enemy were in force, etc. etc., which were carried to the General and Brigadier when, much to the Envoy's disgust, the expedition was given up.

Dec. 9th and 10th.—Information was received by Captain Anderson, that a mine was being carried under the S. E. corner of the new magazine fort, which he immediately made known in the proper quarter. However, no notice was taken of it, although subsequently the report was found to be perfectly true. No attempt was made to recapture Muhommud Shiireef's fort, although a heavy fire was kept up on it during the whole day from every gun that could be brought to bear, in the hopes of destroying the walls; unsuccessfully, however, as the soft mud received the balls, without shewing even a symptom of giving way. Behind these, although the enemy did not attempt to garrison the fort during the day, a strong body of the enemy's Jezailchies took post, and kept up a most effective and destructive fire on the old bazaar, and in fact, sweeping the whole west face of the ramparts; a new embrasure was made in the walls, and a long nine-pounder brought to bear, but still without effect.

Dec. 11th.—Only this day's provisions being left, the General urged upon the Envoy the necessity of coming to some terms with the enemy; in consequence of which the Envoy, who had re-opened communications with the

Sirdars, had arranged a conference with them, which was to take place on the right side of the Cabul river, where the bridge had formerly stood. Accordingly, Sir William, attended by Captains Lawrence, Mackenzie, and Trevor, proceeded to about a mile from cantonments, when he was met by Sirdar Muhommud Akbar Khan, Muhommud Osman Khan, Sultān Muhommud, (half brother of Mahommud Akbar,) Muhommud Shireef, chief of the Kuzzilhash tribe, Muhommud Shah Khan, Khoda Buksh Khan, (Ghilzie Sirdar,) in fact the heads of all the chief tribes in the kingdom. The Envoy opened the conference by stating, that "the continuance of the British army in Afghanistan, appearing to be displeasing to the nation, and the British Government having no other object in sending troops to this country, than the integrity, happiness, and welfare of it; and that object being defeated, they can have no wish to remain; the following conditions were therefore offered for the Sirdars' consideration:—

1st.—Immediate supplies to be furnished to the troops to any extent required, carriage cattle ditto.

2d.—The British troops to evacuate Afghanistan.

3rd.—An offensive and defensive alliance to be formed.

4th.—The Ameer Dost Muhommud Khan and all his family to be released.

5th.—His Majesty Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk to have the option of remaining in the country as a private individual, to be treated with all honour and respect, and have a guaranteed stipend of a lakh of rupees annually, or, if he so wished, is to be allowed to accompany the British troops to Hindoostan, taking all his property and family with him, only giving up such effects as had formerly belonged to the Ameer Dost Muhommud. In the event of carriage not being procurable for his property and family, they are to remain in the Bala Hissar, and be treated with all honour and respect, and on the arrival of the Ameer and all other Affghans imprisoned in India at Peshawur, the former are to be transported with safety to India.

6th.—All the sick and wounded to be left under care of the Sirdars at Cabul, and treated as guests.

7th.—All spare ammunition, guns, and small arms, if the means of transport are not procurable, to be made over to the Sirdars.

8th.—All surplus property of officers, for which carriage might not at present be procurable, to be left in charge of Zuman Khan, and be forwarded to India on the first opportunity.

9th.—No man to be molested on either side, for his actions during the war. Such chiefs as had stood staunch to the king, to be allowed either to accompany his Majesty, taking with them all property, or remain in Afghanistan, treated with every respect.

10th.—Any British subject wishing to remain in Afghanistan for the purposes of trade, to be in no way molested.

11th.—The troops at Jellalabad to evacuate that fort ere the Cabul force commences its march. The forces at Ghuznee and Candahar, to quit those places as soon as the season would admit of their marching.

12th.—The Sirdars Mahommud Akbar Khan, and Osman Khan, or any other chiefs wishing so to do, to accompany the troops, on their march to Peshawur.

On the Envoy reading the first article, the Sirdar Muhommud Akbar Khan interrupted him, saying "There is no occasion for our furnishing you with supplies; what reason is there, why you should not march to-morrow?" The other chiefs immediately checked the impetuosity of this young man, who during the remainder of the conference conducted himself with the same courtesy as the others. After having lasted about two hours, the conference closed, and the parties returned to their respective homes. During the night Lieutenant Le Geyt, Adjutant of the 2d Irregular Cavalry, took a convoy of ammunition into the Bala Hissar, where during the whole course of the day we had been in a great state of excitement, observers of the conference, but not knowing either the cause or result. Lieutenant L. gave us the reports current at the time as to its issue, and stated the probability of our immediate retreat. He took back a supply of grain for the morrow.

Dec. 12th.—This morning early, it was observed from the rampart above the Lahore Gate of the Bala Hissar, that a party of horsemen were rapidly advancing from Seah Sung towards the gate. Not being able to distinguish whether they were friends or enemies, Lieut. M. immediately ordered the walls to be manned, and taking one section as an advance, took up a position a little in advance of the fosse. All doubts were however soon dispelled, by observing that the cavalry were pursued by a small party of footmen, who from the rocks of Seah Sung, kept up a continual fire on them. On their close arrival, it proved to be Captain Hay, bringing in orders for the immediate evacuation of the Bala Hissar, and marching for Cantonments, at the same time telling us that we were to leave for Hindoostan on the 14th. This was indeed quick work, but however, any thing was better than our late life, and we anticipated rejoining our companions in Cantonments. Owing to the orders he brought to Major Ewart and Captain Conolly, all the garrisons at the different forts were immediately relieved by Jazeelchies or sepoy of the king's; the upper tower was also occupied by his men, and all our guns and troops were assembled by two o'clock p. m. in the grand square, from whence they marched out to the road, facing Seah Sung, and awaited anxiously the arrival of the ponies and other carriage cattle, which, we had been warned, would be sent from Cantonments for our ammunition and commissariat stores, accompanied by a large body of the Sowars of Mahommud Akbar Khan. About dusk none having come, we, at the recommendation of the Political Assistant, returned to our old quarters, and had to place all the

guns again in position (relieving at the same time) ; the King's troops being relieved by our men. All were perfectly disgusted, after having got all in readiness, that our march to Cantonments should be so unfortunately stopped.

A deputation of Chiefs waited on Sir William Macnaghten this morning, for the purpose of proposing, that Shah Soojah should be left nominally as king, the Barukzeye tribe exercising, by one of their chiefs, the functions of Wuzer. But owing to the mutual jealousy of the parties concerned, this proposition entirely fell to the ground. Among the Sirdars who thus accompanied this deputation, was Mahommud Khan, commonly known by his title of the "Naib Ameer," and as his name will henceforth figure in this narrative, as one of our principal mediums of communication with the enemy, I will give here a short account of him. Of a good family, he distinguished himself during the misfortunes of Dost Mahommud, by a devoted attachment to his cause, being one of the few, who, through all his troubles and adversities, never forsook him. For this he was seized by Shah Soojah, all his property confiscated, he himself imprisoned, after being mulcted in the sum of three lakhs of rupees. His feelings towards the British were most favourable, as he was fully aware that it was through the intercession of the Envoy that his life had been spared by the victorious monarch ; he had been enlarged on the rebellion breaking out, and was now one of the most influential in the Council of the Sirdars.

This day the Envoy and Minister wrote to Major Eldred Pottinger, C. B., acquainting him that a treaty had been entered into with the Sirdars, one article of which was that he was to remain as a hostage pending Dost Mahommud Khan's return to this country ; also apprising him that Colonel Palmer had been ordered to evacuate Ghuznee, as soon as the season would permit of his so doing, and ordering him to afford him all the assistance he could on the road, and on his arrival at Cabul ; also desiring him to take every opportunity he could of informing Colonel Stoddart at Bokhara, and Captain Arthur Conolly at Khiva, of the unfortunate turn of events.

Dec. 13th.—Again did we vacate our different positions in the Bala Hissar, making over command of them to the King's troops, and with labour and difficulty got our heavy guns and ammunition ready for our march to Cantonments, and only awaiting carriage for the stores from the latter place. About 2 p. m. we observed masses of Affghan Cavalry assembling on the spur of the Seah Sang hills, and about an hour afterwards, a column consisting of a squadron 5th L. C. and a troop of Irregular horse escorting 200 spare ponies for our baggage and ammunition, slowly took its way from Cantonments, towards the point where the horsemen were assembled. On its arrival there, a halt of about half an hour ensued, and the officers, Capt. Collyer 5th L. C. and Lieut. Le Geyt, went to visit the Chief on the hill, who proved to be Sirdar Mahommud

Akbar Khan, who had come out from the city with all his followers for the purpose of escorting our small body through the numerous hordes of Ghilzie banditti, whom no treaty could bind, no ties of honour prevent dipping their hands in blood, if plunder to ever so trifling a degree, would be the result, and who already, among the rocks on the hills of Seah Sung, had assembled in thousands, for the purpose of attacking us; knowing well that with the large quantity of baggage and stores we had to escort, our handful of troops would not be able to act with any effect against them.

At about 4 p. m., (at this season of the year nearly dusk,) the convoy arrived, and we had then to load the whole of the ponies with their stores; this was accomplished by six, it being exceedingly dark and freezingly cold, and they began to move slowly down the narrow street of the Hissar, to form line of march, outside on the road to Cantonments. About half an hour before this a detachment of the Sirdar's horse and footmen had arrived, under command of the Rajah Ali Bahadur, a Mussulmanized Hindoo, who had been a follower of Dost Mahommud, and now adhered to the fortunes of his son, for the purpose of hurrying us off, stating that the Sirdar would not be answerable for any baggage, or even for our safety, if we started after dark, and begging us to leave what was not ready, and start at once. On seeing these troops of the Sirdar, the Shazadeh Futteh Jung, who, by the order of the King, his father, had relieved me at the gate, placed his Jezeilchies and sepoya, on the ramparts and walls, and implored me quickly to leave the Bala Hissar, saying he feared treachery on the part of the Chiefs. All the King's people were full of alarm, and agitated by the most absurd reports, declaring that not a man of us would ever reach Cantonments, and that we were throwing ourselves into a trap laid for us by the enemy; who, they said, were in force, inside the Lahore gate of the city, and that immediately on our leaving the walls of the Hissar, they would rush out; and between the horsemen on one side, and the foot on the other, we would be cut to pieces.

Ere our rear guard, consisting of Lieutenant Melville's (the Light) company, and No. 7, had well left the gates, a party of the Sirdar's Jezeilchies made a rush for the purpose of gaining an entrance into the Bala Hissar; but the garrison were not to be so easily surprised, and immediately closed the gates, thereby shutting in some forty of our sepoya, invalids and men of M's. company, who had not had time to get clear of the gate. This being done, the King's troops on the walls commenced to fire from musketry, on what I suppose they considered a strong body of the enemy, though, it being dark, with little effect on any body. I was then speaking to the Rajah Ali Bahadur, at the head of a few of the Sirdar's people, when a charge of grape from the 3-pounder on the walls whistled about our ears, killing and wounding three of Lieut. M's. men, and

several horses and men of the Sirdar. We did not at all know what to make of this, and expecting as we did every moment to be attacked in front, our situation was by no means pleasant. To add to our other misfortunes, the Sirdar now declared, that, owing to the lateness of the hour, we must remain where we were for the present, until he could make some arrangement with the Chief of the Ghilzies, who were now in force on the Seah Sung hills; so here we were benighted, without a single article of clothing further than our regimentals, and exposed to the rigorous frost of a December night in these lofty regions, and not having tasted a single article of food since the morning breakfast. No wood was procurable, or we should have lighted bivouac fires as we remained shivering in the cold until twelve, when Captain Conolly decided upon making an attempt to *re-enter the Bala Hissar, and take up our former position.* However, on his going to the gate for the purpose of attempting to parley, accompanied by Major Ewart and myself, they immediately opened a fire on us, and when we at length got them to answer our repeated enquiries, as to whose orders they were obeying by firing on us, they replied, that the King had commanded them to hold the gate at all hazards, and open it for no one, nor would they. Captain Conolly then requested some of them to take a message to his Majesty, acquainting him with our situation, and requesting he would open the gates. This one of the garrison promised to do, but as he brought us no answer, we were obliged to give up the attempt as fruitless. Captain C. then sent a horseman off to the Sirdar, to know why we were delayed; he sent word that he was treating with the Ghilzies, but we could not march before day-light, and so we had no alternative but to remain where we were, shivering in the frost, and compelled to stand or walk about, not having the wherewithal to lay down on. The ground was now completely white, with hoar frost, and we most anxiously watched for the approach of day. At length the morning star rose, and we knew that our fate would soon be decided; and although it would be in vain to deny, that, situated as we were, six hundred men, divided into several parties, and surrounded by thousands of enemies we had no apprehensions as to the result, yet they were mingled with a determination to sell our blood as dearly as we could to these traitorous barbarians. Immediately day broke, we received orders to form line of march, which was speedily done, and the advanced guard set off, followed by the baggage, ammunition and stores, in the centre of which was the main column, and then, rear of all came our two companies, under command of Captain Corrie.

For the first four hundred yards all went well, and although a large body of footmen hovering about immediately seized any thing that could not be carried on, yet they offered us no personal molestation, having the fear of Mahommud Akbar's horsemen and our muskets before their eyes. The Rajah kept continually sending me messengers to march quicker,

which however I would not do. On reaching the commencement of the Seab Sung hills, in the narrow road, entering the gorge, the whole of the Ghilzies, notwithstanding every exertion on the part of Mahommud Akbar's horsemen to prevent them, sword in hand, commenced an attack on the rear guard, other parties of them at the same time keeping up a brisk fire from the hill. Here, owing to the shameful conduct of a small body of Skinner's and Walker's (some forty men irregular horse,) who had, under a native officer, been joined to the rear guard, Lieut. M's. company was for a short period thrown into confusion. The above mentioned cavalry, becoming panic struck on the attack commencing, drew their swords not to use them against the enemy, but cutting their way through his men, fled towards Cantonments. However, Lieut. M. soon succeeded in rallying his men, or the consequences might have been ruinous, and they faced about, formed line, and opened a brisk fire on the foe, who taking to the rocks and hills, from caverns and positions opened an ineffectual fire on us. This sort of skirmishing fight continued until we had emerged, through the gorge, into the plains facing Cantonments, where the main column had been necessitated, from the brisk attack of the enemy, to leave two guns, (one long 9 and one 6-pounder) behind them. Here we halted, but the firing becoming excessively hot, owing to the horsemen, who had formed our escort, having been compelled to leave for reinforcements, we were obliged, alone, to bear the brunt of the enemy's attack, and a party of 5th light cavalry who had been sent from the front to our assistance, being unable to force their half-starved horses over a small stream flowing between us, were of no use. An order here was sent to us to leave the guns, as they had no bullocks or other carriage to send us, and to come on towards Cantonments, which we accordingly did, but had not proceeded more than 200 yards, ere our farther advance was countermanded, and we were told to retake the guns at all hazards. The men immediately faced about, and having refilled their pouches, the ammunition in which had been expended, advanced at a double to the charge. The enemy however awaited not our attack, but after one volley took to flight, and with a loss of only four men, we had again possession of the guns, which, after very great exertions we contrived to drag into Cantonments, where we arrived at 10 A. M., thoroughly exhausted with hunger and fatigue.

In Cantonments, all were in a state of great excitement, and most anxious to know the issue of the conferences now daily taking place. Supplies came in, in small quantities and at most exorbitant prices, from the city, thirty or forty rupees being given, for one camel load of chopped straw, and other things at equally dear rates.

Osman Khan had an interview with the Envoy to-day, but what took place did not transpire. But as three and a half lakhs of rupees were sent out to the Sirdars, we may justly suppose, it was relative to monetary affairs.

Dec. 15th—Reports were busily circulated, and easily believed all over Cantonments, that His Majesty the Shah, dreadfully enraged at the terms of the treaty, by which he had been deprived of his kingdom, was offering rewards for European heads, and doing all in his power to injure us among the inhabitants of the city. This latter perhaps might have been true, but I should attach very little credit to the former.

Two or three of the sepoye of the 54th Regt., who had been shut in the Bala Hissar, having made their escape over the walls during the night, arrived to-day. They say, that the King had caused them all to be paraded in his presence, when he told them that from that moment they must consider themselves as his soldiers, that he should promote them all to *naiques* and *havildars*, and should increase their pay, etc., ending by saying that he would be as a father to them; notwithstanding these very fine promises, they were all eager to make their escape, and many of them contrived to do so, arriving, poor fellows, with their feet very severely frost-bitten, as they had walked with naked feet through the deep snow. They had escaped over the walls of the Hissar in the following manner. "Their companions in the fort, and themselves had each taken off their cumur-hands, and tying them together formed a sort of rope, and one by one they had been let down, a height of nearly 50 feet." Provisions came in, in the same scanty manner as yesterday, *attah* at a *seer* and a quarter the *rupee*! Since the commencement of the truce, the gates of the Cantonment and different fields in the neighbourhood have been infested with a set of blood-thirsty men calling themselves *Ghazees*, or warriors for the cause of religion; these barbarians acknowledge the authority of no chief, and believe, or pretend to believe, that the slaying infidels, whatever their other crimes may be, gives them a claim to Paradise. They are very numerous, as any rascal, who chooses to call himself so, and leave his other employment for the sake of fighting against us, becomes one. Not only do they ill-treat and rob any *Hindoostanis* going outside the gates, but those *Affghans*, who by the *Sirdar's* orders bring us in provisions, are themselves even subject to their violence—as on returning having deposited their loads they are immediately stripped, and plundered of every thing, by these banditti; who, using religion as cloak for their sins, wash their hands in blood and every kind of iniquity. They are protected by the *Moolahs*, and priests, in the city, and the *Sirdars* themselves are sometimes obliged to submit to abuse from their foul tongues. The General wrote to Sir Wm. Macnaghten, laying before him, that unless the *Sirdars* with whom he was now treating, sent in supplies sufficient for the troops by three o'clock *p. m.*, the camp cattle would be, through starvation, unable to move, leaving us no alternative, in case of retreat being necessary, but blowing up our magazines, guns, and treasure, and marching at all risks; bringing forward also, that if the *Sirdars* who are treating, and who are well able to supply us, do not do so, it is a proof of treachery on their part.

could only treat with them in a body at this meeting. As the Sirdar Mahommud Akbar Khan, observing a very fine pair of pistols in the belt of Captain Lawrence, took a prodigious fancy to them, being double-barrelled ones, and requested to see them in his own hand, Captain L. by the Envoy's desire, immediately presented them to him in the name of the British Government.

All these conferences and daily ambassadors, tended greatly to excite the minds of the troops. The question began to be asked, Why do we delay? We were all aware that the treaty had been agreed to; that the terms were, our immediate evacuation of the country, and restoration of Dost Mahommud Khan, and we wondered for what purpose our departure was day by day delayed and put off. We feared, and as it turned out but too justly, that the Sirdars were playing a game with us, each striving for his own ends. The Affghans still kept up their troops in readiness for any emergency, large bodies of them daily passing and repassing within sight of Cantonments, and there being the strictest order, not on any account to fire on them, they taunted with insult the soldiers on the ramparts, with the greatest impunity.

They this day, amongst their other demands, required Brigadier Shelton as a hostage. Intelligence from Ghuznee gives us the melancholy news that the enemy had gained possession of the town, and the troops were closely besieged in the citadel, where, however, owing to the admirable arrangements of Colonel Palmer, they still gallantly held out, and as long as their supplies lasted, were good against all Affghanistan.

Dec. 21st.—On the evening of this day, the Envoy, accompanied as formerly by Captains L. and T., met the Sirdars Mahommud Akbar, Sultan Jan, and Osman Khan, near the banks of the canal. On this occasion they did not dismount from their horses, but appeared considerably irritated, and spoke loudly and angrily to Sir William. On his enquiring the reason of this difference in their talk and manner, Mahommud Akbar explained it by saying, that they had intercepted a letter from Major Leech Political Agent, Khelat-i-Ghilsie, addressed to a friend in the city, assuring him that it was not the intention of the British ever to evacuate Affghanistan; that in a short time troops in considerable force would arrive, and that it behoved all Affghans well inclined to British interests, to be staunch and hold themselves aloof from the rebels, whose ultimate destruction was inevitable; that if funds were required, Pokur Doss, a Hindoo shroff in the city, would answer demands to any amount. The Sirdars, always prone to suspicion, were much alarmed, and expressed themselves warmly, saying that no subordinate of Government would have dared to use such a tone and language unless he was fully aware of the wishes and intentions, both of the rulers in India and the Envoy and Minister here; that the seizure of this letter had filled the minds of both them and their followers with consternation. After some time, the Envoy succeeded in

pacifying them, by assuring them, that Major Leech must have written the letter, ignorant of the treaty that had been formed, and that even if he had been aware of it, his situation was of so subordinate a nature, that any thing he could urge would have no weight, and be of no avail, with him or the British Government.

The conference having lasted until dark, broke up amicably on both sides.

This day the hostages were decided on as follows: Major Pottinger, Lieuts. Warburton, Conolly, and Airey, A. D. C.; the two latter accordingly went in, and Captains Trevor and Drummond returned to Cantonments.

Dec. 22d.—This morning some waggons and ammunition were given over to our *Affghan allies*, and the Envoy sent his carriage and horses as a present to Mahummud Akbar. Captain Drummond, who had only been allowed to come in to see his friends in Cantonments on his promise to return, left for the city.

At night, Captain Skinner, Deputy Assistant Commissary General, who had from the commencement of the insurrection up to that period, been at first concealed, and afterwards detained prisoner in the city, arrived at the mission, accompanied by Sirdar Salaam Khan, cousin of Mahummud Akbar Khan and Sirwur Khan, Lohanee, (a wandering tribe of merchants who have for years carried on the principal trade of Cabul with India, Toorkistan, and even as far as Moscow,) who were the bearers of a letter from Sirdar Mahommud Akbar, which I afterwards learnt was of the following tendency: The Sirdar, after enumerating the various acts of kindness and tokens of esteem, which his father had received from the British Government, assured the Envoy that it was folly to hope to come to any permanent terms with the body of the rebel chiefs, whose interests were so divided, whose wishes so clashed one against the other; but that *He* was ready to throw himself, heart and soul into our hands; that he would either come into Cantonments, with his own party, and fight on our side against all Afghanistan, or remaining with the Rebel Chiefs, await any opportunity chance might offer of making a reverse in our favour; or lastly, and what he (the Sirdar) deemed the most feasible plan, he would join the King, adopting his cause through thick and thin. In the latter alternative, he expected to be made Minister, he and his heirs for ever, to receive a considerable sum in ready money, and that the Envoy should guarantee the departure of the British troops from Afghanistan at the expiration of eight months, should His Majesty, and he the Waseer deem such a measure desirable. He further affirmed, that his party was by far the most influential and powerful in the country; consisting entirely of fighting men who were ready to follow him to the last, and on any side he might adopt, and that it was for the Envoy to decide, how much better it would be for our interest to secure him, in the place of trusting to the other chiefs, whose power at the best was merely nominal.

turning his head to look towards the Envoy, he was horrified at observing his head where his feet formerly had been, and his hands closely grasped by Sirdars Akbar Khan and Sultan Jan; the expression of his face he describes at that moment as being most dreadful. Captain Lawrence was hurried by Mahommed Shah Khan to his horse, who advised him, if he valued his life, to mount behind him instantly, which he, seeing resistance was hopeless, did. Hardly had he gained his seat, when bands of blood-thirsty Ghazees rushed from behind all the hillocks in the neighbourhood, where, until then, they had lain concealed, and screaming and roaring demanded the blood of the infidels, calling upon Mahommed Shah Khan to give up to them the Ferringhee behind him, who was their lawful prey. The Khan had, however, taken the precaution of having his own immediate horsemen on all sides, who in a measure kept off the crowd of fanatical savages. Captain Lawrence was providentially carried to Mahmood Khan's fort uninjured, except by a few contusions. A short while after he was joined by Captain Mackenzie, who had run the gauntlet, in the same manner, through the Ghazees, but also unhurt, save by the contusions of blows from muskets, etc., which had been liberally dealt out. He had been saved through the united efforts of Gholab Mayoodeen and a merchant named Bhawoor Khan.

From the moment of their arrival in the fort in which was the Naib Ameen Oollah, the cell they were put in was surrounded by fierce bands of Ghazees, who thronged a small window; grossly reviled, spit on, and otherwise insulted them; continually presenting muskets which the people inside turned from them, doing also as much as they could to assuage the rage of the infuriated mob.

After a time, several of the Afghan chiefs and their sons came to see the Ferringhee Infidels, and treated and spoke to them kindly, assuring them that they were in no danger. Naib Ameen Oollah, however, on asking our names, muttered threats of dire import, such as "We'll blow you from guns, any death will be too good for you." Mahommed Shah Khan and his brother Dost Mahommed hurried them out of the room, exclaiming, "Barai khoda,—don't talk in this way; you must spare them, they are your guests." During this time a hand reeking with blood was lifted up by some miscreants, which they afterwards heard was that of the Envoy's, although Captain Lawrence on entering the fort asked after his and Captain Trevor's fate, and was informed that they had been taken to the house of Ameen Oollah.

On their requisition, they gave them dinner, of which the chiefs themselves also partook, having previously, in a gentlemanly manner, eased them of their watches, rings, etc. The chiefs gave them *posteens*, and told them to sit down and eat; they themselves circling round the fire, recited the praises of Mahommud Shah Khan, who, they said, was the principal actor in that day's deeds.

At twelve o'clock at night, they were roused from their slumbers by the Shah Ghazee of Mahommed Akbar, who told them he had come by the Sirdar's orders to conduct them to his house, and that they must accompany him immediately. Accordingly, Captain Lawrence mounted behind Dost Mahomed Khan, and Mackenzie, behind the Shah Ghazee, and in this way they set out, and passed through a considerable portion of the city, which at that time was as silent as death, and they met with no molestation of any sort or kind. On their arrival at the Sirdar's they were ushered into the bed room, where with Mahommed Akbar they sat some time, the latter in tears deploring the occurrences of the day, although he did not acquaint them with the murder of the Envoy. After a short period he asked them if they would not like to see Captain Skinner, and on their answering in the affirmative, they were shown into another room, where they found the latter asleep, who told them (the first time they had heard it) of the cruel death (the manner of which I will hereafter relate) of Sir William Macnaghten and Captain Trevor; after some conversation on the melancholy subject, they lay down on the floor to sleep.

The next morning, Lawrence and Mackenzie had an interview with Mahommed Akbar, who furnished them with Affghan clothes, and sent them under escort of Sultan Jan and other chiefs, through bye lanes and alleys to the house of Mahommed Zuman Khan, where they found the two hostages, Captains Conolly and Airey, and all the principal Sirdars in full conclave. Much discussion took place as to the Envoy's death and the renewal of the treaty; and a paper was drawn out by the chiefs, which after such modifications as the officers proposed was sent into Cantonments. The principal articles of the present treaty were, that married families should be left as hostages, and that all our guns, treasure, and ammunition should be given up. The Envoy was said by them to have met his fate justly, that he deserved death for having attempted to deceive them, and that henceforth no reliance could be placed on our faith.

This consultation concluded, Captains Lawrence and Mackenzie were reconducted to the house of Mahommed Akbar, where although treated with consideration, they remained prisoners until the 26th, their intercourse with all others being entirely cut off. Now, leaving these two officers, who had been so providentially saved, and who eventually returned to Cantonments, I will turn to the unfortunate Sir William and his companion Captain Trevor. It appears (though the information on this subject, having been gleaned by me entirely from Affghans, is meagre and unsatisfactory) it appears that it was the intention of the Sirdar Mahommed Akbar to seize the person of the Envoy and convey him to the city; that on his throwing himself on him with this intention, the Envoy resisted and drew a small sword from a stick he carried. Mahommed Akbar, then pulled a pistol (given him by Sir William) from his belt, and shot him dead. Thus fell Sir William Hay Macnaghten, Bart. Gifted in an extraordinary degree

with a knowledge of Asiatic languages, both living and dead, he had passed with credit and renown through the most important offices in the gift of the Indian Government, to fall at last by the hand of the man, whose father he had deprived of a throne, and who himself he had driven into captivity and bondage. Of his talents to govern such a country as this, I am no judge, but this I may say, that if by entertaining a too high opinion of a demoralized and barbarous nation, he allowed himself to be caught in the snare of the fowler, yet he carried with him to his grave, if not the affection and regret, yet the esteem of the greater part of the Affghan nation; whom, by his upright government and candid dealing, he had, as far as such men can be, endeared to him; and I may here remark, that since his death, mixing as I have done daily with all classes of Affghans, I have seldom or ever heard them speak otherwise than well of him; and their common remark was, that they wondered how a man who was in most things so straightforward should have allowed himself to be led into treacherous doings by Mahommed Akbar—*mais revenons*.

Poor Captain Trevor! he, less lucky, or from the situation he held more disliked than his attendant companions, attempted to mount behind the horse of "Dost Mahommed Khan," but slipping, was cut down by that wretch "Sultan Jan," who, in dividing his head in two, exclaimed to his followers "*Hummi zug Trebor hust*," (this is that dog Trevor,) and he was cut to pieces by the sanguinary infidels.

Dec. 23rd 1841.—In Cantonments, whence an indistinct turmoil was visible towards the place where the Envoy had met the Chiefs, the troops stood to their arms, a portion of them manning the walls. An order was issued to place under close arrest any Affghan Chiefs who might then be in Cantonments, and in this manner four men of rank were seized, and kept as hostages. Immediately on their being taken, many hundreds of the rebels, who were in the Cantonment square, trafficking, or spying, made a rush at the different gates, fearing that they also would be taken. A scene then ensued which surpasses description, the gates completely blocked up by the hundreds striving to get outside, and those in the rear pushing on the front, over the icy ground, upsetting scores, made confusion worse confounded. At about four p. m., the Cantonments were completely cleared of them, and no more disturbance being visible in the neighborhood, the troops left the walls, the sentries being doubled. Hundreds of reports were afloat as to the fate of the Envoy; and Captain Grant, by the General's orders, rode to the head of each regiment to assure them of Sir William's safety, and to state that the conference having been disturbed by the conduct of some Ghazees, he had been carried, with his staff, into the fort of Mahommed Shireef, and would return immediately. Every man formed his own opinion, as we were well aware that the General knew no more of the matter than we did, as none had arrived from the city, since Sir W. had departed. Evening set in; and with our minds

fearfully excited, we adjourned to mess. A chuprassee of the Quarter Master's establishment 54th Regt. contrived to get in from the city, at about eight p. m., and brought the intelligence of the Envoy's murder, adding that they had mutilated his body, and that he had seen a dog eating his hand! This we kept secret, as not being confirmed. Should it have afterwards been proved false, it would have caused most unnecessary alarm. At nine p. m., a great disturbance was heard towards the city, horrible shouts and cries, with rattling of musketry, caused the assembly to be sounded, and the walls again manned. By eleven the noise subsided, and we retired to rest. It was afterwards discovered, that the Ghazees, and other rebels in the city, fearful that on our receiving the intelligence of the Envoy's murder, we should put no more faith in these treaties, and at once attack them, had stood to their arms, thus giving us credit for much more activity and enterprize, than we really possessed, as there is not a doubt that we ought thus to have acted on Sir William's murder, and the great majority of the enemy having made off with their plunder to their fastnesses in the mountains, a brigade might have destroyed the whole, and fearfully avenged our Minister's murder. But that inaction which paralyzed our power, also in this case prevailed; though had the opinion and advice of the leading political authority on Sir William's massacre been followed, the dastardly assassin would not have triumphed in the complete success of his schemes; but either have fallen a victim to the prowess of our arms, or have been again, as before, a fugitive and wanderer on the face of the earth.

Dec. 24th.—A letter was received from the new magazine fort, signed by fifteen petty Ghilzie chiefs, offering to come over to our side, and act as an escort to Jellalabad, on our paying them a certain sum of money, to which the General returned a reply to the effect, that he could only treat with the Sirdars themselves; and pointing out that, as they could give no guarantee to carry their offer into effect, it was perfectly ridiculous. During this day sundry letters arrived, stating that the Envoy was in safety in the city, and it was not until night that it became too certain that he had fallen a victim to the trap he had laid for another. An unusual excitement pervaded all classes and ranks, and it was concluded that all treaties being stopped, an immediate attack would be made on the city. They were soon undeceived. *We attack the city!* We had seen our Political Agent murdered, our magazine taken, our troops defeated, and had not attacked it! Why should we attack it now? No, no, it was our fate again to allow ourselves to be ensnared by their miserable treaties, and, vacillating to the last, in the end to fall victims to their treachery, and seal with the blood of a hundred officers, and 12,000 men, including camp followers, the work so inauspiciously commenced. We passed an anxious and exciting morning; the fates of Lawrence, Mackenzie, and Trevor still unknown, and that of the Envoy not credited. Hope still lingered in the breasts of many, that

he was only carried off for his own and staff's safety. Our enemies throughout had shewn such a *merciful forbearance*, that we might anticipate our Envoy's immediate return, in honour and safety.

The garrison of the new magazine fort sent in a letter through me, being at the time on duty at the old bazaar fort contiguous to it, signed by fifteen petty chiefs, offering if we would trust to them to escort us down in safety to Jellalabad, and adding, that it was the intention of the Sirdars to destroy us on the way, but that *they* could and would protect us, and take us down in safety. I forwarded this to the General, who was at the time sitting in council.

Reports in circulation of our immediate retreat, fighting our way against all. This appears to be the general wish of the regimental officers in Cantonments, who put no trust in the treaties formed with these barbarians, whose greatest pride is to outwit an enemy.—We anticipated being sacrificed, if trusting to treaties formed with them,—we first gave them arms and ammunition, and then threw ourselves into their hands. The general exclamation was, "Let us fight our way down, destroying every thing ere we leave Cantonments, and at least one-third of us will reach Jellalabad; or let us throw ourselves into the Bala Hissar, and hold out to the last!" This latter was the hope of many of us, who thought our Politicals were only treating as a blind to the enemy; but that they intended in the eleventh hour to throw off the mask, and march to the Bala Hissar, join the King, and by foraging parties and sallies get supplies and make a stand until relief could arrive; and writing this as I do, calmly and reflectingly, months after the events have elapsed, there is not a doubt on my mind or in that of those I have consulted, that we could there have held out against any efforts of the enemy to dislodge us for any length of time.

At last came the eventful 6th, which day was doomed to see the commencement of a retreat, that should terminate in the destruction of the whole force. The "end of the beginning."

At a little past eight a. m., the baggage began to move slowly and amid great confusion, out of Cantonments. The 5th L. C., two guns H. A. and 54th Regiment Native Infantry, had been warned for Rear Guard, and as such had already manned the walls, and taken up position at the different posts. The old "Nawaub" had sent a large party of his men, for the purpose of preventing the assemblage of the Affghans in the neighbourhood, and though these certainly attempted to do their duty, and for a time kept the plundering rebels at a distance, yet the reports of the immense quantity of booty which the Cantonments contained, and which was about to be left behind, had gone abroad to a most exaggerated degree, and by one o'clock p. m., the scene outside the walls, became most fearful. Parties of wandering horsemen, dashing through the column of baggage, cutting up the poor camp-followers, and carrying off their booty, caused the white snow which covered the ground, to be

ensanguined with the blood of their helpless victims. The column had gone on unattacked, and we who manned the walls, could afford no assistance, it being an almost Herculean task with so small a proportion of Infantry to repel the hordes of plunderers who now came crowding to the scene. A narrow, and most unsuitable bridge had been thrown across the canal, and nearly three-fourths of the baggage of the army had been there stopped, while the oaths of the camel drivers, the bewailings of the Hindoostani servants, and the roar of the camels, added to the fierce shouts of the "Ghazees" in the neighborhood, caused a "Babel" of sounds, which may be imagined, but not described. At about 5 p. m. the sepoya, then having manned the walls for nearly eleven hours, without tasting anything, and the thermometer below freezing point, the assembly sounded in the main street of Cantonments, and each officer took his company to the rendezvous there. Directly they left the walls, the Cantonments were filled, and about eight thousand men commenced the work of plunder and destruction, while the Rear guard, formed in column in the middle, witnessed with full hearts the desecration of their "Dii Penates." At 6 p. m. the order was given to march out of Cantonments through an opening which had been made in the walls, and proceeding 50 yards to form up and face our old resting place, until the baggage should succeed in getting over the canal. Immediately that we left the Cantonments, the whole line of walls were manned by the rebels, who, uttering insults of every description opened a volley of musketry on us, doing at this short distance great execution. We then commenced file firing, though I fear, from the protection afforded the enemy by the walls, with very little effect. Here fell Lieut. Hardyman, 5th Light Cavalry, shot through the heart—and each corps engaged lost considerably. Colonel Chambers then despatched Lieut. Melville with the Light Company of his Regiment to occupy the Pass over the Seah Sung hills, until such time as the Rear Guard should arrive there, and at half past nine, seeing the impossibility of crossing the baggage, he desired it to be left, and the Rear Guard to commence its march to "Bagramee." Here a most fierce attack was made by the enemy, and one of the guns, in attempting to cross the Canal, fell in and was obliged to be deserted. At ten the small column reached the Seah Sung hills, from whence the sight of Cantonments was indeed fearfully grand, though at the same time it struck sorrowfully to the minds of all. The night was dark and murky, while the columns of lurid smoke and flame, from the Envoy and General's houses, both burning, ascended high into the heavens, and throwing a red glow around, caused the thousands of Affghan banditti in the vicinity to resemble fiends at their orgies; while the faint moans of the dying, the louder cries of the wounded, and the harsh and exulting shouts of the Ghazees added to the effect. On every side lay women and children, dying from the cold, or wounded wretches wishing for the death which came not.

After a most tedious and painful march we arrived at the halting place on the right bank of the Loghur River, at two a. m. 7th, and found the camp one mass of confusion; no places marked out for the different Regiments or baggage; the snow very deep on the ground; all order gone. The men crowded together, and vainly attempted to impart warmth to each other, but many who lay down that night, rose no more. The officers, wrapped in their cloaks, lay shivering on the ground, after eighteen hours' hard work being entirely exhausted and longing for the day. They thus passed this miserable night. At eight o'clock a. m. on the morning of the 7th the assembly sounded, and the column forming slowly commenced its march. 54th Regt. N. I. and 5th L. C. were the advance guard, 37th Regt. over the treasure, the Shah's 6th and Anderson's horse the main column, and the 44th (a portion of them) and mountain train were the rear guard. As the latter were leaving the encampment ground, a small party of Ghilzies made a bold attack, and to the surprise of the whole force (when it was afterwards made acquainted with the fact) succeeded in capturing all the mountain train guns. Comment is here needless. Brigadier Anquetil, who commanded the rear guard, in terms of sorrow and indignation, reported the circumstance to the Major General. Horsemen were observed passing from all sides to our front, where, under the shade of "Abdullah Khan's" fort, and accompanied by many Ghilzies, they were collected in great force. The original intention of the General on starting from Bagram, was to move on at once to Khoord Kabool, but that fate, which seemed to hang over us, caused him, on arriving at Batkak, to alter his determination, and command a halt at the latter place,—sealing the doom of thousands, and playing into our enemy's hands, the very game they wanted. A party of horsemen, headed by some chief, now appeared on the scene, and Captain Skinner was despatched with a flag of truce to discover who they were, and ask their intentions. They proved to be the Sirdar Mahomud Akbar Khan and his followers, amounting to about six hundred horsemen. The Sirdar said, they had come on the part of the chiefs of Afghanistan to see us down to Jellalabad, and demanded six hostages that the force should not proceed farther than Tezeen, ere Major General Sir Robert Sale evacuated Jellalabad, fearing, or pretending to do so, that the junction of the two forces would make them strong enough to return in the spring to Caubul. After two or three messages, the Major General decided on giving three hostages, and Major Pottinger, C. B. accompanied by Captains Lawrence and Mackenzie, were sent over to the Sirdar, who received them with great show of kindness. During these negotiations, the Ghilzies, (footmen) in the neighbourhood were keeping up a continued skirmishing fight in the ravines and ditches in the vicinity.

The 54th Regiment Native Infantry were sent out as Light Infantry to repel these latter, while H. M. 44th were formed on a small hillock facing

Mahmud Akbar Khan and his party, for the purpose of checking his farther advance.

The shades of evening fell, and found us still in the same position, but, as is their usual practice on it becoming dusk, the horsemen on the hill, and the footmen in the ravines retired. The troops just as much tired as if they had been marching all day, and dispirited by observing their comrades falling around them, while these, to all observant eyes, useless negotiations, were being carried on. On the other hand, the Sirdar had gained his point. Instead of making the forced marches we intended, and which would have carried us at once out of both the snow and the power of our enemies; we had allowed ourselves to be deceived and out-manœuvred by this politic barbarian, and had halted at the mouth of the Passes until they should become occupied, and barricaded by the Ghilzie foe. Another night—and such a night!—fell. The soldiers exhausted by fatigue, cold, and hunger, lay down at once in the snow, which was to many both a grave, and winding sheet. Twelve officers, of which the writer was one, crowded round the hot ashes of a pistol case; and with some bottles of wine still remaining, tried to keep off the effect of the cold. They then all huddled together, and lay down on the ground to sleep.

Jan. 8th.—Morning broke gloomily and very cold, and found our force reduced indeed. The sepoy, many of them frost-bitten to a dreadful degree, welcomed death as a release, and being unable to move away courted the stroke of the Affghan knife. At eight A. M., the orders arrived to march through the Pass to “Khoord Cabool,” and the baggage as usual rushed to the front, vainly hoping for safety there. Already had the Ghilzies commenced from the ravines in the neighbourhood a brisk and destructive fire, when the 44th, led on by Major Thain, A. D. C., and Captain Lawrence, made a most gallant charge, driving all before them. The troops then fell in, in order of march; the rear guard composed of 5th L. C., H. M. 44th, 37th Native Infantry, and two guns. The 54th Regiment just in front of them formed the treasure guard, and the rest in front. We started under a brisk but concealed fire on all sides, which, while it annoyed us much, at the same time, we were unable to return, not having sufficient effective men to spare the required number of skirmishers. However on reaching the mouth of the Pass, the fire from one particular hill was so severe, that Major Ewart ordered the officer in charge of the Light Company 54th to associate with him 20 men of the European convalescents, and crown the height. The Light Company, consisting of about 20 files, and the Europeans, accordingly advanced at a double, and commenced the really formidable task. As the snow had fallen so deeply as to conceal any ravines or irregularities on the side of the mountain, causing it to appear like a large pyramid, the men not knowing where to stop sometimes disappeared entirely. However, the officer and about four of his men succeeded in reaching the summit, having entirely silenced the

enemy's fire in that direction; but observing the very small number of men who had gained the ascent, the Major sounded the recall. The confusion was now fearful beyond description; attacked by a concealed and powerful enemy on both flanks, front and rear, baggage was deserted on all sides, and the Ghilzies, made bolder by success, advanced knife in hand, uttering loud cries, to the attack. The 44th, as rear guard, showed a gallant though weak front, and their loss was great. In the centre of the Pass dreadful indeed was the slaughter; wounded men covered with blood, vainly endeavoured to obtain a safer place in the advance, and only rendered the confusion greater. Baggage, ammunition, and even children were deserted, and to get out of the Pass seemed the object of all. The poor ladies, sharers of our misfortunes and miseries, and noble ones too, had to endure, equally with ourselves, the general attack. Lady Sale had three shots through her clothes, one taking effect in her arm. A Kujawa containing Mrs. Boyd, her's and Mrs. Anderson's children, was overset, and though she herself escaped with one child, two of the latter, one belonging to herself, one to Mrs. Anderson, fell into the hands of the enemy (Mrs. Boyd's was returned to her next day by Mahommud Akbar Khan, and Mrs. Anderson's four months afterwards, having in the interim been most kindly treated by the old Nawab.) But to return. The retreat at this period took the appearance of a rout, and we had the greatest difficulty in getting the treasure out of the defile. On reaching the extremity of the Pass, the Horse Artillery, that noble branch of the service, whose courage, even in extremity, never failed, and who supported all their misfortunes cheerfully, halted, and turning a gun on the Pass, awaited the debouchment of our troops and the arrival of the enemy's. This soon happened, and we received them with some well-directed round of grape; but alas! they were too powerful, and after losing on our side many valuable lives, amongst others those of Captain (Lt. Major) Patton who had lost his arm in Cantonments, and Captain Sturt, Ex-Engineer, the enemy remained in possession of the gun. To add to our now fast increasing miseries, it began to snow heavily, and the wearied and wounded troops, took up their ground on the high table land at Khoord Kabul with heavy and dreadful forebodings as to their future fate. Night, and such a night! slowly wore away—and on waking in the morning, I found two sepoy's frozen to death at my feet, having crept up trying to gain a little warmth from the edges of the posteen that covered me!

At eight a. m. again we got orders to march, but the column of baggage, which as usual rushed to the front, had not proceeded a mile ere it was countermanded, and a halt was decided upon, Mahommud Akbar having promised the General, through Skinner, to forward to us plentiful supplies of every description, which promise none believed but those who had all along been the Sirdar's dupes. Supplies! where were they to come from! In a bleak, barren, mountainous country, our enemy promises

supplies for some thousand men, and is believed! Had all the flour in the neighbouring forts been made into bread it would not have been a ration a man. Another day, in the deepest snow, on the highest table land in the vicinity of Caubul, was thus to be passed by us; our force being even then but merely nominal, as the natives' hands and feet were nearly all frost bitten, and the cold was so intense as to render non-effective those few who had as yet escaped. About 180 or 160 men, was the greatest strength of our strongest regiments, and each hour made them fewer, and so.....we halted! Major Thain and myself, who had been sent on to stop the baggage, which had crowded on a head, after some trouble succeeded in doing so, and the camp followers, etc. again assembled at Khoord Kabul. About ten a. m. the Sirdar appeared on a hill about half a mile distance from camp, surrounded by his followers, and Captain Skinner brought over a message from him stating that as the road was not safe he should be happy to take the ladies and families, and the wounded, down to Jellalabad. This, after asking the ladies, was accepted, and they prepared to go over to a fort in the neighbourhood, about two miles from camp, accompanied by some wounded officers, and their husbands, whom the General had ordered with them.

At about two p. m., a number of Anderson's horse deserted, and many more attempting to do so, the officers of the different regiments rushed in sword in hand hitting them with their swords, and Lieutenant Hawtray of the 37th, a gallant young officer, cut down two of them. A general parade was ordered, and Khoda Bukah Khan, accompanied by the Assistant Adjutant General, poor Grant, rode to the head of each regiment, and said that he had come from Mahomed Akbar, who declared his intention of killing, or sending back any men that should desert to him. Parade dismissed, the poor men returned to their ground, each regiment mustering from 100 to 150 men, many of these disabled by frost and cold, or wounds received in the Passes. The effects of the former were most wonderful, the hands or feet had become completely raw, as if they had been severely burnt, and the pain was so excessive, that groans were heard on all sides, more particularly from those on whose extremities mortification had taken place. I observed an officer (Captain Shaw, 54th) lying moaning on the snow, and on taking Dr. Cardew up to him, he said the whole of his lower limbs were dead, he having received a compound fracture of the thigh, at Bulkak. Many other officers were nearly in the same state. Majors Griffiths, 37th, Scott, 44th, Lieutenants Bott and Hazett of the 5th L. C., all likewise badly wounded. And as the night fell in, the cries of those suffering in the immediate neighbourhood became loud and agonizing. The subdued moans of enduring patience, or the more audible outcries of rage and despair, were fearfully distinct. Night wore away, and at the earliest dawn, a bush fire was opened on our flank, by the persevering foe; we however, with the exception of the sentry, conti-

nued lying down, as we were not strong enough to leave camp and encounter the enemy, and by lying down the balls principally passed over us. At eight the bugle sounded for marching, and the rear guard, composed of the Shah's 2d Irregular Cavalry and the 54th Regiment N. I., the 37th in charge of treasure, off we set. On leaving the ground, a strong party of the enemy charged down the hill, and the 54th fronting them, the Shah's 2d Cavalry were ordered to charge, which setting off at a gallop, they accordingly did; but, to the astonishment of all beholders, instead of charging as our own forces and friends, they halted on reaching the Ghilzies, uttered a loud shout, and turning round, shewed a front against us; while the 54th officers on the plain below, observing what they thought was so gallant a charge, leaving the ranks, cheered them on. But their hearts indeed sunk within them, when they saw themselves exposed alone to the attack of this large party of Ghilzies, and these horsemen, on whom had been their sole dependence, joined the ranks of their foes, doubly traitors both to our Government and Shah Shoojah, which is the more wonderful, as they were one of the finest regiments ever seen, and the portion of them at Jellalabad behaved very well. However cold, hunger, hardship of all sorts, and overwork will change any body of men. The column having got on its way, the rear guard, now the 54th Regiment alone, commenced its march amidst a heavy fire from all sides, and strange to say, with strict orders not on any account to return it! as by so doing we might possibly injure our friends. Strange indeed must the infatuation of those be, who could see their own forces and followers mowed down in hundreds, and yet consider the destroyers *friends*!!

On leaving the ground at Khoord Kabul, the destruction distinctly visible to the rear guard was more than fearful—all those (European and Native) whom frost or wounds had incapacitated, and prevented leaving their ground, were murdered before our very eyes; so near, that the officer commanding the Light Company 54th, the last of all, actually heard the gurgle in the throat of a sergeant, which these fiends in human form were cutting—and these were the *friends*, on whom we were not to fire!

The column proceeded, losing men every second, the Ghilzies following at about 50 paces in the rear, and becoming bolder every moment. On Lieut. Melville's horse being shot, they rushed up, seized him by the collar, and ere he could extricate himself from the saddle, the horse having fallen on him, had actually commenced stripping him, when four sepoy who had remained with him bayoneted three of the ruffians and shot a fourth. Immediately on this the whole regiment, then about a hundred and thirty strong, opened their fire, and repulsed the assailants for a time; but on reaching the jungle Tarechoe (dark Pass) where there is a sharp turn in the road, the enemy were for a minute shut out from our fire; they took advantage of this, rushed in from all sides in great strength, made a fierce attack, and the 54th Regt. was cut to pieces. Major Ewart, com-

manding, had both his arms broken, and rode on to the front. Lieuts. Weaver and Morrison were also wounded, and Brevet Capt. Kirby killed. Observing the regimental colour on the ground and the Jemadar killed, I immediately seized it, and tried to make my way forward with it, when I received a stunning sword cut on the head, which felled me to the ground; ere I could rise, another blow from a spear was received by me, and the color snatched from my grasp. Crawling on I had nearly reached my regiment, when I again received two other wounds, and found myself surrounded by upwards of twenty of the Afghans; however they all of a sudden perceived a chest of treasure, and leaving me rushed to the greater booty, and I thus contrived to crawl through the snow at the road side to the column. Faint from loss of blood, finding a pony without a saddle, I contrived to mount on its back, and mercifully reached the middle of the column, now, with the exception of the Horse Artillery and H. M. 44th, a mass of confusion worse confounded. Many a good soldier had bit the dust, and the column now consisted of nothing but servants, camp followers, wounded and unarmed soldiers, and baggage. The 44th and a gun were ordered on a hill to the right, and shewed a gallant though weak front to the enemy, but to very little purpose. On reaching the head of the Huft Kotul, I found that the loss of blood, and the extreme cold (which was beyond every thing intense) made me so faint, that I was unable to proceed further. The column passed on, and I had not been there five minutes, ere a horseman rode up, who had accompanied Capt. Skinner from his interview with the Sirdar, and offered me a "nan," (a Native loaf,) for a rupee, this I wanted not, but I bought and gave it to a poor European struggling on. I then offered the man seven rupees (being all I had) if he would mount me before him, and take me to the Sirdar's; this he agreed to do, and placing me before him on his saddle he proceeded: about a quarter of a mile in rear of the baggage, we met the Sirdar and his followers, who received me most kindly. He laid me down on a bank, and with his own hands dressed my wounds, by placing in them burnt lint to staunch the blood. He then mounted me behind a follower, and having put a turban on my head, and given me a posteen, made me proceed by his side. On reaching the valley under the Huft Kotul, a most melancholy and fearful sight was given to view. Here had been the fiercest attack of the whole; from the hills on each side of the Pass the enemy had rushed down sword in hand, whilst at the same time a most deadly fire from the rocks and caverns at the side was kept up, causing a frightful amount of slaughter, more particularly amongst the European portion of the troops, whom, from their secure hiding places, the enemy picked off with fearful accuracy. The Sirdar halted at each European body, and asked me whether it was a sahib, or a gora, and I recognised Major Scott, 44th, Major Ewart, 54th, Dr. Bryce, H. A.; Captains Leighton and W. White, 44th, and Lieut. Shaw, 54th, having been killed in the early

part of the day, where I was wounded. The above make the number of killed this day, although many others were wounded. Dr. Cardew mortally, three officers of my regiment besides myself, Lieut. Hamilton 5th Cavalry, etc. On arriving with the Sirdar at the mouth of the Tezeen valley, we took the road up a hill to the right, going straight for the fort. I could hardly keep my seat from weakness, yet I still have a vivid recollection even now, of the fearfully diminished state of the camp, and the impression it made upon me, as I gazed on it from the summit of the hill; not one-eighth of the men who started with us, were now remaining; the greater portion had already been numbered with the dead, and those that remained, were in a most fearful state. From this part of my journal, all that is stated is from enquiry, or statements made by one or other of the few lookers-on, or actors that remained; my own remarks will be confined as to the bodies I saw on the road, and the native reports or letters brought in by the Hurkaru to the Sirdar's camp. I was taken straight to the lower fort at Tezeen, where I was laid down in a corner of a wretchedly dirty room, about 12 feet square, accompanied by about 25 wounded and naked Hindostanies; however I was sincerely thankful for my providential escape, and cast many a sorrowing thought back on my late poor companions in arms, exposed to the attacks of a numerous and blood-thirsty enemy, and, without food or clothing, and the weather bitter cold. I found Captains Haig, Bellew and Skinner at the fort, who had accompanied some horsemen when the fire became very hot in the Tezeen valley, and thus escaped present destruction, as they were quite alone, with the exception of the above-mentioned horsemen of the Sirdar's, and for whom they waited, in the hope of making sound, decisive and favorable terms, as it was now evident to all, that nothing but terms of some description could save the force from inevitable and total destruction. Famine, cold and starvation, added to the attacks of an unsparing and barbarous enemy, caused even hope to fly from the breast of all. On the arrival of the Sirdar, he again told them, as he had before told Captain Skinner in the morning, that he could not protect the whole of the camp, but, that if the European officers and soldiers would give up their arms, and place themselves entirely under his protection (officers being allowed to keep their swords) he would escort the whole of them safely to Jellalabad; this, Captain Skinner told him he knew would not be accepted of, as it would reflect eternal disgrace upon the General; the Sirdar replied, if they did not do so the whole force would be cut to pieces, and he could offer no other terms. Captains Skinner, Bellew, and Haig then departed to relate to the General what had passed; and we took a kind farewell of each other. The Sirdar then came into the room where I lay, and I must say, did all he could to make my situation comfortable; he applied lint to my wounds, and gave me tea with his own hands; he appeared very anxious to receive the General's reply, and when the news

arrived, that the troops had marched after a halt of about two hours, seemed agitated in the extreme, and repeatedly said to me, "They will all be cut to pieces; why did they not accept the terms I offered them!" Early the next morning he mounted, and with his followers proceeded by a short cut across the mountain to Jugdulluk, leaving me in charge of Ameer Khan, a follower of the Rajah, telling me to be easy, that all I wanted should be granted, and that I should be joined in the evening by the ladies and hostages, when I should go on by easy marches in a kirjaivah to Jellalabad.

I shall now, leaving my own relation, follow the course of the camp, until the fatal termination of all their sufferings on the hill at Gundamuck. Between seven and eight o'clock *p. m.*, the troops, hardly rested by their halt of two hours, commenced again their perilous and dreadful march; and after a night's march, interrupted by attacks from the enemy, both in front and rear, which had the effect of driving the camp followers backwards and forwards like waves of the sea, they reached Kutta Sung, about day break on the 11th, where they halted about one hour, continuing their march towards Jugdulluck at nine o'clock, which place they reached about half past two *p. m.*, the last mile or two having been most dreadfully harassed by the enemy, and leaving many valuable lives on the road; Dr. Cardew, mortally wounded, was left on the ground at Tezeen; Dr. Duff, about a mile on the road from Seah Baba; Pay-master Bourke and Ensign Fortye, 44th, died of wounds received on the road. On reaching the latter place, it was observed that the whole of the hills and sides of the road were occupied by the enemy, who, as our force descended into the valley, with their jingals did great execution, and again covered the road with the dying and the dead; the rear guard was formed of 50 file of the 44th, and some 20 file of the 5th Light Cavalry, which, with the exception of a few file in front, now composed the whole remaining force; the camp followers and troops were so thick a body, that nearly every one of the enemy's shots told; they at last took up a position on a height, near some ruined walls. As scarcely any Europeans of the advance now remained, and the enemy were increased, the General called all the officers (about 20) to form line and shew a front. They had scarcely done so ere Captain Grant, Assistant Adjutant General received a ball through his cheek, which broke his jaw. On the arrival of the rear guard, which was followed up by the enemy, the latter took possession of a height close to the troops' position. For security our men went within the ruined walls, they being at the time almost maddened with hunger and thirst. A stream of clear water was running in the front, and within 150 paces of their position, but no man could venture down without a certainty of being massacred. For about half an hour they had a respite from the fire of the enemy, who, however, closely watched their proceedings. Captain Johnson was desired by the General to see if any bullocks or camels were procurable

from among the followers, and he luckily found three of the former, which were instantly killed, and served out to the Europeans, and as instantly devoured, although raw, and still reeking with blood.

A few horsemen being observed near at hand, a signal was made for one of them to approach; he did so, and was questioned, as to what chief was present. He replied, "Mahommud Akbar Khan;" a message was sent to the Sirdar by the General, as to why we were again molested. A reply was brought back, that the chief wished to converse with Skinner, who therefore returned with the messenger. This was at about half past three p. m. We had now fondly hoped that further annoyance would be stopped. Scarcely, however, had Skinner taken his departure, and they who had been marching for the last thirty hours had thrown themselves down on the ground, completely worn out by cold, fatigue, hunger, and thirst, than their persevering foe, not yet glutted with the blood of the thousands that had fallen, suddenly commenced firing volley after volley into the enclosure, where they were resting. All was again instant confusion; there was one general rush outside; men and cattle all huddled together, each urgently striving to shield himself from the murderous fire of the enemy. At this time, about twenty gallant soldiers of the 44th Queen's made a simultaneous rush down the hills to drive the enemy from their heights in the neighbourhood. In this they were most successful, for the latter had taken to flight even ere our soldiers reached their position. In about a quarter of an hour, as our small party would not admit of any division, the aforementioned soldiers were recalled. They again entered within the walls, and again instantly was their foe in his former position, dealing death among them. At about 5 p. m. Skinner returned, with a message that the Sirdar wished to see the General, Brigadier Shelton and Captain Johnson at a conference—and that if they would go over, he would engage to put a stop to any further annoyance, and give food to the troops; and that if Brigadier Shelton and Captain Johnson would remain as hostages for General Sale's evacuation of Jellalabad, he would escort our small remaining force in safety. Mahomed Shah Khan, (father-in-law of the Sirdar) came at dusk, with an escort to receive the three latter; and they started in the confident hope that some arrangement might be effected by which to save the few remaining lives; they proceeded to the upper end of the valley, and found the Sirdar and his party bivouacking in the open air. Nothing could exceed the kind manner in which they were received by the chief, who immediately, on hearing that they were hungry and thirsty, ordered a cloth to be spread on the ground, and some pillao and tea to be brought. After having satisfied their appetites, they sat round a blazing fire, and conversed on various subjects. By the General's desire, Captain Johnson begged of the Sirdar that he would early in the morning forward provisions to the troops, and make arrangements for supplying them with water, both of which he

promised to do. The General was also most anxious he should be permitted to return in the morning to his troops, and stated he would send Brigadier Anquetil, should he require another officer in his stead, and also pointed out the stigma that would attach to him, should he remain in a place of safety, while such imminent danger was pending over his troops. To this the Sirdar would not consent. At about 11, after promising he would early in the morning call together the Chiefs of the Pass to make arrangements for the troops' safe escort, he shewed the three officers into a small tent, where, stretched on the ground, they soon found that repose which had been so long denied them.

Jan. 12th.—When they awoke in the morning, they were warned by the Sirdar's confidential servants not to leave the tent, as the Ghilzie Chiefs were coming in with their followers and they might get insulted. At about nine A. M., the Chiefs of the Pass, and of the country towards Soorkab arrived, when they and the General sat down to discuss matters. The Chiefs were most bitter in their expressions of hatred towards us, and declared that nothing would satisfy either them or their men, but the utter extermination of the infidel dogs. Money they would not receive. The Sirdar, as far as words went, tried all in his power to conciliate them, and when all other arguments failed, put them in mind that his father and the whole of his family were in the hands of the British Government at Loodaunah, and that vengeance would be taken on the latter in the event of mercy not being shewn to us. Mahomed Shah Khan offered them Rs. 60,000, in the event of our being allowed to proceed unmolested. This they refused, and requested to consult with their followers, when they told Mahomed Shah Khan, that they would accept two lakhs, and grant a free passage. On this being represented to the General he agreed to it, and made known the same to Mahomed Shah; who went away, promising to return quickly. Captain Skinner was written to early in the day to beg he would come over; this letter, however, did not reach him until he had received a mortal wound, of which he died the same day, and thereby Government was deprived of a most valuable officer, and his friends of a kind and intelligent companion.

Until twelve o'clock crowds of Ghilzies kept swarming in from the surrounding country, to make their salaam to the Sirdar, to participate in the plunder of our unfortunate people, and revel in English blood. The Sirdar endeavoured to pacify them, but with no effect. At about one P. M. the Sirdar left the General and went to the top of the hill in rear of our bivouack, where, from the time of the departure of the General, all had been confusion, or a scene of bloody slaughter. The troops (few remaining) had been kept under a constant fire the whole day, deprived of both food and water, having lost Captain Skinner, while Major Thain and many others had received severe wounds instead of, as the Sirdar had assured the officers with him, having been treated with every kindness, and supplied with

all they wanted. I will now leave the hostages, ladies, prisoners, etc. and follow the course of the troops for their few remaining hours.

With anxiety did they await the return of the General and his party, in the hope that, through their means, matters would be satisfactorily arranged, further hostilities cease, and their progress to Jellalahad ensured. On the 10th evening, when the General did not return, the officers had come to the resolution to retreat at all hazards to Jellalahad, which however was afterwards changed, and they agreed to wait further intelligence from Mahommed Akbar's camp; which they did, being under a heavy fire the whole of the 11th. On the morning of the 12th, they were filled with hopes of release from their situation, which however were soon dissipated by a large party of Affghans, who, taking up a position on a hill to the south-east, opened a murderous fire on them. To appease this, Captains Skinner and Bellew went out to parley with some horsemen, who came in sight, when one of them mortally wounded the former gallant fellow, and then on the latter giving the alarm, and bringing out the few remaining Europeans, retreated to the camp, glorying in the murder they had committed. Since my captivity I have discovered, from his own confession, that the bloody villain was Ser Bullund Khan, an influential Ghilzie chieftain.

On the Europeans charging, the enemy took to flight, but resumed their former position when our gallant fellows retired behind their broken walls; again charge succeeded charge, and the numbers of our gallant band were fast decreasing, while those of the determined foe were proportionately increasing;—so that by one P. M., the old walls were entirely surrounded, and hundreds of rifles poured in their murderous discharge from every side. The Artillerymen, those few that remained, formed in the ranks of the 44th, and gallantly supported on foot that deathless reputation they had gained, when urging their daring steeds into the heart of the battle. About two P. M., the last charge was made without any advantage on our side, but with great and melancholy loss. Captain Marshall (Shah's 6th) severely wounded; Lieut. Wade, H. M. 44th shot dead; Lieut. Hawtrey, 37th N. I., also being wounded; these as well as every other officer having most conspicuously distinguished themselves, devoting even their lives, when called upon, with patriotic bravery. A party of the 44th now took up a position on a small hill commanding the approach to the old fort, which kept the enemy in some measure at bay; the ground being completely covered with the bodies of the dead and dying was a fearful sight; soldiers taking the last words of some favorite comrade, which they were never fated to convey; while dying officers gave their few papers to a friend, who, a few short hours afterwards was doomed to lie on the bloody field himself.

At 3 P. M., an Affghan arrived, bearing a letter from Major General Sale, concealed in a quill about his person, and who took back an answer, stat-

ing their melancholy situation, and begging for immediate succour. Some ponies were killed this-day, served out and eaten raw by the men, while water was only procured at the risk of the men's lives. In consequence of no letter or communication being received from the General's party, Brigadier Anquetil called a council of war, when it was decided to retreat at all hazards; and therefore, at 9 p. m. this final, destructive, yet in evitable step was taken, leaving all the sick and wounded to be massacred on the ground. The confusion was great; the 44th took the lead by mistake, and the Cavalry and Artillery did not leave till the Ghilzies were in the midst of them, shooting them or dealing death with their fearful knives. A rush then took place for the road, and all proceeded on without the least order: about three miles from Jugdulluck they arrived at a barrier composed of felled trees well twisted together, about six feet high; bitter confusion now took place, the Affghans rushing down from each side, caused fearful havoc among our troops. "Sauve qui peut," was the cry, and, although many officers and men fell victims to the frantic fanatics, yet at length the united exertions of horses and men forced the barrier down, and again the much decreased column pushed forward. The 44th were again put into something like order, by the united exertions of Captain Bygrave and other officers, who on this and every occasion, each and all nobly distinguished themselves, proudly upholding the pre-eminent superiority of the British name, cheerfully bearing their many hardships, and striving to impart hope and spirit into the minds of their men.

Here fell Brigadier Anquetil, a most brave and able officer, who, to the last, had striven to the utmost to uphold order and some sort of arrangement in the proceedings of the troops. About 300 of all colours crossed the barrier; the remainder had met their fate between it and Jugdulluck, or had taken to the Hills in the neighbourhood.

The Affghans in large bodies followed the little troop of soldiers and followers, who now had to contend every step of their retreat; onward they proceeded, and onward also were signal fires denoting their approach, well lighted by the enemy, which spread from hill to hill, with meteor-like rapidity; at about three miles in advance, another barrier had been formed by the enemy, but not of the strength of the former one, and again the enemy made a rush, which was however gallantly repulsed, though with some loss on our side. It was at this time about one a. m., and our whole body of fighting men, consisting of some hundred or so, with amongst the whole of the men not more than 30 muskets.

At three a. m. they arrived at the Soorkaul river, the bridge across which was occupied by the enemy in force, so as to oblige the poor men to cross the bitterly cold water, although a small party also succeeded in forcing the bridge. Here fell Lieut. Cadell, H. M. 44th, who was shot through the back of the neck, just as he was leaving the water. The whole body of troops now became most dispirited, nearly giving up all

hope; parties were formed, who chose their own leader, and order was gone. Many of the officers who had preserved their horses, now made a push for the front, vainly hoping their steeds would yet carry them in safety to the goal of their wishes—Jellalabad. At seven a. m. eighty men composed the whole of this doomed little body; the Affghans were pressing close on their rear, and the numbers in their immediate vicinity were about 1000, so that on approaching Gundamuk, it was deemed advisable to take to a hill on the left hand side of the road, and crowning it, repel, as best they could, the attacks of their unsparing foe. After being there about ten minutes, a horseman advanced, who, waving his turban, requested to parley. This was done, and Major Griffiths accompanied by Mr. Blewitt, one of Captain Johnson's writers, as interpreter, was sent to see what terms could be made with the Chief, who was about some half a mile off. The enemy in the vicinity immediately on their departure, waving flags, approached and offered them "*nanu*" (native loaves) for sale, but, most unfortunately for our troops on their arrival amongst them, they immediately began seizing the muskets from the hands of the Europeans, who resisting this, the Affghans again retired, and from a short distance opened a murderous fire, which our men returned, until all their ammunition was exhausted, and began to throw stones, which perceiving, the enemy rushed in with drawn knives among them, and with the exception of two officers and four men, the whole of this doomed band fell victims to the sanguinary mob.

APPENDIX.

No. VIII.

An Adventure in the Khybur Pass.

We mentioned in last issue, having just received a very interesting letter from an officer at Gundamuck; and amongst other matters, our correspondent gives the following particulars of the narrow escape of a friend of his, who had recently pushed up alone from Peshawur to join General Pollock's army, meeting with adventures on the road which had tarnished the subject of conversation for several days in camp, and caused considerable admiration for the dashing spirit displayed by Captain Trower and his small party. It seems that this officer, who was on his way up to the army, heard of its having moved in advance, and being resolved at all risks to share the glory that awaited his comrades, he made up his mind to push on, in the hope of overtaking the force, notwithstanding that the road was considered any thing but safe, parties of marauders being about in all directions. Captain Trower was not, however, to be turned from his purpose by this intelligence, and procuring the escort of half a dozen Hindustani horsemen, and placing his baggage on as many mules, he made his way through the Khybur to Chardeh, where we believe there is a small military post, and at that place most providentially he was delayed a day by sickness, for it afterwards came to light that the marauders had received intimation of his approach, and were on the look out for him in the desert, in great numbers; but becoming impatient, they dispersed in consequence of his not appearing at the time they expected; the danger of the next march, which lies across the desert, was, however, so strongly pressed upon Capt. Trower's notice, that he was induced to strengthen his little party by a guard of eight *Eusfyze*, or Burkundauze, and so commencing his march with the rising moon, he got safely over the desert, and had just entered the last Pass, which is represented as about three miles in length, when a body of Khyburries, some fifty or sixty in number, overtook and attacked the party. Fortunately, the nature of the ground was such that a small body

of determined soldiers could keep very superior numbers in check, and Captain Trower made his dispositions accordingly; ordering his servants to push on as fast as possible with the baggage, guarded by half of the *Easfyze*, whilst he himself covered them with the remainder of the guard and the troopers. This soldier-like disposition was however scarcely made, ere the enemy began to close upon his party, and the ground being favourable for a charge, Captain Trower gave them a volley, and dashing at them with his horsemen, sent them flying amongst the rocks in all directions. As ill luck would have it though, a vicious mule being alarmed at the firing, loosened her load and ran off into the thick of the enemy: Captain Trower of course did not wish to expose his men unnecessarily, but the gallant Duffadar and his *Jowanna* would not hear of the Sahib's mule being thus lost, so another charge to the rescue having been determined on was accordingly made, and in the thick of the *melee*, Captain Trower managed to seize her bridle rein, a liberty which the old lady ungratefully resented, by at once kicking off her load, and this they left as lawful prize to the enemy, for as the *fuillade* was beginning to grow rather warm, and one of the guard had been already shot dead, it was thought unwise to wait to pick up the scattered baggage; so the party slowly retired, covering the remainder of the baggage as a Rear Guard, the enemy following pretty closely, and keeping up a continued fire, whilst Captain Trower and his horsemen charged them again and again, whenever they came near enough, and the nature of the ground would allow the Cavalry to get at and give them a taste of cold steel, in return for their game at "long bullets!" The cowardly rascals were, however, careful not to expose themselves more than was necessary, and each time that they were charged by this mere handful of horse, the troopers sent them flying; though the enemy were almost ten to one in number. In this manner Captain Trower made good his way to Jellalabad, which he reached with the single casualty above stated, after a continued skirmish of at least three hours' duration. Our correspondent further states, that Captain Trower describes the cool soldier-like gallantry of his troopers, and especially of their Duffadar, under a constantly snipping fire, as most admirable. It appears to have been indeed fortunate that Captain Trower was not attacked until he had entered the Pass, as in the open country, his well judged plan of defence could hardly have prevented his being overpowered by such superior numbers!

APPENDIX

No. IX.

The defence of Khelat-i-Ghilzie.

We marched into quarters at Khelat-i-Ghilzie in November 1841. Our barracks were excellent, but the fortifications of the place were little more than commenced on, and along some hundred yards of the works there was neither wall nor ditch. Directly we got news of the insurrection at Cabool, the sepoy^s were set to work to strengthen the defences of the post—scarps, palisades, parapets, and a ditch at the most accessible part of the works were commenced on, and both Officers and men continued to work at them until the winter set well in, and the frost rendered the ground so hard, that there was no longer any working it. On the 9th December about fifteen hundred Ghilzies made their appearance, with the intention, as they said, of besieging us. They took up their ground about two and a half miles, off, but their warlike efforts were confined to firing a few shots into the place at night, and an attempt made by a party of their horse to cut off some of our men who were cutting bhootah for fuel, in which they were foiled by the sepoy^s of the guard. A fall of snow compelled them to decamp after nine days; and the only damage they did us was, to make all the Chiefs in our neighbourhood “yagee.”* Of all the Chiefs whom we had paid and supported, only one man adhered to us, and he a person of no great influence. The winter now set in with severity, and the cold soon became excessive. We had no doors for the barracks, and neither doors nor glass for the windows of our quarters, which were large and lofty rooms, some 36 feet long, and our supply of firewood we were obliged to husband, so that we never could keep our rooms warm. You must recollect Khelat-i-Ghilzie, its situation is a very exposed one, situated in the throat of a funnel: high winds prevail throughout the year, and in winter the lower the temperature sunk, the higher blew the north wind. Snow lay for two months on the ground, and the thermometer fell as low as forty degrees below the freezing point. With no doors to the barracks, and only

* Mutinous, troublesome.

such rough purdahs as grain bags, which were all we could get, you may conceive how much our men suffered; a gale of wind always blowing when the temperature was below zero, and usually, too, blowing most strongly at night. I have never experienced a winter so continuously cold. When we entered the garrison we had provision in flour for the troops, for upwards of six months; but as we got an increase of three hundred men to the post, when Colonel Maclaren's brigade passed us on its return to Candahar, we had many additional mouths to feed, and we knew not how long we might be required to hold the post. We had a quantity of wheat in store, but with the country all round "yagoe" we had not the means of grinding it. We got possession of some millstones, and tried to get up mills, but after getting all the machinery in order, we found that all the water we could command was not sufficient to keep the machinery in motion. We then tried a bullock mill which also failed from our not being able to fabricate the iron work of sufficient solidity, and we should have been utterly nonplused, had not an Officer in the garrison possessed a book on mechanics in which was contained a description of a vertical hand-mill capable of grinding some sixteen maunds daily. This we succeeded in constructing after two months and a half's labour upon mills, and no little anxiety as to the result. We were now easy in our minds, for this with some small hand-mills gave us the means of supporting our garrison for some two or three additional months, and we knew our men would fight and hold the post against all the Affghans in the country as long as our provisions lasted. We had occasional communication with Candahar by means of highly paid *cosids*, and we thus learned the disastrous fate of our Cabool comrades. The tedium of the winter was excessive, but it passed at last. With the spring our labours on the defences recommenced, and as soon as the weather became mild, the hostile Chiefs of the two great Ghilzie tribes in our neighbourhood made their appearance. These gentlemen had spent the winter in a more sheltered locality, and, as long as they were not near us, the villagers brought in commodities for sale, but, with their appearance, all supplies ceased. On two occasions we were obliged to *chappoo* sheep—the first was a peaceable affair, we secured a whole flock without let or hindrance, but, on the second occasion, we had to fight for them, and had a few men wounded. We had forty-three *European* Artillerymen in the garrison, and it was chiefly for them that the animal food was required. The supply of all their necessities ran out in winter, and on two different occasions they were for some days on bread and water, yet they never grumbled, worked as well as if they had been highly fed, and bore all their privations with the most admirable good humour. The hostile Ghilzie Chiefs at first brought only a few hundred men with them, and took up their quarters at a safe distance of some miles from us; but during all April they were receiving accessions to their force, and with these accessions their boldness increased, until they diminished their distance to less than a mile from the place. As they approached, our range

necessarily became more limited, and we had neither Cavalry nor the means of moving a gun, and the country round Khelat-i-Ghilzie is full of ravines, and exceedingly favourable to the skulking mode of fighting which these gentry most approve of. We were latterly, as the investment became more close, obliged to confine ourselves to the narrow space within our defences; these by the continued labour of our men had become very respectable, and, such as we deemed no Affghan without the aid of guns would have attempted. In this however, we were agreeably disappointed. Towards the middle of May the enemy commenced to dig trenches round the place, working at them all night. By the 26th they had completely surrounded us with them, the nearest being within two hundred and fifty yards of our defences. These were all loopholed, and afforded the enemy perfect cover; they were constructed, too, with some skill as to position, as the advanced trenches were invariably protected by two or three trenches in their rear, and they were uniformly placed, so as to have the advantage of any natural cover afforded by the ground. From these trenches the hottest fire any of us had ever seen Affghans keep up, was poured upon any one who exposed himself; obviously picked marksmen were selected for the duty, for they fired exceedingly well for Affghans, and at ranges of from 600 to 700 yards, their long Jexails threw balls with great accuracy. They were so completely sheltered in these trenches that we seldom had an opportunity of firing at them excepting when parties were relieving each other, and then the double barrels and rifles of the officers came into play. Such had been the monotony of our previous existence, that it was a matter of great amusement firing at these gentry, and it was seldom that any fellow got into the nearer trenches in day light, without running the gauntlet of a few double barrels. On the evening of the 20th May, the enemy were unusually quiet, and so few of them visible that it was a matter of doubt whether the greater number of them had not decamped. A few of them were observed, by means of our telescopes, at a distant fort practising escalading with scaling ladders, and this was the first intimation we had of their having constructed these articles. Officers and men had, for several nights previously, kept at their posts; there was bright moonlight, and the night passed with unusual quietness, until towards morning the moon went down. The attention of the Officer on duty was then suddenly arrested by the clatter of horses' feet, indicating the close presence of a large body of horse, and the word was passed round to get ready. Shortly afterwards the whole northern face of the works was assaulted by dense bodies of the enemy. The morning was so dark, that they were within 100 yards before they were observed, though we were on the look out for them, and they came on with great boldness, shouting Allah! Allah! They were received with discharges of grape and a hot fire of musketry, which must have done heavy execution among their dense masses; still they pressed on, pushing their attack with the greatest vehemence at the North-east and North-west angles of the works, where the ascent

was most easy, and the defences apparently most accessible. At the North-east angle the defences consisted of a ditch, scarp of some seven or eight feet in height, a slope of some eight feet between the top of the scarp and the parapet, the latter consisting of sand bags. The enemy, by the aid of scaling ladders, crossed the ditch, ascended the scarp and sloping bank, and endeavoured to get over the parapet: here they were resolutely met with the musket and bayonet. Thrice they came boldly on to the assault, planting one of their standards within a yard of the muzzle of one of our guns, and thrice they were driven back; only one man succeeded in getting into the place, and he was shot with his foot on the axle of this gun. Two guns were in position at this part of the works, and the attempts of the enemy to get within the works through their embrasures, and over the parapets on either side, were so determined that the Artillerymen, for some minutes were obliged to quit their guns, and betake themselves to the musket and bayonet, with which they did good service; the sepoys too fought well, one of them was observed by the Artillery men to bayonet four men. The principal annoyance suffered by the garrison was from showers of heavy stones; these were thrown into the works in great quantity to cover the escaladers, and several of our men were knocked down and smartly bruised by them. During the height of the assault the enemy fired little; they had apparently slung their matchlocks and came on sword in hand, but they were met by a fire so deadly and well sustained that they had no chance of success. The Officers of the garrison were all surprised at the boldness and determination of the attack, but we understood afterwards that trusting to their numbers, and emboldened no doubt by their previous successes at Kabul and Ghuznee, they reckoned so confidently on taking the place, that many of their women were waiting in the ravines close at hand to share in the plunder of the garrison. The assault lasted from twenty minutes to half an hour, and at day-break they drew off, carrying away all their wounded, and many of their dead. A party of them took refuge behind some rocks at the N. W. angle of the works and just under the barracks, popping their heads out occasionally; they fired a few shots at us, but they fired so seldom, that their numbers were supposed to be few. Two companies of sepoys sallied out to unearth them, and to the surprise of all, at least 300 men broke cover and bolted for the neighbouring ravines faster than we ever saw Afghans run before. A heavy fire was poured into them, but they ran so fast, and cover was so close that few of them fell. The greater part of the enemy retired into the ravines into which they had dragged their dead and wounded, and from daylight until half past two P. M., they were employed in carrying them off. From their trenches on the north face of the works which were filled with men, they kept up a pretty constant fire to cover this process. Had we possessed a few good Cavalry, we should have inflicted a heavier loss on them, but they were strong in horse, having about 800 in the field, while we had not a mounted man, and so it was judged prudent, as

the ground afforded excellent cover for their mode of fighting, to rest satisfied with the thrashing we had given them, and to permit them to carry off their wounded without incurring the loss of our own men in moving on to attack them. They left 104 dead bodies at the foot of the defences, and within a few days after the assault, the Political Agent ascertained that the number of killed, and of wounded men, who died within a few days after the action, considerably exceeded 400. On the dead bodies were found quantities of our own magazine cartridges, supposed to have been procured at Ghuzni, and which accounted for their unusual expenditure of ammunition. Computed by themselves the lowest number of assailants was stated at 5500 men, the highest at 7000. On the body of the Nazir of Meer Allum, Chief of the Hotuck tribe of Ghilzies, who fell in the assault, was found the muster roll of his contingent amounting to 2000 and odd men; he furnished about a third part of the force, so that the number of assailants must have been about 6000 men. By sunset on the day of attack not an enemy was visible, and it was a source of honest gratulation to the garrison, that we had driven off our enemies and inflicted a heavy loss on them by our own efforts. The garrison consisted of about 900 men, about 500 of whom were actually engaged. When we took possession of the place, it consisted of little more than three ranges of barracks for the troops, built on a commanding position. By the assiduous labour of the sepoya and the constant supervision of the Engineer and Officers, it had been converted into a post of such strength, as if well defended, would have puzzled regular troops unfurnished with guns to take, and did defy Affghans. It must have been a source of honest pride to our excellent commanding Officer to find, that when positions of greater strength had submitted, he had not only fortified his own post, but maintained it, and signally defeated the enemy before it.

Troops in quarters in this country have seldom suffered more from the severity of climate and the privation of accustomed necessaries, than those at Kelat-i-Ghilzie. During the more severe days in winter, the Hindoo Sepoya did not cook for two days together, and even the Europeans, so bitter was the cold, were glad to keep to their barracks, and even to their beds, to keep themselves warm. Our bazar was latterly destitute of every thing excepting the usual Commissariat rations issued from the godown, and for some months these were served to the Sepoya on a reduced scale. As for the Officers they laughed at their own privations, but they will not soon forget the dreary winter days, their shivering meetings at mess table, their tiffins on bread and water, and their nights at mess to discuss their scanty fare, to which hunger was an excellent sauce and the only seasoning. Two days after the defeat of the enemy, we heard of the advance of Colonel Wymer's brigade to relieve us, which arrived on the 26th of May. We moved into camp, the barracks and defences of Kelat-i-Ghilzie were destroyed, and the 7th of June saw us safe at Kandahar.

APPENDIX.

No. X.

Narrative of the Captivity of Colonel PALMER, and other Officers at Ghuzni, during and after the Insurrection at Cabul, 1841. By Lieutenant CRAWFORD, of the Bombay Army.

I left on the 30th October last year, having under my charge three state prisoners and seven hostages to be escorted to Cabul, and for the safeguard of the same, I was accompanied by a troop from my own corps, and about forty Affghan horse under a chief called Guddoo Khan. It was on the 7th November we reached Oba; we had marched rapidly, but in perfect peace, and as little expected to be attacked on the road, as I do at this moment; you may imagine, therefore, how thunderstruck I was, when Guddoo Khan entered my tent, bringing with him a native official of that part of the country, styled the Urz Beggie, who gave me an account of the disasters in Cabul on the second of the month, and as I afterwards found bad as matters really were at the capital, he made them out to be much more so. He strongly pressed my returning to Khelat-i-Ghilzie, saying, that there were 20,000 men round Ghuznie, and to go on would be to certain death. I considered, however, it would never do for an officer to turn back on a mere rumour of danger, and that should the man's story really be true, still I had a better chance of reaching Ghuznie, which was only fifty four miles off, than Khelat which was ninety. Tired though my horses were, they might make Ghuznie in one forced march, but they would not be able to get to the other station under a couple of days; the road lay through the barren and hostile country of the Ghilzies, and, as I subsequently discovered, it proved that Urz Beggie was a traitor: he wished to get me back through the Ghilzie districts, as he himself was a man of that tribe, and would have raised the whole country about my ears: not a man of us would have escaped to tell the tale. After duly considering all the pros and cons of the case, I mounted my detachment at 8 P. M., and moved on toward Ghuznie. We marched rapidly the whole night, and by daylight had reached Nance, about thirteen miles from Ghuznie, but the first streak of dawn shewed us that the people were on the alert, there were videttes on every hill, and in a very short time, word was passed from fort to fort, and their inhabitants turned out hanging on my flanks and rear, and firing with their rifles at us. Their horse-

men were bolder, they swarmed round us like wasps, riding up, firing their pieces into our troop, and galloping off to reload. We were nearly helpless against such a foe, twice we charged and cut up a few, but the rascals always sought shelter near the numerous forts that covered the plain, and then laughed at us; in addition to not being able to catch the villains, we found that every time we charged or halted to shew a front, it only gave the enemy time to circle round our flanks and head us; and their footmen also came up from the rear. Accordingly we left the high road altogether, and turned out into the plain, where the foot would scarcely dare to follow us, and indeed by proceeding at the trot we pretty well shook off these gentry, but the horsemen still followed, and to add to our troubles, I found that the ponies, on which the prisoners were mounted, were exhausted and could proceed no further. As they knocked up, I doubled the riders on the other animals, but one after another they gave in. One prisoner was cut down by a horseman of the enemy (plainly shewing there was no collision between them,) two others rolled over in a ditch, where with their horse atop of them, and their legs chained under his belly, I left them; indeed I now found it was impossible I could ever get my charge into Ghuznie alive, and I had only to decide on putting them to death or setting them at liberty. My instructions would have justified my pursuing the former course, but the poor wretches had clearly made no attempt to escape; they were in no manner answerable for the attack made on my party, as was evident from one of their number falling by the sword of our adversaries; and I conceived then, and do now conceive, that in letting these men go with their lives, I was not only acting according to the strict letter of my instructions, but that justice and humanity required I should not slay them in cold blood;—had I put them to death, then Shumsodeen or Mahomed Akbar would have been equally justified in taking our lives, (the lives of all their prisoners,) on the advance of Pollock and Nott on Cabul. I may add, that the Court of Inquiry which I called for, after investigating all the circumstances, decided, that I had acted perfectly right. But to return to my story. After following and harassing us for miles, the enemy drew off when we got near Ghuznie, and I reached that place about 10 A. M. on the 8th, with the loss of all my baggage and prisoners, and fifteen men and twenty horses killed, and several wounded out of my little party. Every day now brought us bad accounts from Cabool, and the infatuation that appears to have seized the Chief Authorities there not only hurried them on to ruin at the capital, but also paralyzed us at Ghuznie. Can you imagine that the necessary repairs and alterations in the citadel were not sanctioned, nor was Palmer permitted to lay in provisions! At the eleventh hour, the Colonel took the responsibility upon himself and set to work; but most invaluable time had been suffered to pass unimproved, and when the enemy made their appearance under our walls, they found us but ill prepared for a siege, especially when it was not man alone we had to combat with, but the rigours of a winter, as intense as that of Canada. The enemy and the snow made their ap-

pearance together; on the 20th Nov. the town was surrounded with the one, and the ground covered with the other, but in a week afterwards, the insurgents broke up their investment of the place, on a report of McLarn's brigade advancing to our relief. This permitted our destroying the villages and buildings within musket shot of the walls, and also afforded us a week's skating on the ditch, but on the 7th December the enemy returned in increased numbers and we were then closely confined to the walls.—The necessity and advantage of turning the inhabitants out of the town was not lost sight of, but unfortunately for us an idea had got abroad that the town people were strongly attached to us and that the sending out so many poor people to perish in the snow was an act of cruelty too great to be dreamt of.—The consequence was that the townsmen entered into a correspondence with their countrymen on the outside, and on the night of the 16th December, having dug a hole through the town, they admitted their friends, who poured in by thousands, and compelled us after fighting all that night and the next day to retire into the citadel. It so happened that from this day the winter set in with increased severity, and its effect soon told fearfully upon the men. The whole garrison, officers and men, were told off into three watches, one of which was constantly on duty, so that every one in the place was eight hours on duty out of the twenty four, and you may imagine, that such constant work and exposure to the intense cold very soon rendered the Sepoys useless.—The snow lay deep, very deep, and often in the course of a single night would fall to the depth of a couple of feet. The thermometer sunk to *ten, twelve, and even fourteen degrees below zero!!* and to such weather were the natives of India exposed day and night, with no prospect of relief, and with no comforts to enable them to support their sufferings. We were reduced to half rations of bad flour and raw grain, on alternate days, and a seer of wood per man each day was all that could be allowed, either for cooking or warmth. The Sepoys were constantly soaked, and unable to dry themselves got sickly, and the hospital was crowded with men whose feet had ulcerated from frost bites. I do think, that if the enemy had pluck enough to have made a rush upon us, they could at any time, after Christmas day, have carried the works with very little difficulty. As it was, however, they contented themselves with keeping up a smart fire with their rifles, and not a man could shew his head above the walls for a moment. Up to the 15th January this work continued, and we lost three or four men daily, from the fire of their marksmen: but on the day mentioned some sort of a truce was entered into, and active hostilities ceased, it being understood, we were to evacuate the place on the arrival of Shumsodeen Khan.—This worthy did not arrive till the middle of the following month, and then the Colonel managed to keep him in play, till the beginning of March, but at last he and his chiefs would stand it no longer, and said that if we did not give up the place immediately, they would recommence hostilities, and we, being utterly helpless, having no water in the citadel, and the snow on which we had depended for a supply

having all vanished, our provision being exhausted, and there being no prospect of the arrival of succour, we had no resource but to make the best terms we could, and trust to Providence that the Enemy would abide by them. On the 6th March we marched out from the citadel, under a treaty signed and solemnly sworn to by all the chiefs that we should be escorted in safety and honor to Peshawar, with our colors, arms and baggage, and fifty rounds of ammunition per man. There was still some snow in the Passes between Ghuzni, and till that should melt, and the necessary carriage could be procured for us, we were quartered in a portion of the town, immediately below the citadel. Scarcely had we entered our new abode, when our enemies flung off the mask and shewed how much they valued oaths made to Infidels. At noon on the 7th whilst nearly every man of ours were cooking, and we were totally unprepared for an outbreak, the Ghazees rushed upon our lines, and succeeded in carrying the houses in which my squadron had been placed. I was in the next house, with Burnet of the 54th, and Nicholson of the 27th, there being no decent room for me in my own proper quarters. On hearing the uproar, I ran to the roof to see what was the matter, and finding what had taken place among my men, and that balls were flying thick, I called up Burnet; he had scarcely joined me, when he was struck down by a rifle ball, which knocked his eye out, and as he was then rendered *hors de combat*, I assumed command of the two companies of the 27th that had been under him, and Nicholson and myself proceeded to defend ourselves as well as circumstances would permit. We were on the left of the mass of houses occupied by our troops, and the first and sharpest attacks were directed at us: the enemy fired our house, and gradually as room after room caught fire, we were forced to retreat to the others, till at last by midnight of the 8th our house was nearly burnt in halves; we were exhausted with hunger and thirst, having had nothing to eat or drink since the morning of the 7th; our ammunition was expended, the place was filled with dead and dying men, and our position was no longer tenable; but the only entrance in front of the house, was surrounded by the enemy, and we scarcely knew how to get out and endeavour to join Colonel Palmer; at last we dug a hole through the wall of the back of the house; we had only hyoanets to work with, and it cost us much labor to make a hole sufficiently large to admit of one man at a time dropping from it into the street below; but we were fortunate enough to get clear out of our ruined quarters in this way, and join the Colonel unperceived by the savages round us. As soon as day broke on the 9th, they occupied our abandoned post, and shortly afterwards attacked and carried the next house, in which was poor Lumsden and his wife and thirty sepoy, every one of whom and their servants were put to death. On the morning of the 10th, Poett and Davis were obliged to retire from their posts, and the survivors here now assembled in the two houses held by Colonel Palmer and the Head Quarters of the corps. You cannot picture to yourself the scene these two houses presented; every room was crammed, not only with sepoy but

camp followers, men, women, and children, and it is astonishing the slaughter among them was not greater, seeing that the guns of the citadel sent round shot, crashing through and through the walls. I saw high caste men groping in the mud, endeavouring to discover pieces of unmelted ice that by sucking them, they might relieve their thirst that so tormented them. Certainly when that morning dawned, I thought it was the last I should see on this earth, and so did we all, and proceeded to make a few little arrangements, ere the final attack on us took place. The regimental colours were burnt to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy; I destroyed my watch, and flung it, and what money I had, *over the wall* of the ditch; I also burnt my poor's wife's miniature, first cramming the gold frame of it into a musket, being determined that one of the Ghazees should have his belly full of gold ere I died. Hour after hour passed on, and still we sat expecting every minute to hear the shout of the final attack, but it came not; from our loop-holes we saw the enemy swarming all around us, in every lane and house and on the hill of the citadel, the place was black with their masses; and as they themselves afterwards told us, there were not less than ten thousand men there thirsting for our blood. But it appears that Shumsoodeen had been afflicted with some qualms of conscience, and had held a council of his chiefs on the subject of admitting us to quarter. I should tell you, that during the three previous days fighting, Shumsoodeen had repeatedly offered us terms, but they were such as we could not accede to; in as much as they commenced by desiring we would surrender ourselves to him, and abandon the sepoy to the fury of the Ghazees. The sepoy, it appears, had held a consultation among themselves, and believing they had no chance of their lives, determined on forcing their way out of the town and endeavouring to get to Peshawur; when we first heard of this mad design and spoke to the men about it, they denied it; but on the 10th, two Native Officers came forward and told us they had made up their minds to go off that night; that if we chose to accompany them, they would be exceedingly glad, but if otherwise they would go alone; it was in vain we pointed out the utter impracticability of their plan; they had got an idea among them, that Peshawur was not above fifty or sixty miles off across the country, and that there was a short cut to it, through the mountains; they immediately commenced digging a hole through the outer wall of the town, by which as soon as it got dark, they might march out into the country. Seeing that our men had now flung off all authority, and were about to desert us, we had nothing further to do but to make the best bargain we could for our lives. Shumsoodeen and all the chiefs again swore by Ghazee, all that was holy, that if we laid down our arms, we should be honorably treated, and sent to Cabool to the Shah as soon as possible: at 10 p. m. we surrendered. The chief sent and begged the officers to come into the citadel immediately, as the Ghazees were yelling for the blood of the Feringee Kafirs, and he could not answer for our safety, if we delayed till daylight: accordingly we went up to the citadel and gave up our swords, the chief placing bodies of his men round our late

quarters to keep the Ghazees from molesting the sepoy: a large party of these latter, however, during the night endeavoured to put their ridiculous plan of flight into execution and made their way about two or three miles from the town; it came on to snow heavily; they got bewildered in the fields, and in the morning were all cut to pieces or made prisoners. For the first few days after we had surrendered, we were treated pretty tolerably: the chief and his brother used to visit and console with us on the change of fortune we had experienced, and expressed their sorrow at the violence of their fanatical followers not having permitted their strict observance of the treaty, on which we had yielded up the citadel to them, but gradually they discontinued their visits; every little thing we had managed to secure, such as watches, penknives, money etc., was taken from us, and we were strictly confined to a small room eighteen feet by thirteen. In it there were ten of us, so you may imagine we had not much room to spare: indeed when we lay down at night we exactly occupied the whole floor, and when we wanted to take a little exercise, we were obliged to walk up and down (six paces) in turns. Few of us had a change of linen, and the consequence was, we were soon swarming with vermin, the catching of which afforded us an hour's employment every morning. I wore my solitary shirt for five weeks, till it became literally black and rotten, and I am really surprised none of us contracted any loathsome disease from the state of filth we were compelled to live in. On the 7th April, we heard of Shah Soojah's murder, and from that date the severities of our confinement were redoubled; they shut and darkened the solitary window, from which we had hitherto derived light and air, and they also kept the door of our room constantly closed, so that the air we breathed became perfectly pestiferous. On the 21st of the month, they tortured Colonel Palmer with a tent peg and rope, in such a manner that it is wonderful he ever recovered the use of his foot. I cannot in a letter explain the process of the torture, but we all witnessed it, and it was something on the principle of the Scotch boot described in "Old Mortality." We were told we should each be tortured in our turn, unless we gave up four lacs of rupees, which the rascals swore we had buried, and that if we continued obstinate, they told us, we should be blown from guns, beginning with the junior. This was a pleasant sort of life to lead, never being certain of that life for twenty-four hours together. In the end of April, our guards suddenly became particularly civil to us for a few days, and we found out they had a report of the advance of our troops; indeed up to the period of our actual release, we could always form a pretty shrewd guess of what our troops were about, by the treatment we experienced at the hands of our captors. If there was any forward movement among our people, any arrival of reinforcements at Jellalabad or Candahar, etc. then we were treated well for a few days, and we got better food, but if our people appeared to be idle and things remained in *statu quo* for a week, then our guard taunted us on the unwarlike spirit of Feringee Armies; and boasted how they would exterminate them if they advanced. Gool Mahomed Khan, the brother of

Shumsodeen, who had always behaved more civilly towards us than the big chief, was, unfortunately for us, despatched to Cabool, on business, about the middle of April; but I believe it was owing to the receipt of a letter from him, that on the 12th May we were permitted to quit our prison room and walk on the terrace of the citadel for *one hour*, and we were told that similar kindness would be shewn us *once a week (!!!)* viz. on Friday, when Shumsodeen was to make a religious pic nic to a neighbouring shrine. Even this we thought a great blessing, and used to count the days and hours to each succeeding Friday, anxiously expecting the moment, when our guard would tell us we might breathe God's fresh air, and look out on the green fields for the allotted period. I thought I had always been an admirer of the beauties of nature, but I had never imagined that the time would have come, that the sight of a few ordinary fields of clover and wheat, would have caused me such delight in their contemplation.

On the 15th June, Gool Mahomed returned from Cabool bringing with him some of the ladies of his brother's family: on their account we were told, we should be removed to other quarters, and of course we expected a change for the worse; but, as it eventually proved, we were agreeably disappointed. Just at this period one of our number, Lieutenant Davis, 27th Native Infantry, had sickened with typhus fever; we had no medicines, no comforts for him, and he lay on the ground delirious, raving about home and his family, and every hour proving worse, till on the 19th, death put an end to his sufferings. We read the burial service over him, and then made his body over to the guard to bury, but I am afraid, they merely flung the poor fellow into a ditch outside the gate. It was a melancholy ceremony, that burial service: few among us, I imagine, but thought it might be his turn next, especially now that sickness had broken out in such a shape; however, on the following day we were removed to another building, where we had three or four rooms to ourselves, and a court yard to walk about in, and our guard was replaced by a more civil set. This was a delightful change, and being greedy of fresh air after so long a deprivation of it, we made the most of our new berth by always sleeping in the open air in the courtyard. It is true it was utterly impossible to get a minute's rest in any of the rooms allotted us, as they were swarming with the foulest vermin, so we thought it no hardship to have the stars for a canopy, and for three months we never slept under a roof, or with any other covering beyond our sheepskin cloaks. From this date the conduct of Shumsodeen toward us improved greatly: he came to see us frequently, and chatted in a kind manner, always telling us we should shortly be set at liberty in exchange for Dost Mahomed, who was returning to Cabool, having been freed by our Government: this gave us renewed hopes of soon again becoming free agents, and as our circumstances were improved, and our guards more friendly toward us, our captivity was more easily borne, but still as time wore on, and nothing definite was learnt regarding our release, we again began to despair, especially when the middle of August arrived, and we seemed as far as ever from the attainment of our wishes.

It was on the 19th August we had as usual wrapped ourselves up in our cloaks, and taken lodgings on the cold ground for the night, when the chief suddenly entered the yard, and told us we were to march immediately for Cabool, and sure enough in half an hour afterwards, we found ourselves along in pairs in kujiawans on each side of camels, and moving towards the capital. How delighted we were to bid adieu to the walls of Ghuznie. I do believe, if we had known we were going to execution, the change would nevertheless have gladdened us. We reached Cabool in three days, without meeting any adventure on the road; but we were abused most grossly by the populace as we proceeded through the streets of the city; fortunately it was in the dusk of the evening, and but few people witnessed our arrival, otherwise they might not have confined their ill-treatment towards us. We went direct to Mahomed Akbar's quarters in the Bala Hissar, and from him we met with the kindest reception. I could not bring myself to believe that the stout, good-humoured, open-hearted looking young man, who was making such kind inquiries after our health, and how we had borne the fatigues of the journey, could be the murderer of Macnaghten, and the leader of the massacre of our troops. He told us, we had come most unexpectedly; that though he had written repeatedly to have us sent to him, (as he had heard we were ill-treated by Shumsoodeen,) yet no attention had been paid to his orders, and now that we had come, it was without any intimation of our approach; he bade us be of good cheer, as our future comfort would be his care, and we should find ourselves treated like officers and gentlemen. After many similarly civil speeches he ordered dinner, and sent for Troup and Pottinger to see us; when they arrived, the whole of us, Mahomed Akbar, his chiefs, and ourselves all set down to the best meal I had had for many a month. The Wuzeer, (as he always styled himself,) chatted and joked away on indifferent subjects during the meal, and shortly after its conclusion dismissed us, saying he would make us over to the care of Pottinger and Troup for the night, and we might go and have a chat with them in private, as doubtless we were anxious to do so. On the following morning, the *arch-fiend* sent us an excellent breakfast, and horses to carry us out a few miles to the fort where the other British prisoners were living, and he desired a list of our wants, regarding clothes, etc. might be made out, and they should be furnished. We found our countrymen living in what appeared to us a small paradise; they had comfortable quarters, servants, money, and no little baggage, and a beautiful garden to walk about in. To our great regret we had only been four or five days in this Elysium, when we were sent off to Bamean; being thus away from the immediate care of Mahomed Akbar, we soon found ourselves called on to rough it once more. Tents had been sent for the use of the ladies, but our guards, would only pitch them when it suited their convenience, and consequently the poor women and children had frequently to bivouac with us men, and that too in the nipping night air of the mountains; none of them, however, I am happy to say, suffered in the least, and they one and all bore their privations most admirably.

APPENDIX.

No. XI.

Narrative of the Murder of SHAH SOOJAH.

Nawab Zamon Khan and Zubar Khan, (the Dost's brother,) Oosman Khan, and Ameen Oollah Khan, having agreed on a plan among themselves, went to the King, and having the holy word (the Koran) with them, satisfied the King by the agreement of both word and oath, inasmuch that he consented to go with an Army, consisting of a general levy, towards Jellalabad; for which end it was settled that the King himself, having sent his tents out of Cabul and made a march to Sees Sing, should there muster and review his whole army, and then march on to Jellalabad; but before this happened, the King, in strict and absolute privacy, of his authority appointed the son of Ameen Oollah Khan commander of his army. The Barukzye Sirdars being much disgusted with the King's thus admitting the son of Ameen Oollah Khan to his confidence, took it much to heart; they then proposed to the King that they should assemble 25,000 soldiers at Cabul, while the King went out to review his army and march on to Jellalabad; the King accordingly took forth his tents and went down to Sees Sing, and the Barukzye Sirdars and the rest, with their force, also went forth for the purpose of being present at the muster of the army by the King, as agreed; so it was that on the first day the King mustered his army as aforesaid, and at night returned to the Bala Hissar, leaving Prince Futteh Jung at Sees Sing; and the same night the King sent letters for the men of Koh-i-binat about Jellalabad, and to Khyber, and the neighbourhood of Peshawur, addressed to the Shahzadducks.

"(N. B.—This sentence is very confusedly written, but a subsequent passage shews, that Shahzadduck Mahomed Casur and others of the royal blood were the parties addressed.) In the morning, the King having made his preparations, and having put on his dress of ceremony, took his seat in his travelling chair of state (khasah,) and went forth out of Cabul, by the gate towards Shah Shakeed, to make his march to Sees Sing; but on the road near Shah Shakeed, Shoojah-ood-dowlah, the son of Nawab Zamon Khan, had placed in ambush fifty Jezailchies.

When the King's retinue reached the spot, these Jazailchies rose and fired on him; two balls struck him—one in the brain, and one in the breast; five of the King's bearers were shot down by the volley; seven of the soldiers that formed the King's escort were also struck, and fell; the King died almost immediately. Shoojah-ood-dowlah coming up with a body of horse, stood over the King's corpse. Whatever property in jewels was about the corpse—the crown, the girdle, and so on, the sword and dagger—was plundered by them. When Shahzada Futteh Jung heard of the catastrophe, he made his way back to the Bala Hissar: the body of horse with Shoojah-ood-dowlah pursued the Prince at a smart pace, hoping to lay hands upon him, but the Prince, by presence of mind and resolution, made his way to the Bala Hissar; but finding the gates there guarded, and the troopers close behind him, he fled back to the city, and hid himself in the fort of Muhmood Khan Beeyat. Zamon Khan and the other chiefs said to Muhmood Khan Beeyat—'The King was our enemy, and we slew him; now give us over the Prince, as we are agreed to make him King;' to which Muhmood Khan answered,—'You Barukzye Sirdars, in swearing a solemn oath to the King, and afterwards killing him, have committed a heinous crime; we, of the tribes (Ooloos) of Cabul, were against the deed.' Zamon Khan replied—'My son killed the King without my wish or consent.' Muhmood Khan at night took Futteh Jung out of his own fort and lodged him with his women in the Bala Hissar, when Ameen Oollah Khan being in the Bala Hissar with near two thousand soldiers there assembled, they placed Futteh Jung on the throne, and declared him King, writing letters to the Ooloos, his dependants, telling them to assemble about the Bala Hissar and throw in supplies, while he himself prepared for action, guarding the gates with artillery. Khan Sherin Khan, Muhmood Khan, and the Koozoollah faction, form one faction; while the Barukzye Sirdars, the Nawabs, the men of the Cabul tribes, and the Kohistanes, form the other."

APPENDIX.

No. XII.

Narrative of the Murder of Sir ALEXANDER BURNES.

Subjoined will be found a melancholy narrative, the only trust-worthy one very probably we shall ever have of the murder of Sir Alex. Burnes, furnished by a native servant, who witnessed in person the matter he professes to describe. It has every appearance of truthfulness; and for our own part, we have no hesitation in attaching to it the fullest credence. It is melancholy to think that Sir Alexander and his brother perished from treachery such as this: and that they might have been saved, had they retired in time to the cantonments, and not pressed it too strictly to be their duty to remain where they were:—

As you must be deeply concerned to learn any details of the events which led to the death of the late lamented Sir Alexander Burnes and his brother at Cabool, I do myself the honor to forward you the deposition of Bowh Sing, lately a Chuprassee in Sir Alexander's service, who was an eye-witness of the events which terminated so fatally: he was a faithful servant, and his statement may, I conceive, be fully relied on.

Deposition of Bowh Sing.

Sir Alexander Burnes was duly informed by his Affghan servants the day previous to his murder, that there was a stir in the city, and that if he remained in it, his life would be in danger; they told him he had better go to the cantonments: this he declined doing, giving as his reason, that the Affghans never received any injury from him, but on the contrary, he had done much for them, and that he was quite sure they would never injure him.

On the day of the murder, as early as 3 o'clock in the morning, a cossid (Wullee Mahomed) came to me, I was on duty outside; he said, go and inform your master immediately, that there is a tumult in the city, and that the merchants are removing their goods and valuables from the shops. I knew what my master had said on this subject the day before, so did not like awakening him, but put on my chupras and went into the Char Chouk; here I met the Wuzeer Nuzamut Dowlah

going towards my master's house; I immediately turned with him, and on our arrival, awoke him, when my master dressed quickly, and went to the Wuzer and talked with him some time; the Wuzer endeavoured to induce him to go immediately into cantonments, assuring him it was not safe to remain in the city; he, however, persisted in remaining, saying, If I go, the Affghans will say I was afraid, and run away; he however sent a note to Sir W. MacNaghten by Wullee Mahomed. A chobdar came from the King to call the Wuzer, who asked and obtained permission to go; at the door the Wuzer said to Sir Alexander Burnes, Why, you see already that some of Ameen Oollah Khan's people have collected to attack you, if you will allow me, I shall disperse them; he (Sir A. Burnes) said, No, the king has sent for you, go to him without delay. The Wuzer accordingly mounted his horse, and went away. The house gates were then closed, and were in a little while surrounded by Ameen Oollah Khan and his people. Hydur Khan, the kotwal of the city, whom Sir Alexander Burnes had turned out of the office, brought fuel from the humam on the opposite side of the street, and set fire to the gates. The Wuzer shortly returned from the Bala Hisar with one of the King's pultuns; on seeing the gates on fire, and the immense crowd about, he took it apparently for granted that Sir A. Burnes had either escaped, or been destroyed, and withdrew the Regiment. At this time the whole mob of the city was collected, and the house in flames. The jemadar of chuprasses told Sir A. Burnes, that there was a report of a Regiment having come to assist him; he was going up to the top of the house to look, and had got half way when he met an Affghan, who said he had been looking about and that there was not the least sign of a Regiment; my master then turned back, and remarked there was no chance of assistance coming either from cantonments or the King. A Mussulman Cashmeeree, came forward and said, if your brother and chuprasses cease firing on the mob, I swear by the Koran that I will take you safe through the kirkee of the garden to the Chandoul, the fort of the Kuzzilbashees; the firing ceased, and Sir A. Burnes agreed to accompany him, and for sake of disguise put on a chogha and loongee. The moment he came out of the door a few paces with the Cashmeeree, this wretch called out, this is Sikunder Burnes! He was rushed on by hundreds and cut to pieces with their knives. His brother, Captain Burnes, went out with him, and was killed dead before Sir Alexander. Captain Broadfoot was not some time before in the house, and expired in half an hour.

'There was a guard of one Havildar, one Naik, and 12 Sepahis; they were all killed early in the affair: all the Hindoostanees except myself were killed; his Sirdar Bearer, who is now with me, escaped, as he was at home. I got away by having an Affghan dress; all the Affghan servants deserted; I got into cantonments after being hid two days in a shop. Sir Alexander forbid the sepoy and others firing on the people until they set fire to the gates.'

APPENDIX.

No. XIII.

Lieut. Col. WADE'S Despatches on forcing the Khyber Pass in 1839.

TO H. TORRENS, ESQ., *Deputy Secretary to the Government of India,
with the Governor General.*

SIR,—I have the honor to report for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor General of India, the capture of the fort of Ali Musjid last night by the troops attached to the Shahzada, on the part of the British Government, and his own regular and irregular levies, commanded respectively by Captain Farmer of the 21st Regiment Native Infantry, and Lieutenant Mackeson, attached to the Mission, together with the Mahomedan Auxiliaries from the Sikh Government, under the personal command of Colonel Sheikh Basawan.

2d. A detailed report of the operations which led to the submission of the place shall be forwarded without delay. In the meantime, I beg to assure His Lordship, that nothing could exceed the gallantry and zeal displayed by the officers and men of the three Governments, both European and Native, in the accomplishment of an enterprise which, the time for the advance of the Shahzada having arrived, I was compelled to prosecute by force.

3d. The exaggerated opinion which has been entertained of the strength of the place has rendered the effect of its speedy reduction, after entering the Pass, highly favourable to the future progress of the Shahzada, with whom I now intend to advance towards Kabul without delay.

4th. During the operations in which we were engaged with the enemy in taking possession of the heights on either side of the Pass to the point where the two roads of Jabaghi and Shadi Bagiar unite, near to Ali Musjid, and in investing the fort, the casualties on our side amount to about 25 killed and 100 wounded, including 1 private killed and 5 wounded of the British Detachment.

4th. Repeated attempts were made by the Khyber Chiefs to induce Mahomed Akbar Khan to join them in opposing the advance of the Shahzada, by their combined exertions, but the state of affairs at Kabul, consequent on the advance of the Shah from Kandahar, and the defection of some of the tribes in Loghar and Kohistan, which I have been employed in detaching from the Government of Dost Mahomed Khan, placed him in an equivocal situation, and obliged him to evade a compliance with the request of these Chiefs, and he is now reported to have dismissed his troops, and to be retreating on Cabul.

I have, &c.

C. M. WADE, *Pol. Agent, &c.*

Camp Lalachina, the 27th July, 1839.

TO T. H. MADDOCK, Esq., *Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, with the Governor General,*

Political Department.

SIR,—With reference to my dispatch of the 27th instant, I have the honor to transmit a detailed report of the operations in which the force accompanying Shahzada Teimur has been engaged in reducing the fort of Ali Musjid.

2d. Having received a letter from Mr. Macnaghten on the 20th instant, dated the 3d instant, one march on the other side of Kelat-i-Ghilzie, confirming the reports which I had received of the actual advance of Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk on Cabul; and a letter having been received, at the same time, from His Majesty to the Shahzada's address, directing him to move forward; and finding, also, that the principal Khyber Chiefs, Abdul Rahiman Khan and Khan Bahadur Khan, with whom Lieutenant Mackeson and Mulla Shakar had been negotiating for a passage through the Pass, were intent only on the same deceptive course, which they had hitherto been pursuing, I determined, after the time which I had, for the last time, granted them for coming to a decision, to move forward with the Prince without delay: and the two entrances to the Pass having been previously secured by me with the zamindars, occupying the lands immediately about them, I entered it, with a party, by that of Jabaghi on the 24th instant, Lieutenant Mackeson proceeding, at the same time, by the Shadi Bagiar route, with a view to occupy a position on the right of the Pass, which we had reconnoitred the previous day, above Lalachina.

3d. The intended point of occupation having been secured, immediately after my arrival the camp of the Shahzada was moved to that place from Gagri, forthwith.

A strenuous effort was made by the enemy to dislodge Lieutenant Mackeson's party from his post, but it was ultimately repulsed with a loss on our part of 5 killed and 19 wounded, while I was employed in stockading a position, immediately in rear of that officer, and in securing the heights on either side of the Pass commanding the ground which I had selected for the encampment.

4th. In these operations, Lieut. Mackeson and myself were ably assisted by Colonel Sheikh Basawan, who proceeded up the Pass itself with a strong body of Infantry, some Cavalry and two Guns, and by Captain Ferris and Lieutenants Rattray and Barr of the British Detachment, while Captain Farmer and Lieutenant Cunningham, with the remaining officers attached to the Mission, were left to conduct the Shahzada. About five miles from the last encampment at Gagri, in passing a narrow defile, Sheikh Basawan's party was attacked by the Khyberes, known to be headed by Misrikhan, one of the Kukikheil Maliks, and who has been one of the most active of the Khyberes in his enmity to the Shahzada. The Khyberes were soon dispersed, with the loss of 1 killed and 2 wounded on our side.

5th. On the following morning we proceeded to dislodge the enemy from a commanding height on which they had stockaded themselves, on the left of the Pass, which object was effected without difficulty, and I then immediately advanced to a point from which I proposed, on the following day, to proceed to the immediate investment of Ali Musjid; on the morning of the 26th instant I moved accordingly to the point intended. The enemy appeared on both sides of the Pass in such strength as their numbers (amounting to 500 Jezailchies, the skilful riflemen of the country, and several hundred Khyberes, who supported them) admitted; but our own troops, who were advancing, by previous concert, on either side of the Pass, under cover of 4 pieces of Artillery, carried by elephants from height to height, proceeded in so steady and gallant a manner to the positions which I had assigned to them, that they occupied them without hesitation, and drove the enemy from one stockade to another, till they were forced to seek refuge on the peaked hill which commands Ali Musjid.

6th. To Captain Farmer and Colonel Sheikh Basawan I entrusted, under my immediate direction, the conduct of the left column, composed of 5 companies of the Shahzada's regular levies; of a company of the British detachment, which I deemed to be my duty to attach personally to Captain Farmer on the present occasion; and of 5 companies of the Maharaja's regular Mahomedan Infantry, besides two pieces of Artillery, one 6-Pounder and one Howitzer under Lieutenant Barr, who remained with me. These officers and the troops accompanying them quickly took possession of the intended points, but, in their eagerness to advance, they ascended the face of the opposite hill and dislodged the enemy from a stockaded position which they occupied immediately below the peak, in which our party were exposed to a galling fire of Jezailchies, during the whole day, and which continued without intermission until midnight, when it was no sooner occupied by us, than it was found that they had evacuated the fort, and then their cantonments outside.

7th. During these operations, I directed Lieutenant Moule, whom I had attached to Lieutenant Mackeson with two pieces of Artillery, a 6-pounder and small mortar, to advance his guns to the extreme point which I had assigned to Lieutenant Mackeson, for the purpose of dislodging the enemy from the sides of the hill opposite that of Ali Musjid.

on the right; and also Lieutenant Burr to bring one of our own two howitzers, escorted by a party of about 250 of the Maharaja's and Doornance horse attached to the Shahzada, to the gorge of the Pass, which forms the only entrance to the open spot in the valley from which the hill of Ali Musjid rises; and it was evident that they were surprised by the novelty and explosion of the shells which were discharged at them in the positions which they held outside the fort. It had been my intention, after having secured the approaches to it, to have battered the fort itself the next morning, had the enemy determined to await a closer attack.

8th. I feel greatly indebted to the zealous co-operation of every officer accompanying the mission, and who were engaged in this enterprise, particularly to Colonel Sheikh Basawan and Captain Farmer, and to the officers and men, European and Native, under their immediate command, to whose persevering energy and exertions in a trying position for troops, newly raised and collected from various quarters, to maintain themselves, is mainly to be ascribed the successful result of the military operations which the conduct of the Khyber Chiefs and the retention of the fort of Ali Musjid by the regular troops of Dost Mahomed Khan compelled me to adopt to obtain a passage for the Shahzada to Cabul. The officers and troops have, indeed, established a strong claim to the expression of my own thanks and acknowledgments for the spirit and alacrity with which they proceeded to the execution of every service which it fell to their lot to perform, my sense of which I have now only to hope that the importance of the acquisition will induce His Lordship to confirm.

9th. In consequence of the withdrawal of General Ventura, the command of the Maharaja's Auxiliary Force of Mahomedans devolved on Colonel Sheikh Basawan, a few days before my departure from Kawalair.

10th. Referring to the tenor of my instructions, the occasion appearing to me to have arrived to ascertain the extent of co-operation which I could expect from the Sikh Army, in support of my advance, and the possibility of my own force being inadequate to the reduction of Ali Musjid, I announced to Konwar Nao Nihal Singh my intention of advancing, and requested that he would be prepared with his Troops to join me in obtaining possession of that place by force. He replied that he could not advance beyond the Sikh frontier, without a reference to Lahore! The fort of Ali Musjid is situated 5 miles beyond it, and I did not wish to incur the delay of a reference which was in my opinion inadmissible after what had passed.

11th. Excepting the withheld employment of their Sikh Troops, which have never quitted Peshawur, though, in order to distract the attention of the enemy, when I was about to enter the Pass, I suggested the advantage of sending a considerable force to Bara and another to Sabgadar, their fortresses on the frontiers of Kohat and Bajour, where they would have remained well protected, it is no more than common justice in me to declare my entire satisfaction with the disposition which has been evinced by Konwar Nao Nihal Singh, on every occasion, to meet all my wants and requisitions to the extent of his authority, especially at a time when the lamented death of his grandfather at Lahore, may be

supposed to have claimed his chief attention, and when I am well aware that nothing but his sense of duty to both Governments prevented him from quitting his command.

12th.—On taking possession of the fort, a quantity of ammunition, some grain, and 3 swivels were found in it. The present fort is not above 150 feet long by about 60 wide, and is built upon an angle of the hill, the whole of which seems formerly to have been well fortified. Its position, however, naturally points it out as one in every way well adapted for disputing the passage of the defile, which there becomes very contracted. Still the Sikhs have formed a very fictitious estimate of its strength in the hands of its recent possessors, and notwithstanding the views which Mr. Clark in his letter of the 20th May last, to your address, assumed to be sound, from the experience which the Sikhs might be supposed to possess, in respect to forcing the Khybar Pass, had the Government of Lahore had in readiness, on my arrival at Peshawar, that Auxiliary Force of Mahomedans, with the assistance of which alone, I have now reduced the fort, I am perfectly satisfied, from what I have seen, that I could then have taken possession of it, with even greater facility than I have now done. The garrison then consisted of 50 men only, and was not increased till some time after my arrival at Peshawar.

13th. The reduction of the place has had a strong effect on the minds of the Khyberries and other neighbouring tribes, who regard the position as the key to the occupation of their country: and, after having collected a certain quantity of supplies, I shall leave a garrison in the fort, and advance with the Shahzada towards Cabul.

Mahomed Akbar Khan evaded to the last the solicitations of Khan Bhadur Khan and Abdul Rahman Khan to come in person to oppose our progress. The latter went himself to Chahar Deh, in the hope of persuading him to come, but failed in the attempt, though he was accompanied back by the Shahghasi of the young sirdar, and fought against us during the continuance of the operations, while Abdul Rahman was personally encouraging his tribe to cut off our communication, and plunder our baggage, between Jahaghi and this place. These two, with some other petty chiefs of their tribes, have deeply committed themselves to the Government of Shah Shoojah, by their perfidy in solemnly engaging from the first to serve us; accepting our money; and, in the end, acting in open hostility to the cause of his Majesty, by joining his enemies, plundering our property, and killing the Camp followers. I deem it my duty to record these circumstances, in order that a just discrimination may be drawn, hereafter, between those who have merited and those who have forfeited the favor of the Shah: and that the worthy may not be confounded with the guilty. Fyztalah Khan and Alla Dad Khan, chiefs whose territories lie on the other side of Ali Musjid, have already come in, which I am happy to say affords every security for the safe and quiet passage of the Shahzada through the rest of the Khyber.

15th. Captain Lafont of the Sikh service, attached to the Mahomedan Contingent, though suffering from fever, remained on duty with Lieutenant Mackeson during the whole of the operations, and afforded him

much valuable assistance. Mr. Lord, who attended me in person during the operations of the 25th and 26th, rendered me his ready aid also in conveying my orders to the different parties engaged. I was deprived of Lieutenant Hillersdon's services from sickness, but Lieutenant Dowson was at the head of his levy in the field, and zealously performed his duty.

16th. I enclose a list of Casualties. I am happy to say that, with a few exceptions, the wounds are generally of a slight nature, and it is gratifying to me to state, that the troops are animated by the best spirit. Konwar Nao Nihal Singh has sent a donation of 5,000 rupees for distribution among the British detachment and the levies of the Shahzada, and I have acknowledged the act by a similar return to the Sikh troops, employed with the Shahzada.

I have, &c.,

C. M. WADE, Political Agent, &c.

Camp, Lalachina, 29th July, 1839.

List of Killed and Wounded in the operations for the reduction of *Ali Musjid* on the 24th, 25th and 26th July, 1839.

| | KILLED. | | | | | WOUNDED. | | | | | HORSES. | | |
|--|----------------------|-------------|-----------|-----------|-----------------|-----------|------------|---------|-----------|-----------|-----------------|---------|----------|
| | Havildars or Nalkes. | Nichandahs. | Drummers. | Privates. | Camp Followers. | Jamadars. | Havildars. | Nalkes. | Drummers. | Privates. | Camp Followers. | Killed. | Wounded. |
| British Detachment, | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Mr. Lord's Bhisallah, | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Lieut. Dowson's Levy, | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Lieut. Hillersdon's Datta, | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Captain Ferris's Datta, | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Captain Ferris's Bhisallah, | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| Captain Ferris's Bhisallah, | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Captain Ferris's Jaxxilechies, | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Captain Ferris's Bhisallah, | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 19 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Lieut. Mackinnon's Levy, | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total, | 1 | 0 | 1 | 9 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 61 | 1 | 4 | 0 |
| Sikh Auxiliaries, | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Ghorcharas, | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 14 |
| French Corps, 1st Battalion, | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 14 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| From the Camp 2d Battalions, | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1st Arty. Nalkes, | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2d Ditto, | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Ranjoles, | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2 Companies of Porbias forming Lieut. Colonel Wade's personal escort from the Sikh Govt. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total, | 1 | 1 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 65 | 0 | 0 | 14 |
| | 2 | 1 | 1 | 17 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 121 | 1 | 4 | 14 |

Men. { Killed..... 12 } 132
 { Wounded... 120 }

Horses. { Killed..... 4 } 18
 { Wounded... 14 }

Lieutenant Barr and several men of the British Detachment of Artillery were struck with spent balls, but are not included in the list of wounded.
Camp Lalachina, the 29th July, 1839.

C. M. WADE, Political Agent, &c.

APPENDIX.

No. XIV.

Captain LAWRENCE's Official account of the Murder of Sir W. H. MACNAGHTEN.

[From Lieut. EYRE's Narrative.]

Letter addressed by Captain G. ST. P. LAWRENCE, late Military Secretary to the Envoy, to Major E. POTTINGER, C. B., late in charge of the Cabul Mission.

SIR.—In compliance with your request, I have the honour to detail the particulars of my capture, and of the death of my ever-to-be-lamented chief.

On the morning of the 23d December, at 11 A. M., I received a note from the late Sir W. H. Macnaghten, warning me to attend, with Captains Trevor and Mackenzie, an interview he was about to have with Sirdar Mahomed Akbar Khan. Accordingly, with the above-named officers, at about 12, I accompanied Sir William, having previously heard him tell Major-General Elphinstone to have two regiments of infantry and two guns ready for secret service. In passing through Cantonments, on my observing that there were more Affghans in Cantonments than usual, or than I deemed safe, the Envoy directed one of his Affghan attendants to proceed and cause them all to leave, at the same time remarking, how strange it was that, although the General was fully acquainted with the then very critical state of affairs, no preparations appeared to have been made, adding, "however, it is all of a piece with the military arrangements throughout the siege." He then said, "There is not enough of the escort with us," to which I replied, that he had only ordered eight or ten, but that I had brought sixteen, that I would send for the remainder, which I accordingly did, asking Lieut. Le Geyt to bring them, and to tell Brigadier Shelton, who had expressed a wish to attend the next interview, that he might accompany them. On passing the gate, we observed some hundreds of armed Affghans within a few yards of it, on which I called to the officer on duty to get the reserve under arms, and brought outside to disperse them, and to

send to the General to have the garrison on the alert. Towards Mahmood Khan's fort, were a number of armed Affghans, but we observed none nearer.

The Envoy now told us that he, on the night previous, had received a proposal from Sirdar Mahomed Akbar Khan to which he had agreed, and that he had every reason to hope it would bring our present difficulties to an early and happy termination; that Mahomed Akbar Khan was to give up Nalb Ameenoolah Khan as a prisoner to us, for which purpose a regiment was to proceed to Mahmood Khan's fort, and another corps was to occupy the Bala Hissar. Sir William then warned me to be ready to gallop to the king with the intelligence of the approach of the regiment, and to acquaint him with Akbar's proposal. On our side us remarking that the scheme seemed a dangerous one, and asking if he did not apprehend any treachery, he replied: "Dangerous it is, but, if it succeeds, it is worth all risks; the rebels have not fulfilled even one article of the treaty, and I have no confidence in them, and if by it we can only save our honour, all will be well; at any rate, I would rather suffer an hundred deaths, than live the last six weeks over again." We proceeded to near the usual spot, and met Sirdar Mahomed Akbar Khan, who was accompanied by several Gilzie chiefs, Mahomed Shah Khan, Dost Mahomed Khan, Khoda Bux Khan, Azad Khan, etc. After the usual salutations, the Envoy presented a valuable horse which Akber had asked for, and which had been that morning purchased from Capt. Grant for 3,000 rupees. The Sirdar acknowledged the attention, and expressed his thanks for a handsome brace of double-barrelled pistols which the Envoy had purchased from me, and sent to him with his carriage and pair of horses, the day before.

The party dismounted, and horse clothes were spread on a small hillock which partially concealed us from Cantonments, and which was chosen, they said, as being free from snow. The Envoy threw himself on the bank with Mahomed Akber and Captains Trevor and Mackenzie beside him; I stood behind Sir William till, pressed by Dost Mahomed Khan, I knelt on one knee, having first called the Envoy's attention to the number of Affghans around us, saying that if the subject of the conference was of that secret nature I believed it to be, they had better be removed. He spoke to Mahomed Akbar, who replied, "No, they are all in the secret." Hardly had he so said, when I found my arms locked, my pistols and sword wrenched from my belt, and myself forcibly raised from the ground and pushed along, Mahomed Shah Khan, who held me, calling out, "Come along, if you value your life." I turned, and saw the Envoy lying, his head where his heels had been, and his hands locked in Mahomed Akbar's, consternation and horror depicted in his countenance. Seeing I could do nothing, I let myself be pulled on by Mahomed Shah Khan. Some shots were fired, and I was hurried to his horse, on which he jumped, telling me to get up behind, which I did, and we proceeded, escorted by several armed men who kept off a crowd of Ghazees, who sprang up on every side, shouting for me to be given up for them to slay, cutting at me with their swords and knives,

and poking me in the ribs with their guns; they were afraid to fire, lest they should injure their chief. The horsemen kept them pretty well off, but not sufficiently so to prevent my being much bruised. In this manner we hurried towards Mahomed Khan's fort, near which we met some hundreds of horsemen who were keeping off the Ghazees, who here were in greater numbers, and more vociferous for my blood. We, however, reached the fort in safety, and I was pushed into a small room, Mahomed Shah Khan returning to the gate of the fort and bringing in Capt. Mackenzie, whose horse had there fallen. This he did, receiving a cut through his neencha (Scotch coat) on his arm, which was aimed at that officer, who was ushered into the room with me much exhausted and bruised from blows on his head and body. We sat down with some soldiers who were put over us with a view to protect us from the mob, who now surrounded the house, and who till dark continued execrating and spitting at us, calling on them to give us up to be slaughtered.

One produced a hand (European) which appeared to have been recently cut off; another presented a blunderbuss, and was about to fire it, when it was knocked aside by one of our guard. Several of the Sirdars came in during the day, and told us to be assured that no harm should befall us; that the Envoy and Trevor were safe in the city (a falsehood, as will be afterwards seen). Naib Ameenoolah Khan and his sons also came. The former, in great wrath, said that we either should be, or deserved to be, blown away from a gun. Mahomed Shah Khan and Dost Mahomed Khan begged he would not so talk, and took him out of the room. Towards night food was given to us, and postcheens to sleep on: our watches, rings, and silk handkerchiefs were taken from us; but in all other respects we were unmolested. The followers of Mahomed Shah Khan repeatedly congratulated him on the events of the day, with one exception, viz. an old Moollah, who loudly exclaimed that, "The name of the faithful was tarnished, and that in future no belief could be placed in them; that the deed was foul, and could never be of advantage to the authors." At midnight we were taken through the city to the house of Mahomed Akbar Khan, who received us courteously, lamenting the occurrences of the day: here we found Captain Skinner, and for the first time heard the dreadful and astounding intelligence of the murder of the Envoy and Captain Trevor, and that our lamented chief's head had been paraded through the city in triumph, and his trunk, after being dragged through the streets, stuck up in the Char Chouk, the most conspicuous part of the town. Captain Skinner told us, that the report was, that on Mahomed Akbar Khan's telling Sir William to accompany him, he refused, resisted, and pushed the Sirdar from him; that in consequence he was immediately shot, and his body cut to pieces by the Ghazees; that Captain Trevor had been conveyed behind Dost Mahomed Khan as far as Mahomed Khan's fort, where he was cut down, but that his body was not mangled, though carried in triumph through the city. On the following morning (24th) we (Captain Skinner, Mackenzie, and self) were taken to Nuwab Zuman Khan's house, escorted by Sultan Jan and other chiefs, to protect us

from the Ghazees; there we met Captains Conolly and Airey (hostages) and all the rebel Sirdars assembled in council. The Envoy's death was lamented, but his conduct severely censured, and it was said that now no faith could be placed in our words. A new treaty, however, was discussed, and sent to the General and Major Pottinger, and towards evening we returned, as we came, to Mahomed Akbar's where I remained a prisoner, but well and courteously treated till the morning of the 26th, when I was sent to Naib Ameenollah Khan. On reaching his house I was ushered into his private apartment. The Naib received me kindly, shewed me the Envoy's original letter in reply to Mahomed Akbar's proposition, touching his being made Shah Shojah's Wuzzer, receiving a lack of rupees on giving the Naib a prisoner to us, thirty lacks on the final settlement of the insurrection, etc. To this the Naib added, that the Envoy had told Mahomed Akbar's cousin that a lack of rupees would be given for his (Ameenollah Khan's) head. I promptly replied, "Tis false," that Sir William had never done so, that it was utterly foreign and repugnant to his nature, and to British usage. The Naib expressed himself in strong terms against the Envoy, contrasting his own fair and open conduct with that of Sir William. He told me that General Elphinstone and Major Pottinger had begged I might be released, as my presence was necessary to enable them to prepare bills on India, which it had been arranged the Sirdars were to get. After some delay, consequent on my asking for Captain Mackenzie to be released with me, and Mahomed Akbar's stoutly refusing the release of either of us, I was sent into Cantonments on the morning of the 29th, escorted by the Naib's eldest son and a strong party of horse and foot, being disguised as an Affghan for my greater protection. I must here record that nothing could exceed the Naib's kindness and attention to me while under his roof.

I have, &c. &c.

G. ST. P. LAWRENCE,

Military Secretary to the Envoy and Minister

*Camp Zoudah,
Ten miles south of Tezeen,
10th May, 1842.*

APPENDIX.

No. XV.

Letter addressed by Capt. C. MACKENZIE to Lieut. VINCENT EYRE.

MY DEAR EYRE,—You ask for a minute account of the circumstances attending the assassination of the late Sir William Macnaghten, and my own detention and imprisonment on that occasion. You may remember that, for many days previous to the fatal 23rd December, the poor Envoy had been subjected to more wear and tear, both of body and mind, than it was possible for the most iron frame and the strongest intellect to bear without deeply feeling its effects. He had fulfilled all the preliminary conditions of the treaty which had been proposed between the British and the Affghan insurgents, whereas the Khans had in no one particular adhered to their engagements. Bad faith was evident in all their proceedings, and our condition was a desperate one: more especially as Sir William had ascertained, by bitter experience, that no hope remained in the energies and resources of our Military leaders, who had been formally protested that they could do nothing more. Beset by this disgraceful imbecility on the one hand, and by systematic treachery on the other, the unfortunate Envoy was driven to his wits' end, and, as will be seen, forgot, in a fatal moment, the wholesome rule which he had heretofore laid down for himself, of refusing to hold communications with individuals of the rebel party, especially with him who was notorious, even amongst his villainous countrymen, for ferocity and treachery, to wit, Mahomed Akbar Khan. Late in the evening of the 22d December, Captain James Skinner, who after having been concealed in Caubul during the greater part of the siege, had latterly been the guest of Mahomed Akbar, arrived in cantonments accompanied by Mahomad Sudeeq Khan, the cousin of Mahomed Akbar and by Lirwar Khan, the Ahanee merchant, who, in the beginning of the campaign, had furnished the army with camels, and who had been much in the confidence of Sir A. Burnes, being, in fact, one of our staunchest friends. The two latter remained in a different apartment, while Skinner dined with the Envoy. During dinner, Skinner jestingly

remarked, that he felt as if laden with combustibles, being charged with a message from Mahomed Akbar to the Envoy of a most portentous nature.

Even then I marked that the Envoy's eye glanced eagerly towards Skinner with an expression of hope. In fact, he was like a drowning man catching at straws. Skinner, however, referred him to his Affghan companions, and after dinner the four retired into a room by themselves. My knowledge of what there took place is gained from poor Skinner's own relation, as given during my subsequent captivity with him in Akbar's house. Mahomed Sudeeq disclosed Mahomed Akbar's proposition to the Envoy, which was that the following day Sir William should meet him (Mahomed Akbar) and a few of his immediate friends, viz. the chiefs of the Eastern Giljies, outside the cantonments, when a final agreement should be made, so as to be fully understood by both parties; that Sir William should have a considerable body of troops in readiness, which, on a given signal, were to join with those of Mahomed Akbar and the Giljies, assault and take Mahomed Khan's fort, and secure the person of Ameenoolah. At this stage of the proposition Mahomed Sudeeq signified that, for a certain sum of money, the head of Ameenoolah should be presented to the Envoy; but from this Sir William shrunk with abhorrence, declaring that it was neither his custom, nor that of his country to give a price for blood. Mahomed Sudeeq then went on to say, that, after having subdued the rest of the Khans, the English should be permitted to remain in the country eight months longer, so as to save their *pardah* (veil or credit,) but that they were then to evacuate Afghanistan, as if of their own accord; that Shah Shooja was to continue king of the country, and that Mahomed Akbar was to be his wuzzeer. As a further reward for his (Mahomed Akbar's) assistance, the British Government were to pay him 30 lacs of rupees, and 4 lacs of rupees per annum during his life! To this extraordinary and wild proposal, Sir William gave ear with an eagerness which nothing can account for but the supposition, confirmed by many other circumstances, that his strong mind had been harassed, until it had, in some degree, lost its equipoise; and he not only assented fully to these terms, but actually gave a Persian paper to that effect, written in his own hand, declaring as his motives, that it was not only an excellent opportunity to carry into effect the real wishes of Government, which were to evacuate the country with as much credit to ourselves as possible, but that it would give England time to enter into a treaty with Russia, defining the bounds beyond which neither were to pass in Central Asia. So ended this fatal conference, the nature and result of which, contrary to his usual custom,* Sir William communicated to none of those who, on all former occasions, were fully in his confidence; viz. Trevor, Lawrence, and myself. It seemed as if he feared that we might insist on the impracticability of the plan, which he must have studiously concealed from himself. All the following morning his manner was distracted and hurried, in a way, that none of us had ever before witnessed. It seems that Mahomed Akbar had demanded a

favorite Arab horse, belonging to Captain Grant, Assistant Adjutant General of the Force. To avoid the necessity of parting with the animal, Captain Grant had fixed his price at the exorbitant sum of 5,000 rupees; unwilling to give so large a price, but determined to gratify the Sirdar, Sir William sent me to Captain Grant to prevail upon him to take a smaller sum, but with orders that if he were peremptory, the 5,000 Rs. should be given. I obtained the horse for 3,000 rupees, and Sir William appeared much pleased with the prospect of gratifying Mahomed Akbar by the present.

After breakfast, Trevor, Lawrence, and myself were summoned to attend the Envoy during his conference with Mahomed Akbar Khan. I found him alone, when, for the first time, he disclosed to me the nature of the transaction he was engaged in. I immediately warned him that it was a plot against him. He replied hastily, "A plot! let me alone for that, trust me for that!" and I consequently offered no further remonstrance. Sir William then arranged with General Elphinstone that the 54th regiment, under Major Ewart, should be held in readiness for immediate service. The Shah's 6th, and two guns, were also warned. It is a curious circumstance, and betrays the unhappy vacillation of poor Elphinstone, that after Sir William had actually quitted the Cantonment in full expectation that every thing had been arranged according to his desire, he (the General) addressed a letter to him, which never reached him, remonstrating on the danger of the proposed attack, and strongly objecting to the employment of the two above regiments. About 12 o'clock Sir William, Trevor, Lawrence and myself set forth on our ill-omened expedition. As we approached the Seah Sung gate, Sir William observed with much vexation that the troops were not in readiness, protesting at the same time, however, that desperate as the proposed attempt was, it was better that it should be made, and that a thousand deaths were preferable to the life he had lately led.

After passing the gate, he remembered the horse which he had intended as a present for Akbar, and sent me back for it. When I rejoined him, I found that the small number of the body guard who had accompanied him had been ordered to halt, and that he, Trevor, and Lawrence, had advanced in the direction of Mahmood Khan's fort, being some 500 or 600 yards from the eastern rampart, and were there awaiting the approach of Mahomed Akbar and his party, who now made their appearance. Close by were some hillocks, on the further side of which from the Cantonment a carpet was spread where the snow lay least thick, and there the Khans and Sir William sat down to hold their conference. Men talk of presentiment; I suppose it was something of the kind which came over me, for I could scarcely prevail upon myself to quit my horse. I did so, however, and was invited to sit down among the Sirdars. After the usual salutations, Mahomed Akbar commenced business, by asking the Envoy if he was perfectly ready to carry into effect the proposition of the preceding night? The Envoy replied, "Why not!" My attention was then called off by an old Aff-

ghan acquaintance of mine, formerly chief of the Cabul police, by name Gholam Moyun-ood-deen. I rose from my recumbent posture, and stood apart with him conversing. I afterwards remembered that my friend betrayed much anxiety as to where my pistols were, and why I did not carry them on my person. I answered that although I wore my sword for form, it was not necessary at a friendly conference to be armed *cap-à-pee*. His discourse was also full of extravagant compliments, I suppose for the purpose of lulling me to sleep. At length my attention was called off from what he was saying, by observing that a number of men, armed to the teeth, had gradually approached to the scene of conference, and were drawing round in a sort of circle. This Lawrence and myself pointed out to some of the chief men, who affected at first to drive them off with whips; but Mahomed Akbar observed that it was of no consequence, as they were in the secret. I again resumed my conversation with Gholam Moyun-ood-deen, when suddenly I heard Mahomed Akbar call out, "*Begeer! begeer!*" (seize! seize!) and turning round, I saw him grasp the Envoy's left hand with an expression in his face of the most diabolical ferocity. I think it was Sultan Jan who laid hold of the Envoy's right hand. They dragged him in a stooping posture down the hillock, the only words I heard, poor Sir William utter being, "*Az barae Khooda,*" (for God's sake!) I saw his face, however, and it was full of horror and astonishment. I did not see what became of Trevor, but Lawrence was dragged past me by several Affghans, whom I saw wrest his weapons from him. Up to this moment I was so engrossed in observing what was taking place, that I actually was not aware that my own right arm was mastered, that my urbane friend held a pistol to my temple, and that I was surrounded by a circle of Ghazees with drawn swords and cocked juzzails. Resistance was in vain; so, listening to the exhortations of Gholam Moyun-ood-deen, which were enforced by the whistling of divers bullets over my head, I hurried through the snow with him to the place where his horse was standing, being despoiled *en route* of my sabre, and narrowly escaping divers attempts made on my life. As I mounted behind my captor, now my energetic defender, the crowd increased around us, the cries of "*Kill the Kafir,*" became more vehement, and, although we hurried on at a fast canter, it was with the utmost difficulty Gholam Moyun-ood-deen, although assisted by one or two friends or followers, could ward off and avoid the sword-cuts aimed at me, the rascals being afraid to fire lest they should kill my conductor. Indeed he was obliged to wheel his horse round once, and, taking off his turban (the last appeal a Mussulman can make), to implore them for God's sake to respect the life of his friend. At last, ascending a slippery bank, the horse fell. My cap had been snatched off, and I now received a heavy blow on the head from a bludgeon, which fortunately did not quite deprive me of my senses. I had sufficient sense left to shoot ahead of the fallen horse, where my protector with another man joined me, and, clasping me in their arms, hurried me towards the wall of Mahomed Khan's fort. How I reached the spot where Mahomed Akbar

was receiving the gratulations of the multitude I know not; but I remember a fanatic rushing on me, and twisting his hand in my collar until I became exhausted from suffocation. I must do Mahomed Akbar the justice to say, that, finding the Ghazees bent on my slaughter, even after I had reached his stirrup, he drew his sword and laid about him right manfully, for my conductor and Meerza Baoodeen Khan were obliged to press me up against the wall, covering me with their own bodies, and protesting that no blow should reach me but through their persons.

Pride, however, overcame Mahomed Akbar's sense of courtesy, when he thought I was safe, for he then turned round to me, and repeatedly said in a tone of triumphant derision, "Shuma moolk-i-ma me geered!" (*You'll seize my country, will you!*) he then rode off, and I was hurried towards the gate of the fort. Here new dangers awaited me: for Moollah Momin, fresh from the slaughter of poor Trevor, who was killed, riding close behind me, (Sultan Jan having the credit of having given him the first sabre cut,) stood here with his followers, whom he exhorted to slay me, setting them the example by cutting fiercely at me himself. Fortunately a gun stood between us, but still he would have effected his purpose, had not Mahomed Shah Khan at that instant with some followers, come to my assistance. These drew their swords in my defence, the chief himself throwing his arm round my neck, and receiving on his shoulder a cut aimed by Moollah Momin at my head. During the bustle I pushed forward into the fort, and was immediately taken to a sort of dungeon, where I found Lawrence safe, but somewhat exhausted by his hideous ride and the violence he had sustained, although unwounded. Here the Giljje chiefs, Mahomed Shah Khan, and his brother Dost Mahomed Khan, presently joined us, and endeavoured to cheer up our flagging spirits, assuring us that the Envoy and Trevor were not dead, but on the contrary quite well. They stayed with us during the afternoon, their presence being absolutely necessary for our protection. Many attempts were made by the fanatics to force the door to accomplish our destruction. Others spit at us and abused us through a small window, through which one fellow levelled a blunderbuss at us, which was struck up by our keepers and himself thrust back. At last Ameenollah made his appearance, and threatened us with instant death. Some of his people most officiously advanced to make good his word, until pushed back by the Giljje chiefs, who remonstrated with this iniquitous old monster, their master, whom they persuaded to relieve us from his hateful presence. During the afternoon, a human hand was held up in mockery to us at the window. We said that it had belonged to an European, but were not aware at the time that it was actually the hand of the poor Envoy. Of all the Mahomedans assembled in the room discussing the events of the day, one only, an old Moolah, openly and fearlessly condemned the acts of his brethren, declaring that the treachery was abominable, and a disgrace to Islam. At night they brought us food, and gave us each a postheen to sleep on. At midnight we were awakened to go to the house of Mahomed

Akbar in the city. Mahomed Shah Khan then, with the meanness common to all Affghans of rank, robbed Lawrence of his watch, while his brother did me a similar favour. I had been plundered of my rings and every thing else previously by the understrappers.

Reaching Mahomed Akbar's abode, we were shewn into the room where he lay in bed. He received us with great outward shew of courtesy, assuring us of the welfare of the Envoy and Trevor, but there was a constraint in his manner for which I could not account. We were shortly taken to another apartment, where we found Skinner, who had returned, being on parole, early in the morning. Doubt and gloom marked our meeting, and the latter was fearfully deepened by the intelligence which we now received from our fellow-captive of the base murder of Sir William and Trevor. He informed us that the head of the former had been carried about the city in triumph. We of course spent a miserable night. The next day we were taken under a strong guard to the house of Zeman Khan, where a council of the Khans was being held. Here we found Captains Conolly and Airey, who had some days previously been sent to the hurwah's house as hostages for the performance of certain parts of the treaty which was to have been entered into. A violent discussion took place, in which Mahomed Akbar bore the most prominent part. We were vehemently accused of treachery, and every thing that was bad, and told that the whole of the transactions of the night previous had been a trick of Mahomed Akbar and Ameen-oollah, to ascertain the Envoy's sincerity. They declared that they would now grant us no terms, save on the surrender of the whole of the married families as hostages, all the guns, ammunition, and treasure. At this time Conolly told me, that on the preceding day the Envoy's head had been paraded about in the court yard; that his and Trevor's bodies, had been hung up in the public bazar, or *chouk*; and that it was with the greatest difficulty that the old hurwah, Zuman Khan, had saved him and Airey from being murdered by a body of fanatics, who had attempted to rush into the room where they were. Also that previous to the arrival of Lawrence, Skinner, and myself, Mahomed Akbar had been relating the events of the preceding day to the *Jeerga*, or council, and that he had unguardedly avowed having, while endeavouring to force the Envoy either to mount on horseback or to move more quickly, *struck* him, and that, seeing Conolly's eye fastened upon him with an expression of intense indignation, he had altered the phrase, and said, "I mean I *pushed* him." After an immense deal of gabble, a proposal for a renewal of the treaty, not however demanding all the guns, was determined to be sent to the cantonments, and Skinner, Lawrence, and myself were marched back to Akbar's house, enduring *en route* all manner of threats and insults. Here we were closely confined in an inner apartment, which was indeed necessary for our safety. That evening we received a visit from Mahomed Akbar, Sultan Jan, and several other Affghans. Mahomed Akbar exhibited his double-barrelled pistols to us, which he had worn the previous day, requesting us to put their locks to rights, something being amiss. Two

of the barrels had been recently discharged, which he endeavoured in a most confused way to account for by saying, that he had been charged by a havildar of the escort, and had fired both barrels at him. Now all the escort had run away without even attempting to charge; the only man who advanced to the rescue, having been a Hindoo Jemadar of Chuprassis, who was instantly cut to pieces by the assembled Ghazees. This defence he made without any accusation on our part, betraying the anxiety of a liar to be believed. On the 26th, Capt. Lawrence was taken to the house of Ameenollah, whence he did not return to us. Capt. Skinner and myself remained in Akbar's house until the 30th. During this time we were civilly treated, and conversed with numbers of Affghan gentlemen, who came to visit us. Some of them asserted that the Envoy had been murdered by the unruly soldiery. Others could not deny that Akbar himself was the assassin. For two or three days, we had a fellow-prisoner in poor Sirwar Khan, who had been deceived throughout the whole matter, and out of whom they were then endeavouring to screw money. He of course was aware from his countrymen that not only had Akbar committed the murder, but that he protested to the Ghazees that he gloried in the deed. On one occasion a moonshee of Major Pottinger, who had escaped from Charekar, named Mohun Beer, came direct from the presence of Mahomed Akbar to visit us. He told us that Mahomed Akbar had begun to see the impolicy of having murdered the Envoy, which fact he had just avowed to him, shedding many tears either of pretended remorse, or of real vexation, at having committed himself. On several occasions Mahomed Akbar personally, and by deputy, besought Skinner and myself to give him advice, as to how he was to extricate himself from the dilemma in which he was placed, more than once endeavouring to excuse himself for not having effectually protected the Envoy, by saying that Sir William had drawn a sword stick upon him. It seems that mean while the renewed negotiations with Major Pottinger, who had assumed the Envoy's place in Cantonments, had been brought to a head, for on the night of the 30th, Akbar furnished me with an Affghan dress (Skinner already wore one) and sent us both back to cantonments. Several Affghans, with whom I fell in afterwards, protested to me that they had seen Mahomed Akbar shoot the Envoy with his own hand: amongst them Meerza Baoodeen Khan, who, being an old acquaintance, always retained a sneaking kindness for the English.

I am, my dear Eyre, yours very truly,

C. MACKENZIE.

Cabul, 29th July, 1842.

APPENDIX.

No. XVI.

SKINNER'S Horse at Dadur.

The following official account of a very gallant affair, in which Skinner's Horse were engaged against a body of the enemy, greatly their superiors in numbers, reached us too late to be inserted in the body of the book.—ED.

Upper Scinde.

SIR,—I hope that the effects of my wounds and subsequent severe attack of fever will prove sufficient to excuse my not having brought to your notice, long ere this, the very gallant conduct of the detachment of the 1st, or Skinner's Bengal Local Horse, during the two attacks made on the post of Dadur, by Nusseer Khan.

From the 25th of October, we were in constant expectation of an attack, either by day or night, which rendered it absolutely necessary, to keep both men and horses ready to act against the enemy at a moment's warning, so that men and horses were very much fatigued for want of sleep during the night, and rest by day. On the 28th the enemy emerged from the Bolan Pass, and pitched about a mile to the south of it. Next day about noon, they were observed to be gathering, and shortly afterwards they were seen to move towards the right of our camp, evidently for the purpose of taking advantage of the cover afforded by the high jawaree crops and a deserted village, at about 1,300 yards to the right of the intrenched camp. Captain Watkins having accepted of my services, I received command of the Horse, and about 2 P. M. was ordered to draw out from the dawk compound, and to be ready to act against the advancing enemy; in about half an hour I could perceive their heads to the right, over the bushes near the village; the guns immediately opened on them, with such effect, as to force them to divide into parties; one body moving to their left, to attack the breast-works; the other directly to the front, which almost immediately afterwards opened a fire upon us, under cover of the standing crops of jawaree and cotton, etc., whilst one part of the same body advanced to our left, for the purpose of outflanking us.

As the ground was not favourable for Cavalry, I retired about 100 yards, and then fronted; and the suwars opened a well directed and effective fire on those of the enemy that were nearest, which for a considerable length of time served to check their advance; but as those in the rear came up, their fire became so very much increased, that I thought it advisable to order a charge; and I am proud to say, that it is, in my opinion, impossible for any Troops to receive an order to close with an enemy, with greater pleasure, or to carry it into execution with more determined bravery, than the men under my orders did; and when I mention that the enemy opposed to them amounted to between three and four thousand, I know that you will give Skinner's men full credit for their determined and gallant conduct in driving from the field such a very superior body, they themselves only amounting to 121, including Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officers.

I very much regret not being able to particularise those who most distinguished themselves in the *melée*, as I was obliged to retire from the field, having received a wound, which prevented my continuing with them; but when I left, all and every one were doing their utmost to out-do his neighbour, and by looking at the return of killed and wounded, which I do myself the honor to enclose, you will see with what a degree of determined zeal and devotion to the service, they behaved.

The only one, with the exception of the two Resauldars, who was particularly remarked by me, previous to the charge, was Naib Resauldar Mohamed Hossein Khan, who rode down the line, calling on the suwars to recollect, that they were in the presence of Bombay Sepoys, and that they were the only Bengal suwars in the country; that they must let the Bombay Troops see what they, the 1st or Skinner's Horse can do; he had just finished, when the men dashed on towards the enemy. Of any more intelligence regarding their good conduct, I am indebted to the Senior Resauldar, Gool Mahomed Khan, who was wounded in recovering the body of Resauldar Meer Behader Ally, who the last time I saw him, was leading the left Rissallah on in most gallant style, well supported on the right by the other Resauldar.

It was not in the open field alone that they had to act against the enemy, but likewise, when in the compound Dawk Bungalow, for on the first and second attacks, the enemy kept up a fire on their position, in the first instance from near 3 P.M. to past 2 A.M. of the 30th, and in the second, from about 4 P.M. of the 31st to 3 A.M., on the 1st November, during which time, I am happy to say, none of the men were killed, although several were wounded.

I have the honor, &c.

A. F. MACPHERSON, on Special Duty.

Quetta, 31st March, 1841.

List of Killed and Wounded of Skinner's Horse, during the FIERCE Attack on the Post of Dadur.

| No. | Rank and Names. | Remarks. |
|-----------------------|----------------------------|---|
| KILLED. | | |
| <i>Risauldar.</i> | | |
| 1 | Meer Behader Ally. | Shot through the body. |
| <i>Sewars.</i> | | |
| 1 | Ally Bahadoor. | Both by matchlock balls. |
| 2 | Tota Ram. | |
| WOUNDED. | | |
| <i>Risauldar.</i> | | |
| 1 | Gool Mohamed Khan. | Sword cuts on left hand and shoulder. |
| <i>Duffadars.</i> | | |
| 1 | Ghoolam Mahomed Khan. | Ditto ditto. |
| | Kurramuth Ally. .. | Very severe cut in right elbow. |
| | Nawab Meersah. .. | Gun shot in the cheek. |
| | Behmuth Khan. .. | Sword cut in leg. |
| | Bhawul Khan. | Shot in leg. |
| 6 | Bhungash Khan. .. | Shot in arm. |
| <i>Sewars.</i> | | |
| 1 | Ahmed Khan. | Sword cut in left wrist. |
| | Abdoolah Khan. | Ditto in left hand. |
| 3 | Khoda Bax. | Ditto right ditto. |
| 4 | Meerza Jaun Beg. | Four sword cuts, two over the shoulders and two on the arms; and also a spear wound in the left breast. |
| 5 | Kummer Ally. | Sword cuts in right thigh. |
| 6 | Sundul Khan. | Cut in left hand. |
| 7 | Fouzdur Khan. | Shot in left shoulder. |
| 8 | Abdoolah Khan. .. | Sword cut on hand. |
| 9 | Doorjun Khan. | Shot in right arm. |
| 10 | Nuseed Khan. | Ditto in leg. |
| 11 | Wazeer Khan. | Shot in left foot. |
| 12 | Kamdar Khan. | Ditto in leg. |
| 13 | Sheikh Ummeer. .. | Sword cut in thigh. |
| 14 | Sheikh Wazeer. | Ditto in left hand. |
| 15 | Dulliet Khan. | Severe sword cut in right knee, since dead. |
| <i>Horses killed.</i> | | |
| 1 | Risauldar's. .. | This includes missing. |
| 7 | Sewars. | |
| <i>Wounded.</i> | | |
| 1 | Risauldar. | Six wounded by the sword, the rest by matchlock balls. |
| 1 | Naib Risauldar. .. | |
| 1 | Jemadar. | |
| 1 | Duffadar. | |
| 15 | Sewars. | |

A. F. MACPHERSON, on Special Duty.


List of Killed and Wounded of Skinner's Horse, on the Second Attack on the Post of Dadur.


| No. | Rank and Names. | Remarks. |
|------------------------|---|-------------------------|
| <i>Jemadar.</i> | | |
| 1 | Mamsoddeen. | Matchlock ball. |
| <i>Suwar.</i> | | |
| 4 | Allheebux Hissamooddeen. } Shaik Shahamuth, and Golam Ally. } | Matchlock ball. |
| <i>Horse Killed.</i> | | |
| 1 | <i>Suwar.</i> (Moortuxpeh Khan.) | Shot through the neck |
| <i>Horses Wounded.</i> | | |
| 2 | Duffadars | All by matchlock balls. |
| 8 | Suwar... | |


A. F. MACPHERSON, on Special Duty.
H. J. BROWN, Assistant Pl. Agent, U. S.

Quetta, 21st March, 1881.









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